Can AI developers be held epistemically responsible for the processing of their AI systems when these systems are epistemically opaque? And can explainable AI (XAI) provide public justificatory reasons for opaque AI systems’ outputs? Koskinen (2024) gives negative answers to both questions. Here, I respond to her and argue for affirmative answers. More generally, I suggest that when considering people’s uncertainty about the factors causally determining an opaque AI’s output, it might be worth keeping in mind that a degree of (...) uncertainty about conclusions is inevitable even in entirely human-based empirical science because in induction there’s always a risk of getting it wrong. Keeping this in mind may help appreciate that requiring full transparency from AI systems before epistemically trusting their outputs might be unusually (and potentially overly) demanding. (shrink)

Visual stimuli that are made invisible by a following mask can nonetheless affect motor responses. To localize the origin of these target priming effects we used the psychological refractory period paradigm. Participants classified tones as high or low, and responded to the position of a visual target that was preceded by a prime. The stimulus onset asynchrony between both tasks varied. In Experiment 1 the tone task was followed by the position task and SOA dependent target priming effects were observed. (...) When the visual position task preceded the tone task in Experiment 2, with short SOA the priming effect propagated entirely to the tone task yielding faster responses to tones on visually congruent trials and delayed responses to tones on visually incongruent trials. Together, results suggest that target priming effects arise from processing before and at the level of the central bottleneck such as sensory analysis and response selection. (shrink)

I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.

Versuche zur Geschlechtswahl bei der Befruchtung führten in jüngerer Zeit zu anwendbaren, wenngleich noch eingeschränkt erfolgssicheren Techniken. Deren ethische und rechtliche Bewertungen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Abhandlung. In Gesellschaften und Kulturen mit traditioneller Bevorzugung männlicher Nachkommenschaft gibt es einerseits ein starkes Interesse für die Geschlechtswahl, andererseits wird in einigen westlichen Ländern der vorgeburtlichen Geschlechtswahl sehr geringe praktische Bedeutung beigemessen. Dabei unterscheidet sich die Verfügbarkeit der entsprechenden reproduktionsmedizinischen Verfahren von freier Zugänglichkeit zu allen Methoden (Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Spermatozoentrennung usw.) des Fortpflanzungsmedizinmarkts (USA) bis (...) hin zu strenger Reglementierung (Deutschland). Es wird anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur der Frage nachgegangen, welche für die Begründung rechtlicher Regelung beachtlichen sozialen oder gesundheitlichen Gefährdungen durch präkonzeptionelle Geschlechtswahl verursacht werden könnten, und welche Gründe es andererseits für die Zulässigkeit sozial motivierter präkonzeptioneller Geschlechtswahl gibt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungVersuche zur Geschlechtswahl bei der Befruchtung führten in jüngerer Zeit zu anwendbaren, wenngleich noch eingeschränkt erfolgssicheren Techniken. Deren ethische und rechtliche Bewertungen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Abhandlung. In Gesellschaften und Kulturen mit traditioneller Bevorzugung männlicher Nachkommenschaft gibt es einerseits ein starkes Interesse für die Geschlechtswahl, andererseits wird in einigen westlichen Ländern der vorgeburtlichen Geschlechtswahl sehr geringe praktische Bedeutung beigemessen. Dabei unterscheidet sich die Verfügbarkeit der entsprechenden reproduktionsmedizinischen Verfahren von freier Zugänglichkeit zu allen Methoden (Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Spermatozoentrennung usw.) des Fortpflanzungsmedizinmarkts (USA) bis (...) hin zu strenger Reglementierung (Deutschland). Es wird anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur der Frage nachgegangen, welche für die Begründung rechtlicher Regelung beachtlichen sozialen oder gesundheitlichen Gefährdungen durch präkonzeptionelle Geschlechtswahl verursacht werden könnten, und welche Gründe es andererseits für die Zulässigkeit sozial motivierter präkonzeptioneller Geschlechtswahl gibt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungVersuche zur Geschlechtswahl bei der Befruchtung führten in jüngerer Zeit zu anwendbaren, wenngleich noch eingeschränkt erfolgssicheren Techniken. Deren ethische und rechtliche Bewertungen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Abhandlung. In Gesellschaften und Kulturen mit traditioneller Bevorzugung männlicher Nachkommenschaft gibt es einerseits ein starkes Interesse für die Geschlechtswahl, andererseits wird in einigen westlichen Ländern der vorgeburtlichen Geschlechtswahl sehr geringe praktische Bedeutung beigemessen. Dabei unterscheidet sich die Verfügbarkeit der entsprechenden reproduktionsmedizinischen Verfahren von freier Zugänglichkeit zu allen Methoden des Fortpflanzungsmedizinmarkts bis hin zu strenger Reglementierung. (...) Es wird anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur der Frage nachgegangen, welche für die Begründung rechtlicher Regelung beachtlichen sozialen oder gesundheitlichen Gefährdungen durch präkonzeptionelle Geschlechtswahl verursacht werden könnten, und welche Gründe es andererseits für die Zulässigkeit sozial motivierter präkonzeptioneller Geschlechtswahl gibt. (shrink)

Die sechzehn Beitrage stellen in vielen Schwerpunkten die rasante Entwicklung dar, die die Eurolinguistik seit der ersten Tagung 1997 genommen hat. Den Hintergrund bilden der Europa-Begriff und die Vorgeschichte der Eurolinguistik im 20.

Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social generics, applied it to 1.1 million tweets about people, and analyzed the tweets. While it is often suggested that generics (...) are ubiquitous in everyday communication, we found that most tweets (78%) about people contained no generics. However, tweets with generics received more “likes” and retweets. Furthermore, while recent psychological research may lead to the prediction that tweets with generics about political groups are more common than tweets with generics about ethnic groups, we found the opposite. However, consistent with recent claims that political animosity is less constrained by social norms than animosity against gender and ethnic groups, negative tweets with generics about political groups were significantly more prevalent and retweeted than negative tweets about ethnic groups. Our study provides the first ML-based insights into the use and impact of social generics on Twitter. (shrink)

I argue that the often-heard claim that all serious present-day political philosophers subscribe to the principle of equal respect and concern or to the doctrine of equal moral status or are in some other fundamental sense egalitarians is wrong. Also wrong is the further claim that the usual methods currently used in political philosophy presuppose basic equality. I further argue that liberal egalitarianism itself is wrong. There is no universal duty “of equal respect and concern” towards every person, for one (...) does not owe one’s nice sister and a serial rapist equal respect and concern. There is also no duty of the state to respect all citizens equally, for a state need not be equally concerned about murderous criminals on the one hand and their innocent victims on the other. The potential maneuver of saving liberal egalitarianism by claiming that people have equal rights is unsuccessful. Human beings clearly do not have equal rights, nor are they born with equal rights; and merely having an equality of some rights, for example of “basic” or human ones, would not suffice for egalitarianism. Appeals to “recognition respect” and related concepts are also to no avail. Trying to go back still a step further and to claim that certain rights inequalities or justified discriminatory rules are themselves “grounded” in equal respect and concern at some deeper, norm-generating level (like, for example, the original position or a discourse-ethical principle of justification) is also futile. Finally, I argue that the “This is not what we mean”-strategy of escaping the above arguments reduces egalitarianism to triviality and empty rhetoric. Liberal egalitarianism should be abandoned. (shrink)

The paper is replaced by a new version (12-2019): DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3572846 -/- Physical phenomena emerge from the quantum fields everywhere in space. However, not only the phenomena emerge from the quantum fields, the law of the conservation of energy must have its origin from the same spatial structure. This paper describes the relations between the main law of physics and the mathematical structure of the “aggregated” quantum fields.

abstract Can torture be morally justified? I shall criticise arguments that have been adduced against torture and demonstrate that torture can be justified more easily than most philosophers dealing with the question are prepared to admit. It can be justified not only in ticking nuclear bomb cases but also in less spectacular ticking bomb cases and even in the so‐called Dirty Harry cases. There is no morally relevant difference between self‐defensive killing of a culpable aggressor and torturing someone who is (...) culpable of a deadly threat that can be averted only by torturing him. Nevertheless, I shall argue that torture should not be institutionalised, for example by torture warrants. (shrink)

Der protestantische Theologe Karl Girgensohn (1875–1925) ist 1903 mit seinem frühen Werk über das Wesen der Religion an die Öffentlichkeit getreten, welches einen starken religionsphilosophischen Standpunkt zum Ausdruck bringt. Kernüberlegung ist hierbei eine kognitive Theorie des Religiösen, in der die Gottesidee zentral ist. Unter Berücksichtigung der Biographie Girgensohns geht der vorliegende Beitrag auf diese frühe Studie zum Wesen der Religion ein und skizziert den Übergang des Autors von einem philosophischen zu einem experimentell-introspektiven Ansatz der Religiositätsforschung, welcher dann zum Fundament für (...) die Dorpater religionspsychologische Schule wurde. Basierend auf Girgensohns frühem Werk werden abschließend Implikationen für die heutige empirische Theologie vorgeschlagen.The Protestant theologian Karl Girgensohn (1875–1925) came to the public in 1903 with his early work on the nature of religion, which expresses a strong religious-philosophical standpoint. The core consideration here is a cognitive theory of the religious, in which the idea of God is central. Taking into account Girgensohn’s biography, the present contribution addresses this early study on the nature of religion and outlines the author’s transition from a philosophical to an experimental-introspective approach to religious research, which then became the foundation for the Dorpat School of the psychology of religion. Based on Girgensohn’s early work, implications for contemporary empirical theology are finally proposed. (shrink)

In present-day political and moral philosophy the idea that all persons are in some way moral equals is an almost universal premise, with its defenders often claiming that philosophical positions that reject the principle of equal respect and concern do not deserve to be taken seriously. This has led to relatively few attempts to clarify, or indeed justify, 'basic equality' and the principle of equal respect and concern. Such clarification and justification, however, would be direly needed. After all, the ideas, (...) for instance, that Adolf Hitler and Nelson Mandela have equal moral worth, or that a rape victim owes equal respect and concern to both her rapist and to her own caring brother, seem to be utterly implausible. Thus, if someone insists on the truth of such ideas, he or she owes his or her audience an explanation. The authors in this volume - which breaks new ground by engaging egalitarians and anti-egalitarians in a genuine dialogue - attempt to shed light into the dark. They try to clarify the concepts of "basic equality", "equal moral worth","equal respect and concern", "dignity," etc; and they try to justify-or to refute-the resulting clarified doctrines. The volume thus demonstrates that the claim that all persons have equal moral worth, are owed equal concern and respect, or have the same rights is anything but obvious. This finding has not only significant philosophical but also political implications. (shrink)

Certain instances of contraction are provable in Zardini’s system $\mathbf {IK}^\omega $ which causes triviality once a truth predicate and suitable fixed points are available.

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...) research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)