Some philosophers argue that false speech and false belief are impossible. In the Sophist, Plato addresses this 'falsehood paradox', which purports to prove that one can neither say nor believe falsehoods. In this book Paolo Crivelli closely examines the whole dialogue and shows how Plato's brilliant solution to the paradox is radically different from those put forward by modern philosophers. He surveys and critically discusses the vast range of literature which has developed around the Sophist over the past fifty (...) years, and provides original solutions to several problems that are so far unsolved. His book will be important for all who are interested in the Sophist and in ancient ontology and philosophy of language more generally. (shrink)

Axel Honneth is internationally renowned for being one of the leading political and social philosophers of our time, and is highly regarded for his work on recognition and the struggles for recognition. In this interview, he discusses his work over the past four decades, starting from the rise of his intellectual vocation to his most recent book on the sovereignty of work. The text is a transcript, revised by the author, of the dialogue Honneth had with his interviewers and the (...) audience at the masterclass held on 24 May 2023 at the University of Trento, as part of the first series of lectures “Voices from Contemporary Philosophy”. (shrink)

Aristotle created logic and developed it to a level of great sophistication. There was nothing there before; and it took more than two millennia for something better to come around. The astonishment experienced by readers of the Prior Analytics, the most important of Aristotle's works that present the discipline, is comparable to that of an explorer discovering a cathedral in a desert. This article explains and evaluates some of Aristotle's views about propositions and syllogisms. The most important omission is the (...) difficult subject of syllogisms involving modalities. Aristotle distinguishes two relations of opposition that can obtain between propositions with the same subject- and predicate-expressions: contrariety and contradiction. In every canonical syllogism, one term is common to the two premises: it is called “middle term,” or simply “middle.” The remaining two terms of the premises are the only ones occurring in the conclusion: they are called “extreme terms,” or simply “extremes.”. (shrink)

In the last decades, Systems Biology (including cancer research) has been driven by technology, statistical modelling and bioinformatics. In this paper we try to bring biological and philosophical thinking back. We thus aim at making diferent traditions of thought compatible: (a) causality in epidemiology and in philosophical theorizing—notably, the “sufcient-component-cause framework” and the “mark transmission” approach; (b) new acquisitions about disease pathogenesis, e.g. the “branched model” in cancer, and the role of biomarkers in this process; (c) the burgeoning of omics (...) research, with a large number of “signals” and of associations that need to be interpreted. In the paper we summarize frst the current views on carcinogenesis, and then explore the relevance of current philosophical interpretations of “cancer causes”. We try to ofer a unifying framework to incorporate biomarkers and omic data into causal models, referring to a position called “evidential pluralism”. According to this view, causal reasoning is based on both “evidence of diference-making” (e.g. associations) and on “evidence of underlying biological mechanisms”. We conceptualize the way scientists detect and trace signals in terms of information transmission, which is a generalization of the mark transmission theory developed by philosopher Wesley Salmon. Our approach is capable of helping us conceptualize how heterogeneous factors such as micro and macro-biological and psycho-social—are causally linked. This is important not only to understand cancer etiology, but also to design public health policies that target the right causal factors at the macro-level. (shrink)

Summary This article presents three hitherto unpublished letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey on the foundations of mathematics with commentary. One of the letters was sent to Abraham Fraenkel and the other two letters to Heinrich Behmann. The transcription of the letters is preceded by an account that details the extent of Ramsey's known contacts with mathematical logicians on the Continent.

Our focus in this chapter is to address some of the philosophical issues that arise in the scientific and clinical study of the prodromal phase of psychosis. We discuss issues from both metaphysics and philosophy of science as we all as those related to phenomenological approaches and clinical ethics. A clear challenge arises in considering how models of a continuum of psychosis and of schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmental disorder can be reconciled with a scientific understanding of the prodrome as a (...) discrete constellation of signs and symptoms. Clinical and research work on the prodromal stage of psychosis also highlights ethical concerns. Demarcating a mental disorder and applying therapeutic interventions, based solely on risk estimation, should not be carried out lightly. (shrink)

We review several of de Finetti’s fundamental contributions where these have played and continue to play an important role in the development of imprecise probability research. Also, we discuss de Finetti’s few, but mostly critical remarks about the prospects for a theory of imprecise probabilities, given the limited development of imprecise probability theory as that was known to him.

