In a reconstruction of the theories of Freud and Klein, Sebastian Gardner asks: what causes irrationality, what must the mind be like for it to be irrational, to what extent does irrationality involve self-awareness, and what is the point of irrationality? Arguing that psychoanalytic theory provides the most penetrating answers to these questions, he rejects the widespread view of the unconscious as a 'second mind', in favour of a view of it as a source of inherently irrational desires seeking expression (...) through wish-fulfilment and phantasy. He meets scepticism about psychoanalytic explanation by exhibiting its continuity with everyday psychology. (shrink)

Vitalism is understood as impacting the history of the life sciences, medicine and philosophy, representing an epistemological challenge to the dominance of mechanism over the last 200 years, and partly revived with organicism in early theoretical biology. The contributions in this volume portray the history of vitalism from the end of the Enlightenment to the modern day, suggesting some reassessment of what it means both historically and conceptually. As such it includes a wide range of material, employing both historical and (...) philosophical methodologies, and it is divided fairly evenly between 19th and 20th century historical treatments and more contemporary analysis. This volume presents a significant contribution to the current literature in the history and philosophy of science and the history of medicine. (shrink)

The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration (...) principle, Weak-KK, which states that knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. But Weak-KK is vulnerable to an unknowability result and therefore must be rejected. The arguments here suggest that retreating to weaker iteration principles is not an option for the KK enthusiast. (shrink)

Whistleblowing is an effective tool against fraud and corruption in organizations. However, as researchers have struggled to acquire data on actual whistleblowers, research relies on hypothetical intention data and student samples, which is seen as a major limitation. Using a field study of 1,416 employees from China, Germany, and Russia, the purpose of this article is to identify differences and similarities between intention and actual whistleblowing decisions, thus aiding research and interpretation of prior and future studies. I also contribute by (...) analyzing whether findings can be generalized across different cultures and whether status and power influence the whistleblowing process. My results reveal that the key difference between hypothetical and real decisions is not in variables that affect the process, but in effect sizes: Employees underestimate the effect of situational (retaliation) and organizational (compliance measures) variables in hypothetical compared to actual whistleblowing. Thus, reliance on intention research is not inherently problematic, when effect sizes are interpreted with caution. I also find that results are similar across countries and that status and power may not be decisive factors in whistleblowing. My findings should also be of interest to practitioners and policymakers, as they assist in designing effective whistleblowing systems and environments in organizations. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Krishnamurti believes that Man can come to truth neither through any organization, through any creed, through any dogma, priest or ritual, nor through any philosophic knowledge or psychological technique. He has to find it through the mirror of relationship, through the understanding of the contents of his own mind, through observation and not through intellectual analysis or introspective dissection. Man has built in himself images as a fence of security - religious, political, personal. These manifest as symbols, ideas, beliefs. The (...) burden of these images dominates man's thinking, his relationships and his daily life. These images are the causes of our problems for they divide man from man. His perception of life is shaped by the concepts already established in his mind. The content of his consciousness is his entire existence. This content is common to all humanity. When man becomes aware of the movement of his own thoughts he will see the division between the thinker and the thought, the observer and the observed, the experiencer and the experience. (shrink)

Introduction to edited volume on vitalism and/in the life sciences, 1800-2010.

Essences play a central role in Spinoza’s philosophy, not only in his metaphysics, but also in his philosophy of mind, his theory of affects, and his political philosophy. Despite their importance, however, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what exactly essences are for Spinoza. On a widespread reading, the essence of X is nothing but the concept of X. This paper argues against this identification of essences and concepts. Spinozistic concepts are maximally inclusive: the concept of X contains everything that (...) is needed to make X conceivable. The essence of X, in contrast, is more limited in scope and does not include everything that is needed to make X conceivable. Thus, Spinoza avoids the ‘overloading’ of essences and the problems that would ensue. The account developed in this paper has a surprising implication, namely that the essences of non-divine, singular things do not suffice to render these things fully conceivable on Spinoza’s view. Thus, Spinoza breaks with a tradition according to which the essence of a thing states ‘what the thing is.’ As a result, his conception of essence is much further removed from traditional Aristotelian accounts, and from other seventeenth-century accounts, than usually acknowledged. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

This article presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences such as prudence or temperance in terms of statistical moments. Our results, which are generalizations of Roger :27–44, 2011) and Ekern, 329–333, 1980), give a better understanding of how higher-order risk preferences relate to skewness preference and kurtosis aversion. While they are not based on expected utility theory, an implication within that theory is that all commonly used utility functions exhibit skewness preference and kurtosis aversion.

