Textbooks have played the leading role in academic education for centuries and their form has evolved, adapting to the needs of students, teachers and technological possibilities. Advances in technology have caused educators to look for new sources of knowledge development, which students could use inside and outside the classroom. Today’s sophisticated learning tools range from virtual environments to interactive multimedia resources, which can be called e-textbooks. Different types of new educational materials that go beyond printed books are now used to (...) support the academic curriculum, with the most interesting ones exemplified in this article to show their value in medical and life sciences education. Certain interesting attempts by Polish publishers at applying technology to support both self-paced and tutor-paced student learning in the medical profession and related areas are presented. The data was collected through a review of literature, discussions with e-learning specialists and medical students, as well as an analysis of examples of good practices. The article also discusses the results of a countrywide survey on the use of e-textbooks to enhance medical education. The research investigates the targeted academic staff’s attitudes towards the use of e-textbooks, the limitations of their implementation, and the character of e-resources currently used by Polish higher education medical institutions. (shrink)

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and (...) determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals. (shrink)

Any serious attempt to give an account of the cognitive aspect of science – as contrasted with e.g. its social or cultural aspects – cannot ignore the automation revolution. In the conception presented in this paper the results of computer science are taken seriously and integrated with many of the ideas concerning what constitutes scientific inquiry that have been proposed at least since the early Middle Ages. The central idea is that of reliable inquiry. Science makes explicit and elaborates on (...) the methods of acquiring beliefs in our daily life. The central question a scientific method applied to inquiry needs to face is if it is reliable in getting to the truth. On the reliabilist criteria presented here, if a method is logically warranted to get to the right answer – given data and background knowledge available – and to stick to it afterwards, then it is reliable. This is a normative theory, but the standard of reliability is adjusted to the domain of the inquiry at hand. This paper presents the central tenets of the reliabilist conception of science and briefly outlines the main results underlying it. Roughly, the aim of science is interesting truth about the world around us (scientific realism) and reliabilist epistemology affords us precise answers as to how far science can succeed in this task – given the methods, goals and background assumptions available. The philosophical task to deliver an adequate understanding of science is taken to be continuous with scientific research itself (naturalism), a major part of which is concerned with delivering causal explanations (causality) and can only be carried out with limited resources (computability). Many of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science and precisely articulated therewith have appeared earlier in both philosophy and science (history of ideas). I conclude the exposition of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science with discussions of sample case studies where the reliabilist conception of science has been applied to actual scientific research. For obvious reasons none of the grand conceptions of science from the distant past is adequate. Towards the end of this paper I give some substance to the claim that among the few contemporary conceptions of science reliabilist epistemology is the the most comprehensive account. For only it systematically elaborates the ideas of reliability and computability accompanying science from its inception. None of the past or contemporary alternatives to a thoroughly revised understanding of science offered by the reliabilist approach can embrace the recent outburst of new sciences such as computer science, Bayesian statistics and cognitive science. An outline of open problems and directions for future research concludes the paper. (shrink)

Due to the rapid advances in medical technology, medical students are now being faced with increasingly complex and unparalleled ethical and practical dilemmas during their training. The new and future challenges of high-tech medicine demand improvements in current medical education, not only by meeting the needs of students through humanized training programs, but also by involving them in finding solutions to the ethical and legal quandaries they encounter. Today’s students of medical universities must acquire knowledge and understanding of the ethical (...) and legal issues relevant to the practice of medicine, and we have to do everything possible to introduce these students to the current discussions on more or less controversial ethical and legal topics. Although final answers may not be found, the very discussion, argumentation, and awakening of students’ interest should become an essential part of the core curriculum of every doctor. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Konstytucja wolności [The Constitution of Liberty], by Friedrich August von Hayek.

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Infertility is a serious social problem. Very often the only treatment possibility are IVF methods. This study explores the possibility of outcome prediction in the early stages of treatment. The data, collected from the previous treatment cycles, were divided into four subsets, which corresponded to the selected stages of treatment. On each such subset, sophisticated data mining analysis was carried out, with appropriate imputations and classification procedures. The obtained results indicate that there is a possibility of predicting the final outcome (...) at the beginning of treatment. (shrink)

Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpretation of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens absolutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I propose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. Second, departing (...) from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called “theological philosophy”. (shrink)

The article argues that altruistic giving based on anonymity, which is expected to promote social solidarity and block trade in human body parts, is conceptually defective and practically unproductive. It needs to be replaced by a more adequate notion which responds to the human practices of giving and receiving. The argument starts with identification of the main characteristics of the anonymous altruistic donation: social separation of the organ donor from the recipient, their mutual replaceability, non-obligatoriness of donation, and non-obligatoriness of (...) reciprocation on the recipient’s part. Since these characteristics are also central to typical market relations, anonymous altruistic donation not only cannot promote solidarity but may encourage proposals for markets of transplantable organs. Thus, transplant ethics needs to be reframed. It needs to be rooted in, rather than promote, the practices of giving and receiving known to human societies. As the basis for such reframing, the idea of sharing in another’s misfortune is proposed. It relies on the human practices of giving and receiving and, with appropriate regulatory safeguards, can provide a better conceptual basis for blocking commercial exchanges of human body parts. (shrink)

Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...) of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented. (shrink)

Bilinear Logic of Lambek amounts to Noncommutative MALL of Abrusci. Lambek proves the cut–elimination theorem for a one-sided sequent system for this logic. Here we prove an analogous result for the nonassociative version of this logic. Like Lambek, we consider a left-sided system, but the result also holds for its right-sided version, by a natural symmetry. The treatment of nonassociative sequent systems involves some subtleties, not appearing in associative logics. We also prove the PTime complexity of the multiplicative fragment of (...) NBL. (shrink)

In this paper I take a closer look at Fr. Georges Florovsky’s original view on the relation between philosophy and theology. I argue that he tried to formulate an approach based on patristic experience and opposed to the dominating secular paradigm of philosophy. In some sense he wanted to reverse the traditional account. As Teresa Obolevitch aptly suggested, he wanted to replace the principle fides quaerens intellectum by the rule intellectus quaerens fidem. In that first default case the faith needs (...) to be justified or proved by the reason, in the second, unobvious one, the faith has an absolute priority and illuminates itself the natural thought. According to Florovsky, philosophy should not attempt to ground the theology, formulating arguments for the existence of God or proving the coherence of theism, but rather should accept theology as a fundamental premise and then develop a new, non-secular account for the old philosophical topics. (shrink)

Retrieval Induced Forgetting refers to the finding that the retrieval of some items from memory impairs the retrieval of related items. The RIF effect is indicated by a comparison of RP- with unrelated but also tobe- remembered items. Since RIF appears during intentional memorizing of words, therefore we checked whether it depends on attentional control involved in goal maintenance, and also if implicit evaluations of to-be-remembered contents moderate this process. In three experiments, each including AC as the independent variable, we (...) found AC to be related to the RIF effect. Only high but not low AC subjects showed the presence of RIF. The results of the affective priming procedure showed that implicit evaluations of NRP items moderate the relationship of high AC and the RIF effect. The explanation why temporarily devaluated NRP could enhance the RIF effect and suggestion concerning future research summarize the article. (shrink)

Thought style and thought collective are two well-known concepts from Ludwik Fleck’s theory of science, which he originally formulated in Polish and German. This paper contends that these two concepts cannot be fully understood without a third—Stimmung/nastrój, which is one of the musical metaphors that play an important role in Fleck’s thinking. Because it is most often translated into English as “mood”, Fleck’s musical metaphors are mostly lost in translation, appearing as mere rhetoric. Only if and when we understand Stimmung/nastrój (...) in the musical meaning of attunement, we can fully understand thought collectives, for which Stimmung/nastrój is sine qua non, and thought style, which appears if and when a collective turns out to be an enduring and not a momentary one. (shrink)

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to distinguish two common notions of the expression “to see” – objective and subjective without attributing beliefs to the observer. Thus, the main aim can be characterized as extensional explication. This gives us the ability to describe visual perception without assuming anything about higher cognitive abilities of the agent. Subsequent addition of the notion of belief enables me to characterize more visual categories present in the literature of the subject.

Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and (largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate and clarify (...) the cognitivist or ‘conservative’ reading of PP. I argue that the conservative commitments of PP can be divided into three distinct categories: (1) representationalism, (2) inferentialism, and (3) internalism. I show how these commitments and their relations should be understood and argue for an interpretation of each that is both non-trivial and largely ecumenical towards the 4E literature. Conservative PP is as progressive as conservatism gets. (shrink)

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...) of its rational etiology. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)

