Many Western philosophers are poorly informed about the issues involved in nonduality, since this topic is usually associated with various kinds of absolute idealism in the West, or mystical traditions in the East. Increasingly, however, this topic is finding its way into Western philosophical debates. In this "scholarly but leisurely and very readable" (Spectrum Review) analysis of the philosophies of nondualism of (Hindu) Vedanta, Mahayana Buddhism, and Taoism, Loy extracts what he calls "a core doctrine" of nonduality of (...) seer and seen from these three worldviews and then applies the doctrine in various ways, including a critique of Derrida's deconstructionism. (shrink)

In his essay “Things Do Not Move,” Sengzhao (374?−414 CE), a prominent Chinese Buddhist philosopher, argues for the thesis that the myriad things do not move in time. This view is counter-intuitive and seems to run counter to the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. In this book chapter, I assess Sengzhao’s arguments for his thesis, elucidate his stance on the change/nonchange of things, and discuss related problems. I argue that although Sengzhao is keen on showing the plausibility of the thesis, (...) he actually views the myriad things as both changing and unchanging and upholds the nonduality of motion and rest. In fact, the nonmoving thesis follows from the discernment that things change from moment to moment without there being any enduring stuff in the process. Among philosophical works that confer a higher ontological status on nonchange over change, Sengzhao’s essay is unique and well worth pondering. (shrink)

Jizang (549−623 CE), the key philosophical exponent of the Sanlun tradition of Chinese Buddhism, based his philosophy considerably on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c.150−250 CE), the founder of the Indian Madhyamaka school. However, although Jizang sought to follow Nāgārjuna closely, there are salient features in his thought on language that are notably absent from Nāgārjuna’s works. In this paper, I present a philosophical analysis of Jizang’s views of the relationship between speech and silence and compare them with (...) those of Nāgārjuna. I first elaborate on Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of twofold truth and discuss his thought concerning the relationship between language and ineffable quiescence. I then examine Jizang’s interpretation of the doctrine. Thereafter, I distinguish silence qua teaching from silence qua principle and examine Jizang’s views on the relationship between speech and these two kinds of silence. It is shown that while Nāgārjuna leans toward affirming a clear-cut distinction between speech and the ineffable quiescence, Jizang endorses the nonduality of conventional speech and sacred silence. (shrink)

Previously published: Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997.

Radical personal and systemic social transformation is urgently needed to address world-wide violence and inequality, pervasive moral confusion and corruption, and the rapid, unprecedented global destruction of our environment. Recent years have seen an embrace of intersubjectivity within discourse on educational transformation within academia and the public sphere. As well, there has been a turn toward contemplative education initiatives within North American schools, colleges and universities. This article contends that these turns might benefit from openness to the ontologies, epistemologies, and (...) ethics of the ‘wisdom traditions’ from which many contemplative practices are drawn. To illustrate this point, we discuss the value of intercultural philosophy of education, and introduce Eastern philosophical ideas, specifically, the Shambhala Buddhist notion of the nondual ground and wisdom of basic goodness and related teachings. We detail how awareness of basic goodness and its holistic expression in the ground, path, and fruition of Shambhala teachings can open vital questions regarding intersubjectivity, challenge and reinvigorate aspects of current engagements with contemplative practices, and provide significant insights and educational paths for transformational endeavours in neoliberal times. Informed by our learning from Shambhala, we conclude with a deepened understanding of intercultural philosophy of education. (shrink)

