This edited collection focuses on the problem of social justice, or, more particularly, how the demand for social justice was articulated and implemented in ...

From an African point of view, there is no social justice in the world today and, from that point of view, there may not be much difference between the African, African-American, Asian, or even Western perspectives. There may, however, be some difference in the reasons given in support of this perspective or, rather, conclusion. The African perspective is heavily influenced by events such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and, more recently, by the report of South Africa’s Truth (...) and Reconciliation Commission and the bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The reason, in part, is that all of these events or reports seem to reinforce the belief, which I take to be contrary to the core principle of social justice, that African lives are either worthless or do not count as much as others. Further, they seem to have the effect of cheating Africans or making fools out of them, which, from a traditional Akan point of view, is a violation of the tenets of social justice. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Views from the North: Hans Petter Graver: Law, Justice and the State: Nordic Perspectives u Jacob Dahl Rendtorff: The Danish Welfare State: Philosophical Ideals and Systemic Reality u Sigri!Dur *orgeirsdottir: Feminist Ethics and Feminist Politics u Kuellike Lengi: The Situation of Human Rights in Estonia u Einar Palsson: Pythagoras and Early Icelandic Law u Law, Discourse and Rationality: Mats Flodin: Internal and External Rationality of Legal Systems u Logi Gunnarsson: A Discourse About Discourse u Hjordi!s Hakonardottir: (...) Legal Language: A Tool of Justice u Ghita Holmstrom-Hintikka: On the Use of Expert Witness in Legal Reasoning and Inquiry u Law, State and Nation: Agust H. Ing*orsson: Democracy, Bureaucracy and Marginalization of the State u Aleksander Peczenik: Law-State, Legal Certainty and Legitimacy of Law u Ove K. Pedersen/Sverre Raffnsoe: Reorganizing Society u Juha Raikka: Mill on National Sentiment u Pall Skulason: Concepts of the State and Classes of Value u Problems of Law and Rights: Britt-Mari Blegvad: How to Cope With Uncertainty: Trust and Law u Jon Wetlesen: Animal Rights or Human Duties?. (shrink)

In my 1990 work – Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice – I argued for four modifications of Rawls’s principles of social justice and rendered a modified version of his theory in four principles, the first of which is the Basic Rights Principle demanding the protection of people’s security and subsistence rights. In both his Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness Rawls explicitly refers to my version of his theory, clearly accepting three of my four proposed (...) modifications but rejecting the fourth ‐‐ the demand for social and economic democracy – on grounds that it automatically justifies socialism as opposed to capitalism. I argue, contrary to Rawls, that it is not true that this demand automatically picks socialism as the preferablesocioeconomic/political system and that a Social and Economic Democracy Principle demanding workplace and neighborhood democracy is officially neutral between these two systems … although plausible empirical assumptions may, indeed, favor the former. I then significantly elaborate my second version of Rawls’s theory of social justice which is composed of the following principles arranged in a very strong order of priority : Basic Rights Principle, Equal Basic Liberties Principle, Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, Modified Difference Principle, and Social and Economic DemocracyPrinciple. I argue that this elaborated version of the theory – which I call “Justice as Fair Rights” – is better than either Rawls’s original theory or my previous versions of it. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Justice in General: E. Attwooll: Is the Idea of Justice Asymmetric? u C. L. Sheng: Injustice in Law Caused by Conflict between Equality and Equity u G. Barden: Approaches to Justice: The Economy and the State u C. Schmidt: The Concept of Justice in Economic Theory u M. Milde: Rawls, Pluralism and the Value of Contract Theory u J. Tasioulas: M. Walzer on Justice u L. Cedroni: An Ethological Approach to Law, (...) class='Hi'>Justice and the State uaR. Kevelson: Justice as Artifice and Sign u A. Makolkin: Semiotics and Poeticity of Law and Justice u D. Ginev: Law and Morality from a Hermeneutic-Semiotic Perspective Rights in General: F. Viola: Personal Identity in the Human Rights Perspective u J.-R. Sieckmann: Justice and Rights u P. Comanducci: Justice and Rights u D. Wayand: Aboriginal Rights - Then and Now u M. Pavcnik: Argument der Grundrechte u D. B. Boersema: What's Wrong with Rights? u E. E. Dais: A Kantian Critique of Justice Holmes's Rights Theory Social and Environmental Rights: B. M. Baker: The Welfare State: Objectives, Subordinate Principles and Justifying Grounds u U. Penski: Zur Begruendung und Struktur sozialer Rechte u H. LaFolette: Two Forms of Paternalism u L. J. Mazor: Social Justice / Asocial Injustice u D. Wood: Constitutional Minimalism and the Discretionary Power of the Welfare State u u.a. (shrink)

