Research-oriented universities are known for prolific research activity that is often supported by students in faculty-guided research. To maintain ethical standards, universities require on-going training of both faculty and students to ensure Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR). However, previous research has indicated RCR-based training is insufficient to address the ethical dilemmas that are prevalent within academic settings: navigating issues of authorship, modeling relationships between faculty and students, minimization of risk, and adequate informed consent. U.S. universities must explore ways to identify (...) and improve RCR concerns for current (faculty) and future researchers (students). This article reports the findings of a self-study (_N_ = 50) of research stakeholders (students and faculty) at a top tier research institution. First, we report on their perceived importance of applying RCR principles. Second, we explore relationships between stakeholder backgrounds (e.g., prior training, field, and position) and how they ranked the degree of ethical concerns in fictitious vignettes that presented different unethical issues university students could encounter when conducting research. Vignette rankings suggested concerns of inappropriate relationships, predatory authorship and IRB violations which were judged as most unethical, which was dissimilar to what sampled researchers reported in practice as the most important RCR elements to understand and adhere to for successful research. Regression models indicated there was no significant relationship between individuals’ vignette ethics scores and backgrounds, affirming previous literature suggesting that training can be ineffectual in shifting researcher judgments of ethical dilemmas. Recommendations for training are discussed. (shrink)

Mathematicians judge proofs to possess, or lack, a variety of different qualities, including, for example, explanatory power, depth, purity, beauty and fit. Philosophers of mathematical practice have begun to investigate the nature of such qualities. However, mathematicians frequently draw attention to another desirable proof quality: being motivated. Intuitively, motivated proofs contain no "puzzling" steps, but they have received little further analysis. In this paper, I begin a philosophical investigation into motivated proofs. I suggest that a proof is motivated if and (...) only if mathematicians can identify (i) the tasks each step is intended to perform; and (ii) where each step could have reasonably come from. I argue that motivated proofs promote understanding, convey new mathematical resources and stimulate new discoveries. They thus have significant epistemic benefits and directly contribute to the efficient dissemination and advancement of mathematical knowledge. Given their benefits, I also discuss the more practical matter of how we can produce motivated proofs. Finally I consider the relationship between motivated proofs and proofs which are explanatory, beautiful and fitting. (shrink)

