The systematization of the sciences as a cultural task. Options for an open understanding of culture in Paul Hinneberg's Encyclopedia. – Paul Hinneberg promises, in his multi‐volume Kultur der Gegenwart (1906sqq.), to capture the ‘culture’ of his time in its entirety; only a veritable encyclopedia could be adequate to the task of synthesizing the manifold and disparate tendencies of ‘Kultur’. Surprisingly, however, any attempt to make explicit the systematic principles governing his encyclopedic synthesis is missing from (...) his project. It is argued that this – unusual – feature of Hinneberg's Kultur der Gegenwart can itself be understood as a result of typical analyses of ‘Kultur’ at the turn of the century; culture, as an open, multi‐sided, and integrative concept may indeed best be captured in an open system that avoids strict and explicit demarcations. In these respects, the task of capturing Kultur turns out to be closely linked to another task prominent around 1900: that of providing a systematic ordering of the various ‘Wissenschaften’. (shrink)

An Encyclopedia for the Empire. In the preface to the universal encyclopedia Die Kultur der Gegenwart (The Culture of the Present), the editor‐in‐chief Paul Hinneberg places his project – not openly but nevertheless unequivocally – in the tradition of the French Encyclopédie that Diderot and d'Alembert had organized from 1751 until 1765. The attempt to accomplish anew such a large‐scale project and, in this way, to win the German Empire the kind of intellectual leadership which the Encyclopédie, in (...) historical retrospect, had achieved for the epoch of Enlightenment, required to convince the leading scholars, scientists, and technicians of the nation to participate in the endeavor and to assemble their contributions under a common systematic agenda through which this universal encyclopedia would distinguish itself from all dictionaries and disciplinary encyclopedias. While the Encyclopédie followed to a large extent an empiricist philosophy, Hinneberg trusted in the integrative function of the concept of culture and the ability of his contributors to elucidate the history of their respective disciplines and to connect them with neighboring fields of culture. The present contributions argues that although, from a philosophical point of view, the historicist tack taken by Hinneberg makes the concept of culture quite blurry, it nevertheless provides enough cohesive structure such that the work, even though unfinished as a consequence of war and inflation, represents a faithful picture of its epoch that Hinneberg understands as an epoch of transition. (shrink)

From 1906 onwards the Teubner Verlag in Leipzig published the first volumes of an ambitious encyclopedia "Die Kultur der Gegenwart, ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele" under the general editorship of the cultural philosopher Paul Hinneberg. The work presents a systematic account of contemporary culture. Leading scholars of the age were recruited to work on the project. Ernst Troeltsch was charged with the section on Protestant Christianity and the Modern Age; the first edition of this appeared in 1906, with (...) an extended second edition in 1909, which was republished unrevised in 1922. In the present volume, Troeltsch's study is published as a separate book for the first time. In this study, Troeltsch reconstructs the historical development of Protestantism from the Reformation to the present. He distinguishes an old Protestant epoch, which is more medieval in its orientation, and a new Protestantism, which he sees as belonging more to the enlightened modern age. Troeltsch elucidates the difference between the two epochs by emphasising in particular the changes in Protestant cultural relations, and thus in Protestantism's cultural significance. (shrink)

In Situations and Individuals, Paul Elbourne argues that the natural language expressions that have been taken to refer to individuals — pronouns, proper names, and definite descriptions — have a common syntax and semantics, roughly that of definite descriptions as construed in the tradition of Frege. In the course of his argument, Elbourne shows that proper names have previously undetected donkey anaphoric readings.This is contrary to previous theorizing and, if true, would undermine what philosophers call the direct reference theory (...) (which holds that the sole contribution of a proper name to the truth conditions of a sentence is an individual) as well as the related doctrine that proper names are rigid designators. Elbourne begins by addressing donkey anaphora, relating other concerns about pronouns to the solution of this notorious problem. His subsequent argumentation provides a unified semantics for the donkey anaphoric and bound and referential uses of pronouns and discusses the prospect of unifying the syntax and semantics of pronouns with the syntax and semantics of normal definite descriptions. Elbourne's aim is not only to advance his proposal of a unified syntax and semantics but also to urge linguists and philosophers dealing with pronoun interpretation to consider a wider range of theories than they do at present, and to test the competing claims of description-based theories and dynamic semantics against the data. (shrink)