The similarities in the philosophies of Parmenides and Śaṅkara1 need to be better understood than they have been so far. I will argue that the goal they share can be characterized as that of leading their audiences to nondual reality, which is the only trustworthy knowledge or experience one can have. They refer to this nondual reality respectively as being and Brahman. Even if the phrase ‘nondual reality’ or ‘nondual experience’ strikes many readers as controversial if applied to Parmenides’ being, (...) it agrees with the ‘fashionable’ Parmenides interpretations that insist that Parmenides’ laws of thought, such as the impossibility of knowing not-being,2 will enable us to understand what being is; and it makes.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 353-358 [Access article in PDF] The Application of Nondual Epistemology to Anomalous Experience in Psychosis Caroline Brett THE COMMENTARIES PROVIDED by Marzanski and Bratton, and McGhee have drawn my attention to several ways in which my analysis could benefit from clarification or supplementation, and the range of the specific phenomena to which it can be applied. Since writing this paper nearly 3 years (...) ago, my own views of the area have developed, and in some aspects, shifted; nevertheless, within this response I shall comment on the specific aspects of the original paper that I feel may have been misunderstood or overlooked by the commentators, and those aspects that benefit from the broader perspective they provided.To clarify the direction of the original paper: I would describe it as an attempt to make a deeper examination of processes involved in some kinds of anomalous experience than is provided by the "cognitive problem-solving model"; in other words, to supplement rather than challenge or undermine this perspective. Moreover, the focus is intended to be more on identifying the point at which the experience, or the response to the experience (more on the relation between these two below) becomes pathological, than on cleanly distinguishing a psychotic state from a mystical one. However, because I do use these terms contrastively throughout the paper, I concede that these aims become blurred and may in fact be indistinguishable.Third, the paper concerns only a relatively narrow arena of both mystical and psychotic phenomenology, selected for the purpose of a tight conceptual analysis and comparability, and possibly suffers a lack of generalizability or scope of application as a result. Most notably, I leave aside the paranoid or persecutory interpretative framework often seen as paradigmatic of the psychotic state (although a brief mention of how emotionally relevant themes may arise out of anomalous cognition is included), focussing instead on the more "Schneiderian" aspects of psychotic phenomenology, in which there is a self-observed alteration of normal experience. 1 It may be an important point of contrast that I do not specifically focus on "hallucinations, voices, and visions" as described by McGhee and, to an extent, Jackson and Fulford. It may also be worth [End Page 353] flagging up the fact that I do not focus on "delusional beliefs" at all, instead choosing to focus on the "delusional mood," which notably does not involve crystallized delusions as such. As a result, the main aim is not to compare two descriptively defined states of mind, as seems to be suggested by McGhee in his commentary, but rather to see to what extent a certain form of experience can be understood within a particular epistemological structure, and the implications of this.Further to this issue, Marzanski and Bratton raise an objection to a view in which a common core of mystical experience is posited; one which could be identified interculturally and independently of "the language and tradition in which the self is formed." They make an important point that the perspective gained by applying the epistemology of Zen Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta may have no authority in helping to understand the locus of pathology in anomalous experiences that have occurred in an individual who is not established in these cultures or traditions or for a person who does not accept these epistemologies in the first place. The issue of the existence of some core mystical experiences that are translated into religious experiences in different cultures is a matter of comparative religion and theology, and outside the scope of this paper (although my own opinion is that such a core exists). In the absence of any argument to support this opinion, it must be conceded that this may severely limit the applicability of my analysis, especially if irreconcilable differences are thought to exist between the epistemologies of, for example, theistic and monistic philosophies. However, I would suggest that whatever wisdom can be gleaned from the various spiritual doctrines in existence around the world with regard to unusual and/or distressing states of mind should be absorbed where... (shrink)

How is modern psychotherapy impacted when it is approached from the presence and understanding of the unconditioned mind? What happens when therapists are able to function as a sacred mirror for their clients' essential nature, reflecting back not only the contents of awarenessùthoughts, feelings and sensationsùbut awareness itself? Informed by their direct experience as well as by nondual teachings from both eastern and western wisdom traditions, the authors take a fresh look at what psychotherapy can be. These seminal essays will (...) challenge and inspire readers to approach psychotherapy in a new wayùas a potential portal for experiencing their deepest nature as free and joyful beings.Seasoned clinicians, Dan Berkow, Stephan Bodian, Dorothy Hunt, Sheila Krystal, Lynn Marie Lumiere, Richard Miller, John Prendergast, John Welwood, Jennifer Welwood and Bryan Wittine, and innovative western spiritual teachers, Adyashanti and Peter Fenner, explore critical issues at the interface of psychology and spirituality from a nondual perspective. (shrink)

