What kind of reality is legal reality, how is it created, and what are its a priori foundations? These are the central questions asked by the early phenomenologists who took interest in social ontology and law. While Reinach represents the well-known “realist” approach to phenomenology of law, Felix Kaufmann and Fritz Schreier belonged to the “positivist” “Vienna School of Jurisprudence,” combining Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—and thereby challenging Reinach’s views on how legal (...) class='Hi'>reality and the legal a priori were to be conceived. This paper addresses the controversy between these positivist and realist approaches to phenomenology of law, with the goal of introducing the lesser known theories of Kaufmann and Schreier. The special focus on their critique of Reinach’s outline should give us an overview of their positions vis-à-vis the basic and a priori elements of which legal reality consists and the role that phenomenology plays in analyzing them. There is one general tendency to be noted: While the phenomenological legal positivists see the root of legal reality in an act of interpretation according to a “normative scheme of interpretation,” Reinach locates the roots of legal reality in social interaction and argues for the existence of entities independent of any interpretation. (shrink)

This volume features fourteen essays that examine the works of key figures within the phenomenological movement in a clear and accessible way. It presents the fertile, groundbreaking, and unique aspects of phenomenological theorizing against the background of contemporary debate about social ontology and collective intentionality. The expert contributors explore the insights of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, and Max Scheler. Readers will also learn about other sources that, although almost wholly neglected by historians of philosophy, testify (...) to the vitality of the phenomenological tradition. In addition, the contributions highlight the systematic relevance of phenomenological research by pinpointing its position on social ontology and collective intentionality within the history of philosophy. By presenting phenomenological contributions in a scholarly yet accessible way, this volume introduces an interesting and important perspective into contemporary debate insofar as it bridges the gap between the analytical and the continental traditions in social philosophy. The volume provides readers with a deep understanding into such questions as: What does it mean to share experiences with others? What does it mean to share emotions with friends or to share intentions with partners in a joint endeavor? What are groups? What are institutional facts like money, universities, and cocktail parties? What are values and what role do values play in social reality? (shrink)

In 1984, John W. Yolton published Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid. His most recent book builds on that seminal work and greatly extends its relevance to issues in current philosophical debate. Perception and Reality examines the theories of perception implicit in the work of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers which centered on the question: How is knowledge of the body possible? That question raises issues of mind-body relation, the way that mentality links with physicality, and the nature of the (...) known world. In contrast to commonsense realism, which suggests that the world is as it appears to be, a more complex theory developed throughout this period. Yolton traces its evolution from Descartes to Kant, via Arnauld, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Yolton explains that the new theory postulated two interactive relations between perceivers and the physical world, one physical and causal, the other cognitive. An understanding of this double relation is important for an accurate construction of the history of philosophy. It is also important for contemporary thought because it suggests a way to account for representation (cognitivity) and realism at the same time. (shrink)

Review of Sorina Paula Bolovan (ed.), Ciprian Firea, Nicoleta Marţian, Sorin Marţian, Diana Covaci, Călătorie prin patrimoniul ecleziastic transilvănean. Ghid istoric, artistic şi pastoral (Journey through the Transylvanian Ecclesiastic Heritage. Historical, Artistic and Pastoral Guide), (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2011).

The treatment of history by philosophers seems to have entered upon a new phase, as regards the questions both what kind of knowledge we are dealing with and what is the relation of the historic experience to reality. As Professor Guido de Ruggiero pointed out in the April number of the Journal , this interest in the problems of history has not received much recognition in English thought at present. It is the purpose of the argument of (...) the present article to maintain that whilst there are two methods of approach to reality, the one through knowledge and speculative thought, the other through history and practical experience, a philosophical interpretation is necessary to the understanding of history, though philosophies of history as usually conceived are not possible. The dualism of experience to which reference is here made is not identical with the dualism with which Professor de Ruggiero is concerned. (shrink)

A New York Times Notable Book of the Year “For anyone wanting to understand the twists and turns of the history of ideas, this book will be indispensable.”―John Gray, New York Times Book Review The Sense of Reality was the last new collection of essays published by Isaiah Berlin in his lifetime. All informed by Berlin’s lifelong fascination with the history of ideas, these engaging studies range widely: the subjects explored include realism in history; judgment in (...) politics; the history of socialism; the nature and impact of Marxism; the radical cultural revolution instigated by the Romantics; Russian notions of artistic commitment; and the origins and practice of nationalism. The title essay, taking its cue from the impossibility of recreating a bygone epoch, is a superb centerpiece. Now with a new foreword by Timothy Snyder and a new appendix comprising a previously unpublished essay on the great Russian critic Vissarion Belinksy and a previously uncollected lecture on utopianism, The Sense of Reality is a rich and illuminating collection from one of the most seductive writers and thinkers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This book traces a deep misunderstanding about the relation of concepts and reality in the history of philosophy. It exposes the influence of the mistake in the thought of Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Nietzche and Bradley, and suggests that the solution can be found in Hegelian thought. Ellis argues that the treatment proposed exemplifies Hegel's dialectical method. This is an important contribution to this area of philosophy.