Przedmowa Problematyka związana z zależnościami przyczynowymi, ich modelowaniem i odkrywa¬niem, po długiej nieobecności w filozofii i metodologii nauk, budzi współcześnie duże zainteresowanie. Wiąże się to przede wszystkim z dynamicznym rozwojem, zwłaszcza od lat 1990., technik obli¬czeniowych. Wypracowane w tym czasie sieci bayesowskie uznaje się za matematyczny język przyczynowości. Pozwalają one na daleko idącą auto¬matyzację wnioskowań, co jest także zachętą do podjęcia prób algorytmiza¬cji odkrywania przyczyn. Na potrzeby badań naukowych, które pozwalają na przeprowadzenie eksperymentu z randomizacją, standardowe metody ustalania zależności przyczynowych (...) opracowano na początku XX wieku. Zupełnie inaczej sprawa przedstawia się w przypadku badań nieeksperymentalnych, gdzie podobne rozwiązania pozostają kwestią przyszłości. Zadaniem tej książki jest podanie warunków, które powinny być spełnione przez te rozwiązania, oraz sformułowanie proceduralnego kryterium zależności przy¬czynowych jako szczegółowej realizacji tych warunków. Pociąga ono waż¬kie konsekwencje dla filozofii i metodologii nauk, które ujawnia – podany w Części II – zarys me-todolo¬gii proceduralnej. W literaturze przedmiotu brakuje w miarę wszechstronnego i systema¬tycznego omówie¬nia najnowszych filozoficznych i metodologicznych dys¬kusji na temat przy¬czynowości, co niech będzie wytłumaczeniem, dlaczego w niektórych punktach obecnej książki szczegółowo referuję trudno dos¬tępne teksty źró¬dłowe. Przymiotnik „proceduralny” używam tu w znaczeniu węższym niż Huw Price (w którego pracach właściwszy byłby termin „kryterialny”) dla podkre¬ślenia – zgodnie z łacińskim źródłosłowem procedo – że dla ustalenia przy¬czyny niezbędne jest podjęcie przez uczonych określonych interakcji z ba¬daną rzeczywistością. Zalążki zamysłu prezentowanego w tej książce przedstawiłem podczas warsztatów filozoficznych „Philosophy and Probability” w roku 2002, zor¬ganizowanych przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu w Konstancji. Wdzięczny jestem uczestnikom tych warsztatów za uwagi, a przede wszyst¬kim następującym osobom: Luc Bovens, Brandon Fitelson, Alan Hájek, Stephan Hartmann oraz Jon Williamson. Podczas międzynarodowej konferencji „Analytical Pragmatism”, zorgani¬zowanej w Lublinie w roku 2003 przez Wydział Filo¬zofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, odniosłem swoją koncepcję do prac Nancy Cartwright. Szczególnie inspirujący okazał się komentarz Huw Price’a do mojego referatu i przeprowadzona z nim dysku¬sja. Ujęcie koncepcji metodologii proceduralnej na szerszym tle współ-czes¬nego nurtu empirystycznego w filozofii nauki przedstawiłem w roku 2004 podczas konferencji „5th Quadrennial Fellows Conference”, zorgani¬zowanej przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu. Szczególnie pomocne w dalszych moich pra¬cach były uwagi Jamesa Bogena, Janet Kourany, Jamesa Lennoxa, Johna Nortona, Thomasa Bonka, Jana Woleńskiego i Johna Worralla, za które wyra¬żam swoją wdzięczność. Korpus książki powstał podczas mojego stażu w Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu, który odbyłem jako stypendysta Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej w roku akademickim 2004-2005. Uczestniczyłem w tym czasie w życiu naukowym Centrum i w pracach badawczych zespołu z Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu Carnegie-Mellon w Pittsburghu kierowanego przez Clarka Glymoura. Na jego ręce składam podziękowanie za wiele po¬mocnych uwag do moich wy¬stąpień oraz tekstów i za dyskusje przede wszystkim z nim samym i z jego najbliższymi współpracownikami: Peterem Spirtesem oraz Richardem Scheinesem, a także pozostałymi członkami tego zes¬połu, doktorantami i uczestnikami seminarium badawczego „Causality in the Social Sciences”. Za wieloletnie wsparcie, wielopłaszczyznowe inspiracje towarzyszące pi¬saniu tej książki, a także liczne pomocne uwagi do jej wcześniejszych wersji dziękuję przede wszystkim Księdzu Profesorowi Andrzejowi Bronkowi oraz Księdzu Profesorowi Józefowi Herbutowi, współprowadzącemu seminarium doktorskie w Katedrze Metodologii Nauk Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubel¬skiego im. Jana Pawła II, jak również pozostałym uczestnikom tego semina¬rium. Dziękuję mojej Żonie, dr Annie Kawalec za wiele wysiłku włożonego w ulepszenie redakcji – językowej i merytorycznej – obecnej książki. Książkę tę można czytać na kilka sposobów. Czytelnikom zainteresowa¬nym przede wszystkim prowadzeniem badań empirycznych polecałbym rozpoczęcie od Rozdziału 2. i kontynuację pozostałych rozdziałów Części I, a następnie Dodatków. Czytelnikom zainteresowanym problemami filozo¬fii i metodologii nauk polecałbym rozpoczęcie lektury książki od Części II i uzupełniającą lekturę Rozdziału 2., a następnie Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia. Czytelnikom mniej zainteresowanym zagadnieniami teoretycznymi pole¬całbym zapoznanie się z fascynującymi dziejami odkrycia przyczyn cholery przez Johna Snowa, które rekonstruuję w Rozdziale 1. W dalszej części nato¬miast polecałbym przejście do Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia, które w mniej specjalistyczny sposób przybliżają proponowane tu rozstrzygnięcia. Tekst książki nie był dotąd publikowany. Wyjątkiem są pewne fragmenty Rozdziału 8. oraz 9., które w zmienionej postaci ukazały się w Rocznikach Filozoficznych (Kawalec 2004). -/- Lublin, luty 2006 r. (shrink)

TRADITION AS A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity. In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a conceptual toolkit (...) of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of language game. This structure includes defined principles of communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community and rule of inclusion for potential new members. Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates between closed system of tradition-based community and his environment. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)