Through her silencing thesis, Langton has contributed to the study of epistemic injustice by highlighting a possible cause of such a phenomenon: She asserts that the pornographic representation of sexual relationships affects the felicity conditions of speech uttered by women, so this speech is not understood as an illocution by men. This fact arguably undermines women’s credibility, since their testimony is not even registered in men’s testimonial sensibility. However, this thesis entails problematic consequences from at least two standpoints. From a (...) theoretical perspective, it enacts a circularity when it comes to the empirical individuation of the subordinative effects of pornography. I will point out that this problem arises from Langton’s substantive conception of power, i.e. from her notion of authority as an attribute which can be ascribed to preexisting subjects. From a political perspective, such conception of power allows Langton to performatively rank women as credible when testifying sexual violence, but it also leads her to silencing alternative political strategies, e.g. the ones proposed by Butler. Hence, I propose to consider this form of silencing as a specific kind of epistemic injustice, one that neutralises the performative value of political discourses. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Signification Truth Note Further Reading.

RESUMO O artigo propõe uma releitura cruzada dos conceitos de acidente, desenvolvido por Landowski no âmbito de sua teoria sociossemiótica da interação, e explosão, elaborado por Lotman em seus últimos escritos de semiótica da cultura. Longe de ser um fim em si mesmo, este confronto almeja esboçar uma síntese teórico-epistemológica que possa contribuir à análise dos processos comunicacionais-discursivos que regem o devir dos sistemas socioculturais, bem como ao seu enquadramento conceitual. A minha hipótese é que a cifra desta articulação resida (...) no vínculo entre a indeterminação destacada por ambos os autores e a carga estésica, isto é, o núcleo de tensões sensíveis que, conforme vislumbra Landowski, os acontecimentos acidentais/explosivos são capazes de mobilizar. Para procurar demonstrar sua pertinência e relevância, partirei de um caso concreto: as jornadas de junho de 2013 e seu impacto no processo que levou, em 2016, ao impeachment de Dilma Rousseff e, em 2018, à eleição de Jair Bolsonaro. ABSTRACT The article proposes a comparison between the concepts of accident, developed by Landowski in his sociosemiotic theory of interaction, and explosion, elaborated by Lotman in his last writings on the semiotics of culture. Far from being an end in itself, this confrontation aims to sketch a theoretical-epistemological synthesis that can contribute to the analysis of the communicational-discursive processes that trigger the historical flow of sociocultural systems, as well as to their conceptual categorisation. My hypothesis is that the basis of this articulation lies in the link between the indeterminacy highlighted by both authors, and the aesthesic value, that is, the core of sensible tensions that, as shown by Landowski, the accidental/explosive events could mobilise. In order to demonstrate its pertinence and relevance, I will focus on a specific case study: the 2013 protests in Brazil and their impact on the process that led to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. (shrink)

This paper aims to foster an interdisciplinary dialogue between Ricoeur’s phenomenological- hermeneutical thought and human geography, in particular with respect to the issue of landscape interpretation. The connection draws on the idea that landscapes and lived spaces can be read as texts, not unfamiliar to human geography and semiotics from 1980s onward. In the first part of the paper I will briefly expound some theories of landscape which make use of the metaphors “landscape as cultural image” and “landscape as text” (...) in human and cultural geography. Then, I will discuss the main contribution of Ricoeur to the issue of space. The philosopher already envisioned a possible application of his “threefold mimesis” of Time and Narrative to architectural spaces. In the conclusion, I will propose to rejuvenate the geographical metaphor of “landscape as text” by introducing a possible application of the Ricoeurian notion of “meaningful action as text” to landscape. (shrink)

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should (...) the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement. (shrink)

Fino a vent’anni fa il nome di Solger, uno dei pensatori più significativi del Romanticismo tedesco, certo il più sistematico e filosoficamente attrezzato tra i protagonisti di quella grande stagione, era noto in Italia, anche fra gli studiosi di estetica, quasi soltanto per la menzione che delle sue teorie viene fatta nelle Lezioni di Estetica di Hegel. Nel giro di pochi anni, però, la situazione è radicalmente cambiata. Sono state tradotte le sue Lezioni di estetica, apparse postume nel 182...

