Particular persons have claims against being made worse off than they could have been. The literature, however, has focused primarily on only two-option cases; yet, these cases fail to capture all of the morally relevant factors, especially when a person’s existence is in question. This paper explores how to assess claims in multiple-option choice sets. We scrutinize the only extant proposal, offered by Michael Otsuka, which we call the Weakening View. In light of its problems, (...) we develop an alternative: the Combining View. The Weakening View holds that a person’s claim against a loss of well-being relative to one distribution is weakened by the availability of further alternatives relative to which the person gains well-being. By contrast, our view holds that a person has an overall claim for or against a certain distribution relative to the whole option set, where overall claims are second-order functions of the different pairwise claims. Finally, we defend the Combining View by exploring its implications for the impact of a person’s possible non-existence on their overall claims, and we develop a proposal for how the number of distributions relative to which a person gains or loses welfare influences the strength of their overall claims. (shrink)

My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multiple-conclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multiple-conclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of (...) premises; it is simply silent on which, of the given ‘choices’, we select from the (conclusion) set of options. (shrink)

Economic models are founded in the idea of taking individuals' preferences as both known and given. This article explores the evolution of personal preferences, within a context of both entrepreneurial discovery and Objectivist philosophy. It begins by formalizing Ayn Rand's theory of Objectivism applied to human values, and continues by modeling preference changes similar to Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction—a process of self-discovery. Next the role of societal factors is examined in forming shared preference sets. Finally, the article describes (...) how the strength of human preferences is used to narrow choice sets in the presence of greater consumption options. (shrink)

We propose an extension of Aczel's constructive set theory CZF by an axiom for inductive types and a choice principle, and show that this extension has the following properties: it is interpretable in Martin-Löf's type theory. In addition, it is strong enough to prove the Set Compactness theorem and the results in formal topology which make use of this theorem. Moreover, it is stable under the standard constructions from algebraic set theory, namely exact completion, realizability models, forcing as well (...) as more general sheaf extensions. As a result, methods from our earlier work can be applied to show that this extension satisfies various derived rules, such as a derived compactness rule for Cantor space and a derived continuity rule for Baire space. Finally, we show that this extension is robust in the sense that it is also reflected by the model constructions from algebraic set theory just mentioned. (shrink)

Previous studies show that adults and children evaluate the act of leaving a choice for others as prosocial, and have termed such actions as socially mindful actions. The current study investigates how the desirability of the available options (i.e., whether the available options are desirable or not) may influence adults’ and children's evaluation of socially mindful actions. Children (N = 120, 4- to 6-year-olds) and adults (N = 124) were asked to evaluate characters selecting items for themselves from a (...) set of three items—two identical items and one unique item—in a way that either leaves a choice (two diverse items) or leaves no choice (two identical items) for the next person (i.e., the beneficiary). We manipulated whether the available options were either desirable or undesirable (i.e., damaged). We found that adults’ and 6-year-olds’ evaluation of socially mindful actions is moderated by the desirability of the options. Although they evaluate the act of leaving a choice for others as nicer than the act of leaving no choice both when the choosing options are desirable and when they are undesirable, the discrepancy in the evaluation becomes significantly smaller when the choosing options are undesirable. We also found that inference of the beneficiary's feeling underlies social evaluation of the actor leaving a choice (or not). These findings suggest that children consider both the diversity of options left and the desirability of the available options in understanding and evaluating socially mindful acts. (shrink)

In set theory without the Axiom of Choice, we consider Ingleton’s axiom which is the ultrametric counterpart of the Hahn–Banach axiom. We show that in ZFA, i.e., in the set theory without the Axiom of Choice weakened to allow “atoms,” Ingleton’s axiom does not imply the Axiom of Choice. We also prove that in ZFA, the “multiple choice” axiom implies the Krein–Milman axiom. We deduce that, in ZFA, the conjunction of the Hahn–Banach, Ingleton and Krein–Milman (...) axioms does not imply the Axiom of Choice. (shrink)

