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En 1901, l’auteur a démontré que la notion de la valeur économique est basée sur celle de la préférence et de l’avantage. Partant des résultats acquis par Franz Brentano dans l’analyse des notions d’avantage et de valeur, l’auteur démontre que tes notions d’utilité et de devoir se ramènent à cette même base. Il s’ensuit une démonstration du rapport des obligations juridiques et des normes de droit positif, avec l’idée du devoir moral. L’auteur s’efforce de réaliser la synthèse du subjectivisme (...) de Protagoras et de l’objectivisme platonicien en prenant, avec le premier, la conscience subjective comme point de départ, et en désignant, avec le second, les actes distingués comme justes {in sich als richtig charakterisierte Akte) pour fondement de l’objectivité de ce qu’on appelle vérités et valeurs objectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence LINDA L. McALISTER FRANZBRnrCrXr~O,in his important early work Psychologie vom empirischen Stand, punkt (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena,x It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the Psychologie, he devotes him.self to this (...) task, and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction. After enumerating examples of men~l phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several charac, teristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one whdch has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence," 2 (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rathor location, indicating existence in the mind). As examples of mental phenomena Brentano lists first ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen), whether sensory or issuing from the imagination, and by this he meam not the objects which are presented or which one has before one's mind, but rather the condition or, what Brentano; broadly speaking, calls the act of having such an idea or presentation.3 Thus the acts of hearing something, or seeing or perceiving something would be mental phenomena regardless of whether the object which is, e. g., seen, ds perceived through the visual organs or seen in the mind's eye, so to speak. Other examples are acts of judgment, amongwhich Brentano includes ~:emembering, inferring, believing, doubting; and emotions.such as being happy or sad, lovi~,g and hating, along with which Brentano includes such things as willing, intending, choosing, etc.4 i Oskar Kraus, e.d.,2nd ed. (Leipzig,1924),I, 109. Psych. I, 137. Psych. I, 111. " Psych. I, 112. [423] 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ExamFles of physical phenomena which Brentano mentions are "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I perceive; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination." s It appears from the examFles, then, that mental phenomena are all mental acts, in a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of sensible qualities, the inclusion of "a landscape" being, apparently, a slip on Brentano's part, as his student, friend and editor Oskar Kraus points out. 6 As mentioned above, Brentano thought that there is one partieula~ mark of mental phenomena which characterizes them better than any other: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affmned or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.7 Commentators, perhaps not surprisingly, have disagreed as to the precise nature of the view which Brentano is enunciating in this passage,s Some have supposed that since you can think of, hate, or judge, etc., things which do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, then the immanent object of which Brentano speaks i,s not Pegasus but a "thoughtof Pegasus" (gedachtes Pegasus) which exists in one's mind whenever someone th'mks of Pegasus. Apparently H6fler interpreted the doctrine in this way in a paper which he presented to the Fifth International Psychology Congress in 1905.9.In the light of some passages from Brentano's early writings it appears to be a plausible interpretation. Consider, for example, the following passage: There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely.... The two concepts are not identical but they... (shrink)

Mr. Kubat attributes much of the misinformation about Brentano's theories to the lack of an edition of Brentano's collected writing. If anyone should wish to know more about Brentano's doctrines, he may have been led by this remark to despair of finding them anywhere in print. The three works which Mr. Kubat mentions, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, Religion und Philosophie, and Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, all edited by F. Mayer-Hillebrand and published by A. Francke in Bern, represent no (...) more than a continuation of the Gesamtausgabe of Brentano's writings which was begun by Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil after Brentano's death. The volumes in the Gesamtausgabe represent ten numbers in Meiner's Philosophische Bibliothek and are listed under the heading, "Gesammelte philosophische Schriften." They contain not only new editions of much of the work which Brentano published during his lifetime, but a large amount of material which Kraus and Kastil selected from his enormous Nachlass as well. I am sure that Mrs. Mayer-Hillebrand herself would be the first to recognize that the three published volumes she has edited, and the one on esthetics which is soon to appear in print, are part of a whole which also includes the volumes edited by Kraus and Kastil. Taken altogether, the thirteen volumes that have been published by Meiner and by Francke can well be viewed as at least an adequate substitute for a collected edition. Surely they include everything which is necessary to dispel the common misinformation which Mr. Kubat tries to explain by denying their existence. The trouble has not been the lack of a collected edition, but the lack of readers. (shrink)

The Description Logic Handbook covers all aspects of the research in the field of knowledge representation. Written by some of the most prominent researchers in the field, and covering the basic technical material and implementational aspects, it is both a unique reference and a self-study guide.

Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Ein Vortrag. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittl, Erkenntnis, 1 I. Die Einladung zu einem Vortrage, welche die Iuristische Gesellschaft Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis Ein Vortrag Seite Wert der Geschichte und ...