The revised Common Rule adopts the reasonable person standard to guide research disclosure. Some members of the research community contend that the standard is confusing and ill-suited to the research oversight system. Yet the revised rule is not as radical as it might seem. During the 1970s, judges started using the standard to evaluate negligence claims brought by injured patients who said doctors had failed to obtain informed consent to the harmful procedures. In its influential Belmont Report, the National (...) Commission recommended application of a “reasonable volunteer standard” to guide IRBs evaluating research disclosures. Evidence also suggests that IRBs often invoke the reasonable person standard in deliberations about consent forms. But past application of the standard has been informal and uneven. Robust application of the reasonable person standard will require researchers and IRBs to learn more about what ordinary people want and need to know about the studies they are invited to join. Input from people with personal experience as study participants could be particularly useful to this effort. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Please Help Me”Rebecca L. VolpeTwo–year–old Jay was born prematurely at 26 weeks gestation, addicted to opiates. After several months in the Neonatal ICU, he was sent home, ventilator–dependent but with a high likelihood of survival and a low chance of severe, lasting disability. When Jay was 1½, he had a cardiopulmonary arrest at home. The parents of children who are on ventilators at home receive extensive education and (...) training about how to respond to something like an arrest. They are taught that a quick response is often critical to their child’s long–term prognosis. And yet, Jay’s parents took such a long time to respond to his code that Jay now has severe hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy: his brain was deprived of oxygen for so long that he has no higher cortical function, and will never think, speak, walk, or play.Currently, Jay is ventilator–dependent and has a very poor prognosis. Jay goes back and forth between a nursing home and the hospital. During one of his many hospitalizations, the ICU team decided to call an ethics consultation, because they felt that continued aggressive intervention was no longer in Jay’s best interests. I was the person on the other end of the line when the medical team called. After having a brief conversation with the attending physician, I left my office and walked to the Pediatric ICU to visit Jay. I arrived at the bedside—really just a large crib—and saw a baby with dark hair lying flat on his back. His tongue was swollen and protruding from his mouth, his eyes were puffy and closed, and his limbs were limp. On his belly was a piece of paper with the words, “BECKY PLEASE HELP ME” typed in huge, bold font. I looked up, into the eyes of the attending physician and said, “Did you type that?” The physician nodded yes. Much could be said about this physician’s behavior. But the bottom line—from a clinical perspective, at least—is that this ICU team was desperate, and that they had significant expectations that I would be able to help them.I began the work of the consultation. I reviewed the medical record, spoke with members of the treating team, and set up a time to talk to the family. During the family meeting, I learned that Jay’s parents wanted to continue to treat aggressively, and that they believed it was not their place to decide when it was their son’s time to die. That was [End Page 122] God’s decision. They could not fathom removing interventions that were maintaining their son’s life. They acknowledged that his quality of life was not high, but, still, it was life.The preferences of the treating team were in stark contrast to the parents’ preferences. The neurologists believed Jay did not have the capacity to experience physical pain, but the ICU team believed that continuing to treat Jay was cruel. Although the ICU team acknowledged that Jay was probably not suffering, they noted that we could not know for sure, and that sometimes Jay grimaced and withdrew—signs that are often interpreted as suffering. The ICU team also argued that given all the sick children in the world, and the scarcity of healthcare resources, it didn’t make sense to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars into prolonging Jay’s life. Additionally, they discovered that Jay had osteopenia (weak, brittle bones)—which was causing multiple bone fractures. The ICU team anguished over the thought of Jay’s small, soft bones continuing to break despite their best efforts.The bioethicist in me knows that, as long as the patient isn’t suffering and the parents aren’t demanding futile interventions (they weren’t), our role as providers was not to judge the parents’ value system. I told the ICU team over and over that different people place different value on Jay’s type of life, and that it wasn’t for us to tell them that their value structure was wrong. I talked with other members of the clinical ethics consultation service. Then I brought the case to the entire institutional... (shrink)

What role does audience uptake play in determining whether a speaker refuses or consents to sex? Proponents of constitution theories of uptake argue that which speech act someone performs is largely determined by their addressee’s uptake. However, this appears to entail a troubling result: a speaker might be made to perform a speech act of sexual consent against her will. In response, we develop a social constitution theory of uptake. We argue that addressee uptake can constitute a speaker’s utterance of (...) ‘no’ as a speech act of consent under some conditions, but that this does not prevent us from judging that an addressee committed rape. Second, we claim that addressee uptake is not the only form of uptake that matters—the uptake of other members of the discursive community matters too, and can override the addressee’s uptake, constituting the speaker’s utterance as the speech act it was intended to be. (shrink)

We can understand objectivity, in the broadest sense of the term, as epistemic accountability to the real. Since at least the 1986 publication of Sandra Harding’s The Science Question in Feminism, so-called standpoint epistemologists have sought to build an understanding of such objectivity that does not essentially anchor it to a dislocated, ‘view from nowhere’ stance on the part of the judging subject. Instead, these theorists have argued that a proper understanding of objectivity must recognize that different agential standpoints offer (...) different access to objective truths, with some standpoints holding better epistemic potential than others. As Harding puts it, standpoint epistemology calls for “a critical evaluation of which social situations tend to generate the most objective knowledge claims” so as to identify those standpoints that “produce empirically more accurate descriptions and theoretically richer explanations” (1991, 142, 149). Which standpoints enable the most objectivity with respect to a particular inquiry is, for the standpoint theorists, always an empirical at least as much as a conceptual question; it requires attention to the actual, material relationship between knowers, knowledge practices, and objects known. Standpoint epistemology was developed primarily by self-identiªed feminist epistemologists. Virtually all developments of standpoint episte-. (shrink)