No study in the philosophy of science created such controversy in the seventies as Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. In this work, Feyerabend reviews that controversy, and extends his critique beyond the problem of scientific rules and methods, to the social function and direction of science today. In the first part of the book, he launches a sustained and irreverent attack on the prestige of science in the West. The lofty authority of the "expert" claimed by scientists is, he argues, (...) incompatible with any genuine democracy, and often merely serves to conceal entrenched prejudices and divided opinions with the scientific community itself. Feyerabend insists that these can and should be subjected to the arbitration of the lay population, whose closes interests they constantly affect—as struggles over atomic energy programs so powerfully attest. Calling for far greater diversity in the content of education to facilitate democratic decisions over such issues, Feyerabend recounts the origin and development of his own ideas—successively engaged by Brecht, Ehrenhaft, Popper, Mill and Lakatos—in a spirited intellectual self-portrait. Science in a Free Society is a striking intervention into one of the most topical debates in contemporary culture and politics. (shrink)

Paul Elbourne defends the Fregean view that definite descriptions ('the table', 'the King of France') refer to individuals, and offers a new and radical account of the semantics of pronouns. He draws on a wide range of work, from Frege, Peano, and Russell to the latest findings in linguistics, philosophy of language, and psycholinguistics.

Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in (...) volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. (shrink)

Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in (...) volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. (shrink)

The apparent contextual variability exhibited by ‘knows’ and its cognates—brought to attention in examples like Keith DeRose’s Bank Case—poses familiar problems for conservative forms of invariantism about ‘knows’. The paper examines and criticises a popular response to those problems, one that involves appeal to so-called ‘pragmatic’ features of language. It is first argued, contrary to what seems to have been generally assumed, that any pragmatic defence faces serious problems with regard to our judgments about retraction. Second, the familiar objection that (...) the pragmatic effects at issue do not seem to be cancellable is considered. Advocates of the pragmatic defence have suggested that cancellability concerns can be dealt with fairly readily. It is shown both that their recent attempts to respond to those concerns, and some other possible attempts, are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that the popular relevance-based accounts, found in the work of Jessica Brown, Alan Hazlett, and Patrick Rysiew, fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of our judgments. (shrink)

Paul Elbourne explores the complex nature of meaning in crystal clear language. He draws on approaches developed in linguistics, philosophy, and psychology - assuming a knowledge of none of them - in a manner that will appeal to everyone interested in this essential element of human psychology and culture.

Michael Bergmann argues directly from our ignorance about actual and merely possible goods and evils and the broadly logical relations that hold betweenthem to the conclusion that “noseeum” arguments from evil against theism like William L. Rowe’s are unsuccessful. I critically discuss Bergmann’s argument in the first part of this paper. Bergmann also suggests that our ignorance about value and modality undermines the Humean argument from evil against theism that I defended in a 1989 paper. I explain in the second (...) part of this paper why this suggestion is false. (shrink)

Constructive empiricism is not just a view regarding the aim of science; it is also a view regarding the epistemological framework in which one should debate the aim of science. This is the focus of this book -- not with scientific truth, but with how one should argue about scientific truth.