The great variety of meditation techniques found in different contemplative traditions presents a challenge when attempting to create taxonomies based on the constructs of contemporary cognitive sciences. In the current issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Travis and Shear add ‘automatic self-transcending’ to the previously proposed categories of ‘focused attention’ and ‘open monitoring’, and suggest characteristic EEG bands as the defining criteria for each of the three categories. Accuracy of current taxonomies and potential limitations of EEG measurements as classifying criteria are (...) discussed. (shrink)

The great eleventh-century figure, Rāmānuja, belonged to the Śrīvaiṣṇava community that worshiped the divine as Viṣṇu-with-Śrī, the Lord-and-Consort. But he also embarked on a project to develop an interpretation of the first-century Vedāntasūtra, which presented the supposedly core teachings of the major Upaniṣads, traditionally the last segment of the sacred corpus of the Vedas. Rāmānuja sought to reconcile the devotional commitments of Śrīvaiṣṇavism—which was built on the human yearning for the divine that was incomprehensibly Other while graciously accessible—with the conceptual (...) demands of the Vedānta in which a profound identity between the individual self (ātman) and the impersonal, ultimate explanatory principle (brahman) was taught. This reconciliation of difference and identity came to be called “Qualified Nondualism.” In his earliest work, the Vedārthasaṃgraha, one of the ways Rāmānuja points to reconciliation is through identifying a single state of consciousness as both cognition of nonduality (the Vedāntic project) and the emotionally valent experience of happiness (the supreme expression of the human encounter with the divine). It does not seem that he systematically pursues this conception of how a state can be both cognitive and affective, and such an analysis will require independent philosophical analysis. Thus, this article argues that if a state of consciousness were indeed both cognitive and affective in this way, we would have a full explanation for how the devotional approach of a human being to Viṣṇu-with-Śrī can also be the self’s realization of identity with brahman. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:A desideratum for Buddhist-Christian exchange is more first-order philosophical engagement—engagement that brings our traditions into direct conversation on genuinely shared first-order questions. To converse in that way, we have to identify shared philosophical loci, areas where our systems are—as much as this is possible—reflecting on the same problem, or the same data. This essay identifies one such shared locus, so that the Christian philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984) can philosophize together with the broadly Yogācārin authors Dignāga (ca. 480–540 ce) and Dharmakīrti (...) (mid-sixth–mid-seventh century). That shared locus is, as Lonergan describes it, the fact that what is "primary" in our knowing is the identity of knowing and known. Nondual cognition plays, for both parties, a constitutive and primary role in our knowing. But Lonergan and the Yogācārins draw divergent conclusions from the shared phenomenological insights. For the Yogācārins, this observation motivates their distinctive mind-only idealism—the conclusion that nothing but mere nondual experiencing can be established as real. For Lonergan, this same identity is the basis for affirming that our knowing attains to objective knowledge of an intelligible order whose actuality is distinct from our knowing it. Those divergent conclusions are grounded in divergent accounts of what the real is, and how it is to be known. What Lonergan shares with the Buddhists, though, makes him the rare Christian philosopher whose technical cognitional theory is quietly pervaded by the notion of cognition's "primary" nonduality. Lonergan, then, can provide the technical philosophical basis for wider ranging Christian receptions of Indian accounts of nondual cognition—including theological receptions which enshrine nondual cognition in accounts of the Trinity, and of human consciousness as a created image of the Trinity. (shrink)