There is no fairness in the world. Inequality can be observed in all spheres of human activities and in all parts of the world. This leads to the world-wide gross injustice. The main dilemma of survival is: either social fairness to people or the end of human history. The patience of people in hardship is exhausted. Social and interstate contradictions are being sharpened, and they add fuel to the flames of international tension. The world is on its way (...) to endless terror. Even “Golden Billion” is not quiet any longer. Fierce confrontation between the rich and the poor, the outlaws and the citizens takes nowadays place in Europe and the United States. As we can see the struggle will stop at nothing. It will spread with its unprecedented bitterness and moral bifurcation in people, the alarming symptoms of which are already being manifested. The mankind is moving towards the “all-in war’ state, the state of being at war on everything and everyone. Equality – it is Chimera. But what should we do, how should we act in order not to make equality a Pandora’s box, fueling global tension and giving a birth to revolutions and wars? What is there to be done with man’s strive for being at least not worse than the others? The solution of this problem is to open equal chances to all members of human society, to give them real and objective opportunities which form the basis of social justice. Sooner or later the mankind will come to cooperation via solving global environmental problems, and leveling all nations’ welfare on the basis of world wealth co-ownership. (shrink)

Hegel's often-echoed verdict on the apolitical character of philosophy in the Hellenistic age is challenged in this collection of new essays, originally presented at the sixth meeting of the Symposium Hellenisticum. An international team of leading scholars reveals a vigorous intellectual scene of great diversity: analyses of political leadership and the Roman constitution in Aristotelian terms; Cynic repudiation of the polis - but accommodation with its rulers; Stoic and Epicurean theories of justice as the foundation of society; Cicero's moral (...) critique of the traditional political pursuit of glory. The volume as a whole offers a fresh and comprehensive guide to the main currents of social and political philosophy in a period of increasing interest to classicists, philosophers and cultural and intellectual historians. (shrink)

Hegel's often-echoed verdict on the apolitical character of philosophy in the Hellenistic age is challenged in this collection of essays, originally presented at the sixth meeting of the Symposium Hellenisticum. An international team of leading scholars reveals a vigorous intellectual scene of great diversity: analyses of political leadership and the Roman constitution in Aristotelian terms; Cynic repudiation of the polis - but accommodation with its rulers; Stoic and Epicurean theories of justice as the foundation of society; Cicero's moral critique (...) of the traditional political pursuit of glory. The volume as a whole offers a comprehensive guide to the main currents of social and political philosophy in a period of increasing interest to classicists, philosophers and cultural and intellectual historians. (shrink)

