Reflection and Rationality in Leibniz
Abstract
Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and
rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the
knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances.
Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is
much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance
which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can the having of reflective
acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of
necessary and eternal truths?
The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus
conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish
this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is,
according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a
unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self-
consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible
because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances
and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which
we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences.
This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and
rationality are connected with each other.