I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that φ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that φ, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the small difference principle.

This book centers on two trends in contemporary epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, (...) are lacking. The first part of the book involves diagnosing the Gettier Problem (perhaps the central challenge for any reductive analysis) and defending that diagnosis against objections. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. The third and final part of this book explores of what non-reductive virtue epistemology should look like, with the aim of establishing a new form of non-reductive virtue epistemology--a type of non-reductive proper functionalism--that is able draw from the strength of the aforementioned trends and contribute positively to a number of debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond. (shrink)

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the (...) reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of demystifying and mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the (...) irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness; this paper will focus on the inverted spectrum argument, knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument. (shrink)

This article discusses a kind of knowledge classifiable as knowledge-wh but which seems to defy analysis in terms of the standard reductive theory of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which they are true if and only if one knows that p, where this proposition is an acceptable answer to the wh-question ‘embedded’ in the ascription. Specifically, it is argued that certain cases of knowing what an experience is like resist such treatment. I argue that in some (...) of these cases, one can know that p, where an acceptable answer to the question ‘What’s the experience like?’ is that p, but where one does not know what the experience is like. This could point to the distinctiveness of this sort of knowledge. (shrink)

Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not (...) all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; it evades concerns that its rivals face. (shrink)

The article provides a brief analysis of the current debate on the two types of knowledge – knowledge-how and knowledge-that and discusses the possibility of reduction of the former to the latter. Two promising anti-reductionist strategies are highlighted. The first strategy uses the notion of “epistemic luck” to demonstrate that the epistemic characteristics of these two kinds of knowledge differ. The second strategy can be based on M. Dewitt’s treatment of linguistic knowledge, which, if (...) accepted, at least deprives the proponents of epistemic reductionism of claims to the universality of their position. (shrink)

Standardization has emerged as the dominant principle guiding the organization and provision of healthcare, with standards resultantly shaping how nurses conceptualize and deliver patient care. Standardization has been critiqued as homogenizing diverse patient experiences and diminishing nurses’ skills and critical thinking; however, there has been limited examination of the philosophical implications of standardization for nursing knowledge and practice. In this manuscript, I draw on Foucault's philosophy of order and categorization to inform an analysis of the consequences of healthcare (...) standardization for the profession of nursing. I utilize three exemplars to illustrate the impact of the primacy of standardized thinking and practices on nurses, patients and families: pain assessments using the 0‐10 pain scale; patient triage emergency departments through the Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale; and determination of cause of death within the context of the current opioid crisis. Through each exemplar, I demonstrate that standardization reductively constrains nursing knowledge and the health and healthcare experiences of patients and populations. I argue that the centrality of standardization must be re‐envisioned to embrace the complexity of health and more effectively and meaningfully frame nursing knowledge and practice within healthcare systems. (shrink)

In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analysis (...) then turns out either to be non-reductive, e.g., causal, or else falls prey to "gettier" counterexamples. my positive suggestion is that we eschew reductive analyses of epistemic concepts in favor of non-reductive analyses. (shrink)

In the article I consider whether philosophical anthropology offers knowledge about man. I begin with a definition of knowledge, then I present philosophical anthropology against the background of other kinds of anthropology. Having explained what is proper to it, I show that its goal cannot be the attainment of knowledge. Knowledge has requirements that an unreduced philosophical anthropology cannot fulfill; reduction deprives it of what is proper to it. However, the fact that it does not produce (...) knowledge is not a defect. The goal of my article is to create a common arena for considering various different approaches to man; this requires that the various parties admit that man cannot be reduced to what can be known about him. In order to know something, it is necessary to use carefully selected methods; it is not the case that merely saying something about man implies the possession of knowledge about him. (shrink)

This paper proposes an analysis of statements about universals according to which such statements assert nothing more than that the evidence we’d take to confirm them obtains, where this evidence is understood to consist solely of patterns in the behavior of particulars that cannot be explained by other regularities in the way things behave. On this analysis, to say that a universal exists is simply to say that there is such a pattern in the behavior of certain particulars, (...) and for any predicate F that is presumed to correspond to a universal, to say that a particular is F is simply to say that its behavior exhibits a pattern of this sort. I argue that there is no theoretical work that we want postulations and ascriptions of universals to do that they’d be unfit for if analyzed in this way, and consequently that there is no reason to treat such statements as asserting anything more than what the proposed analysis suggests. (shrink)