The discourse over secularization has undergone a pronounced change. In this context the debate over the social role of religions in post-modern societies started again about ten years ago and is still going on. This debate is also underway in political theory and political philosophy. Authors like Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer and Gianni Vattimo are key players in this debate. On the one hand, liberals such as Rorty tend to reduce religions to the private sphere. On the (...) other hand, a post-secular model has developed over the last decade. Habermas is probably the most well-known of these academics. In his view, deliberative democracy needs sources for motivation as an antidote, and religions could provide such a moral resource. The paper wants to explore this discourse about the social role of religion. This analysis will focus on the contribution of religions to the debate on justice. It will be argued, that religions could be interpreted as comprehensive social practices. More precisely, religions can be regarded as cultural practices through which people live and interpret their lives. The common characteristic of all religions is that they establish a comprehensive practice that enables discussion and reflection on a transcendent dimension of reality. In plural societies, in which different forms of reasons play an important role, religions as social practices could be one important social factor, especially when we are reflecting about the sources of global justice. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to formulate some questions about a concept, justice, and some of its theoretical problems. When we discuss social and distributive justice, we are not simply pointing to a "state" problem. Justice is a challenge that is incumbent to every human being and, therefore, to everyone, in this era that is undoubtedly that of globalized capitalism. Taking into consideration congress emphasis on exploring dimensions of the human and inquiring into the challenges (...) facing humanity, and our need for global discussions about the values and concepts of development, values and human concerns, trying to find out what concepts might be essential, I think that one of those essential concepts is justice. But the problem begins from its very definition – justice is a concept that, from its root, is indeterminate. Justice comprises multiple meanings: it refers to a human capacity, an ideal and an essential element in social institutions, as well as a double but, at the same time, a singular dimension, individual and sociopolitical. My pretension is to explore some meanings of justice opening a dialogical perspective, believing that this is a fertile way to consider actual world challenges. Part of: Paper - 24th World Congress of Philosophy, FISP (Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie), Peking University. Beijing (People's Republic of China) 13/08/2018. (shrink)

The dynamic development of science and technology in the last decades has led to new challenges in jurisprudence. This holds for individual fields of doctrinal law as well as the concerned fields of jurisprudence. It is especially significant for the structure of justice, the efficiency of law as a steering instrument of society, and the empirical conditions of legal responsibility. In a jurisprudential perspective, the philosophy of law is rather engaged with the adaptiveness of its traditional principles and categories (...) or the capacity to come to terms with the new developments and less concerned with concrete matters of law. (shrink)

Existing social disparities in the United States are inconsistent with the promise of democracy; therefore, there was a need for critical conceptualization of the first principles that undergird American democracy and the genesis of democratic social change in America. This constructivist grounded theory study aimed to construct a grounded theory that provides an understanding of the process of American democratic social change as it emerged from the nation’s founding documents. A post hoc polytheoretical framework including Foucault’s, Bourdieu’s, (...) and Marx and Engels’s theories of power was used to understand power dynamics. The research question focused on understanding the process of democratic social change in America. The sample comprised the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, The Federalist Papers, and the U.S. Constitution. The documents were retrieved from the National Archives and Library of Congress. The data analysis plan incorporated successive comparison, situational and dramaturgical analysis, deconstruction, and perspective taking as strategies. The result was the construction of a democratic social change process theory preceded by five grounded theories: (a) first principles of democracy, (b) first principles of democracy conceptual framework, (c) socio-ethical