The multiobjective optimization on the basis of ratio analysis method captures diverse features such as the criteria and alternatives of appraising a multiple criteria decision-making problem. At the same time, the multiple criteria problem includes a set of decision makers with diverse expertise and preferences. In fact, the literature lists numerous approaches to aid in this problematic task of choosing the best alternative. Nevertheless, in the MCDM field, there is a challenge regarding intangible information which is commonly involved (...) in multiple criteria decision-making problem; hence, it is substantial in order to advance beyond the research related to this field. Thus, the objective of this paper is to present a fused method between multiobjective optimization on the basis of ratio analysis and Pythagorean fuzzy sets for the choice of an alternative. Besides, multiobjective optimization on the basis of ratio analysis is utilized to choose the best alternatives. Finally, two decision-making problems are applied to illustrate the feasibility and practicality of the proposed method. (shrink)

We introduce a distinct type of choice that has yet to be addressed by self-control research: Choosing between activities that offer both delayed and immediate rewards. We describe when and why such mixed-reward choices pose challenges to self-control, and suggest that self-control in mixed-reward choices may be supported by delay discounting.

There is an enduring tension in thinking about the architecture of systems that select behaviours, including evolved organisms. One line of reasoning supports convergence in control systems and conversion of the values of all options into a common currency, in part because this seems the best or only way of trading off costs and benefits associated with outcomes of varying types. A competing consideration supports parallelism or other forms of fragmentation, because of inefficiencies associated with integration, and suspicion towards general-purpose (...) cognitive systems. In addition, recent neuroscience has given particular attention to the question of how partly independent ‘habit based’ and ‘planning based’ decision-systems might interact. The issues here are, at least in part, a special case of the more general integration versus parallelism tension. This tension provides a useful framework for thinking about the implementation of different kinds of sensitivity to risks of various types, the variety of mechanisms by means of which risk sensitivity might be modulated, and how risk might be traded off against other components of value or disincentive. I describe the tension, briefly survey some of the relevant empirical evidence, and conclude with tentative observations on the topic of risk. (shrink)

The axiom of multiple choice implies that metric spaces are paracompact but the reverse implication cannot be proved in set theory without the axiom of choice.

We show that the assertion that every vector space is a projective module implies the axiom of multiple choice and that the reverse implication does not hold in set theory weakened to permit the existence of atoms.

A major approach to the ethics of artificial intelligence is to use social choice, in which the AI is designed to act according to the aggregate views of society. This is found in the AI ethics of “coherent extrapolated volition” and “bottom–up ethics”. This paper shows that the normative basis of AI social choice ethics is weak due to the fact that there is no one single aggregate ethical view of society. Instead, the design of social choice (...) AI faces three sets of decisions: standing, concerning whose ethics views are included; measurement, concerning how their views are identified; and aggregation, concerning how individual views are combined to a single view that will guide AI behavior. These decisions must be made up front in the initial AI design—designers cannot “let the AI figure it out”. Each set of decisions poses difficult ethical dilemmas with major consequences for AI behavior, with some decision options yielding pathological or even catastrophic results. Furthermore, non-social choice ethics face similar issues, such as whether to count future generations or the AI itself. These issues can be more important than the question of whether or not to use social choice ethics. Attention should focus on these issues, not on social choice. (shrink)

Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting (...) system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems. (shrink)

The idea of multiple options for action in a specific situation is essential for choice and deliberation. But what exactly is an option for action? A simple and natural approach to this question is via conditional analyses. While conditional analyses ofdispositionsandabilitiesface well‐known objections and are widely considered untenable, I argue that several of these objections do not apply to conditional analyses ofoptions. Others do, but the analyses can be modified or interpreted in a suitable way so as (...) to deal with them. One central difficulty, however, remains and can only partially be resolved. Still, all things considered, the prospects of conditional analyses of options for action are quite good; they should not be lightly dismissed. (shrink)

Brian Hedden has proposed that any successful account of options for the subjective “ought” must satisfy two constraints: first, it must ensure that we are able to carry out each of the options available to us, and second, it should guarantee that the set of options available to us supervenes on our mental states. In this paper I show that, due to the ever-present possibility of Frankfurt-style cases, these two constraints jointly entail that no agent has any options at any (...) time. This consequence, however, is clearly unacceptable, so one of Hedden’s constraints must go. Because the ability constraint is indispensable, I argue, we have no choice but to reject the supervenience constraint. Hedden’s underlying motivation for imposing the supervenience constraint is the conviction that our options should be transparent to us, but transparency also proves to be incompatible with the ability constraint, so it must be rejected as well. I conclude by sketching an unabashedly externalist account of options, which conceives of options as exhaustive combinations of atomic movements. (shrink)