It has often been claimed that (i) Aristotle's expression 'protasis' means 'premiss' in syllogistic contexts and (ii) cannot refer to the conclusion of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. In this essay we produce and defend a counter-example to these two claims. We argue that (i) the basic meaning of the expression is 'proposition' and (ii) while it is often used to refer to the premisses of a syllogism, in Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 it is used to refer to the (...) conclusion of a syllogism. In our view, the best explanation of Aristotle's use of the expression 'protasis' is that it means proposition throughout but is frequently used without change of meaning (in certain specific contexts) to refer to the premisses from which a conclusion follows. In Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 he uses 'protasis' to refer to the conclusion when he needs a single expression to refer to both the conclusion and one of the premisses of the syllogism that constitutes the core of a syllogism through the impossible. If we are correct, we have shown that the view that the expression 'the final protasis' in EN 7.3, 1147b9ff must mean 'the final premiss' and so cannot refer to the conclusion of the relevant syllogism is mistaken. (shrink)

"The fact is, man is an etymologizing animal."Etymologizing—the practice of connecting one word with one or more other similar-sounding words that are believed to elucidate its meaning1—is a complex and putatively universal phenomenon.2 Thus, to take two representative examples far apart in time and space, etymologizing practices figure prominently in some episodes of the Hebrew Bible,3 but also provide some modern influential thinkers with an important mode of argument.4 Perhaps etymologizing is so pervasive because it offers a pliable and powerful (...) tool for addressing a key question, namely, why is something called what it is?While this question has universal appeal, only a few cultures seem to have addressed it... (shrink)

BackgroundDefinition and concept of the ‘beginning of human life’ are weakened by co-existing contrasting hypotheses based on humanistic or religious beliefs rather than scientific foundations. This plethora of conceptually distant views have important common concerns in different fields of science and shape, in turn, several societal aspects including laws related, for instance, to inheritance eligibility or abortion, end-of-life care and euthanasia, and reproductive technology. Also, they are fundamental to evaluate opportunity for resuscitation vs. palliative care in extremely preterm infants. In (...) this article, we address one of the most common tenets in medicine: the acceptance that human life starts with first breath, even though several events are well-documented to take place before its occurrence.Main textSeveral studies show how pivotal physiological events take place before first breath. Evidence of a number of neurological events occurring before first breath opens the way to the primacy of the Central Nervous System, given its immediate extra-uterine activation at birth. This activation eventually sets specific physiological conditions that allow the complex sequence of events determining the muscle activity associated with the influx of air in the lung and the settling of a continuous and successful extra-uterine respiration. We would like to invite the scientific community to endorse a clear-cut position against the paradigm of ‘first breath’ as the beginning of life. Herein, we also assume how, a still undefined, yet possibly specific quid in the external environment triggers further physiological response in newborns. Better understanding of the critical events that occur at the beginning of human life is likely to cause great concern and expectations in scientists, researchers and physicians working in the domain of brain, and its physiology, and mental health.ConclusionsThe comparison between beliefs and evidence-based observations generates confusion, misperceptions and false expectations in society, hence, in the scientific and medical community. Different and more solid alternatives about the carachterization of the ‘beginning of human life’ are indeed available and require to be explored and defined. (shrink)

Hypercomputation—the hypothesis that Turing-incomputable objects can be computed through infinitary means—is ineffective, as the unsolvability of the halting problem for Turing machines depends just on the absence of a definite value for some paradoxical construction; nature and quantity of computing resources are immaterial. The assumption that the halting problem is solved by oracles of higher Turing degree amounts just to postulation; infinite-time oracles are not actually solving paradoxes, but simply assigning them conventional values. Special values for non-terminating processes are likewise (...) irrelevant, since diagonalization can cover any amount of value assignments. This should not be construed as a restriction of computing power: Turing’s uncomputability is not a ‘barrier’ to be broken, but simply an effect of the expressive power of consistent programming systems. (shrink)

This essay explores selected examples of puns and etymologizing in the Pali canon. It argues that they do not solely serve a satirical intent, but are sophisticated rhetorical devices, skilfully employed by the Buddha to induce a reflective awareness in the listeners and persuade them into accepting his view. Their rhetorical function and efficacy is investigated, while foregrounding a new interpretation of the Aggaññasutta.