principles of democracy, (d) demoralizing process, and (e) either-or approach to democracy. Positive social change implications include applying a democratic social change process to future social change endeavors across domains and levels of analysis, a normative framework for a republican form of government, and a tool to analyze and minimize the latent consequences of social justice policies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Space by Juan HerreraAída R. GuhlincozziCartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Spaceby juan herrera Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2022Juan Herrera’s historical recounting of Latino activism in Fruitvale, California, in Cartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Space is stellar. In fact, the case focused on by Herrera as an example (...) of activism producing space and creating change in the name of social justice is not the only top-quality contribution to Latinx geographies to be found in this book. Herrera’s conceptualization of “cartographic memory” builds on the intertwining of Latinx writers and historians with traditional spatial thought from the history of geography. His definition of “cartographic memory” as a “political remaking of urban geography and therefore a selective mapping” adds to the broader oeuvre of activism and space coming out in recent years (14).The geographic location for Cartographic Memory comes from the author’s long history of working in and around Fruitvale as both a volunteer and community member. As a new resident of the Oakland area, Herrera mistakenly navigated himself to Fruitvale, where he found the elements of the place clearly speaking to a cultural aesthetic of Latin-idad. Intrigued, Herrera began volunteering in the area, and learned more of the long activist history of the space. That activist history, Herrera argues, has long been under-studied, or even forgotten, in Chicano activist history, and merits recognition. Herrera’s efforts with [End Page 139] this book go a long way to gathering together that spatial history and reconstructing it for the reader through interviews and oral histories with numerous activists, extensive archival research, and ethnography focusing on the 1960s and 1970s Mexican-American activist mobilization in support of the Chicano movement.The power of the focus on Fruitvale must be recognized, as Herrera also makes space for intently peeling apart the layers of nonprofit funding, social movements, and community-building and support. The chapter, “Revolution Interrupted,” is about the funding situation of the Unity Council in Fruitvale and how the funding structure was constructed over time in the context of the political and economic opportunities of the 1960s. It speaks to how this had a profound effect on the organizers and community given the shift from grassroots to institutional funding. This chapter opens the book with a focus on the national scope of funding opportunities for organizations in the 1960s that focused on race and ethnicity. Through this lens are explored the effects of local political actions—such as the 1969 speech by San Antonio-based Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) leader Jose Angel Gutierrez—on funding at the federal level. Because of the perceived militancy of these remarks, the U.S. Congress became concerned, and eventually passed the 1969 Tax Reform bill, limiting the types of projects that could be funded philanthropically. This type of multi-scale understanding of Fruitvale activism is threaded throughout the entire book, from chapter 1, “Making Place,” in which Herrera summarizes activist perspectives on Fruitvale as emphasizing “not only how the neighborhood itself [produced] a geography of activism but also how it was interconnected to other places of struggle throughout the United States” (emphasis in original; 33).Herrera also navigates the interactions of race, ethnicity, and space, tracing how coalitions, influences on political efforts, and collaboration took place throughout Fruitvale and Oakland during this period. His second chapter, “The Other Minority,” identifies where Black Panther Party-related work occurred; the marketization that began to occur of a non-threatening, non-Black “Latino” identity; the effect that this had on activist efforts; and more. Importantly, in this chapter Herrera’s interviews reveal that part of the interest in these coalitions came from the clear organizational success Black activists had achieved in their [End Page 140] work, leading Mexican American activists in Oakland to pursue similar efforts. One interviewee, Herman Gallegos, a prominent activist at the time, spoke of recalling an event where Black men would gather monthly to focus on leadership. Thinking highly of them, he says that he recognized them as future “mayors, judges... [but] kept thinking... (shrink)