We do not always benefit from the expansion of our choice sets. This is because some options change the context in which we must make decisions in ways that render us worse off than we would have been otherwise. One promising argument against paid living kidney donation holds that having the option of selling a ‘spare’ kidney would impact people facing financial pressures in precisely this way. I defend this argument from two related criticisms: first, that having (...) the option to sell one’s kidney would only be harmful if one is pressured or coerced to take this specific course of action; and second, that such forms of pressure are unlikely to feature in a legal market. (shrink)

An analysis of students’ difficulties for a curricular topic may help the educator to gain better insight into students’ reasoning about that topic which is a prerequisite for high-quality teaching. The purpose of this study was to demonstrate how distractor analysis may be used for identifying students’ difficulties in a certain topic. In order to be in position to perform invariant measurement and to easily relate students’ difficulties to their achievement levels, we decided to take a Rasch modeling approach. Our (...) study included 14 wave optics items and 286 students from five universities in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rasch modeling was used to estimate item and student measures, as well as to create option probability curves which allowed us to relate students’ achievement levels to the choice of individual distractors. It has been found that all 14 included items function in line with the Rasch model. In 10 out of 14 items there were distractors chosen by at least 25% of students. For several out of these 10 items, the option probability curves indicated that attractiveness of individual distractors depended on students’ ability levels. We could conclude that the Rasch-based distractor analysis may provide very useful information for differentiation of physics instruction. Analiza studentskih poteškoća vezanih za određenu nastavnu temu može pomoći predavaču u stjecanju boljeg uvida u studentsko razumijevanje određene teme, što je preduvjet za visokokvalitetnu nastavu. Svrha ovog istraživanja sastojala se u demonstriranju načina na koji analize ometača mogu biti iskorištene za identificiranje studentskih poteškoća u određenom području. Kako bismo mogli provoditi invarijantna mjerenja i lako povezati studentske poteškoće s razinama njihovih postignuća, odlučili smo se studiju provesti u okviru Rasch formalizma. Naše istraživanje obuhvatilo je 14 zadataka iz područja valne optike i 286 studenata s pet sveučilišta u Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj te Bosni i Hercegovini. Rasch modeliranje korišteno je za procjenu težine zadataka i sposobnosti studenata, kao i za kreiranje krivulja vjerojatnosti ponuđenih opcija što nam je omogućilo povezivanje razine razumijevanja studenata s izborom pojedinačnih ometača. Utvrđeno je da svih 14 zadataka funkcionira u skladu s Rasch modelom. Za 10 zadataka imali smo ometače koje je odabralo najmanje 25 % studenata. Kod nekoliko od ovih 10 zadataka krivulje vjerojatnosti ponuđenih opcija ukazuju na to da atraktivnost pojedinačnih ometača ovisi o razinama sposobnosti učenika. Možemo zaključiti da analiza ometača primjenom Rasch modeliranja može dati vrlo korisne informacije za diferencijaciju nastave fizike. (shrink)

According to the axiomatic foundations of social choice theory, not all decisions benefit everyone. Often, decisions that do not have any implied benefit for the decision maker are made in the (best) interests of others. When a decision is made concerning welfare of others, some individuals—including the decision maker, may be on the receiving end. For, it is impossible to make social decisions by taking into account individual preferences that satisfy all and everyone. This is on account of a (...) great variety in individual choices and preferences ubiquitous among different individuals. Tastes vary among different people—so does individual preferences, and that’s natural. Conflict of interests arises due to subtle variances in individual preferences. In this paper, we discuss about the decision choice that seldom works for every conceivable set of individual preferences. Following Arrovian precepts, it is impossible to satisfy one and all, for there remains a great diversity in individual preferences that result in the problem of choice. Hence, in this research, we develop a taste-based theory of social choice that attempts to address the problem of choice by helping individuals choose the best and the most effective and optimal option among a given set of alternatives that’s assumed to be rational. (shrink)

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of (...) an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement. (shrink)