Although Chan, or Zen, Buddhism traditionally claimed itself as a special transmission outside doctrinal teachings that eschews the written word, it has long been praised for its improvisational, atypical, intriguing, and intricate use of words. Prominent Chan masters are characteristically skillful in employing paradoxical and aporetic phrases, figurative and poetic expressions, negations, questions, repetitions, and so forth, to express their thoughts, indicate their awakened states of mind, cut off the interlocutor’s habitual dualistic thinking, or evoke in him or her an (...) experience of awakening. This fact, among others, has led some contemporary scholars to claim that the Chan experience of awakening does not... (shrink)

Though scholars of Chinese Theology have expanded the inter-religious dialogue between Christian theology and traditional Chinese philosophy and culture from Neo-Confucianism to other fields such as Taoism, the dialogue with Chinese Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, has not been carried out yet. This article mainly reflects on the starting point of Leung In-sing’s Chinese Theology through the perspective of Dharma as Nonduality in Chan. Firstly, it briefly outlines the background and basic ideas of Chinese Theology formulated by Leung In- sing, (...) focusing on discussing the two fundamental theological categories: “Relationship” and “Rapport.” Then, it annotates and analyzes Huineng’s“Dharma as Nonduality.”Finally, from the perspective of Huineng, it rethinks the starting point of Chinese Theology itself and proposes further research questions. (shrink)

In this autoethnographic essay, I reflect on my brief personal experiences of conducting field research on ways in which way a small group of Tibetan Buddhist monks enact a monastic total institution in Ladakh, India. More specifically, I analyze my experiences in view of the relationship between dual and nondual mind, as discussed by Henry Vyner (2002) in Anthropology of Consciousness, and use this analysis to develop preliminary insights into the ways in which a Tibetan Buddhist monastery is constituted.

Having been raised as a Catholic and educated in the West, then trained as a monk in India since the 1980s, Canadian author Swami Muktananda of Rishikesh is uniquely positioned to bring the Eastern tradition of Vedanta to Western spiritual seekers. In Awakening to the Infinite, he answers the eternal, fundamental question posed by philosophical seekers, "Who am I?" with straightforward simplicity. Knowing who you are and adopting a spiritual outlook, he counsels, can help solve problems in daily life to (...) do with relationships, work, children, sexuality, illness, and social injustice. In answering the question "Who am I?," Swami Muktananda of Rishikesh draws on the ancient teachings of advaita or nonduality, the truth that there is no division between ourselves and others at a fundamental level. The book is drawn from the many conversations he has throughout the year meeting with individuals from different backgrounds, cultures, and walks of life, as well as public talks and question and answer sessions. Covering subjects ranging from the spiritual path to everyday problems, Muktananda addresses questions with simplicity and compassion, from the standpoint of someone who is anchored in the infinite but fully in touch with the world. His teaching follows the words of Christ and the Old Testament as well as those of the sages of India, who all proclaim a universal truth that transcends all religions: 'You are not the body; you are not the mind; you are the immortal, divine Self. Realize this and be free.'. (shrink)

Whether extrovertive, introvertive, or some further hybrid, the process of the soul touching the fullness of its divine origins is itself undergoing transformation in the twenty-first-century cultural matrices of Israel. A remarkable exemplar of devotional Hebrew cultures can be found within the hybrid networks of haredi worlds in Israel today. R. Yitzhaq Maier Morgenstern, author of Yam ha-okhmah, Netiv ayyim, and De'i okhmah le-nafshekha, is arguably the most innovative mystical voice in Israel. Why are his works resonating so strongly both (...) inside and outside their haredi communities of origin? How is his innovative thinking affecting the devotional praxis of Devekut both inside and outside the unfolding Hasidic networks? This exploration of mystical apperception through Devekut builds upon studies of Garb, Huss, and Meir, while challenging the idea that Morgenstern's expanding impact is solely a function of his mystical-magical charisma and hypernomian spiritual practice. This study argues that it is Morgenstern's hybridized thinking through key theoretical issues in Kabbalah and Hasidism as they apply to the lived practice of a devotional life of Devekut that will likely remain his strongest innovation and contribution to contemporary Jewish mysticism. (shrink)