Social choice theory and theories of deliberative discourse have deeply impacted on the way political scientists understand the dynamics of democratic politics and decision-making. _Deliberation, Social Choice and Absolutist Democracy_ addresses the dispute between these competing schools of thought. Deliberative democracy and social choice theorists offer the two dominant and competing conceptions of participation in contemporary democratic theory. With the former holding that theories of discourse tell us that through the democratic process we can arrive at consensus, (...) rational outcomes and even principles of justice, while the latter suggest that fair and equal participation is more likely to lead to instability and irrational outcomes. With an in-depth examination of social choice theory and deliberative democracy, David van Mill: presents two case studies on the American Continental Congress 1774-1789 provides an assessment of the types of institutions that will promote radical democracy and create stable outcomes with the minimum sacrifice of the freedom and equality of participants defends a more radical idea of absolutist democracy, gleaned from the writings of Hobbes, against the claims made in favour of limited constitutional government. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of political theory, particularly those with an interest in democracy and social choice theory. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is,those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties,rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. (1) Rawls' method of adopting the"original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods.A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since (...) history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test. (shrink)

In order to compare the distributive principle between Marx and Rawls on justice, we have to definite the concept of distributive justice, injustice and beyond justice. By Marx the theoretical concept of distributive justice is something like distribution according to contribution, that is what you earn correspondence to what you have done, principally it is also could be accepted by Rawls, but as soon as we actualities this principle from theory to reality, it is distorted, on (...) the sense of Marx, by the actual capitalism social structure. Related to the principle of justice I regard the principle of beyond justice as distribution regardless what youhave done, under the situation of capitalism, it means to adjust distribution by the way of taxation and etc, which is defended by Rawls with justice as fairness, under the situation of supposed communism, it means distribution according to one’s needs. The principle of distributive injustice could be understood as economic exploitation with Marx’ labor theory of value, but it first comes from Hegel’s theory of labor alienation. With this understanding of the principle of distributive justice, injustice and beyond justice, we try to analysis distributive principle from theory to reality between Karl Marx and John Rawls. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to ascertain how the victims of injustice ought to (...) be compensated, since history strongly suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper sets forth the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION In any society relatively few disputes are brought to judges for resolution. Most are handled informally or forgotten. Fewer still are cases that go to trial. Most are settled. Compromises are reached even in cases where issues are hotly contested and where millions or billions of dollars in damages are claimed. Recently, for example, one of the most controversial lawsuits of our time, the Agent Orange case, was settled. In that case, veterans of the Vietnam War, their spouses, and (...) their children alleged that a defoliant — Agent Orange – used in Southeast Asia contained dioxin and was responsible for deaths, debilities, miscarriages, and birth defects suffered by members of the plaintiff class. Class members argued that the manufacturers of the defoliant, seven major chemical companies, knew that it was tainted and should be made to compensate them for their injuries, claiming billions of dollars in damages. The case received national exposure and became a rallying point for veterans, a means they hoped to use to publicize their plight and to spur Congress to come to their aid. On the eve of trial, the case was settled. The defendants, who denied liability throughout the pretrial period, agreed to pay the veterans $180 million. In turn, the plaintiff class agreed to drop the suit. Thus ended a controversy which not only presented novel legal issues and tested the ability of the federal courts to handle complex lawsuits, but concerned the well-being of a large number of veterans, their spouses, and their handicapped children as well. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze what kind of understanding of justice prevails at the beginning of the 21st century. I will shortly show the evolution of justice, concerning on the ancient and Enlightenment understandings of this concept. I shall attempt to justify the thesis that in the contemporary world the factors that play the most important part in the evaluation of justice are aesthetic ones. The essence of the aesthetic evaluation I will describe by (...) refer to the Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” where he analyses the specific character of the judgments of beauty. I will try to show that the characteristics which Kant ascribed to beauty havebeen transferred by modern philosophy to moral judgments and categories – specially to the judgment concerning justice. Finally I will focus on the contemporary dispute concerning economic human rights – this is a good concrete example for my thesis that today our understanding of justice (or better “social justice”) is based on the aesthetics arguments. (shrink)

Within the liberal framework, policies designed to rectify inequality generally take two forms: the formal equality option of equal treatment for everyone or the substantive equality option of "special" treatment for those whose difference continues to matter. Martha Minow argues that the framework creates a "dilemma of difference" because each option risks creating or perpetuating further disadvantages for members of oppressed groups. This paper examines the framework and the dilemma by highlighting the relational features of the language of equality and (...) of people who make determinations of equality. Relational insights are used to reexamine feminist work on care ethics, work considered to be hostile to equality analysis and justice theory. By providing a relational critique both of care ethics and of justice theory, I attempt to bring the two closer together by highlighting various connections. Care and justice are not entirely or always in opposition, but they inevitably interact and intertwine in ways that allow new possibilities and ways of being in social relations to emerge. (shrink)

Growing philosophical interest in theories of obligation has many sources. Among the most important ones is the tendency to redefine the scope of the political. Then we are Inevitably confronted with the question about the nature and scope of our obligations towards others. An analysis of an important and popular distinction between obligations of justice and obligations of charity shows that their distinctive characteristics are seldom precise and clear-cut. Moreover, they are more superficial rather than substantive and do not (...) allow to draw a clear line between obligatory and desirable behavior, or legally and morally obligatory behavior. In present-day ethical theory there is a tendency towards expanding the scope of obligations of justice and redefining their content. Actions whichtraditionally might have been considered as display of good nature are more and more often perceived as obligations avoidance of which is unjust. This also changes the role of institutions. The borders and content of individual obligations of justice should be considered in close connection with the problem of constructing just social institutions. The subjects of justice (the moral individual and the social institute) are interrelated and the search for an optimalbalance between two viewpoints – those of private interest and impartiality – becomes a unifying project both for political and moral philosophers. (shrink)