This paper is an analysis of a video clip of an interview between a reporter and ice hockey player following a game in which the player was involved in a hard collision with a member of the opposing team. The paper explores blame attribution and how participants claim and disclaim expertise in a way that supports or undermines assertions to have correctly seen and assessed the actions shown on tape. Our analysis focuses on the video of the interview, and it (...) also examines relevant video clips of the collision and various commentaries about the identities of the characters and their actions shown on the videos. In brief, the study is a third-order investigation of recorded-actions-under-analysis. It uses the videos and commentaries as “perspicuous phenomena” that illuminate and complicate how the members’ own action category analysis is bound up with issues of expertise, evidence, and blame. (shrink)

John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...) rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics. (shrink)

On the basis of a reconstruction of legal theory in the tradition of Marx - a current that has been more or less silenced since the end of the 1970s - Subjectivation and Cohesion develops a critical counter-pole to the theories of law that predominate in social theory today. To this end, the works of Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Evgeny Pashukanis, Oskar Negt, Isaac D. Balbus, the so-called 'State-derivation School', Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas and Michel Foucault are first (...) analysed for their strengths and weaknesses, and then combined to form a new construction: a materialist legal theory that is up to date and can avoid the shortcomings of existing theories - above all their disregard for gender relations and the reductive consequences of functionalist, economic or politicist approaches to law. (shrink)

diefes thut Ariftoteles. indem er die verfchiedenen Bedeutungen. die nach feiner Beobachtung der Name des Seienden umfaßt. unterfcheidend. die eigentlichen von den uneigentlichen fondert und die let-,tern von der metaphyfifchen ...

Franz Clemens Brentano. -ZZW fo daß fich vielmehr der Gedanke einer Verwandtfchaft des Verfahrens hier und dort mit einer kaum abzuwehrenden Macht uns aufdrängt, Pafcal. der geniale Mathematiker und Phhfiker. thut in feinen *Penfees ...

Expanding on the theory of ethics first posited by Brentano in The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong this re-issued work, first published posthumously in 1952, is based on series of lectures on practical philosophy, given at the university of Vienna from 1876 to 1894. The English-speaking reader will find it interesting to examine the step-by-step development of Brentano’s ethical theory, his extensive critique of British moral philosophers, and his unusually detailed section on casuistry.

The first introductory textbook on description logics, relevant to computer science, knowledge representation and the semantic web.

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 92-134.

Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand nebst Abhandlungen über Plotinus, Thomas von Aquin, Kant, Schopenhauer und Auguste Comte. Unveränderter Print-on-Demand-Nachdruck der 2. Auflage von 1968. Inhalt: Einleitung I. Die vier Phasen der Philosophie (1895) II. Plotinus (1876) III. Thomas von Aquin (1908) IV. Über Kants Kritik der Gottesbeweise (1911/12) V. Schopenhauer 1911/12) VI. Auguste Comte (1869) VII. Über voraussetzungslose Forschung (1901) Anmerkungen Brentanos zu den vier Phasen der Philosophie Anmerkungen des Herausgebers zum Gesamtwerk Namen- und Sachregister.

Franz Brentano is recognised as one of the most important philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This work, first published in English in 1988, besides being an important contribution to metaphysics in its own right, has considerable historical importance through its influence on Husserl’s views on internal time consciousness. The work is preceded by a long introduction by Stephan Körner in collaboration with Brentano’s literary executor Roderick Chisholm. It is translated by Barry Smith.

T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbay’s irreflexivity (...) lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maio’s and Zanardo’s operator is replaced by a version of “actually”. (shrink)

This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.

Im Februar 1930 beschloß das Parlament der tschechoslowakischen Republik, Präsident Th. G. Masaryk aus Anerkennung seiner Verdienste um die Republiksgründung eine Summe von 20 Millionen Kronen zu widmen. Aus Dankbarkeit seinem philosophischen Lehrer Franz Brentano gegenüber ermöglichte Masaryk mit einem Teil dieser Summe im darauffolgenden Jahr die Gründung einer Brentano-Gesellschaft und eines Brentano-Archives in Prag unter der Leitung von Oskar Kraus. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht die Vorgeschichte und die Geschichte der Gesellschaft bis zu ihrer endgültigen Auflösung im Jahre (...) 1955 und damit ein Stück vergessener Wissenschaftsgeschichte zu rekonstruieren. Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Rolle gelegt, die die Brentano-Gesellschaft im Bemühen um den wissenschaftlichen Nachlaß Brentanos spielte. (shrink)

Následující text vydal v roce 1930 Oskar Kraus pod názvem Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins v časopisu Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 75, n. 1-2, s. 1-22. Obsahuje výňatky z korespondence Franze Brentana a pražského profesora Karlo-Ferdinandovy univerzity Antona Martyho z roku 1895 a část Martyho přednášky o Brentanově teorii časového vědomí z téhož roku. Tématem textu je zdůvodnění přechodu od modelu časového vědomí, který pracuje s časovou modifikací předmětů představování, k modelu, který pracuje s časovou modifikací intencionálního vztahu k (...) předmětu. Ve verzi, která je zde zachycena, jde o přechod ke kontinuální modifikaci aktů souzení, které předmět „kladou“. Čtenáře, který by se zajímal o popis a hlubší zdůvodnění vývoje a povahy Brentanových teorií časového vědomí, bych odkázal na následující texty: Chisholm, R. (1981): „Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time“. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1), 3-16, a Chrudzimski, A. (2005): Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität, Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden, Ontos, Frankfurt. V češtině pak na Janoušek, H. (2017): „Brentanova teorie času a časového vědomí“. Pro-Fil, 18, no. 1, (v tisku), dostupné online na stránkách časopisu Pro-Fil. (shrink)