In order to compare the distributive principle between Marx and Rawls on justice, we have to definite the concept of distributive justice, injustice and beyond justice. By Marx the theoretical concept of distributive justice is something like distribution according to contribution, that is what you earn correspondence to what you have done, principally it is also could be accepted by Rawls, but as soon as we actualities this principle from theory to reality, it is distorted, on the sense of Marx, (...) by the actual capitalism social structure. Related to the principle of justice I regard the principle of beyond justice as distribution regardless what youhave done, under the situation of capitalism, it means to adjust distribution by the way of taxation and etc, which is defended by Rawls with justice as fairness, under the situation of supposed communism, it means distribution according to one’s needs. The principle of distributive injustice could be understood as economic exploitation with Marx’ labor theory of value, but it first comes from Hegel’s theory of labor alienation. With this understanding of the principle of distributive justice, injustice and beyond justice, we try to analysis distributive principle from theory to reality between Karl Marx and John Rawls. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

This work provides an annotated translation, together with a brief commentary, of the “Bao Wei Quan” chapter, the 20th chapter of the Chunqiu fanlu. The Chunqiu fanlu is an important Chinese Confucian text. It is ascribed to a pivotal Former Han (206 BCE – 9 CE) scholar, an exegete of the Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 195–115 BCE). This text offered to readers an ideal of rulership that remained highly relevant to the development of the ethical and political (...) discourse of Chinese Confucianism. Despite its importance, the Chunqiu fanlu has only very recently been fully translated into a Western language, 1 and is one of the rare major classical Chinese texts which still lacks a full Japanese translation. Thus, the purpose of this work is to contribute to the ongoing Chunqiu fanlu translation project and to present to the reader some of the form and content of this influential work. -/- ⟪春秋繁露⟫第20章〈保位權〉的漢文注譯 -/- 本文是對⟪春秋繁露⟫第二十卷〈保位權〉含有短評的注譯。⟪春秋繁露⟫是中國儒學代表作之一。其作者据考据被認為是以注釋⟪春秋公羊傳⟫而聞名的西漢學者董仲舒（公元前195年—公元前115年）。⟪春秋繁露⟫是 一部被公認為有助於理解中國儒學發展史的最重要的經典著作之一。⟪春秋繁露⟫中所倡導的統治理想以及天人感應的概念兩千年以來一直是倫理政治學中的一個核心問題，這部書對中國儒學的倫理和政治論述的發展起著极為重 要的作用。⟪春秋繁露⟫雖然在中國傳統文化中占据著重要的地位，但它最近才被完整地翻譯成任何歐洲國家的語言，不過完整日語翻譯本中仍然缺少的一部。筆者希望本文可以為正在進行中的⟪春秋繁露⟫翻譯工程做出一點貢 獻，并希望通過本文給廣大讀者介紹一點該著作的基本形式和一小部分內容。. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophical ideas developed during the Wei-Jin period, broadly referred to as xuanxue in Chinese and ‘Neo-Daoism’ or ‘Dark Learning’ in English, have been accorded increasing attention in academia. This article provides an introduction to some major thinkers of the Wei-Jin period, addressing both their original writings and recent scholarly interpretations. The article aims to demonstrate that many Wei-Jin period intellectuals formed their theories through reinterpreting the relationship between texts associated with Daoism and Confucianism. Thinkers of this period (...) often attempted to show how these defining ‘schools’ of pre-Qin Chinese thought did not propose theories that were fundamentally inconsistent, and that their ideas could be woven together as elements of a coherent view. This intellectual movement can thus be, and often has been, viewed as an attempt to integrate Daoism and Confucianism. However, a more nuanced reading demonstrates that these thinkers were reworking the relationship between what were seen as predominately Daoist or Confucian themes from their very foundation. Accordingly, the common description of Wei-Jin thinkers as ‘Daoist’ is decidedly incongruous. (shrink)

Ben shu jie he shi dai fa zhan de yao qiu,Cong pi pan ji cheng you xiu chuan tong wen hua de shi jiao,Dui xian qin ru jia"he"zheng zhi lun li si xiang jin xing le bi jiao quan mian de si kao.