Sub-Saharan African countries have generally remained relatively poor for many decades, despite various internal and external measures. Every year, African governments conceive and implement poverty reduction and eradication policies, and multi-lateral agencies and developed countries provide development assistance to enable SSA countries achieve their development goals. This article utilises systems theory to advance the thesis that sub-Saharan countries’ failure to develop is, to a significant extent, a consequence of poor knowledge utilisation. The significance of knowledge utilisation arises from (...) the fact that in modern society, differentiation is pronounced and each sphere requires special knowledge for optimal outcomes. However, in sub-Saharan countries, knowledge is largely utilised to secure the vulgar goals of the political elite. When knowledge is perceived to require policies that are in disharmony with those goals, it is not utilised. This paper demonstrates that the selective under-utilisation of knowledge accounts for the failure of sub-Saharan countries to realise their development goals. The analysis concludes that while in his Social Systems Niklas Luhmann conceived society to be a constituent of systems and sub-systems that work to enable it to maintain and renew itself, in SSA countries dysfunctional political systems impede the process of self-maintenance and self-renewal. As such, Sub-Saharan states must re-orient to utilise knowledge correctly. Keywords Knowledge, modern society, differentiation, political elite, development. (shrink)

The “erasing race” effect is the reduction of the salience of “race” as an alliance cue when recalling coalition membership, once more accurate information about coalition structure is presented. We conducted a random-effects model meta-analysis of this effect using five United States studies (containing nine independent effect sizes). The effect was found (ρ = 0.137, K = 9, 95% CI = 0.085 to 0.188). However, no decline effect or moderation effects were found (a “decline effect” in this context would (...) be a decrease in the effect size over time). Furthermore, we found little evidence of publication bias. Synthetically correcting the effect size for bias stemming from the use of an older method for calculating error base rates reduced the magnitude of the effect, but the it remained significant. Taken together, these findings indicate that the “erasing race” effect generalizes quite well across experimental contexts and would, therefore, appear to be quite robust. We reinterpret the theoretical basis for these effects in line with Brunswikian evolutionary-developmental theory and present a series of predictions to guide future research in this area. (shrink)

We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.

This essay embarks on a thorough exploration of Edmund Husserl’s seminal contributions to the philosophical discourse on consciousness, with a particular focus on the dynamics of conscious decisions within the framework of phenomenology. By delving into Husserl’s nuanced examination of consciousness—its temporal structure, the nature of self-awareness, and the foundational concept of intentionality—the analysis reveals the intricate ways in which Husserl posits the transcendental ego as the nexus of meaning, judgment, and perception. The discussion illuminates how Husserl’s theory of (...) intentionality and the intentional act’s matter and quality serve as the cornerstone for understanding the will’s engagement with the world. Through a detailed exposition of Husserl’s ideas on the phenomenological reduction, the essay articulates the active role of consciousness in constituting reality and the ethical dimensions underpinning the exercise of free will. The paper argues that Husserl’s insights into conscious decision-making challenge conventional views by framing free will within the contexts of knowledge, ethical deliberation, and the ego’s autonomy. This essay contributes to the ongoing dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind by highlighting Husserl’s profound impact on our understanding of consciousness, agency, and the existential significance of human decisions. Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, Conscious Decisions, Transcendental Ego, Intentionality, Free Will, Consciousness, Epistemology, Temporality, Rationality, Autonomy, Phenomenological Reduction (Epoché), Intersubjectivity, Self-awareness. (shrink)

Originally published in 1940. Firstly, this book seeks to combine epistemology and the new developments of the time in psychology. It holds that no epistemology can be sound if it is psychologically defective, nor can a psychological analysis of knowledge be philosophically naïve. Secondly, it attempts to suggest a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation. Offering a significant reorientation to epistemological thought of its time, this work considers perception, sense and memory and examines the referential (...) theory of knowledge. It is a lucid and precisely organised reading and analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

Originally published in 1940. Firstly, this book seeks to combine epistemology and the new developments of the time in psychology. It holds that no epistemology can be sound if it is psychologically defective, nor can a psychological analysis of knowledge be philosophically naïve. Secondly, it attempts to suggest a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation. Offering a significant reorientation to epistemological thought of its time, this work considers perception, sense and memory and examines the referential (...) theory of knowledge. It is a lucid and precisely organised reading and analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

F. A. Hayek is uniquely responsible for his fellow economists grasping the importance of the decentralization of knowledge: as Hayek shows in his pathbreaking “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” knowledge nowhere exists as a coherent whole and to pretend otherwise is a most serious error. Hayek also shares responsibility for the popularity of a strong form of the methodological individualist research program which asserts that since collectives as such have no impact on the choices of individuals, (...) investigators ought to purge any reliance on collectives from our analysis. (shrink)