"This book analyses the contemporary global revival of Nondual âSaivism, a thousand-year-old medieval Hindu religious philosophy. Providing a historical overview of the seminal people and groups responsible for the revival, the book compares the tradition's medieval Indian origins to modern forms, which are situated within distinctively contemporary religious, economic, and technological contexts. The author bridges the current gap in the literature between "insider" and "outsider" perspectives by examining modern Nondual âSaivism from multiple standpoints as both a critical scholar of religion (...) and an empathetic participant-observer. The book explores modern Nondual âSaivism in relation to recent scholarly debates concerning the legitimacy of New Age consumptive spirituality, the global spiritual marketplace, and the contemporary culture of narcissism. It also analyses the dark side of the revived tradition, and investigates contemporary teachers accused of sexual abuse and illegal financial activities in relation to unique features of Nondual âSaivism's theosophy and modern scholarship on new religious movements and cults. This book shows that, although Kashmir âSaivism has been adopted by certain teachers and groups to market their own brand of "High Tantra," some contemporary practitioners have remained true to the system's fundamental tenets and teach authentic forms of Nondual âSaivism. This book will be of interest to academics in the fields of religion and Asian philosophies, especially South Asian, tantric, neo-tantric and yoga philosophies, alternative and New Age spiritualities, religion and consumerism, and new religious movements and cults"--. (shrink)

The great Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara puts forth a mystic parallelism thesis that is identified and examined here: mystical and sensory experiences are epistemically parallel. Among the conclusions drawn are that the Advaita metaphysics precludes successful defense of a Brahman-centered philosophy on the basis of such a thesis because Advaita precludes a story about how the experience of its Brahman could arise. Thus Śaṅkara needs "scripture" (śruti) to secure important parts of his view. A truly mystical Vedānta, in contrast, would not.

Buddhist traditions are heir to some of the most creative thinkers in world history. The Lives of the Masters series offers lively and reliable introductions to the lives, works, and legacies of key Buddhist teachers, philosophers, contemplatives, and writers. Each volume in the Lives series tells the story of an innovator who embodied the ideals of Buddhism, crafted a dynamic living tradition during his or her lifetime, and bequeathed a vibrant legacy of knowledge and practice to future generations.

This small book from a talk given by spiritual teacher Andrew Cohen in Bodhgaya, India in early 1996 is an explosive and captivating journey into the nature of what it means to be awake. In this talk Andrew Cohen takes the reader by the hand in a profound step-by-step investigation into the multidimensional nature of what it means to be truly whole.

In this paper, I investigate the phenomenology of awakening in Chinese Zen Buddhism. In this tradition, to awaken is to ‘see your true nature’. In particular, the two aspects of awakening are: (1) seeing that the nature of one’s self or mind is empty or void and (2) an erasing of the usual (though merely apparent) boundary between subject and object. In the early Zen tradition, there are many references to awakening as chopping off your head, not having eyes, nose (...) and tongue, and seeing your ‘Original Face’. These references bear a remarkable resemblance to an approach to awakening developed by Douglas Harding. I will guide the reader through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments which investigate the gap where you cannot see your own head. I will endeavour to show that these methods, although radically different from traditional meditation techniques, result in an experience with striking similarities to Zen accounts of awakening, in particular, as experiencing oneself as empty or void and yet totally united with the given world. The repeatability and apparent reliability of these first-person methods opens up a class of awakening experience to empirical investigation and has the potential to provide new insights into nondual traditions. (shrink)