Analiza studentskih poteškoća vezanih za određenu nastavnu temu može pomoći predavaču u stjecanju boljeg uvida u studentsko razumijevanje određene teme, što je preduvjet za visokokvalitetnu nastavu. Svrha ovog istraživanja sastojala se u demonstriranju načina na koji analize ometača mogu biti iskorištene za identificiranje studentskih poteškoća u određenom području. Kako bismo mogli provoditi invarijantna mjerenja i lako povezati studentske poteškoće s razinama njihovih postignuća, odlučili smo se studiju provesti u okviru Rasch formalizma. Naše istraživanje obuhvatilo je 14 zadataka iz područja valne (...) optike i 286 studenata s pet sveučilišta u Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj te Bosni i Hercegovini. Rasch modeliranje korišteno je za procjenu težine zadataka i sposobnosti studenata, kao i za kreiranje krivulja vjerojatnosti ponuđenih opcija što nam je omogućilo povezivanje razine razumijevanja studenata s izborom pojedinačnih ometača. Utvrđeno je da svih 14 zadataka funkcionira u skladu s Rasch modelom. Za 10 zadataka imali smo ometače koje je odabralo najmanje 25 % studenata. Kod nekoliko od ovih 10 zadataka krivulje vjerojatnosti ponuđenih opcija ukazuju na to da atraktivnost pojedinačnih ometača ovisi o razinama sposobnosti učenika. Možemo zaključiti da analiza ometača primjenom Rasch modeliranja može dati vrlo korisne informacije za diferencijaciju nastave fizike. (shrink)

The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which (...) ends are implicated in which decisions (e.g., do individual goals guide particular choices? do different ends jointly pick out courses of action?). Unfortunately, such an account is lacking. As a result, there is a gap (at least) in our most basic account of human behavior. In this paper I explore that gap and examine some proposals for closing it. (shrink)

Next SectionThe principle of respect for autonomy has shaped much of the bioethics' discourse over the last 50 years, and is now most commonly used in the meaning of respecting autonomous choice. This is probably related to the influential concept of informed consent, which originated in research ethics and was soon also applied to the field of clinical medicine. But while available choices in medical research are well defined, this is rarely the case in healthcare. Consideration of ordinary medical (...) practice reveals that the focus on patient choice does not properly grasp the moral aspects involved in healthcare. Medical decisions are often portrayed as if doctors and patients in confidence confront specific decisions about examinations or treatment, yet the reality often involves many different participants, with decisions being made over time and space. Indeed, most of the decisions are never even presented to patients, as it would be unethical to suggest something that is not medically justifiable. The options patients do confront are somewhat arbitrarily constructed within the narrow framework of both what is deemed to be medically appropriate and how the healthcare system is organised practically. While the autonomy discourse has proven valuable, a failure to distinguish between the fields of medical research and clinical medicine has generated a focus on patient choice that does not reflect what is really at stake in healthcare settings. This is alarming, because the current discourse misrepresents medical practice in a way that actually contributes to bioethical self-delusion. (shrink)

Whereas the literature on choice overload has shown that people tend to defer their choice or experience less satisfaction under choice proliferation, this paper aims to test how the profusion of choice directly affects individuals’ revealed preferences over options. To do so, we run an experiment where subjects have to compare familiar and unfamiliar options under different choice contexts. We hypothesize that, as the choice set expands, the decisions become harder and more costly and (...) subjects may find familiar items relatively more attractive. Our results provide clear evidence of set size dependence of revealed preferences: Subjects prefer familiar items more frequently in larger choice sets. This evidence is robust to a number of experimental variations and statistical controls. (shrink)

We discuss several features of coherent choice functions—where the admissible options in a decision problem are exactly those that maximize expected utility for some probability/utility pair in fixed set S of probability/utility pairs. In this paper we consider, primarily, normal form decision problems under uncertainty—where only the probability component of S is indeterminate and utility for two privileged outcomes is determinate. Coherent choice distinguishes between each pair of sets of probabilities regardless the “shape” or “connectedness” of the (...) sets of probabilities. We axiomatize the theory of choice functions and show these axioms are necessary for coherence. The axioms are sufficient for coherence using a set of probability/almost-state-independent utility pairs. We give sufficient conditions when a choice function satisfying our axioms is represented by a set of probability/state-independent utility pairs with a common utility. (shrink)