In der Ontologie wird einerseits danach gefragt, was für Arten von Gegebenem es überhaupt gibt und andererseits, worin das Sein eines Gegenstandes bzw. einer Art von Gegenstand besteht. Im Folgenden wollen wir uns mit der Ontologie der Computerspiele beschäftigen. Dass es so etwas wie Computerspiele tatsächlich gibt, ist im Gegensatz zu der Frage, ob es Abstrakta wie allgemeine Eigenschaften oder fiktive Entitäten gibt, evident und unkontrovers. Spannender, weil alles andere als offensichtlich, ist aber die Antwort auf die Frage, was Computerspiele (...) eigentlich sind, oder anders formuliert, was Computerspiele zu Computerspielen macht, oder wieder anders gesagt, worin das Computerspiel-Sein beseht. (shrink)

La paix entre l’État et les FARC en 2016 a fortement limité le nombre de victimes de violences mais ces dernières risquent de repartir de plus belle. La moitié des guérilleros ont été désarmés par l’ONU, ce qui laisse le pays sans encadrement territorial pour s’opposer au narcotrafic. Les anciens FARC sont assassinés par de nouvelles structures criminelles en train d’occuper le terrain.

Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances. Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can (...) the having of reflective acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of necessary and eternal truths? The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is, according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self- consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences. This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and rationality are connected with each other. (shrink)

Through a close reading of the two definitions of evil in the Introduction to Responses to Thalassios, this article points out a circular, cognitive-affective-somatic, genetic mechanism that St. Maximos the Confessor considers responsible for the initiation and transmission of the fallness as a human condition and the specific manifestation of it in the form of passions. It elucidates the first definition as mainly phenomenological, by identifying the circular mechanism and its behavioural expressions, and the second definition as more aetiological, by (...) explaining why this mechanism emerges and reemerges with the fallen humanity despite its catastrophic results. CONTRIBUTION: This article highlights a double genetic mechanism that St. Maximos the Confessor grasped within the fallen human condition as a curse solvable only in Christ, a notion largely carved out by previous Maximian scholarship, but fully explained and valuated here. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles —the principle that no two numerically distinct things are perfectly similar—features prominently in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Despite its centrality to his philosophical system, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what modal status Leibniz ascribes to the PII. On many occasions Leibniz appears to endorse the necessity of the PII. There are a number of passages,however, where Leibniz seems to imply that numerically distinct indiscernibles are possible, which suggests that he subscribes to a merely contingent (...) version of the PII. In this paper I attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency. I argue that Leibniz consistently takes the PII to be necessary and that this view of his shines through even in his correspondence with Clarke. I also show that competing interpretations, on which Leibniz’s PII is contingent, misread a number of crucial passages from this correspondence. (shrink)

Research on the asymmetric effect of negative versus positive affective states on scope of attention, both at a perceptual and a conceptual level, is abundant. However,...

One of the main moral costs of stare decisis lies in the continuous possibility of entrenching morally deficient decisions in the law. Although legal systems usually make provision for dealing with morally deficient precedents, there are cases in which the legal obligation of later courts to follow one of these precedents is undefeated. This possibility affects the overall justification of stare decisis. One traditional answer to this problem consists in accepting this moral cost, on the belief that the benefits of (...) stare decisis outweigh it. On this view, when there is an undefeated legal obligation to follow a morally deficient precedent, the court must simply follow precedent. In this article, I question this approach and defend an alternative solution. I argue that, under some conditions, a court facing a morally deficient precedent should have the power to either follow the precedent or suspend its application to the parties by ordering a temporary stay of proceedings and referring the case to a higher court with power to overrule the precedent. This proposal entails exercising an equitable power recognised by the legal system, which I defend against three possible objections. (shrink)