Originally published in 1940. Firstly, this book seeks to combine epistemology and the new developments of the time in psychology. It holds that no epistemology can be sound if it is psychologically defective, nor can a psychological analysis of knowledge be philosophically naïve. Secondly, it attempts to suggest a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation. Offering a significant reorientation to epistemological thought of its time, this work considers perception, sense and memory and examines the referential (...) theory of knowledge. It is a lucid and precisely organised reading and analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

We owe most scientific knowledge to methods of inquiry that are never formally analyzed. The analysis of behavior does not call for hypothetico-deductive methods. Statistics, taught in lieu of scientific method, is incompatible with major features of much laboratory research. Squeezing significance out of ambiguous data discourages the more promising step of scrapping the experiment and starting again. As a consequence, psychologists have taken flight from the laboratory. They have fled to Real People and the human interest of (...) “real life,” to Mathematical Models and the elegance of symbolic treatments, to the Inner Man and the explanatory preoccupation with inferred internal mechanisms, and to Laymanship and its appeal to “common sense.” An experimental analysis provides an alternative to these divertissements.The “theories” to which objection is raised here are not the basic assumptions essential to any scientific activity or statements that are not yet facts, but rather explanations which appeal to events taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions. Three types of learning theories satisfy this definition: physiological theories attempting to reduce behavior to events in the nervous system; mentalistic theories appealing to inferred inner events; and theories of the Conceptual Nervous System offered as explanatory models of behavior. It would be foolhardy to deny the achievements of such theories in the history of science. The question of whether they are necessary, however, has other implications.Experimental material in three areas illustrates the function of theory more concretely. Alternatives to behavior ratios, excitatory potentials, and so on demonstrate the utility of rate or probability of response as the basic datum in learning. Functional relations between behavior and environmental variables provide an account of why learning occurs. Activities such as preferring, choosing, discriminating, and matching can be dealt with solely in terms of behavior, without referring to processes in another dimensional system. The experiments are not offered as demonstrating that theories are not necessary but to suggest an alternative. Theory is possible in another sense. Beyond the collection of uniform relationships lies the need for a formal representation of the data reduced to a minimal number of terms. A theoretical construction may yield greater generality than any assemblage of facts; such a construction will not refer to another dimensional system. (shrink)

Scientific theories are analyzed in terms of the role that they play in science rather than in terms of their logical structure. It is maintained that theories: provide descriptions of the fundamental features of their domains; on the basis of 1, explain non-fundamental features of their domains; provide a guide for further research in their domains. Any set of propositions that carries out these functions with respect to some domain counts as a theory. This view of theories is developed and (...) defended, and provides the basis for reconsidering a number of issues in the philisophy of science. It is argued that theories need not be unrestrictedly universal with respect to space and time; that the distinction between observable and theoretical entities fails because observables do function as theoretical entities in scientific theories, that there is no genuine philosophical problem of reduction; that the notion of "levels" can be replaced by the notion of "domains"; and that theories are the basic unit of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa (...) and anumāna, and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe impact of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program on psychological outcomes and quality of life in lung cancer patients remains unclear. This meta-analysis aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the MBSR program on psychological states and QoL in lung cancer patients.MethodsEligible studies published before November 2021 were systematically searched from PubMed, EMBASE, Cochrane Library, PsycINFO, China National Knowledge Infrastructure, and Wanfang databases. The risk of bias in eligible studies was assessed using the Cochrane tool. Psychological variables and QoL (...) were evaluated as outcomes. We used the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation system to grade the levels of evidence. Statistical analysis was conducted using RevMan 5.4 and STATA 14.0.ResultsA total of 17 studies involving 1,680 patients were included for meta-analysis eventually. MBSR program significantly relieved cancer-related fatigue and negative psychological states, enhanced positive psychological states, and improved quality of sleep. Evidence on MBSR programs' overall treatment effect for QoL revealed a trend toward statistical significance.ConclusionBased on our findings, the MBSR program shows positive effects on psychological states in lung cancer patients. This approach should be recommended as a part of the rehabilitation program for lung cancer patients.Systematic Review Registrationhttps://archive.org/details/osf-registrations-mwvbq-v1, identifier: 10.17605/OSF.IO/MWVBQ. (shrink)

First published in 1958, this book focuses on the meaning, interpretation, and use of the verb 'to know'. In our daily lives we are often claiming to know this or not to know that; and it is not therefore surprising that the verb has played a major role in philosophical speculation from Plato down to Bertrand Russell. This book analyses the varying meanings of 'know' in its different operational roles: knowing Jones seems to have a different sort of logic from (...) knowing French or from knowing what to do - and equally from knowing that the earth is round and from knowing how to read music. Knowing something is also different from merely believing it. The main purpose of this book is to elucidate, in a new and original way, this whole question of the logical behaviour of 'know'; but its further and no less important purpose is to show how, once we have grasped the way in which certain key 'know'-statements function, a number of philosophical disputes may be discussed more fruitfully and settled more expeditiously. Some of the analyses offered will be regarded as controversial and will undoubtedly provoke discussion. The style is lucid and economical and technical terms are reduced to a minimum. This work is intended not only for the professional philosopher and the university student, but also for the general reader who is interested in the methods of modern philosophical analysis. (shrink)