I begin by asking an engagingly naive question that a layman would have every right to put to us - and often has. Why should we interest ourselves seriously in the once-upon-a-time worlds of fiction - these unreal stories about unreal individuals? It has been a persistent question in the history of criticism - ever since Plato called the poet a liar - and it is a question at once obvious and embarrassing. It is obvious because, for the apologist (...) for imaginative literature, it becomes a prolegomenon to all further questions; and it is embarrassing because merely to ask it threatens to put literature out of business and, with it, all those who treat it as a serious and world-affecting art. Why, then, should we interest ourselves seriously in fictions? However elementary, it is a question that is more easily asked than answered. Murray Krieger is the author of The Tragic Vision and The Classic Vision, which have recently been reprinted in the two-volume paperback Visions of Extremity in Modern Literature. He is University Professor of English and director of the Program of Critical Theory at the University of California at Irvine. "Poetic Presence and Illusion: Renaissance Theory and the Duplicity of Metaphor," another contribution to Critical Inquiry, appeared in the Winter 1974 issue. See also: "The Dismantling of a Marionette Theater; or, Psychology and the Misinterpretation of Literature" by Erich Heller in Vol. 4, No. 3. (shrink)

It is stressed that any theory of which it is claimed that it is compatible both with standard realism and with the experimental data is subject to severe constraints. One is that it must either incorporate superluminal influences or negate the free will of the experimentalist. The other one is that, in it. it is only at the price of accepting “backward causality” that a measurement can he interpreted as revealing the value the measured quantity had, just before, rather than (...) just after, the measurement look place. (shrink)

This book highlights Kant's fundamental contrast between the mechanistic and dynamical conceptions of matter, which is central to his views about the foundations of physics, and is best understood in terms of the contrast between objects of sensibility and things in themselves.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 491 adequacy of his ideas. Yet our view of a person's character can govern our view of what he is trying to do. More specifically, if we think Dewey never completely abandoned the idealistic standpoint with its emphasis upon the harmony of self and community realization, that he sought out easy solutions to tough moral problems, we will not regard his work as making an honest attempt (...) even to face these problems. (Coughlan is very sympathetic to Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey on this point.) Viewing Dewey in this way, one is tempted to come to Coughlan's conclusion that there is an ambiguity in Dewey's philosophy about how values are created and, moreover, that this conclusion "haunts any philosophy.., that does not allow itself to appeal to some transcendent source" (pp. 161-162). By the time we reach this latter conclusion we have forgotten that the aim of Dewey's moral philosophy is not to point to some transcendent source that tells us what is "right" to do. Indeed, to the extent that we appeal to such a source, we are apt to ignore the existent factors that are responsible for creating the problem. Put another way, Dewey's standpoint requires that we reject the view that one of the parties to a moral conflict is wrong because he holds the wrong moral rule and the other right because he holds to some rule that truly tells us what we "ought" to do. Instead, he maintains that the origin of the conflict is within the situation itself, and the only way out of the conflict (if there is a way out) is to take advantage of or even reconstruct the factors in the situation. Instrumentalism is the position, itself always open to revision and reconstruction on particular points, that the philosopher can offer an interpretation of moral and political problems that makes them more amenable to resolution. The philosopher, unlike the casuist, cannot tell us what to do. He attempts to provide a conception of ourselves and our social situation that will enable us to go about doing. On specific matters, Coughlan uncovers much new and interesting information. To list only a few items: he points to the possible influence of a minister named Newman Smyth on Dewey's short-lived philosophy of "dynamic intuitionalism" as developed toward the end of the important 1884 paper, "The New Psychology." He gives the most complete account so far of Dewey's unsuccessful "Thought News" experiment at Michigan and of the early development of the organic circuit theory. He tells us something of the details of Vermont life that would tend to dispel the simplistic notion that Dewey's interest in democracy was a product of his growing up there. And--most interesting of ail--a fascinating chapter on the early life of Mead and his friend Castle reveals that at one point Mead was so reduced to despair at the prospect of a cold universe governed by the laws of Newtonian physics that he simply rid himself of it by maintaining that space is simply a construction of the optic nerve: "the three dimensions simply rest upon it!" (p. 128). It was a tough time to try to become a successful philosopher. His tendency to speculate about Dewey's motives aside, Coughlan has given us the most complete and carefully worked out treatment of the early years of Dewey's life. DONALD F. KOCH Michigan State University Human Reafity and the Social World: Ortega's Philosophy of History. By Oliver W. Holmes. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975. Pp. xi + 175. $12.50) Professor Holmes's study in intellectual history is an inquiry into the interrelationship of Ortega's social and intellectual experiences with the formation of his ideas. In the author's own words: "This essay attempts a systematic analysis of Ortega's philosophy of human reality, the social world, and history. The unified analysis of his philosophy drew heavily upon the traditions of historicism, phenomenology, and existentialism. Such was the influence of these philosophical traditions that Ortega became, at once, critic and representative of their respective positions, problems, and solutions" (p. vii). 492 HISTORY... (shrink)