A general practice of precedent is one that can plausibly apply to any well-functioning legal system. This practice, which can be grounded in the Rule of Law, needs to make it the case that courts always have a legal reason for following relevant precedent – even if the precedent is morally suboptimal, so long as it is not evil. Without this reason, a precedent may be treated as having no legal influence for the later court (‘the Null Model’), and this (...) runs counter to the Rule of Law. On top of this reason, courts may have a general legal obligation to follow precedent – stare decisis – but this risks entrenching morally bad decisions in the law. We need, therefore, a type of reason that lies in between the Null Model and stare decisis as a necessary step for any future justification of stare decisis. But how can courts have a legal reason for following morally suboptimal precedent? They can have that reason, I argue, in virtue of a specific judicial duty, positively laid down in a legal source, which aims to advance the Rule of Law in an institutionalised way. In this article, I aim to explain and justify that judicial duty. (shrink)

In der Medizinethik haben sich moralische Gründe, die die Würde des Patienten betreffen, gerade auch in Fragen am Lebensende als wichtige Grundlage praktischen Überlegens neben solchen des Wohlergehens und der Autonomie fest etabliert. Dabei hat es sich eingebürgert, zwischen Gesichtspunkten zu unterscheiden, die die kontingente Würde einer Person in den Blick nehmen, und solchen, die sich auf eine nicht-kontingente Würde ihrer Träger beziehen. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich auf eine weitere Grundlage aufmerksam machen, die von Überlegungen, die von der Menschenwürde (...) der Betroffenen in beiderlei Art ihren Ausgangspunkt nehmen, verdeckt zu werden drohen: Moralische Gründe, die sich der Bewahrung oder Vermehrung des Sinns verschrieben haben, den Menschen in ihrem Leben sehen oder vermissen. Diese Sinn-Gründe, so mein Argument, weisen einige strukturelle Gemeinsamkeiten zu Würde-Überlegungen auf, die auf eine gemeinsame ontologische Grundlage und überlappende Gehalte beider zurückzuführen sind. Dessen unbeschadet haben beide Arten von Gründen eigenständige Funktionen beim Nachdenken über medizinethische Probleme; tatsächlich haben Gründe des Sinns im Falle moralischer Herausforderungen am Lebensende oftmals sogar den Primat in dem Sinne, dass sie konstitutiv in Würde-Gründe eingehen können und auch unabhängig davon auf moralisch relevante Gesichtspunkte verweisen. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar un diálogo entre los conceptos de red de Bruno Latour y malla de Tim Ingold. La presentación de este diálogo se funda en la exploración de los desafíos que surgen al poner en valor a los no-humanos y al tratar la cuestión de la experiencia. Esta noción se introduce para clarificar la forma en que el vínculo entre humanos y no-humanos se desarrolla temporalmente. Así, se observan diferencias entre un “cuerpo aplanado” y un (...) “organismo que experimenta”, alternativas a ideas de aprendizajes y habilidades como socialización o habitus. Finalmente, se trata la reubicación que realiza Latour de la noción de red en su obra tardía, en lo que se considera la existencia de un énfasis experiencial. Se concluye señalando que el desarrollo conceptual presentado debe verse menos como una contraposición entre modelos teóricos estabilizados, que como una reflexión en movimiento ligada a formas experimentales de investigación.: This article aims to present a dialogue between Latour's notion of network with Ingold's concept of meshwork. This dialogue is based on the exploration of the challenges that arise in valuing non-humans in the analysis of these authors. To clarify how the link between humans and nonhumans is specifically developed, I introduce the pragmatic notion of experience. In this line, I described the differences between a “flattened body” and a “body that experiences”, in what is considered an experiential emphasis. Finally, Latour's relocation of the notion of network in his later work is discussed. The article concludes by pointing out that the conceptual development presented should be seen less as a contrast between stabilized theoretical models, than as a reflection in movement linked to experimental forms of research. (shrink)

All forms of cognition, whether natural or artificial, are subject to constraints of their computing architecture. This assumption forms the tenet of virtually all general theories of cognition, including those deriving from bounded optimality and bounded rationality. In this letter, we highlight an unresolved puzzle related to this premise: what are these constraints, and why are cognitive architectures subject to cognitive constraints in the first place? First, we lay out some pieces along the puzzle edge, such as computational tradeoffs inherent (...) to neural architectures that give rise to rational bounds of cognition. We then outline critical next steps for characterizing cognitive bounds, proposing that some of these bounds can be subject to modification by cognition and, as such, are part of what is being optimized when cognitive agents decide how to allocate cognitive resources. We conclude that these emerging views may contribute to a more holistic perspective on the nature of cognitive bounds, as well as their alteration subject to cognition. (shrink)