This collection of essays, originally published in 1970 by Random House, gathers together some of the best initial responses to the problems raised by Edmund Gettier's celebrated critique of the traditional analysis of knowledge. Designed for upper-level courses and seminars in undergraduate philosophy programs and is intended as an introduction to epistemology from the analytic point of view.

The results of an empirical study into the perceptions of “hands-on” experts concerning the welfare of (non-human) animals in traveling circuses in the Netherlands are presented. A qualitative approach, based on in-depth conversations with trainers/performers, former trainers/performers, veterinarians, and an owner of an animal shelter, conveyed several patterns in the contextual construction of perceptions and the use of dissonance reduction strategies. Perceptions were analyzed with the help of the Symbolic Convergence Theory and the model of the frame of reference, consisting (...) of knowledge, convictions, values, norms, and interests. The study shows that the debate regarding animals in circuses in the Netherlands is centered on the level of welfare that is required; the importance of animal welfare is not disputed. Arguments that were used differed according to the respondents’ specific backgrounds and can be placed on a gradient ranging from the conviction that the welfare of animals in circuses is sufficiently warranted and both human and animal enjoy the performance (right end), to the conviction that animal welfare in circuses is negative, combined with the idea that the goal of entertaining people does not outweigh that (left end). The study confirms that perceptions reflect people’s contexts, though the variety in scopes suggests that the (inter)relations between people and their context are complex in nature. Evidence of cognitive dissonance was abundant. Coping strategies were found to be used more by respondents towards the right end of the gradient, suggesting that those respondents experience more ambivalence. This encountered pattern of association between position on the gradient and frequency of dissonance reduction strategies calls for further research on the type of ambivalent feelings experienced. The authors argue that, to come to an agreement about the welfare of animals in circuses, including the way this welfare should be guaranteed, stakeholders from different contexts need to engage in a dialogue in which a distance is taken from right/wrong-schemes and that starts from acceptance of dilemmas and ambiguity. (shrink)

Roderick Chisholm has offered a new attempt to define knowledge in the second edition of Theory of Knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to present an objection to that definiton.Here is the proposed definition :D6.4 h is known by 5 =df h is accepted by S; h is true; and h is nondefectively evident for 5.To understand D6.4 we need to know what it is for a proposition to be nondefectively evident for a person. That has the (...) following definition:D6.3 h is nondefectively evident for S=df Either h is sertain for S, or h is evident for S and is entailed by a conjunction of propositions each having for S a basis which is not a basis for any false proposition.There are four technical expressions in D6.3: “entailed,” “certain” “evident,” and “basis.“. (shrink)

In “Facts: Particulars of Information Units?”, Kratzer proposed a causal analysis of knowledge in which knowledge is defined as a form of de re belief of facts. In support of Kratzer’s view, I show that a certain articulation of the de re/de dicto distinction can be used to integrally account for the original pair of Gettier cases. In contrast to Kratzer, however, I think such an account does not fundamentally require a distinction between facts and true propositions. (...) I then discuss whether this account might be generalized and whether it can give us a reductive analysis of knowledge as de re true belief. Like Kratzer, I think it will not, in particular the distinction appears inadequate to account for Ginet-Goldman cases of causally connected but unreliable belief. Nevertheless, I argue that the de re belief analysis allows us to account for a distinction Starmans and Friedman recently introduced between apparent evidence and authentic evidence in their empirical study of Gettier cases, in a way that questions their claim that a causal disconnect is not operative in the contrasts they found. (shrink)

The expectation is fulfilled, but in an unexpected way. 'The first studies toward this book were addressed to topics in the field of ethics' ; but our author, like Wagner composing 'Der Ring des Nibelungen', found himself becoming preoccupied with prolegomena. To these the present volume is wholly devoted. In order to establish its fundamental thesis that valuation is a form of empirical knowledge, two preparatory discussions are called for. An analysis of empirical knowledge in general is (...) one of these; but there is an inquiry properly prior even to this, an examination of the topic of meaning. The articulation of the book is accordingly tripartite; and Book I Meaning and Analytic Truth, Book II Empirical Knowledge, and Book III Valuation are of roughly equal length. (shrink)