There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be described (...) in detail in the final physics and biology’ (van Fraassen 1980: 17). In order for the constructive empiricist to determine what counts as observable, he will have to appeal to our best scientific theories of light, human physiology, and so forth. To put the same point in a slightly more abstract way, in order to draw a distinction between observable and unobservable entities, the constructive empiricist needs to use his best scientific theory of observability – call it T* – to tell him the identity of the observable entities. This raises an interesting difficulty. Constructive empiricism is the view that ‘science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate’ (van Fraassen 1980:12). When he accepts a theory, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his scientific theories that are about observable entities. Thus, in order to know which statements of a scientific theory to believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of that theory are about observable entities. In particular then, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his theory of observability T* that are about observable entities. Therefore, in order to know which statements of T* he can believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of T* are about observable entities. However, it is T* that tells the constructive empiricist what counts as an observable entity: the constructive empiricist therefore needs to use T* to tell him which statements of T* he can believe. The fact that the distinction drawn by T* must also apply to itself is not an immediate cause for alarm.. (shrink)

This intriguing new book examines and analyses the role of critical realism in economics and specifically how this line of thought can be applied to the real world. With contributions from such varying commentators as Sheila Dow, Wendy Olsen and Fred Lee, this new book is unique in its approach and will be of great interest to both economic methodologists and those involved in applied economic studies.

Do the evils in the world make it unlikely that God exists? In the first half of this chapter, Paul Draper formulates a Humean argument from evil for an affirmative answer to this question. He compares the theistic hypothesis that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God exists to a competing hypothesis called naturalism. He claims both that naturalism is simpler than theism, and that naturalism fits or “predicts” a variety of facts about good and evil much better than (...) theism does. After sketching a defense of these two claims, he briefly discusses several theistic responses to his argument. In the second half of the chapter, Trent Dougherty raises several important objections to Draper's argument. (shrink)

Introduction My claims are scandalously out of proportion with the general temper of the times and my literary background, which must be regarded by almost ...

Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in (...) volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. (shrink)

This paper examines interaction involving a child with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder, a humanoid robot and a co-present adult. In this paper data from one child (collected as part of the ROBOSKIN project) is analysed in order to evaluate the potential contributions of a conversation analytic perspective to the examination of data relating to socio-emotional reciprocity. The paper argues for the value of treating all interaction as potentially relevant, looking without carefully pre-defined target behaviours and examining behaviour within its specific (...) sequence of interaction. Adopting this approach, the paper suggests, enables noticings and observations that might not be available from perspectives that rely on the coding of pre-specified behaviours in isolation. Treating all interaction as potentially relevant brought into view interactions that might otherwise be dismissed or ignored – because they occurred before, or after, the trial itself. Being informed by the value of unmotivated looking – rather than pre-specified coding schemes – enabled highly relevant behaviour that was not anticipated within the trials to be analysed. Finally, seeing sequence as important meant that behaviours were appreciated in their intricate detail, enabling a more precise understanding than might be available if they were considered separately from that sequential environment. Keywords: autism; assessment; autistic spectrum disorder; experiment; conversation analysis; interaction; humanoid robot; sequences; sequence of interaction; socio-emotional reciprocity. (shrink)

In this journal, Peter Lipton and I discussed Musgrave's objection that the constructive empiricist cannot consistently maintain his own distinction between the observable and the unobservable, and van Fraassen's initial reply. We considered several possible interpretations of van Fraassen, and expressed misgivings about each. Muller and van Fraassen have consequently clarified the official constructive empiricist response to Musgrave, although some issues still remain.According to Muller and van Fraassen, Musgrave's objection assumes that constructive empiricism is to be understood in line with (...) a syntactic account of our scientific theories – whereby a theory consists of a set of sentences formulated in some suitable language – whereas constructive empiricism has always been wedded to an explicitly semantic account of our scientific theories, which understands a scientific theory in terms of a class of models. Once this oversight is amended, the objection is seen to be toothless. As Muller and van Fraassen write: " Indeed, the only proper response, and the one that turns the table on Musgrave and his followers, is to argue that his incoherence argument does not work in the context of the semantic view as here elaborated, while the bad consequence he draws is an inevitable corollary to the older view within which he presents it. "The force of Musgrave's objection therefore turns on nothing more than implicitly saddling the constructive empiricist with an independently problematic account of what a scientific theory is.This move should cause some surprise however, for Musgrave's objection – albeit usually presented in conjunction with an explicitly syntactic construal of our scientific theories – is in fact quite neutral between these competing accounts. As Musgrave originally put it, in order for the constructive empiricist to draw his distinction between observable and unobservable …. (shrink)