Successfully integrating history, political psychology, and psychoanalysis, Fantasy and Reality in History studies individual and social anxiety, crisis management, racism and nationalism. By blending clinical and historico-political methods, Loewenberg examines the psycho-sexual conflicts of several charismatic political leaders, including, among others, Gladstone, and Zhirinovsky, Russia's contemporary fascist.

(1996). Is national history a thing of the past? On the growing reality of world history in the Twentieth century. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 696-702.

Problem: The paper’s main focus is on the question of whether Mitterer’s non-dualising philosophy is able to show a way out of the antagonistic opposition of fact and fiction, realism and constructivism. In addition, since Mitterer’s philosophy has hardly been discussed so far in historiography and theory of history, I also examine the question of whether his approach can provide new theoretical insights in these disciplines. Method: I follow a close reading of Mitterer’s texts and relate them to the (...) propositions of a variety of publications from the field of theory of history. Results: Mitterer’s arguments show, on the one hand, how to expel the idea of creation from our historical thinking as there is no authenticity waiting behind our world of descriptions. On the other hand, they make clear that historiography no longer has to decide between realism and relativism. Rather, it is a relationist approach that shows a way to research the many entanglements and complexities between past realities and their descriptions. A different way to write history becomes visible: a history of realities. Implications: The discussion of Mitterer’s non-dualism not only shows how historical research might benefit from this philosophy (in leaving behind some dualistic foundations of the discipline or the search for historical origins) but also how non-dualism might profit from the insights of history (with regard to power, processuality, and temporality. (shrink)

This book does several things, and it does them all well. Yolton firmly contextualizes the debates about perception within the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while showing how these debates are often repeated in contemporary philosophy of mind. Along the way, he provides novel interpretations of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant that are clearly and convincingly presented. Perhaps the most important feature of his treatment is that it so vividly shows the Moderns grappling with issues about perception that continue to (...) plague us. The uniting theme of the work is Yolton’s insistence that direct realism and representationalism are compatible. Yolton’s defense of direct realism is largely motivated by the thesis that many philosophers incorrectly take a representational theory of mind to necessitate indirect realism. This mistake arises, according to Yolton, because they suppose that the representations themselves become the objects of perception and therefore stand between the perceiver and the world of objects. Yolton’s argument that the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were struggling to establish two interactive relations between perceivers and the physical world underlies his compatibility thesis: There is a physical and causal relationship and, more importantly, there is what Yolton calls a “cognitive” or “semantic” relationship. The latter relationship holds the key to the compatibility of representationalism with direct realism. (shrink)

This contribution demonstrates the benefits of a transatlantic history of early modern mining that encompasses both a cross-pollination of approaches and a critical reexamination of the field’s underlying assumptions. It applies to Álvaro Alonso Barba’s 1640 El arte de los metales conceptual frameworks developed by historians of early modern European mining, by scholars of labor and science in the colonial Andes, and by theorists of reader reception and scholarly practice. This analysis offers a revised understanding of Pamela Long’s model (...) of the “trading zone” as a vision of knowledge production promoted by elite Europeans and shaped by the dialogic model of knowledge production taught at European universities. Parallels between Barba and the German humanist and metallurgical author Georg Agricola (1494–1555) underscore the applicability of these findings with respect to Barba for early modern mining more generally. (shrink)

John Yolton describes this collection of nine essays as "a kind of a sequel" to his 1984 book Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid. Four of the chapters have previously appeared in print, and most can stand on their own, presuming little or no familiarity with previous chapters. Indeed, the title is somewhat misleading, for the material is not presented in chronological fashion, and there is little attention given to Leibniz and none to Spinoza--not what one would expect to find (...) in a history from Descartes to Kant. (shrink)

The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental features, devices and concepts. Then, we will (...) approach the characterization of VR as an “empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why, nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative, we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars. In the conclusion, however, we will, we will examine some of the serious concerns related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences. (shrink)

This reissued volume by Isaiah Berlin, originally published in 1996, comprises primarily essays from the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s concerning political themes such as government repress...

Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not (...) assert the existence of distinct non-spatio-temporal objects. On Allais's account, we cannot understand Kant's idealism without a clear account of his notion of intuition and of the role of intuition in cognition: she understands Kantian intuitions as representations that give us acquaintance with the objects of thought. This enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and to see why he takes the complete idealist position to be established there. (shrink)