How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach, the simulation theory approach and the direct perception approach. Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, (...) ST and DP are all implicitly or explicitly committed to a particular conception of social perception. Thus, it is necessary to look into the nature of social perception in developing a theory of social cognition. I claim that social perception involves the following three characteristics: In social perception, other people are given to us; other people are given as transcendent; other people are given as transcendent but potentially accessible. They respectively constitute the Immediacy constraint, the Transcendence constraint, and the Accessibility constraint on theories of social cognition. I suggest that TT and ST fail to do justice to the Immediacy constraint and the Accessibility constraint, while DP does not pay due attention to the Accessibility constraint. (shrink)

The literature on cosmopolitan justice has yet to address what principles to adopt when duties of global justice and duties of social justice are in conflict. In this paper, I address David Miller’s contention that some may fall into the justice gap since we need to prioritize duties of social justice in cases of conflict. I argue that Miller’s analysis depends on three stipulations: the incommensurability of the values underlying duties of social (...) justice and those of global justice; the need to justify duties of justice to their holders; and the need to consider the necessary institutions to realize and implement justice obligations. I argue against the incommensurability clause by showing that both conceptions of justice pursue moral equality as the underlying and commensurate value. Instead, I propose that the currencies of justice we employ in the two contexts of justice are different. Discussing the justifiability clause I agree with the stipulation that we have to justify decisions that affect the realization of justice to those who have to carry the burden of realizing them. This implies, however, that we may have to accept that some prioritize duties of global justice over duties of social justice. If this is the case, it seems as though the state has little recourse to prioritize duties of social justice. Finally, discussing Miller’s institutional clause I ask why the justice relevant institutions can only be those of the state. It is plausible to say that in our current world, institutions of humanitarian aid are effective means to satisfy duties of global justice. (shrink)

This article pays special attention to some issues of justice erased by extending constitutional and political problems to a more generally rank. Controversies generated by the principle of justice are multiplicated in their formulation in different social spaces and time relocation. In this article we test the applicability of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice in changing political orders, emphasizing its particularities and limitations. Solving past political problems in different political regimes induces many theoretical disscutions. In (...) spite of all dificulties, new debates in intergenerational justice appears like a possibility in approaching controversial political matters. We’ll try also to formulate some proposals concerning the possibility of applications of some constrains of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice to changing political order issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation by Anna Floerke ScheidRamon LuzarragaJust Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation Anna Floerke Scheid lanham, md: lexington books, 2015. 208 pp. $84.00Anna Floerke Scheid argues that the Christian just war and just peacemaking ethical traditions lack a comprehensive ethic for revolutionary nonviolent activity and warfare. She proposes to fill this lacuna (...) through a theological exploration of what constitutes a just revolution. While Scheid maintains a consistent [End Page 212] preference for nonviolent resistance against tyranny, she remains open to the possibility of revolutionary warfare.The author articulates four stages of a just revolution. The first stage is jus ante, nonviolent resistance against a tyrannical government. Here the opposition develops a democratic and revolutionary vision of society that respects human rights, models that vision within its organizations, and resists through nonviolent acts. Second is jus ad, the stage where a tyrannical government eliminates all avenues for negotiation and represses peaceful resistance. This forces the revolutionary opposition to consider armed resistance as a last resort. Here Scheid grapples with two limitations of traditional just war theory. The first reserves the authority to start a war with governments. She argues that the legitimacy for a just revolution comes from a revolutionary organization's ability to envision and model a just society. Because a tyrannical government's authority is illegitimate, a revolutionary movement's just vision and practices gain for it a de facto legitimate authority. This legitimacy is reinforced by a revolutionary movement's ultimate intention to effect reconciliation with their oppressors postwar. The second limitation is the reasonable hope of success. Scheid analyzes the history of this criterion and demonstrates how it supports defensive wars despite the uncertainty of success. Oppressed persons, as the subjects of their own hope of liberation, ought to decide what constitutes the probability for success in fighting tyranny. Throughout this stage, revolutionary warfare must be practiced in tandem with continuing nonviolent resistance.The third stage is jus in, the justice practiced during armed revolutionary resistance. Fighting is deemed necessary to force a tyrannical government to negotiations. Meanwhile, revolutionary military units would work to minimize violence and loss of life. The last stage is jus post, the reconciliation needed to prevent revolutionary warfare from spiraling into revenge. Here the exercise of restorative justice—where responsibility for past injustices is assumed by all sides and a just resolution developed for social reconciliation and the development of a new, democratic society that respects human rights—is all important. Throughout the book, Scheid uses the African National Congress's revolutionary struggle against the South African apartheid government as a successful example of her theory in practice.Scheid's well-argued proposal deserves careful consideration by ethicists. Students will profit from her excellent summary of just war theory, where she brilliantly recovers some of its forgotten features. On the other hand, her concluding chapter considering the Arab Spring's potential for just revolution would have been stronger if she extended beyond a comparison to South Africa to incorporate similar features found in other successful revolutions. The 1986 Philippine People Power Revolution, the 1989 collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes, and the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal come to mind. Moreover, important for South Africa's success was the durability of the [End Page 213] political institutions the British left behind. These institutions provided the framework that handled the transition of power from the pro-apartheid National Party to the post-apartheid African National Congress government. This feature could have been brought to light, as many recognize this structure as contributive to the peaceful transition of power in other countries that won independence through revolution, from the United States in the eighteenth century to India and the Caribbean in the twentieth.Ramon LuzarragaBenedictine University at MesaCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The marketplace of ideas theoy has been utilized as one means to justify,from a societal perspective, contempora y public relations practice. Proponents confend that practitioners serve society in true Miltonian fashion by helping clients inject their views into that marketplace. One must question, however, whether afunctional marketplace of ideas exists relative to the public relations process. Further, by focusing ethical questions on individualistic practitioner behavior relative to that marketplace, practitioners may not be paying sulyicient attention to the demands of distributive (...) and social justice. (shrink)