Scarce healthcare resources can be allocated in many ways. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in the UK focuses on the size of the benefit relative to costs, yet we know that there is support among clinicians and the general public for reducing inequalities in health. This paper shows how the UK general public trade-off these sometimes competing objectives, and the data we gather allow us to show the weight given to different population groups, for example, 1 extra (...) year of life in full health to someone who would otherwise die at the age of 60 years is worth more than twice as much as an additional year of life to someone who would otherwise die at the age of 70 years. Such data can help inform the rationing decisions faced by all healthcare systems around the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Murder in the Garden? The Envy of the Gods in Genesis 2 and 3 Paul DuffJoseph Hallman George Washington University University of St. Thomas According to Walter Brueggemann, "No text in Genesis (or likely in the entire Bible) has been more used, interpreted and misunderstood" than the story of Adam and Eve in the garden. "This applies to careless, popular theology as well as to the doctrine of (...) the church"(41). Augustine attempted to explain the first few chapters of Genesis on no fewer than five different occasions throughout his career. Based on his reading ofPaul, Augustine and Western Christianity after him believed that the entire human race inherited the disobedience ofAdam and Eve. The story in Genesis 2-3 represents the beginning ofthe J narrative, the so-called Yahwist account of the creation which originated in the early years ofthe Israelite monarchy.8 Commentators have long acknowledged a variety ofelements in the Yahwist creation account which complicate its interpretation and defy any satisfactory explanation. Among the more puzzling elements in the story are, first, the implication in Gen. 3:22 of a plurality of divine beings, a fact which seems to contradict the rest ofthe narrative and which also flies in the face of Israelite monotheism. Second, according to Gen. 2:17, God threatens Adam with the punishment of 8 The Yahwist document, originally independent, was later combined with three other strands of ancient material to form the Pentateuch. For a recent study ofthe "Documentary Hypothesis," see Richard Friedman. 1 84Paul DuffandJoseph Hallman immediate death for transgressing the deity's prohibition (cf. 3:3, 3:4). God does not carry out the threatened punishment, however, nor does the text offer the reader an explanation for the deity's commutation ofthe sentence (Westermann 224-5). Third, the origin and nature ofthe serpent in the story is unclear. Where did he come from? The identification ofthis figure with Satan in the later tradition has no support in the text (Westermann 237-9). Finally, the prohibition not to eat ofthe single tree in the garden appears to be arbitrary. Hence the crime of Adam and Eve is obviously contrived. Despite the fact that the original sentence of death for their disobedience was not carried out, the curses invoked on Adam and Eve seem hardly warranted by the offense. Consequently, some sections ofthe text depict the deity as a petty tyrant, certainly a very different picture than that given by other scriptures ofthe Jewish and Christian traditions. We believe these difficulties can be overcome by approaching Genesis 2-3 from a Girardian perspective.9 We propose that this story has evolved10 in order to hide its original meaning. As a result—following Girard's understanding of the function and evolution of mythology—we will endeavor to "deconstruct" Genesis 2-3 in order to trace the evolution ofthis myth from its origin in a primal crime. This will enable us to explain the inconsistencies in the text as it stands and to appreciate the final revisions made by the biblical author(s). We will begin with a brief discussion of Girard's understanding ofmyth. Then we will turn to the problems ofthe Genesis text. Girard on myth According to Girard, myth is, quite simply, a narrative about a primal murder, rewritten from the vantage point ofthe killers (1977a, 64-7, 91-5; 1986, 24-44). As such, mythology covers up the role of the victimage mechanism as the basis ofculture. Myths which disguise or cover up such a crime can take many forms. For instance, the foundational murder of an 9 In his recent book on Paul, Robert Hamerton-Kelly presents a Girardian interpretation of this passage which is completely different from ours (92-7). Since Hamerton-Kelly appears to read the myth at face value without a sense of development, he, like most interpreters, ends with somewhat tortuous conclusions. 