This essay presents an analysis of Levinas’ and Qisong’s perceptions of the peace as an awakening to the other and its context. Based on an analysis of their views, it suggests that we as a society need to develop an ethical sensitivity, and also to base it otherwise than on an ethically neutral ontology. The first section examines Levinas’ perception of the Western ideal of peace and presents its ontological presupposition of the “sufficiency of being.” The second section interprets his (...) conception of peace as relationship with the other grounded in a “nondual transcendent.” In the third part, a parallel analysis of Levinas’ Chan Buddhist counterpart is presented: Qisong’s peace as relationship with the other grounded in a “nondual transcendent.” The last part explores a second parallel: between Levinas’ peace as disinterestedness and Qisong’s no-form good deeds. (shrink)

Unlike the most common in the modern studies – the psychological, ethical, socio-cultural – approaches to the problem of suffering, in this paper the philosophical problematics of ontological dimension of the suffering in the Buddhist philosophy is raised. Many modern scholars are inclined to think that a more adequate translation for the Sanskrit term duḥkha is “unsatisfactoriness”. However, from the material presented in the article follows that this rendering does not feet the sense of the notion of duḥkha when it (...) is examined in the ontological plane, and thus the traditional translation “suffering” in this sense remains more adequate. It is also shown that the etymology of the Sanskrit term duḥkha as a «improperly installed» axle of the wheel of a cart has strong connotations with the metaphor of the wheel and the symbol of swastika in the Buddhist cultural tradition (wheel of being, three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma etc.). In this paper the main causes of suffering (self, body, ignorance, desire and other afflictions) exposed in Buddhist texts and scholarship are revised, and on the example of the Cūḷasuññata-sutta it is demonstrated that the real final cause of suffering in the Early Buddhism is our body and not our “self” and ignorance. While in the Mahayana Buddhism based on the philosophy of emptiness and the principle of nonduality, the dichotomy of soul and body is removed, the attainment of nirvana becomes possible in this body and the real cause and source of suffering becomes the ignorance. On the other hand, the paper argues that just the ontological view on the problem of suffering (under the angle of the principle of nonduality) provides us with understanding of the fact that the suffering can be overcome despite its indestructible ontological status. (shrink)

This article aims to explore contemplative practitioners’ direct lived experiences of enlightenment and develop a multi-item scale measuring these experiences. A mixed-method approach was adopted. The first study is a phenomenological study that interviewed 24 participants with enlightenment experiences and the second study is a scale-development study that recruited 1130 participants for scale validation. Two major clusters of the enlightenment experiences including sensory feelings and nondual realizations emerged from the phenomenological study and the four main themes of the realizations were (...) formed: intrapersonal insights, inspiration internalization, interpersonal compassion, and interconnectedness. After exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis, a three-factor structure of the Spiritual Enlightenment Experience Scale, including nonduality, sensory clarity, and sensory disappearance were revealed. The findings of the research depicted a fuller picture of spiritual enlightenment experiences which may contribute to the current knowledge of religiosity and spirituality, as well as transpersonal psychology. The results suggest that the core components of spiritual enlightenment experiences include sensory clarity and disappearance experiences and realizations of nonduality. (shrink)

This chapter employs Buddhist conceptions of karma and nonduality to generate movement oblique to the ontologically freighted opposition of sameness and difference – opening a “middle way” beyond the contrariety of modern valorizations of global unification and postmodern valorizations of free variation. In doing so, the author's aim is both conceptual clarification and critical integration. If modern and postmodern valorizations of autonomy have been crucial to empowering distinctive responses to social, economic, political, and cultural coercion, a non‐dualistic conception of (...) diversity has potential for strengthening and more equitably orienting the interdependence of these spheres – a value for relational transformation from the personal sphere to the environmental. (shrink)

The Euro-American philosophical traditions offer two extreme positions to the problem of identity over time: G. W. Leibniz' essentialism and Derek Parfit's reductionism. A third alternative conception of personal identity is presented here, more appropriately named personal nonduality, which is based on Nishida Kitarō's conception of personal unity as nonrelative contradictory self-identity.