Summary Robert Boyle did not subordinate chemistry to mechanical philosophy. He was in fact reluctant to explain chemical phenomena by having recourse to the mechanical properties of particles. For him chemistry provided a primary way of penetrating into nature. In his chemical works he employed corpuscles endowed with chemical properties as his explanans. Boyle's chemistry was corpuscular, rather than mechanical. As Boyle's views of seminal principles show, his corpuscular philosophy cannot be described as a purely mechanical theory of matter. Boyle's (...) classification of corpuscles allowed him to connect his corpuscular views of matter with chemistry. Boyle did not rule out the possibility of a classification of chemical substances based on their properties: his aim was to reform the received classification. (shrink)

Van Helmont's chemistry and medicine played a prominent part in the seventeenth-century opposition to Aristotelian natural philosophy and to Galenic medicine. Helmontian works, which rapidly achieved great notoriety all over Europe, gave rise to the most influential version of the chemical philosophy. Helmontian terms such as Archeus, Gas and Alkahest all became part of the accepted vocabulary of seventeenth-century science and medicine.

ArgumentThis article argues that during the seventeenth century chemistry achieved intellectual and institutional recognition, starting its transition from a practical art – subordinated to medicine – into an independent discipline. This process was by no means a smooth one, as it took place amidst polemics and conflicts lasting more than a century. It began when Andreas Libavius endeavored to turn chemistry into a teaching discipline, imposing method and order. Chemistry underwent harsh criticism from Descartes and the Cartesians, who reduced natural (...) phenomena to the mechanical affections of matter, leaving little room for chemistry as an independent discipline. Boyle rejected the chemical principles and promoted the fusion of chemistry with corpuscularianism. He did not reduce chemical phenomena to the mechanical affections of matter, but strived to promote chemistry as part of natural philosophy. Lemery gave strong impulse to the recognition of chemistry as a discipline in its own right by fostering a compromise of chemistry and mechanism. Lemery adopted the chemical principles, but did not see them as the ultimate ingredients of bodies. In order to promote chemistry, he distanced it from alchemy and pursued the reform of chemical terminology. (shrink)

Robert Boyle was one of the most influential scientific and theological thinkers of his time. This is the first edition of his correspondence, transcribed from the original manuscripts. It is fully annotated, with an introduction and general index.

This volume emphasizes the diversity and fruitfulness of early modern mechanism as a program, as a concept, as a model. Mechanistic study of the living body but also of the mind and mental processes are examined in careful historical focus, dealing with figures ranging from the first-rank (Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Cudworth, Gassendi, Locke, Leibniz, Kant) to less well-known individuals (Scaliger, Martini) or prominent natural philosophers who have been neglected in recent years (Willis, Steno, etc.). The volume moves from early modern (...) medicine and physiology to late Enlightenment and even early 19th-century psychology, always maintaining a conceptual focus. It is a contribution to a newly active field in the history and philosophy of early modern life science. It is of interest to scholars studying the history of medicine and the development of mechanistic theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY 199 ~ to the principle of acting for the common good are played down by Grant in her discussion of Locke. Nevertheless, Grant advances the important proposition with respect to the tradition of liberalism as a political doctrine that "Locke's political theory contains two tendencies that are not entirely harmonious." That is, there is an uneasy blend of radical (...) and conservative elements in Lockean liberalism, and "this ambivalent attitude is an expression of the central axis of conflict within liberal theory generally" (204). For those who seek to understand Locke's role as a progenitor of liberalism and the persistence of certain types of arguments and problems which retain their significance for thinkers who identify themselves with that political theory, therefore, John Locke's Liberalism provides an excellent starting point. RICHARD ASHCRAFT Universityof California, Los Angeles Fabio Todesco. Riforma della metafisica e sapere scientifico. Saggio suJ. H. Lambert (z 7281777 ). CoUana di Filosofia, vol. x5. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987. Pp. 348- L 3o,ooo. Voltaire expressed his view of Wolffian metaphysics in a letter to Prince Frederick of Prussia: "Ce sont des 6clairs au milieu d'une nuit profonde; c'est tout ce qu'on peut esp~rer, je crois, de la m~taphysique. "~ Voltaire's attitude towards metaphysics was not shared by Condillac, who in his Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines (1746) distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics: one, ambitious and obscure of itself, pretends to discuss the essences of beings and the inscrutable causes of things; the other, more circumspect, confines itself to the analysis of knowledge, and so provides the only possible basis for a clarification of mind; it is "la science qui contribue le plus ~ rendre l'esprit lumineux, precis et 6tendu, et qui, par cons6"quent, doit le preparer ~ l'6tude de toutes les autres." It started with Locke, and is to be treated with the same exactitude as geometry in order to give a clear and invariable meaning to the words used, and a simple and easy order to the propositions." Maupertuis, who in 1746 became the President of the newly re-founded Berlin Acad~mie Royale des Sciences, hoped for the application of mathematics to metaphysics; nevertheless, he didn't expect the same degree of certitude from the latter as from the former. 3 In 1761 the Berlin Academy proposed a prize question as to whether metaphysics were capable of the same degree of evidence as mathematics. Lambert answered the question by claiming that geometrical demonstrations might be applied to metaphysics. 4 Four years afterwards (January 1765) Lambert was enrolled as a merei Letter of 1 September 1736, in Voltaire'sCorrespondence,ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), 5: 232. " Oeuw-esPhilosophiquesde Condillac,ed. Georges Le Roy (Paris: P.U.F., 19~7), 1:3. DesDevoirsde l'Acadg, micien, in Histoirede l'AcademieRoyaledesSciencesetBelles-Lettres,~5 vols. (Berlin, 1746-71), 1 (1746): 142-43. 4 "Llber die Methode, die Metaphysik, Theologie und Moral richtiger zu beweisen.... "ed. K. Bopp, Kantstud,en, suppl. 4~ (1918). BOOK REVIEWS a37 ber of the Berlin Academy; in the speech he delivered on that occasion he maintained that the simple concepts first formulated by Locke were the basis of human knowledge. From these simple concepts were drawn axiomata and postulata, the starting points of demonstrations that were necessarily and strictly to follow "l'ordre et le rigueur g~ometrique. ''~ In his own research, Lambert's point of departure was the philosophy of Christian Wolff, who had applied geometrical method to philosophy and provided demonstrations of its propositions, and definitions of all its constituent terms. The result Lambert obtained is very different from that of Wolff's metaphysics, which was constructed by deduction from the most general concept of ens, elaborated through a series of classifications per genera et species. Lambert abandoned this Wolffian system of classification in order to follow the anatomical method introduced by Locke, and by which the fundamental constituent elements of thought might be reached. The metaphysics of Lambert is a reversal of that of Wolff: it is built up from simple ideas derived immediately from sense perception: these simple ideas, being indivisible, are... (shrink)