Salsa dancing, a partnered dance premised on the felt sense of connection, is well suited to an exploration of Henry’s radical phenomenology of immanence and Heidegger’s facticity of life. Birthed in social celebratory contexts, salsa carries a particular motile freedom. What matters most is not how the dance movements are created from an outer frame of reference, but the experience of interactive responsiveness that emerges from unanticipated acts of giving life to another. Connecting to one’s partner and exuding a presence (...) filled with life is revealed in an indepth interview with two-time world champion salsa dancer, judge, choreographer and coach, Anya Katsevman. This interview attempts to invoke the kinetic, kinesthetic and affective registers of the lividness and livingness of salsa dancing. As a phenomenological inquiry into factical life, the inter-view is presented not so much as a matter of shared perspectives or viewpoints, but more in the way of an inter-feeling, a practice of life engagement. This affectively-oriented approach provides both promise and challenge to the field of phenomenology. It invites us to delve more deeply into feeling acts of seeing. It also helps us understand how, through attending more fully to acts of seeing, we can increase the intensity with which we feel the upsurge of life. (shrink)

The recent decision of the House of Lords in Stack v. Dowden appears, at first sight, to endorse a new approach to the jointly owned family home. However, upon closer inspection, this proves to be something of an illusion: the new approach is remarkably similar to the traditional resulting trust in that it attaches more weight to financial payments than to other contributions. A further problem is that the disjunction between the reasoning of the judges and the actual result (...) makes it a difficult decision to apply to future cases. This case-note will consider the legal and social issues raised by the case and will argue that it has the potential to disadvantage women who do not make an equal financial contribution to the purchase of the home. (shrink)

In 2017, federal officials issued a revised version of the Common Rule, the federal regulations that govern much of the human subject research conducted in the United States. Two provisions on information disclosure have reportedly provoked confusion among researchers and people responsible for research oversight. These provisions incorporate the familiar and foundational legal concept known as the reasonable person standard, applying this to research disclosure. Although other, long‐standing Common Rule provisions require reasonableness judgments, the new provisions differ in that they (...) require reasonableness to be judged from the ordinary person's perspective instead of the perspective of scientists, clinicians, and other experts generally involved in designing and reviewing human studies. (shrink)

Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality at play in mathematical proofs. The approach adopted consists in viewing mathematical proofs as reports of proof activities—that is, sequences of deductive inferences—and in characterizing the rationality of the former in terms of that of the latter. It is argued that proof activities are governed by specific norms of rational planning agency, and (...) that a deductive step in a mathematical proof qualifies as rational whenever the corresponding deductive inference in the associated proof activity figures in a plan that has been constructed rationally. It is then shown that mathematical proofs whose associated proof activities violate these norms are likely to be judged as defective by mathematical agents, thereby providing evidence that these norms are indeed present in mathematical practice. We conclude that, if mathematical proofs are not mere sequences of deductive steps, if they possess a rational structure, it is because they are the product of rational planning agents. (shrink)

Who should define what constitutes ethical and lawful medical practice? Judges? Doctors? Scientists? Or someone else entirely? This volume analyses how effectively criminal law operates as a forum for resolving ethical conflict in the delivery of health care. It addresses key questions such as: how does criminal law regulate controversial bioethical areas? What effect, positive or negative, does the use of criminal law have when regulating bioethical conflict? And can the law accommodate moral controversy? By exploring criminal law in (...) theory and in practice and examining the broad field of bioethics as opposed to the narrower terrain of medical ethics, it offers balanced arguments that will help readers form reasoned views on the ethical legitimacy of the invocation and use of criminal law to regulate medical and scientific practice and bioethical issues. (shrink)