10It is virtually certain that the account found in Gen. 2 and 3 did not come into being as a free composition of the Yahwist. But, as Claus Westermann has pointed out in his history ofthe exegesis ofthis passage (186-91), despite the fact that most see it as a product of a long... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:INDIFFERENCE AND ENVY: THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERN ECONOMY Paul Dumouchel University ofQuébec-Montréal 1. Girard and economics René Girard himself has not written very much on economics, at least explicitly. Though his works are full ofinsights into and short remarks on the sacrificial origin of different economic phenomena or the way in which mimetic relations and commercial transactions are often intertwined and act upon each other.1 Unlike religion, (...) psychology, psychoanalysis, literature and anthropology, the analysis of modem and traditional economies from the point ofview ofmimetic theory has never been carried out by Girard himself, but for the most part by other people, for example, in the French speaking world, which I know best, essentially by Michel Aglietta and André Orléan in La violence de la monnaie (1982) and by Jean-Pierre Dupuy and myself in L'enfer des choses (1979) and as well as others, such as, by Mark Anspach, Andrew Feenberg, P. Lantz, A. Orléan, G-H. de Radkowsky and Lucien Scubla in various works on economy, economic anthropology, or the place and role of money in literary texts.2 In a way, this is somewhat surprising since the relationship between mimetic and economic phenomena, at least in a broad sense, was seen quite early on. For example, soon after the original publication Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque (1961) the French Marxist Lucien Goldman wrote in his Pour une sociologie du Roman (1964) that Girard's work was the most important book to read in order to understand 1 For example, Mensonge romantique (18-23); Des choses cachées (82-88). 2 See Anspach, Feenberg, Lantz, Orléan [passim], de Radkowski. 150Paul Dumouchel the effects of economic alienation on literature since Georg Lukács's Theory of the Novel (1920). Moreover in a footnote in Les origines du capitalisme (1971) Jean Baechler suggested that those wishing to understand the nature of the infinite desire for acquisition which capitalists economies have institutionalized should read Girard's book.3 Whatever the reason for Girard's relative disinterest in economic phenomena others have not been prevented from tackling this problem and it bears witness in a special way to the dynamism and intellectual power ofthe mimetic theory that its application to the field ofeconomics has essentially, ifnot entirely, been due to the work of others rather than to the efforts of René Girard himself. 2. The substantivist-formalist debate In the late 1 940's and early 1 950's a debate began that divided (and still divides) the community ofeconomists and ofanthropologists interested in economic phenomena. It concerns the nature ofeconomy and is generally referred to as the substantivist-formalist debate. It was first formulated in the works of the Austrian economist, Karl Polanyi.4 In The Great Transformation (1945), a book on the history ofthe formation and organization ofthe market economy in Europe from the late 1 8th to early 20th centuries, Polanyi already argued that the modem market economy was a rare historical accident. Furthermore Polanyi said, unlike what liberal and economic ideologies pretend, thatthere is nothingnatural aboutthe market. It does not correspond to any spontaneous human tendency to barter and exchange, and it does not arise by itself as soon as certain conditions are satisfied. Onthe contrary, modem markets have been put into place through sustained and voluntary state policies which consciously destroyed traditional solidarities, authorized the unlimited sale of land and labor and literally created the labor market, for example, in England through the Reform Bill of 1834 that repealed the existing Poor Laws which had prevented the free circulation of labor. The system formed by market economies, the balance of power among European states and the gold 3 Interestingly, 24 years later, in the second vastly enlarged edition of that work, Le capitalisme, (1995) the reference to Girard has disappeared though the text ofthe original work, which now constitutes the second part of the book, is otherwise reprinted in its integrity. 4 Actually Polanyi in The Livelihood ofMan (1977) sees the origin of the debate in Carl Mengers, Principles ofEconomics [1871]. Let us say then that it found its first modern formulation in the work of Polanyi. Indifference andEnvy... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:FERMENT IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE REVISITED PAUL T. DURBIN University of Delaware Newark, Delaware I N 1986 I published a survey of some then-recent works in academic philosophy of science, primarily in the United States (The Thomist 50/4 (Oct. 1986): 689-700). My theme was continuity amid change, with a secondary focus on the diversity of philosophers' discussions of science-a diversity much greater than many academic philosophers of science (...) were then admitting. In my earlier survey, I conceded that one recent contribution, by Ronald Giere, represents something genuinely novel in philosophy of science. I was concentrating there on an early adumbration, in article form, of Giere's new approach, which-following W. V. Quine-he has dubbed "naturalized philosophy of science." Giere soon produced a book length version of this approach, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (1988), and it is with that book that I want to begin my survey here. Giere says that from the beginning of his graduate studies in philosophy he had been " troubled... because philosophical discussions of induction seemed so remote from scientific practice as [he] had known it (Explaining Science, p. xv). But, twentyfive years later, his skepticism had increased markedly: From this skepticism, and some fortuitous encounters with work in cognitive science, Giere quickly went on to perceive the I began to lose my faith in the general program.... My skepticism progressed to the point that I now believe there are no special philosophical foundations to any science. There is only deep theory, which, however, is part of science itself (p. xvi). 655 656 PAUL T. DURBIN outlines of his new naturalized philosophy of science. This involves the view that, in general, " cognitive agents... develop representations of the world and make judgments about both the world and their representations of it." And, in particular in Giere's view, "scientists [are] cognitive agents and... scientific models [are] a special type of representation" (pp. xvi-xvii). Philosophy of science is not exactly expendable, but its task becomes one of understanding what scientists do, not of providing rational foundations for it. Later, Giere is even more explicit about the rejections this naturalized approach entails. It means, he says, giving up philosophical definitions of rationality, where he explicitly mentions Karl Popper and Larry Laudan-with their conflicting definitions of rationality-as examples (p. 8). And Giere equally forcefully repudiates other alleged philosophical foundations, whether empiricist, positivist, Kantian, etc. (p. 15). What Giere includes in his approach is an evolutionary naturalism (with debts to Donald Campbell and George Gale, among others), openness to social influences on cognitive resources, and close parallels with " traditional [internalist] historians of science " (p. 19). However, Giere goes on, "evolutionary models of scientific development recommend some changes in the way the history of science is conceived," moving it in the direction that "social historians" have moved for other reasons: "To see the processes of variation and selection at work, one must look at many members of a research community, including those who are unsuccessful" (p. 19).1 Despite Giere's repudiation of "over fifty years [of] philosophy of science " in which its practitioners " have labored to·elucidate the nature of scientific theories and the [rational] criteria for choosing one theory over others " (Explaining Science, 1 An approach very similar to Giere's (in my opinion) has been provided in David Hull's Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (1988)-though Hull makes no use of cognitive science models, and his examples are from the history of biological research communities. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 657 p. 5), that enterprise continues unabated. And it is to these continuing efforts that I turn next. I. Conventional Philosophy of Science I begin with an excellent textbook that clearly and authoritatively summarizes all the traditional issues-and defends their continued relevance against the critics. The textbook is Merrilee Salmon et al., Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (1992), a collaborative work produced by members of the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the University of Pittsburgh. Focusing on this one textbook is not meant to disparage the others that are now appearing with increasing frequency in a field... (shrink)

