Epistemological relativism and the sociology of knowledge

Philosophy of Science 15 (1):4-10 (1948)
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Abstract

Since Protagoras' classic “man is the measure of all things,” claims of relativism and counter-claims have been tendered. The nineteenth century saw Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Westermarck, Pareto, Marx, and others, suggesting that institutions, customs, moral codes, and the like, are “relative” both to the culture and to the time. At the crest of this wave of “relativism” surged a vicious claim: that truth and knowledge itself were merely functions of particular conditions. The “validity” of knowledge was said to be at the whim of historic, social factors. Not only is no theory really true; no particular statement is ever so. Not only is no theory or statement really true; no theory of knowledge has thus far ever been free from the bias of its genesis. There have been no absolute insights for epistemology. Or so, at least, it was claimed.

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reprint Hinshaw, Virgil G. (1950) "Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge". Journal of Symbolic Logic 15(1):72-73

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Citations of this work

Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity.Peter Olen - 2016 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
From Formalism to Psychology: Metaphilosophical Shifts in Wilfrid Sellars’s Early Works.Peter Olen - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):24-63.
Against Epistemological Relativism.Frans Gregersen - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):447.

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