Who should define what constitutes ethical and lawful medical practice? Judges? Doctors? Scientists? Or someone else entirely? This volume analyses how effectively criminal law operates as a forum for resolving ethical conflict in the delivery of health care. It addresses key questions such as: how does criminal law regulate controversial bioethical areas? What effect, positive or negative, does the use of criminal law have when regulating bioethical conflict? And can the law accommodate moral controversy? By exploring criminal law in (...) theory and in practice and examining the broad field of bioethics as opposed to the narrower terrain of medical ethics, it offers balanced arguments that will help readers form reasoned views on the ethical legitimacy of the invocation and use of criminal law to regulate medical and scientific practice and bioethical issues. (shrink)

Children tend to view equal resource distributions as more fair than unequal ones, but will sometimes view even unequal distributions as fair. However, less is known about how children form judgments about inequality when different procedures are used. In the present study, we investigated children’s consideration of procedures, outcomes, and emotions when judging the fairness of unequal resource distributions. Participants were introduced to a Fair Coin and an Unfair Coin. In two between-subjects conditions, they watched a researcher flip either the (...) Fair or Unfair Coin in order to distribute resources unequally between two child recipients. Participants then rated the fairness of this event, provided verbal justifications for their ratings, and rated the emotional state of each recipient. Results revealed that participants rated the event as more fair in the Fair Coin than the Unfair Coin condition. References to the outcome in children’s justifications predicted lower fairness ratings, while references to the procedure only predicted lower ratings in the Unfair Coin condition. Greater Emotion Difference Scores predicted lower fairness ratings, and this effect increased with age. Together, these results show that children consider procedures, outcomes, and emotions when judging the fairness of inequality. Moreover, results suggest age-related increases in consideration of recipients’ emotions makes inequality seem less fair, even when fair procedures are used. Implications for the development of fairness are discussed. (shrink)

When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor's mental states. Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction, an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment and during moral judgment. In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the (...) actor's mental states. A particularly striking effect occurred for attempted harms : Relative to TMS to a control site, TMS to the RTPJ caused participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible. Thus, interfering with activity in the RTPJ disrupts the capacity to use mental states in moral judgment, especially in the case of attempted harms. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between social background factors and educational achievements. It draws on unique data from London LEAs. The paper illustrates detail analysis on levels of disadvantage in schools and the complexities of judging school performance including discussion on the potential of z-score indicators to measure the levels of deprivation in urban area schools. Overall, the findings from the empirical evidence suggests that there is a strong relationship between disadvantage and examination success, with LEAs located in non-deprived areas (...) tending to obtain higher percentages 5 + A*-C good GCSE passes. Further analysis of the relationship between pupils background and school achievement also confirmed, by and large, that schools with a higher number of disadvantaged families do less well than schools where, a small proportion of their pupils come from disadvantaged families. The paper concluded that uncontextualised performance table is fundamentally flawed and argued for the need to compare like with like and move beyond league table approaches of comparing schools. Policy implications are highlighted as well as practical suggestions. (shrink)

In August, Amnesty International and the World Medical Association expressed concern at reports that a judge in Saudi Arabia had asked several hospitals in the country whether they could perform an operation to damage a man's spinal cord as punishment for attacking another man and leaving him paralysed. The man had already been sentenced to seven months imprisonment for the crime, the injured victim requested the further sentence under Sharia Law, which is strictly enforced across Saudi Arabia. According to reports, (...) one of the hospitals approached declined on ethical grounds. Another hospital stated that it was possible to damage the spinal cord in the way requested, but that the procedure would have to be done at a specialised hospital. 1In its statement, Amnesty International urged the authorities not to carry out the sentence, which it argued would be a grave violation of international human rights law and contravene the United Nations convention against Torture, to which Saudi Arabia is a state party. 2 The WMA expressed its support for the physicians who refused to carry out the request by the Saudi court, participation in which would constitute a severe breach of medical ethics. 3 The WMA reminded doctors that the Declaration of Tokyo clearly states that no physician should participate in the practice of torture or any other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, whatever the offence of which the victim of such procedures is suspected, accused or guilty of. The Declaration also includes a prohibition of participation in the planning or advising for such a procedure. NHS white paperIn July 2010 the government published a White Paper outlining its plans to transform the delivery of National Health Services in England. 4 The White Paper has been described as ‘one of the biggest shake ups of the health system …. (shrink)

Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t (...) drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm. (shrink)

### Marris Bill In June 2015, Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Rob Marris, who topped the ballot for private members’ bills, introduced the Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill (‘the Marris Bill’) into the House of Commons. The Marris Bill was nearly identical to the Falconer Bill debated in the House of Lords early in the year (Eth 20, 2014–2015), and would permit competent, terminally ill adults with a clear and settled intention to end their life to receive physician assistance to (...) do so. Two doctors must be satisfied that the persons are terminally ill and are reasonably expected to die within 6 months, have the capacity (construed in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005) and have a clear and settled intention to end their lives, which have been reached voluntarily, on an informed basis. The Marris Bill also included one of the amendments approved at Committee Stage of the Falconer Bill, which, in addition to the need for two doctors to be satisfied as to the eligibility criteria, would require all requests to be approved by a judge of the High Court (Family Division). Further to this, the Marris Bill included two new clauses: first, a requirement for High Court Judges to rule on requests within 14 days1 and, second, a requirement for any doctor with doubts about the capacity of a person requesting assistance to refer that person for assessment to ‘an appropriate specialist’.2 The Marris Bill received its second reading in the House of Commons on 11 September 2015, where it was overwhelmingly rejected by 330 votes to 118.3 A large number of those who opposed the Bill did so on the grounds that it had the potential to go beyond its limits and to pressurise the elderly and other vulnerable people, particularly those without family support, to consider …. (shrink)

### High Court rejects assisted dying challenge The High Court has rejected the latest challenge to the law on assisted dying in the UK, brought by Noel Conway. Mr Conway, a retired college lecturer, was diagnosed with motor neuron disease in 2012. Since his diagnosis, his health has deteriorated and he is dependent on ever-increasing levels of assistance with daily life, including the use of non-invasive ventilation to help him breathe. He sought a declaration from the court that section 2 (...) of the Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible with his right to a private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As part of his case, Mr Conway submitted the outline of an alternative statutory scheme, which he argued, if implemented, would provide sufficient safeguards. He submitted that the prohibition on assisted suicide should not apply where an individual is aged 18 and over; has been diagnosed with a terminal illness and has a clinically assessed prognosis of 6 months or less to live; has the mental capacity to make the decision; makes that decision in a voluntary, clear and settled manner; and retains the ability to undertake the final act. Additionally, two doctors must confirm that the individual meets the criteria, and permission for the provision of assistance must be authorised by a High Court judge. Previous challenges to the UK law on assisted dying, including Pretty and Nicklinson, had established that section 2 of the Suicide Act does engage individual’s Article 18 rights, but that such an interference could be justified under Article 8 of the ECHR, which permits interference ‘such as is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country’. The question …. (shrink)

Re AA and Re P : the ‘forced caesarean’ caseOn 30 November 2013 The Telegraph reported that Essex County Council Social Services had obtained a High Court Order against a woman that allowed her to be forcibly sedated and her child removed by caesarean section and taken into care.1 The original story reported that the woman, an Italian national who had been in the UK on a short-term basis for work, had experienced ‘something of a panic attack’ and, after calling (...) the police, was compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Five weeks later, the report said, she was restrained, forcibly sedated and awoke hours later to find that, pursuant to a court order obtained by Essex County Council Social Services, her baby had been removed by caesarean section and taken into care by social workers.The story was subsequently reported in a number of other media outlets and prompted such widespread outrage that the presiding judge, Mr Justice Mostyn, took the unprecedented step of releasing both the judgement of the initial application to the Court of Protection and the verbatim transcript of proceedings. It became apparent that the facts of the case had been drastically misreported by the media and that coverage had conflated two very separate issues: the medical procedure of the caesarean section and the taking of the child into local authority care.The initial case heard in the Court of Protection on 23 August 2012, Re AA,2 was the result of an application made not by the local authority or social workers seeking to remove the child but by Mid-Essex National Health Service Trust seeking a declaration and an order, on the basis of medical evidence, that the patient lacked capacity and that it would be in her best interests to undergo a caesarean section. Mr Justice Mostyn found in …. (shrink)