This book presents a systematic account of the role of the personal spiritual ideal of wu-wei--literally "no doing," but better rendered as "effortless action"--in early Chinese thought. Edward Slingerland's analysis shows that wu-wei represents the most general of a set of conceptual metaphors having to do with a state of effortless ease and unself-consciousness. This concept of effortlessness, he contends, serves as a common ideal for both Daoist and Confucian thinkers. He also argues that this concept contains within itself a (...) conceptual tension that motivates the development of early Chinese thought: the so-called "paradox of wu-wei," or the question of how one can consciously "try not to try." Methodologically, this book represents a preliminary attempt to apply the contemporary theory of conceptual metaphor to the study of early Chinese thought. Although the focus is upon early China, both the subject matter and methodology have wider implications. The subject of wu-wei is relevant to anyone interested in later East Asian religious thought or in the so-called "virtue-ethics" tradition in the West. Moreover, the technique of conceptual metaphor analysis--along with the principle of "embodied realism" upon which it is based--provides an exciting new theoretical framework and methodological tool for the study of comparative thought, comparative religion, intellectual history, and even the humanities in general. Part of the purpose of this work is thus to help introduce scholars in the humanities and social sciences to this methodology, and provide an example of how it may be applied to a particular sub-field. (shrink)

In classical Chinese philosophy, the best kind of life is a life lived in line with the Dao (the “Way”). A core feature of this kind of life is attaining the ideal of wu-wei. In early Daoist writings, wu-wei denotes an ideal way of acting. However, since wu-wei is normally translated as “no-action” these ancient texts give us a picture of the best kind of life that may appear paradoxical to many philosophers. In this paper, I suggest a way to (...) make sense of this classical ideal. I argue that by applying a Merleau-Pontyian framework of action we can arrive at a non-paradoxical reading of wu-wei. On this reading, wu-wei is essentially manifested in a specific way we are aware of what we are doing. (shrink)

Kein Hahn kräht mehr nach dem Verifikationsprinzip, das Moritz Schlick zusammen mit seinen Mitstreitern des Wiener Kreises verfochten hat. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert gilt das Prinzip als philosophisch erledigt; doch Totgesagte leben länger. Ich versuche, eine Fassung des Prinzips zu formulieren, die auch unter den Bedingungen der Nachkriegs-Philosophie verteidigt werden kann: Grob gesagt, muss jeder sinnvolle Satz im Prinzip empirisch (oder doch aposteriori) überprüft werden können, einerlei ob verifiziert oder falsifiziert, ob fallibel oder infallibel, ob direkt oder indirekt, ob deduktiv, (...) abduktiv oder induktiv, ob durch Sinneswahrnehmung oder durch Selbstwahrnehmung. Je nach Situation verlangt das Prinzip die unterschiedlichsten Formulierungen; es wäre verfehlt, es ein für allemal zu fixieren. Vermutlich können wir es sogar auf Sätze ausdehnen, die sich apriori rechtfertigen lassen. Anhand einer Serie von Beispielen (die z.T. aus Schlicks Schriften stammen) demonstriere ich, welche guten Dienste das Prinzip leistet. Erstens dient es dazu, intellektuelle Hochstapelei aus dem Spiel zu werfen und von sinnvollen Aussagen zu unterscheiden. Nun gibt es Sätze, an deren Sinn wir nicht gern rütteln lassen wollen, selbst wenn zunächst nicht klar ist, wie sie sich überprüfen lassen sollen. Das legt einen zweiten Einsatz des Prinzips nahe: Wir sind in diesem Fall aufgerufen, mehr Mühe in den scheinbar unüberprüfbaren Satz zu investieren, ihn besser zu explizieren und dabei doch noch einen Weg zu seiner Überprüfung freizuschaufeln. Bei dieser Übung kann sich sogar unser Überprüfungsbegriff verändern (und damit auch der Gehalt des Verifikationsprinzips selbst). Insgesamt sollten wir den Überprüfungsbegriff so fassen, dass laut Prinzip nicht zuviele wichtige Sätze sinnlos erscheinen. In einer aufklärerischen Ethik des klaren Redens, Meinens und Fragens kommt es darauf an, die gegenläufigen Denkbewegungen auszutarieren, in die wir beim verifikationalistischen Philosophieren gezogen werden. Was das heißt, führe ich anhand vermeintlich sinnloser Sätze aus der Raum/Zeit-Philosophie vor. Am Ende des Aufsatzes bringe ich einige Beispiele ausgemachten Unsinns. (shrink)