This paper aims to recover the ideas about semantics that are contained in Yāska’s _Nirukta_ (c. 6–3 century BCE), the seminal work of the Indian tradition of _nirvacana_ or etymology. It argues that, within the framework of his etymological project, Yāska developed consistent and sophisticated ideas relating to semantics—what I call his theory of meaning. It shows that this theory assumes the form of explicit and implicit reflections pertaining to the relation between three categories: denoting names (_nāman_/_nāmadheya_), denoted objects (_sattva_/_artha_), (...) and name-giving action expressed by verbal roots (_ākhyāta_). A typology of Yāska’s etymologies for what they reveal about semantics will be proposed and investigated. In doing so, attention will be paid to how Yāska’s ideas resemble and anticipate ideas concerning the difference between polysemy and homonymity, metaphoric transfer, and synecdoche. It is hoped that attending to Yāska’s thus-far largely overlooked ideas will help us better appreciate the _Nirukta_’s role in the history of early Indian engagements with semantics. (shrink)

The theme of the relationship between art and society is certainly not a central topic in the aesthetic reflection of Italian neo-idealism. Neither in Croce nor in Gentile it is ever discussed at length, and the few writings in which it is addressed are brief and polemically oriented. This essay, however, proposes to discuss the few hints present in Croce and Gentile on this subject. First, the debate on the materialistic interpretation of history will be examined, to which both Croce (...) and Gentile made important contributions at the end of the 19th century. Secondly, Croce’s own way of doing the history of literature will be discussed, showing the differences that distance him from the Desanctisian model and also from the model derived from the Hegelian Aesthetics. Croce’s way of making history of literature, indeed, aroused harsh criticism after World War II and provoked a request for a “return to De Sanctis”.Finally, but the theme will be only hinted at in the essay, a brief reference will be proposed to the opinions of Antonio Gramsci and his reading of Croce. (shrink)

Nous faisons usage de machines, de chaussures, de cartes, en vue de notre vie, de sa conservation et de son développement. Mais c’est la vie elle-même qui est avant tout « usable », et pour laquelle machines, chaussures, cartes sont utilisées. L’ usage de soi, de son existence, est le présupposé et la poutre maîtresse de tous les autres usages. Or l’usage de soi se fonde sur le détachement de soi. Est utilisée une existence à laquelle on ne peut pas (...) toujours s’identifier, qui ne se possède pas entièrement et qui, sans être vraiment étrangère, n’est pas non plus complètement familière. Autrement dit, l’usage de la vie concerne l’espèce qui, en plus de vivre, doit rendre sa vie possible. Le jeu de scène théâtral récapitule et amplifie les procédés par lesquels l’être humain se sert de son existence. L’activité de l’acteur est un modèle incomparable de l’usage de la vie et du souci de soi. Pour reconstituer avec précision les « technologies du soi », il convient de regarder de près les écrits de Stanislavski, Mejerchol’d, Brecht et Grotowski. (shrink)

Variations sur le survolRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze et le statut de la formeLa question principale que j’aborde dans cet article concerne la manière dont Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze assument l’héritage du finalisme du vingtième siècle.En analysant certains textes fondamentaux de ces deux auteurs, on aperçoit en effet clairement leur dette à l’égard, notamment, du néo-finalisme de Raymond Ruyer. Autant Merleau-Ponty que Deleuze lisent l’oeuvre de Ruyer en la séparant de son contexte d’origine et de ses intentions explicites, à savoir hors de toute (...) exigence de nature épistémologique. Entre ces deux auteurs subsiste toutefois une différence substantielle dans la manière d’employer les concepts ruyériens. Merleau-Ponty réfute l’hypothèse d’une forme qui survole les matériaux constituant l’organisation idéale, mais valorise l’idée d’un thématisme immanent, d’une essence qui subsiste seulement à l’intérieur de ses variations. Deleuze, lui, semble reprendre sans réserve à son compte ces mêmes notions de forme et de survol parce qu’il les interprète comme des concepts plutôt que comme des causes formelles ou finales. Le concept deleuzien n’est pas pris dans la « pâte » du vécu, mais survole toute expérience vécue et tout état de choses. C’est pourquoi il ne peut être que créé, et c’est pourquoi la philosophie ne peut pas être uneactivité descriptive, à la manière de la phénoménologie, mais doit être nécessairement constructive.Variations on the SurveyRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and the Status of the FormThe main question that I confront in this article concerns the way in which Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze take up the heritage of 20th century finalism. By analyzing some of both of these authors’ basic texts, we clearly perceive their debt to, particularly, the neofinalism of Raymond Ruyer. Merleau-Ponty as much as Deleuze read Ruyer’s work separately from its original context and its explicit intentions, that is, they read it outside of any sort of epistemological demand. Nevertheless, we still find between the two a substantial difference in the manner of using Ruyer’s concepts. Merleau-Ponty refutes the hypothesis of a form that surveys the materials that constitute the ideal organization, but valorizes the idea of an immanent thematism, of an essence that only subsists within its variations. Deleuze, for his part, appears by contrast to take unreservedly into his own account these same notions of form and survey because he interprets them as concepts rather than formal and final causes. The Deleuzian concept is not “infested” with the lived, but surveys all lived experience and every state of things. That is why itcan only be created and that is why philosophy cannot be a descriptive activity, in the manner of phenomenology, but will necessarily be constructive. (shrink)