Previous work in Game Studies has centered on several loci of investigation in seeking to understand virtual gameworlds. First, researchers have scrutinized the concept of the virtual world itself and how it relates to the idea of “the magic circle”. Second, the field has outlined various forms of experienced “presence”. Third, scholarship has noted that the boundaries between the world of everyday life and virtual worlds are porous, and that this fosters a multiplicity of identities as players identify both with (...) themselves-offline and themselves-in-game. Despite widespread agreement that these topics are targets for research, so far those working on these topics do not have mutually agreed-upon framework. Here we draw upon the work of Alfred Schutz to take up this call. We provide a phenomenological framework which can be used to describe the phenomena of interest to Game Studies, as well as open new avenues of inquiry, in a way acceptable and useful to all. This helps to distinguish the core of the field from the supplemental theoretical and critical commitments which characterize diverse approaches within the field. (shrink)

Generation Y is a cohort of the population larger than the baby boom generation. Consisting of approximately 80 million people born between 1981 and 2000, Generation Y is the most recent cohort to enter the workforce. Workplaces are being redefined and organizations are being pressed to adapt as this new wave of workers is infused into business environments. One critical aspect of this phenomenon not receiving sufficient research attention is the impact of Gen Y ethical beliefs and ethical conduct in (...) workplace contexts. It is widely accepted that distinct generational experiences shape ethical ideologies and ethical ideologies in turn affect the way people function in the workplace. Thus, Gen Y’s unique cohort experiences are likely to shape their ethical ideologies and consequent workplace judgments and actions. In this article, we examine Gen Y’s ethical ideology and study its impact on workplace functioning regarding leadership style, teamwork, and judgments about ethical violations. Our analyses indicate that Gen Y’ers tend toward situationalism (high idealism and high relativism), and their socially connected orientation produces more lenient judgments of collaborative vs. unilateral ethical violations. However, Gen Y’ers do exhibit individual variation. Relativist Gen Y’ers are more tolerant of ethical violations, whereas, Gen Y Idealists are less tolerant of ethical violations. High Idealists also show stronger teamwork and leadership characteristics. In addition, Gen Y’ers possessing servant leader traits exhibit incrementally better teamwork, and greater perceived unacceptability of ethical violations. We conclude by discussing implications of these findings for managing ethical climates and conduct. (shrink)

Games Studies reveals the performative nature of playing a character in a virtual-game-world (Nitsche 2008, p.205; Pearce 2006, p.1; Taylor 2002, p.48). Tbe Player/Character relationship is typically understood in terms of the player’s in-game “presence” (Boellstorff 2008, p.89; Schroeder 2002, p.6). This gives the appearance that living-into a game-world is an all-or- nothing affair: either the player is “present” in the game-world, or they are not. I argue that, in fact, a constitutive phenomenology reveals the Player/Character relationship to be a (...) multi-dimensional matter of empathy. I advance a broadly Schutzian framework, drawing on his 1932 discussions of “face-to-face encounters” and ”historical predecessors,” showing how at- tention to empathy reveals a variety of “presences” that different kinds of Player/Character relationships afford. The central determinants of empathetic affordances which I focus on here are (i) how much players know about a character (especially the character’s past) and (ii) how players learn this information.The purpose of this discussion will be to show that a phenomenological analysis reveals that the relationship between a player and their character is complex, highly variable, and inherently social. Furthermore, it will add to the growing body of scholarship that demonstrates that video games are rich social objects deserving of study. (shrink)