This volume reflects on questions of human rights in the context of globalization. The essays responding to this subject are rich and varied: they focus on legal acceptance as well as consequences of human rights with regard to social rights and the necessary protection of the environment connected or close to those rights. Another approach to the subject featured in the volume is the legal recognition and the consideration of human rights as moral rights. With concepts on universality, a (...) new cosmopolitism, cultural pluralism and perspectives on religious variants and technological advances the debate on human rights is concluded. Index / Indice I. The Foundation of Rights / El fundamento de los derechos: J. Rubio Carracedo: El legalismo occidental: un problema para la universalizacion de los derechos humanos J. A. Seoane: El caracter juridico de las leyes injustas M. Borowski: Classifying and qualifying properties of fundamental rights J. von Platz: Faith in reason: questioning practical reason as fact, norm, end, and function of human rights R. Cruft: Policy implications of the philosophical foundations of human rights Maria Gabriela Scataglini: Derechos humanos: otra mirada sobre la cuestion de su universalidad II. A New Cosmopolitism / Un nuevo cosmopolitismo: V. de P. Barreto: Derecho cosmopolita y derechos humanos Luis Fernando Barzotto: Reconocimiento y fraternidad A. R. Bernstein: Justifying universal human rights via Rawlsian public reason H. Khatchadourian: Democracy and the globalization of human rights Milagros Otero Parga: Derechos humanos y globalizacion Halim Bepari: Human rights and the United Nations Miracy B. S. Gustin: Rescate de los derechos humanos en situaciones adversas de paises perifericos III. Multiculturism and Pluralism of Values /Multiculturalidad y pluralismo de valores: M. Herrero / M. Saralegui: Dogmatismo politico y pluralismo religioso Berry Tholen: Migration, justice, and Europe's identity. The relevance of special ties for EU's migration policy C. M. Alvarez Chicano: Implicaciones de la inconmensurabilidad de los valores en la aplicacion de principios de orden etico y juridico L. Perez Conejo: Axiologia juridica y pluralismo de valores: algunas consideraciones sobre la nocion de 'inconmensurabilidad' S-I. Liu: Fundamental legal values and globalization with regard to historical experience in freedom of speech L. C. Amezua: Libertad natural y esclavitud voluntaria: reflexiones de F. Suarez sobre la esclavitud IV. Rights and Gender / Derechos y genero: J.M. Gil Ruiz: La violencia de genero en el contexto familiar y la agresion de la ciencia juridica A. Goiriena Lekue: El interes superior del/la nino/a, coparentalidad y neutralidad de genero en la atribucion de la guarda y custodia de los hijos e hijas P. Garcia Guevara: Las politicas de genero en los paises globalizados del 'Tercer Mundo' V. Technological Impact and New Generation Rights / Impacto tecnologico y nuevas generaciones de derechos: M. Ahteensuu: Understanding the precautionary principle in the light of the traditional weak-strong distinction: a critical comment Cristina Monero Atienza: Bases para una teoria de los derechos en el siglo XXI M. Kitahara: Personal data processing and business ethics: personal data processing and personal data protection in business A. D. Oliver Lalana: El lado empirico de la legitimidad comunicativa: sobre la publicidad organizativa del derecho de proteccion de datos en internet J. Ebbesson / M. Zamboni: Transbordering democracy? The case of environment protection Sagrario Moles Nieto: El impacto medioambiental de los cultivos transgenicos VI. Bioethics and Law / Bioetica y derecho: M. Cruz Diaz de Teran: Principios para una biojuridica global C. Faralli / S. Tugnoli: Bioethics between law and science: the Italian law on medically assisted procreation (Law No. 40, February 19, 2004) N. Zeegers: The working of power in communicative regulation: the case of research with human embryos J. A. Fernandez Suarez: La bioetica en la era de la globalizacion F. J. Blazqez Ruiz: Privacidad y discriminacion genetica: propuestas bioeticas y juridicas ante los desafios de un mundo globalizado. (shrink)