I Das Grenzland Im Jahre 1772 annektierte das Habsburgerreich im Süden Polens gelegene Gebiete und gliederte sie als „Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien“ in seinen Herrschaftsbereich ein. Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Habsburger Monarchie im I. Weltkrieg wurde Galizien 1918 Teil des erneut unabhängigen Polen. In Ostgalizien gründeten ukrainische Nationalisten eine kurzlebige „West-Ukrainische Republik“. Im Anschluss weiterer Kampfhandlungen zwischen Polen, Ukrainern und Sowjets annektierte Polen dann ganz Ostgalizien, das von den Polen „Kleines Ostpolen“ genannt wurde, einschließlich der nördlichen Gebiete Wolhyniens und Polesiens. (...) Die im Gefolge des Kriegsendes neu entstandenen Grenzen wurden 1923 international anerkannt. Ostgalizien und Wolhynien wurden 1939 von der UdSSR annektiert und der ukrainischen Sowjetrepublik angegliedert. Während der deutschen Besatzung zwischen 1941–1944 war Ostgalizien Teil des von den Deutschen kontrollierten Generalgouvernements Polen. Im Anschluss an die Befreiung dieser Gebiete durch die Rote Armee kam Ostgalizien wiederum an die ukrainische Sowjetrepublik. Seit der ukrainischen Unabhängigkeit 1991 ist es Teil der West-Ukraine. Das ehemalige ostgalizische Grenzlandgebiet erstreckt sich von der im Norden gelegenen Kreishauptstadt L'viv bis zu der im Süden gelegenen, der ehemaligen österreichischen Provinz Bukowina zugehörigen Stadt Chernivtsi, von der Bergkette der Karpaten im Westen bis zum Fluss Sbrutsch und zu den Ebenen von Podolien im Osten. Es handelt sich um ein Gebiet, das berühmt, aber durchaus auch berüchtigt ist. (shrink)

Tu (Chinese history and philosophy, Harvard U.) offers a panoramic view of the core values of Confucian intellectual thought that have kept it vital for more than two millennia, and underlie the recent resurgence in eastern Asia. Of interest to students of either China or religion and ethics. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This essay attempts to provide an alternative approach to the philosophy of religion through a new interpretation of Daoist philosophy in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. I argue that Lao-Zhuang’s wu-wei should be understood as a reduction of our existential and conceptual beliefs about the reality of this world. In Lao-Zhuang, wu-wei is related to the theme of decentering of the subject. In order to be a true self, we have to make space at the core of our being for Dao (...) to appear. The authentic selfhood is constituted in its correctrelation to Dao. In Daoist philosophy of religion, the center of gravity in the relation between Dao and the world (or worlds) is shifted from this world to Dao, and the problematic in the philosophy of religion is displaced from a truth-oriented issue to a receptivity issue. (shrink)

The concept of wu-wei (nonaction) has undergone significant changes from Lao-zi to Zhuang-zi. This paper will argue that, while wu-wei in Lao-zi is a utilitarian principle, wu-wei of Zhuan-zi represents an aesthetic world-view. The aesthetic nature of the Daoist nonaction will be illustrated through Kant's concept of 'purposiveness without purpose'.