As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfied in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has (...) substantial implications for any non-sceptical epistemological theory of testimony. (shrink)

This third volume of Paul Feyerabend's philosophical papers, which gathers together work originally published between 1960 and 1980, offers a range of his characteristically exciting treatments of classic questions in the philosophy of science. It includes his previously untranslated paper 'The Problem of Theoretical Entities', and the important lecture 'Knowledge without Foundations', in which he develops the perspective on early philosophy and science put forward by Karl Popper. Other themes discussed include theoretical pluralism, the nature of scientific method, the (...) relationship between theory and observation, the distinction between science and myth, and the opposition between 'rationalism' and relativism. Several papers from the 1970s detail his increasing preoccupation with the social status of science and with the decline (as he perceived it) in quality within the philosophy of science itself. The volume is completed by a substantial introduction and a comprehensive list of Feyerabend's works. (shrink)

Paul Helm introduces the doctrine of divine providence--focusing on metaphysical and moral aspects and especially noting divine control, providence and evil, and the role of prayer. In the Contours of Christian Theology.

Qualitative coalitional games (QCGs) were introduced as abstract formal models of goal-oriented cooperative systems. A QCG is a game in which each agent is assumed to have some goal to achieve, and in which agents must typically cooperate with others in order to satisfy their goals. In this paper, we show how it is possible to reason about QCGs using Coalition Logic (CL), a formalism intended to facilitate reasoning about coalitional powers in game-like multiagent systems. We introduce a correspondence relation (...) between QCGs and interpretations for CL, which defines the circumstances under which a CL interpretation correctly characterises a QCG. The complexity of deciding correspondence between QCGs and interpretations for CL is shown to vary from being tractable up to Πp 2-complete, depending on the representation chosen for the QCG and interpretation. We then show how various properties and solution concepts of QCGs can be characterised as CL formula schemes. The ideas are illustrated via a detailed worked example, in which we demonstrate how a model checker can be deployed to investigate whether a particular system has the properties in question. (shrink)

This paper summarizes J.L. Schellenberg’s trilogy on the philosophy of religion. In the first book, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, Schellenberg analyzes basic concepts in the philosophy of religion. In the second, The Wisdom to Doubt, he rejects theism but defends skepticism about both naturalism and a very general religious position that he calls “ultimism.” And in the third book, The Will to Imagine, Schellenberg argues that rationality requires ultimistic faith.

What is unique and essential about theatre? What separates it from other arts? Do we need 'theatre' in some fundamental way? The art of theatre, as Paul Woodruff says in this elegant and unique book, is as necessary-and as powerful-as language itself. Defining theatre broadly, including sporting events and social rituals, he treats traditional theatre as only one possibility in an art that-at its most powerful-can change lives and bring a divine presence to earth. The Necessity of Theater analyzes (...) the unique power of theatre by separating it into the twin arts of watching and being watched, practiced together in harmony by watchers and the watched. Whereas performers practice the art of being watched-making their actions worth watching, and paying attention to action, choice, plot, character, mimesis, and the sacredness of performance space-audiences practice the art of watching: paying close attention. A good audience is emotionally engaged as spectators; their engagement takes a form of empathy that can lead to a special kind of human wisdom. As Plato implied, theatre cannot teach us transcendent truths, but it can teach us about ourselves. Characteristically thoughtful, probing, and original, Paul Woodruff makes the case for theatre as a unique form of expression connected to our most human insticts. The Necessity of Theater should appeal to anyone seriously interested or involved in theatre or performance more broadly. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga claims that certain beliefs entailing God's existence can be properly basic. He uses this claim to suggest two distinct replies to evidential arguments from evil against theism. In "Reason and Belief in God" he offers what he calls his "highroad" reply, and in a more recent article he suggests what I call his "modest" reply. First I show that Plantinga's highroad reply fails, because it relies on a faulty analysis of probability on total evidence. Then I reformulate his (...) modest reply so that is applies specifically to David Hume's evidential argument from evil. And finally, I show that a certain "existential" problem of evil undermines Plantinga's modest reply to Hume's argument. (shrink)

As the vulgar generally look no higher for the original of moral good and evil, just and unjust, than the codes and pandects, the tables and laws of their country and religion, so there have not wanted pretended philosophers in all ages who have asserted nothing to be good and evil, just and unjust, naturally and immutably; but that these things were positive, arbitrary and factitious only.1 In this short presentation I want to propose a sketch of what “naturalizing ethics (...) from a Girardian perspective” would look like. My goal is not to engage in a Girardian tentative at naturalizing ethics, but rather to contrast what such a project entails in comparison with some of the current attempts at .. (shrink)