Politics in America are polarized and trivialized, perhaps as never before. In Congress, the media, and academic debate, opponents from right and left, the Red and the Blue, struggle against one another as if politics were contact sports played to the shouts of cheerleaders. The result, Ronald Dworkin writes, is a deeply depressing political culture, as ill equipped for the perennial challenge of achieving social justice as for the emerging threats of terrorism. Can the hope for change be (...) realized? Dworkin, one the world's leading legal and political philosophers, identifies and defends core principles of personal and political morality that all citizens can share. He shows that recognizing such shared principles can make substantial political argument possible and help replace contempt with mutual respect. Only then can the full promise of democracy be realized in America and elsewhere. Dworkin lays out two core principles that citizens should share: first, that each human life is intrinsically and equally valuable and, second, that each person has an inalienable personal responsibility for identifying and realizing value in his or her own life. He then shows what fidelity to these principles would mean for human rights, the place of religion in public life, economic justice, and the character and value of democracy. Dworkin argues that liberal conclusions flow most naturally from these principles. Properly understood, they collide with the ambitions of religious conservatives, contemporary American tax and social policy, and much of the War on Terror. But his more basic aim is to convince Americans of all political stripes--as well as citizens of other nations with similar cultures--that they can and must defend their own convictions through their own interpretations of these shared values. (shrink)

This book explores the various aspects of social justice--to each according to his rights, to each acording to his desert, and to each according to his need--comparing the writings of Hume, Spencer, and Kropotkin. Miller demonstrates that there are radical differences in outlook on social justice between societies, and that these differences can be explained by reference to features of the social structure.

This timely and provocative book challenges the conventional wisdom that neoliberal capitalism is incompatible with social justice. Employing public choice and market process theory, Nick Cowen systematically compares and contrasts capitalism with socialist alternatives, illustrating how proponents of social justice have decisive reasons to opt for a capitalism guided by neoliberal ideas. Cowen shows how general rules of property and voluntary exchange facilitate widespread cooperation. Revisiting the works of John Rawls, he offers an interdisciplinary reconciliation of (...) Rawlsian principles with liberal democracy by introducing Robust Property-Owning Democracy, a new form of governance that aims to achieve social justice via practical, liberal means. Chapters address the knowledge problem and the incentive problem that emerge when aiming for a fair distribution of social resources and demonstrate how everyday political bargaining can help achieve just outcomes for all. Utilising insights from philosophy, politics and economics to show the role of market institutions and constitutional government in producing social justice, this book is crucial reading for academics, researchers and students of PPE and the political sciences. Its practical policy proposals will further benefit policymakers interested in mechanisms that spread the benefits of economic growth equitably. (shrink)