Variations sur le survolRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze et le statut de la formeLa question principale que j’aborde dans cet article concerne la manière dont Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze assument l’héritage du finalisme du vingtième siècle.En analysant certains textes fondamentaux de ces deux auteurs, on aperçoit en effet clairement leur dette à l’égard, notamment, du néo-finalisme de Raymond Ruyer. Autant Merleau-Ponty que Deleuze lisent l’oeuvre de Ruyer en la séparant de son contexte d’origine et de ses intentions explicites, à savoir hors de toute (...) exigence de nature épistémologique. Entre ces deux auteurs subsiste toutefois une différence substantielle dans la manière d’employer les concepts ruyériens. Merleau-Ponty réfute l’hypothèse d’une forme qui survole les matériaux constituant l’organisation idéale, mais valorise l’idée d’un thématisme immanent, d’une essence qui subsiste seulement à l’intérieur de ses variations. Deleuze, lui, semble reprendre sans réserve à son compte ces mêmes notions de forme et de survol parce qu’il les interprète comme des concepts plutôt que comme des causes formelles ou finales. Le concept deleuzien n’est pas pris dans la « pâte » du vécu, mais survole toute expérience vécue et tout état de choses. C’est pourquoi il ne peut être que créé, et c’est pourquoi la philosophie ne peut pas être uneactivité descriptive, à la manière de la phénoménologie, mais doit être nécessairement constructive.Variations on the SurveyRuyer, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and the Status of the FormThe main question that I confront in this article concerns the way in which Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze take up the heritage of 20th century finalism. By analyzing some of both of these authors’ basic texts, we clearly perceive their debt to, particularly, the neofinalism of Raymond Ruyer. Merleau-Ponty as much as Deleuze read Ruyer’s work separately from its original context and its explicit intentions, that is, they read it outside of any sort of epistemological demand. Nevertheless, we still find between the two a substantial difference in the manner of using Ruyer’s concepts. Merleau-Ponty refutes the hypothesis of a form that surveys the materials that constitute the ideal organization, but valorizes the idea of an immanent thematism, of an essence that only subsists within its variations. Deleuze, for his part, appears by contrast to take unreservedly into his own account these same notions of form and survey because he interprets them as concepts rather than formal and final causes. The Deleuzian concept is not “infested” with the lived, but surveys all lived experience and every state of things. That is why itcan only be created and that is why philosophy cannot be a descriptive activity, in the manner of phenomenology, but will necessarily be constructive. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly to show the partial agreement between two ap-proaches to capitalism, considered as will of power and perverse metamorphosis of desire: Magatti’s conception of ‘techno-nihlist capitalism’ and the idea of ‘libidinal economy’, proposed by Deleuze&Guattari and Lyotard. Secondly, to evaluate the difference be-tween Magatti and Deleuze, in the light of the impact of financial crisis, understood as contraction of will of power and crisis of desire. From this clinical point of view, what is (...) at stake is reconceptualizing the nature of desire as a generative power, against the deleuzian concept of desire as nomad and anonyme flux: the key question is the possibility to think the will of power as a desire to shape social bonds, beyond its perverse temptation to kill the Other. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to examine if and why the European reaction to the migration crisis of 2015 can be considered anti-ethical. In order to argue this, the paper discusses the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which since 2005 has been the EU's overall framework for migration and asylum policies. The second aim of the paper is to justify that an ethics of migration is possible, arguing in favor of the thesis that caring for refugees (...) is a fundamental value for citizenship and a contribution to social justice. (shrink)