Cecilea discusses with Shelley Tremain her experience as a first-generation U.S. citizen and first-generation university graduate; why she was motivated to study philosophy and become a professional philosopher; the launching of the new, open access, online journal, the Journal of Philosophy of Emotions (JPE); the “mismatch” between what she seemed like “on paper” and what she is is capable of; how societal, institutional, professional, and philosophical practices and policies must be adjusted to enable others like her to flourish as professional (...) philosophers; and any resources—such as articles, books, and videos—that she would like to recommend on the topics and issues that she has addressed in this interview. (shrink)

Second, follow-up interview of Cecilea Mun by Shelley Tremain.

A diferencia de lo que piensa la tradición, una afirmación evidente sólo es po- sible en lo que la noología de Zubiri llama campo de realidad, entendido como medio de intelección de lo que son las cosas en realidad. Para aclarar esto, se exponen primero las tesis básicas de la teoría de la inteligencia sentiente, estructurada según sus momentos de aprehensión primordial de realidad, logos sentiente y razón sentiente. En seguida, se exponen las estructuras del logos —dual, dinámica y medial—, (...) dado que la afirmación evidente es momento del dinamismo de dicho logos, y en cuanto evidente, lo es de su estructura medial. Finalmente, se da cuenta de la evidencia como una visión exigencial de lo que son las cosas en el medio que es el campo de realidad. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). (shrink)

This monograph introduces a meta-framework for conducting interdisciplinary research in the science of emotion, as well as a framework for a particular kind of theory of emotion. It can also be understood as a “cross-over” book that introduces neophytes to some of the current discourse and major challenges for an interdisciplinary approach to the science of emotion, especially from a philosophical perspective. It also engages experts from across the disciplines who are interested in conducting an interdisciplinary approach to research and (...) theorizing in the science of emotion, and introduces to them some of the contemporary debates in the philosophy of emotion. It does so by providing a taxonomy of theories of emotion which allows one to understand the contemporary interdisciplinary discourse in the science of emotion as a debate between four fundamental types of theories of emotion—realism, instrumentalism, eliminative-realism, and eliminativism—and which can be found or potentially found across the disciplines, and by arguing for foundational principles which can unify, without consilience, these four kinds of approaches as perspectives about the same object of inquiry. It also covers a wide range of concerns, including the problem of skepticism in the science of emotion, the problem of the underdetermination of a theory by the evidence, the question of the place of ordinary intuitions and ordinary language for a science of emotion, the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, the meta-hard problem of consciousness, the problem of intentionality, questions about the rationality of emotions and whether emotions can be a vehicle for knowledge, and the debate between cognitive and noncognitive theories in the philosophy of emotion. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). -/- (This chapter was previously published in Hypatia, forthcoming, under the title "Rationality through the Eyes of Shame: Oppression and Liberation via Emotion"). (shrink)

Richard Nisbett's The Geography of Thought is one of several recent works that have highlighted purported differences in thinking patterns between East Asians and Westerners on the basis of empirical research. This has implications for teaching and for other issues such as cultural integration. Based on a framework consisting of three distinct notions of rationality, this paper argues that some of the differences alleged by Nisbett are either not real or exaggerated, and that his geography of thought fails to provide (...) an adequate account of thinking styles across cultures. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for teaching and learning critical thinking that can be drawn from the framework developed. (shrink)

Los encuentros y desencuentros entre ética y política son el eje temático de los diferentes ensayos y conferencias aquí reunidos, escritos, ya en el siglo XXI, por un autor fundamental para entender el pensamiento hispanoamericano del XX. Ante la desvalorización y rechazo de los partidos y la política en general, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez reivindica a ésta en su sentido originario: como participación de los miembros de la comunidad en las decisiones sobre los asuntos que interesan a todos. La política así (...) entendida mantiene un nexo indisoluble con la ética, sin perder su autonomía, se encuentra con la política al perseguir ésta la realización de fines y valores con un contenido profundamente moral, y la política se carga de moral no sólo por el contenido de sus fines, sino al impregnar sus medios, la actividad práctica de sus sujetos y las motivaciones que los empujan. Sánchez Vázquez apuesta, así, por una moral que no se quede amurallada en la conciencia individual, y la llama a recuperar el lugar que le corresponde en el escenario propio de la política: la vida pública. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: Singularidad de la crisis actual - Las ciencias sociales en una sociedad postsocietal - Las ciencias sociales frente a su crisis - La economía entre ciencia, ideología y práctica - La antropología entre crisis y crítica ideológicas - Crisis académicas de las ciencias sociales.

Sanskrit text with Hindi translation on Jaina monasticism and ethics.

What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are now (...) considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. -/- Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches, and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry. (shrink)

Describes how an appeal to a reader's sense of traditional "pity" in the writings of French philosophers, social theorists, and novelists interacted with the interest in studying and promoting the virtue within society.

This article first briefly examines the textual structure of the Bhikkhu Samyutta of the Pali Samyutta-nikaya in conjunction with two other versions preserved in Chinese translation in Taisho vol. 2, nos. 99 and 100. Then it compares the main teachings contained in the three versions. These three versions of this collection on the subject of monks represent three different early Buddhist schools within the Sthavira branch. This comparative study of these three different versions focuses on four major topics: physical appearance, (...) Dharma talk, solitude, and heat meditation. It reveals significant differences in structure and doctrinal content, thus advancing the historical/critical study of early Buddhist doctrine in this area. (shrink)

I argue for the importance of clarifying the distinction between metaphysical, semantic, and meta-semantic concerns regarding what Emotion is. This allows us to see that those involved in the Scientific Emotion Project and the Folk Emotion Project are in fact involved in the same project – the Science of Emotion. It also helps us understand why questions regarding the natural kind status of Emotion, as well as answers to questions regarding the value of ordinary language emotion terms or concepts to (...) emotion research, will not help resolve the observed crisis in the Science of Emotion. (shrink)

Sa?yutta of the P?li Sa?yutta-nik?ya in conjunction with two other versions preserved in Chinese translation in Taish? vol. 2, nos 99 and 100. Then it compares the main teachings contained in the three versions. This comparative study of these three different versions focuses on some shared images of Brahm?s and on disagreements of some teachings presented in the three versions. It reveals similarities and significant differences in structure and doctrinal content, thus advancing the historical/critical study of early Buddhist doctrine in (...) this area. (shrink)

This article first examines the textual structure of the Maudgaly?yana Sa?yukta of the Chinese Sa?yukt?gama in conjunction with its P?li parallel. Then it compares the main teachings contained in the two versions. It reveals similarities but also differences in both structure and content.

Offers the first comprehensive survey of Mexican existentialism to appear in English. This book examines the emergence of existentialism in Mexico in the 1940s and the quest for a genuine Mexican philosophy that followed it. It focuses on the pivotal moments and key figures of the Hyperion group, including Emilio Uranga, Luis Villoro, Leopoldo Zea, and Jorge Portilla, who explored questions of interpretation, marginality, identity, and the role of philosophy. Carlos Alberto Sánchez was the first to introduce and emphasize the (...) philosophical significance of the Hyperion group to readers of English in The Suspension of Seriousness, and in the present volume he examines its legacy and relevancy for the twenty-first century. Sánchez argues that there are lessons to be learned from Hyperion’s project not only for Latino/a life in the United States but also for the lives of those on the fringes of contemporary, postmodern or postcolonial, economic, political, and cultural power. (shrink)