Antonio Andrés es un filósofo español del siglo XIV, muy conocido por la relación que mantuvo con Duns Escoto en París. Por esta razón, algunos escritos de Antonio Andrés han sido confundidos con los escritos de Duns Escoto. En este trabajo se estudian dos problemas: primero, determinar qué obras pertenecen a Antonio Andrés; segundo, mostrar si Antonio Andrés fue un filósofo original o bien fue un mero recopilador y difusor de los escritos de Duns Escoto.Antonio Andrés in a Spanish philosopher (...) who lived in 14th century. He is well known because of his relation to Duns Scot. That's why some writings of Antonio Andrés have been confounded with the writings of Duns Scot. Two problems are studied in this work; first, to appoint which writings belong to Antonio Andrés; second, to prove if Antonio Andrés was either an original philosopher or a mere commentator of Duns Scot's writings. (shrink)

Louis Althusser is the blemish on the field of political theory. His barely explored and partly forgotten contributions are nonetheless formative for contemporary critical thought. Interestingly, at their very core his interventions are based on his own extensive readings of early modern political thought. Therefore, this study traces Althusser's readings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu and is the first to do so. Building on this, the study demonstrates how Althusser's new foundation of Marxism, which is very much alive (...) today, arises from this part of his work. Thereby, it becomes visible how the post-Marxist paradigm, which Althusser's many important students further developed, is formed through his readings of the classic thinkers of the bourgeois state. (shrink)

Many philosophers have attempted to answer the ‘ethical question’: can the ethical value of an artwork ever contribute to its aesthetic value, and if so, how? In this paper, I consider a methodological question that arises out of this discussion: should attempts to address the ethical question use analytic tools found in contemporary philosophical literature, art criticism, or some combination of the two? I concur with arguments proposed elsewhere, which suggest that art criticism has an important role to play in (...) addressing the ethical question. However, I argue that any fruitful attempt to answer the question must defend some particular way of understanding the ethical value of artworks, which suggests that we should address what I label the ‘art question’: what is the role and importance of art? This question, I suggest, is one with which philosophers can usefully engage. This division of labour offers a way forward in addressing this important issue. (shrink)

Whistleblowing is regularly identified as corporate control mechanism to prevent and uncover fraud. We review and compare the legal situation for whistleblowers in the People’s Republic of China and India. In a survey of 942 employees from private companies in both countries, we take a look at the status quo of whistleblowing system implementation, explore preference of channels to disclose fraud or corruption, and analyze under which conditions and what kind of employees prefer external over internal whistleblowing. We find that (...) provisions for mandatory whistleblowing systems can be found in the law of both countries. In China in particular, protection is scattered across many different laws in the private sector. Indian companies seem to have systems in place more often, although this difference becomes smaller the larger the company. The general preference of internal over external channels is similar across countries. Our regression models suggest that external channels are preferred over internal ones when fear of retaliatory measures is higher, the company is smaller, and the whistleblower is female. In line with prior literature, the effect of fear of retaliation is moderated by gender: women are less influenced by retaliation. All in all, implementation of whistleblowing systems seems ubiquitous in both countries; legal protection and comprehensive measures to decrease retaliation are lacking. Additional implications of findings are discussed. (shrink)

The present essay approaches two different conceptions of Enlightenment and modernity. The first part considers Michel Foucault’s understanding of modernity as an “attitude” or “critical ethos” belonging to that age, that necessarily questions that which we have come to be in various contingent processes ; the second part considers Jürgen Habermas’s proposal, which invites us to understand modernity as an “unfinished project”, as a certain potential or rational ideal that is still to be carried out. Towards the end of the (...) essay both stances are confronted, whereby an attempt is made to engage elements retrieved from each in a productive dialogue, and to raise some criticisms and observations regarding the sociohistorical conceptions of each author. (shrink)