Many research projects rely on human biological materials and some of these projects generate revenue. Recently, it has been argued that investigators have a moral claim to share in the revenue generated by these projects, whereas persons who provide the biological material have no such claim (Truog, Kesselheim, and Joffe 2012). In this paper, we critically analyze this view and offer a positive proposal for why tissue providers have a moral claim to benefit. Focusing on payment as a form of (...) benefit, we argue that research is a joint project and propose a contribution principle for paying participants in those joint projects. We distinguish between contributions that shape a project’s revenue generating properties, grounding a claim to payment, and contributions that fail to ground such a claim. We conclude, contrary to existing arguments and practices, that some tissue providers have a moral claim to payment beyond compensation for risk and burden. This conclusion suggests that investigators, institutions, and sponsors should reconsider the fairness of their current practices. (shrink)

In this eloquent collection of essays, Rebecca Martusewicz positions a philosophy of education that relies on what transpires between teachers and learners in various contexts. She thoughtfully analyzes how, in the relationship between teachers and learners, all kinds of ideas, beliefs, interpretations, and meanings are generated as a result of potent generative forces that depend, as she demonstrates using post-structuralist theories, on difference as their fuel. Ultimately she argues that to become educated requires an attention to the welfare of (...) self and others and a willingness to confront and shift one’s own habits, practices, and beliefs for that purpose. This work contains: clear translations of post-structuralist theories such as those of Deleuze, Serres, and Derrida; well-written essays that blend good storytelling, theory, and ethical analysis to reconceptualize education as the means toward social justice; and a clear argument for the drawing together of analyses of difference introduced by post-structuralism with attention to ethics and social justice as they apply to education. (shrink)

Focusing on the paradoxes revealed in the multibillion dollar mistake of the Universal Camouflage Pattern and the expansive ambit of a leaked National Security Agency briefing on its approach to “identity intelligence,” this article analyzes security glitches arising from the state’s application of mechanized logics to security and visibility. Presuming that a digital-looking pattern would be more deceptive than designs inspired by natural forms, in 2004, the US Army adopted a pixelated “digital” camouflage pattern, a print that rendered soldiers more, (...) rather than less, visible in the field; it acknowledged this error in 2012. Two years later, “Identity Intelligence: Image Is Everything” visualized the episteme of National Security Agency surveillance with an illustration detailing hundreds of different types of data—biometric, biographic, and contextual—that the agency believes it could exploit to identify and monitor “targets of interest.” These glitches originate in technofetishistic convictions about the nature of digital images and information, limited ways of imagining bodies and lives, and reductive understandings of complex relationships between power and perception. Together, they expose the paradoxes that arise as the state tries to extend its power over the body and the contingency of that power on the smallest of things. (shrink)

This article argues that Vico’s theory of history should be construed as an ontological constructionist account as opposed to its usual realist interpretation. In support of this interpretation I draw upon two important concepts issuing from the body of the Scienza nuova: the notion of ‘‘storia’’ and the verum ipsum factum principle. Both concepts are not only consistent with an ontological constructionist interpretation of Vico’s theory of history but function as powerful explanatory devices in the context of such an interpretation. (...) I show the advantage this interpretation holds for overcoming one of the main charges brought against the Scienza nuova when it is interpreted as presenting a realist conception of history. In highlighting the possibility and, indeed, textual advantages of construing Vico’s theory of history as an ontological constructionist account I claim that Vico may have anticipated the constructionist tradition by some 200 years and may be considered as the founder of constructionism in the philosophy of history. (shrink)

(2013). Affirming and Rethinking our Visions and Responsibilities as Social Foundations Scholars and Educators. Educational Studies: Vol. 49, Critical, Interpretive, and Normative Perspectives of Educational Foundations: Contributions for the 21st Century, pp. 101-103.