During an interview on human rights in a TV programme, the interviewer all of a sudden said that, so far as he could understand, I was establishing a connection between philosophy and torture, and asked me what this connection was. I was shocked.In a couple of seconds I tried to guess how he could have come to such a conclusion. My response was: there is no connection between philosophy and torture, still when you look at the fact of torture with (...) philosophical-ethical knowledge, you can realize that torture does not damage, nor ‘degrade’, the human dignity of the victim of torture, as is usually accepted – e.g. in the formulation of the title of the ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’. It causes damage to the human dignity of the person who tortures. We protect or damage human dignity, but our own human dignity, by what we do and not by what we suffer, since we are responsible for what we do and not for what others do to us. What we do, or refrain from doing, depends on each of us, i.e. acting in accordance with human dignity in our relations with other human beings is a problem in our ethical relation with ourselves, in spite of the fact that our actions are directed to somebody else. (shrink)

Two main but discrepant tendencies characterize the intellectual climate of our world at the turn of the century. We promote, on the one hand, “respect for human rights,” i.e. for certain universal norms, but on the other hand, equally promote “respect to all cultures,”which are differentiated among themselves by their different world-views and their parochial norms. Not rarely do we see that the demands that such parochial norms bring are contradictory to those of human rights.

Words, as well as ways of behavior, can be the objects of value judgments. The term ‘rational’ is such a word: to be rational is to be good. This is probably why, as a reaction to ‘western rationality’, people began to speak of many ‘rationalities’, a claim propounded by postmodernists. Rather than dwelling on the historical developments that led to such a claim, the author looks at concepts relevant to the colloquium ‘The encounter between rationalities’ (on which this issue of (...) Diogenes is based), within their intellectual framework: the modernist–postmodernist debate. (shrink)

Two opposite tendencies characterize the intellectual and political developments in our world as a whole at the end of the twentieth century: on the one hand, we promote respect for human rights, i.e., for certain “universal” norms; on the other, we promote equal respect for all cultures, i.e., respect also for sets of parochial, “relative” norms, which are not only often discrepant among themselves, but often discrepant vis-à-vis human rights as well. In light of this, I argue that we need (...) paideia for a sagacious implementation of human rights in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

The author of the paper starts by calling our attention to problems that make it necessary to rethink philosophy and puts her finger on one common factor at the origin of these problems. This is what she calls “the loss of the object of knowledge” in epistemology.After she shows how the object of knowledge is lost in two prevailing epistemologies of the twentieth century—in pragmatism and logical empiricism—and the consequences of this loss for our lives, she gives examples of rethinking (...) certain philosophical questions. These are the questions of what knowledge is and problems of norms related to the lack of distinction between epistemological kinds of norms. This rethinking also implies the necessity of rethinking philosophical education. (shrink)

How you can respect a culture with blood feuds? A culture with polygamy? It’s not possible. You can be rightly against something or wrongly against it, but if you are against something, you cannot respect it. If you say that you respect it, it would be hypocritical.