The masked priming paradigm has been extensively used to investigate the indirect impacts of unconscious stimuli on conscious behaviors, and the congruency effect of priming on free choices has gained increasing attention. Free choices allow participants to voluntarily choose a response from multiple options during each trial. While repeated practice is known to increase priming effects in subliminal visual tasks, whether practice increases the priming effect of free choices in the masked priming paradigm is unclear. And it is also (...) not clear how the proportions of free choice and forced choice trials in one block will affect the free choice masked priming effect. The present study applied repeated practice in the masked priming paradigm and found that after training, the participants were more likely to be influenced by masked primes during free choice, but this training process did not alter the visibility of masked stimuli. In addition, this study revealed that when the proportions of free choice and forced choice trials were equal during the training stage, this enhanced effect by practice was the strongest. These results indicated that practice could enhance masked stimulus processing in free-choice, and that the learning effect may mainly be derived from the early selection and integrated processing of masked stimuli. (shrink)

In approaching the question of whether groups of people can have cognitive capacities that are fundamentally different than the cognitive capacities of the individuals within the group, we lay out a Multiple, Interactive Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) framework. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and judgment. Rather than focusing on high-level constructs such as modules in an information (...) processing flow diagram or internal representations, MILCS focuses on mechanisms that allow systems to engage in flexible, adaptive behavior. Examples of these mechanisms are network structure-process pairs that: combine data from perception with top-down theories, achieve consistency and consensus through information exchange, selectively attend to information globally assessed as relevant, and develop specialized units from originally homogeneous networks through competition among the units. Two such systems are considered in some detail -- lateral inhibition within a network for selecting from a candidate set the option that is most attractive, and a diffusion process for accumulating evidence to reach a generally rapid and accurate decision. These system descriptions are aptly applied at multiple levels, including within and across people. These systems provide accounts that unify cognitive processes across multiple levels, can be expressed in a common vocabulary provided by network science, are inductively powerful yet appropriately constrained, and are applicable to a large number of superficially diverse cognitive systems. Given that people are typically highly motivated to participate in strong groups, cognitively resourceful people will tend to form groups that effectively employ cognitive systems at higher levels than the individuals. The impressive cognitive capacities of individual people do not eliminate the need to talk about group cognition. Instead, smart people generally form smart groups. (shrink)

Whether we're buying a pair of jeans, ordering a cup of coffee, selecting a long-distance carrier, applying to college, choosing a doctor, or setting up a 401(k), everyday decisions ; both big and small ; have become increasingly complex due to the overwhelming abundance of choice with which we are presented. As Americans, we assume that more choice means better options and greater satisfaction. But beware of excessive choice: choice overload can make you question the decisions (...) you make before you even make them, it can set you up for unrealistically high expectations, and it can make you blame yourself for any and all failures. In the long run, this can lead to decision-making paralysis, anxiety, and perpetual stress. And, in a culture that tells us that there is no excuse for falling short of perfection when your options are limitless, too much choice can lead to clinical depression. In The Paradox of Choice, Barry Schwartz explains at what point choice ; the hallmark of individual freedom and self-determination that we so cherish ; becomes detrimental to our psychological and emotional well-being. In accessible, engaging, and anecdotal prose, Schwartz shows how the dramatic explosion in choice ; from the mundane to the profound challenges of balancing career, family, and individual needs ; has paradoxically become a problem instead of a solution. Schwartz also shows how our obsession with choice encourages us to seek that which makes us feel worse. By synthesizing current research in the social sciences, Schwartz makes the counter intuitive case that eliminating choices can greatly reduce the stress, anxiety, and busyness of our lives. He offers eleven practical steps on how to limit choices to a manageable number, have the discipline to focus on those that are important and ignore the rest, and ultimately derive greater satisfaction from the choices you have to make."--provided by publisher. (shrink)

In April 2018, the International Association of Athletics Federations released new regulations placing a ceiling on women athletes’ natural testosterone levels to “ensure fair and meaningful competition.” The regulations revise previous ones with the same intent. They require women with higher natural levels of testosterone and androgen sensitivity who compete in a set of “restricted” events to lower their testosterone levels to below a designated threshold. If they do not lower their testosterone, women may compete in the male category, in (...) an intersex category, at the national level, or in unrestricted events. Women may also challenge the regulation, whether or not they have lowered their testosterone, or quit sport. Irrespective of IAAF’s stated aims, the options forced by the new regulations are impossible choices. They violate dignity, threaten privacy, and mete out both suspicion and judgement on the sex and gender identity of the athletes regulated. (shrink)

Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief change called descriptor revision. We prove that each of two variants of choice revision based on such construction is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, assuming that the object language is finite. Furthermore, we introduce an alternative (...) modelling for choice revision, which is based on a type of relation on sets of sentences, named multiple believability relation. We show without assuming a finite language that choice revision constructed from such relations is axiomatically characterized with the same sets of postulates that we proposed for the choice revision based on descriptor revision, whenever the relations satisfy certain rationality conditions. (shrink)

To nudge is to design choice contexts in order to improve choice outcomes. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein emphatically endorse nudging but reject more restrictive means. In contrast, I argue that the behavioral psychology that motivates nudging also motivates what may be called jolting — i.e. the design of choice content. I defend nudging and jolting by distinguishing them from the sometimes oppressive means with which they can be implemented, by responding to some common arguments against nudging, (...) and by showing how respect for preferences over option sets and their aggregate properties may require the trimming of option sets, as well as helpful choice contexts. (shrink)

It is often supposed that, given two potential objects of choice X and Y, a specific set of circumstances, and a specific choosing agent, one of the following must be true: (1) opting for X is a better choice than opting for Y, (2) opting for Y is a better choice than opting for X, or (3) opting for X and opting for Y are exactly equally good choices. My aim in this paper is to show how (...) some philosophical insights concerning color perception can illuminate the possibility of two options, X and Y, being such that, even given a specific set of circumstances and a specific choosing agent, none of (1), (2), or (3) holds, but X and Y are positively related to one another as “on a par.”. (shrink)

This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that (...) initial appearances notwithstanding, these cases should not be classed as instances of irrationality in choice or reasoning. One way of explaining away their apparent oddity is to view certain aspects of these examples as making particular options salient. The decision problems in point can then be solved by ‘picking’ these options, although they could not have been ‘chosen’ in a principled way, due to ties or incomparabilities with alternative options. (shrink)

Humanitarian healthcare work presents a range of ethical challenges for expatriate healthcare professionals, including tragic choices requiring the selection of a least-worst option. In this paper we examine a particular set of tragic choices related to the prioritization of care and allocation of scarce resources between individuals in situations of widespread and urgent health needs. Drawing on qualitative interviews with clinicians, we examine the nature of these choices. We offer recommendations to clinical teams and aid organizations for preparing and (...) supporting frontline clinicians in their efforts to determine the least-worst option, and in their responsibility for making such choices. (shrink)

This paper considers whether the category of sovereign “decision,” as it is used in Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology, has analogies with the paradigm of “choice,” as it is theorized in neoliberalism. Both decision and choice belong to that mode of judgement that “cuts” the field of alternatives into two, into two “extreme” alternatives. This mode of judgment not only presupposes the subject of the decision, but also sets up the terms of the choice, clearly indicating the (...) optimal option. For Schmitt, a political decision arises in a “case of necessity”: in the “serious case” of war. And yet, it is precisely the neoliberal depoliticization of war that reduces it to a rule, and every choice fundamentally to a stance for or against. To escape from the neoliberal reduction of political decision in the form of a choice, I examine another mode of decision, absent from Schmitt’s texts: “disclosedness.”. (shrink)

While autonomous vehicles (AVs) are not designed to harm people, harming people is an inevitable by-product of their operation. How are AVs to deal ethically with situations where harming people is inevitable? Rather than focus on the much-discussed question of what choices AVs should make, we can also ask the much less discussed question of who gets to decide what AVs should do in such cases. Here there are two key options: AVs with a personal ethics setting (PES) or an (...) “ethical knob” that end users can control or AVs with a mandatory ethics setting (MES) that end users cannot control. Which option, a PES or an MES, is best and why? This chapter argues, by drawing on the choice architecture literature, in favor of a hybrid view that requires mandated default choice settings while allowing for limited end user control. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new (...) choice-rule called `Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons. (shrink)

Humanitarian healthcare work presents a range of ethical challenges for expatriate healthcare professionals, including tragic choices requiring the selection of a least-worst option. In this paper we examine a particular set of tragic choices related to the prioritization of care and allocation of scarce resources between individuals in situations of widespread and urgent health needs. Drawing on qualitative interviews with clinicians, we examine the nature of these choices. We offer recommendations to clinical teams and aid organizations for preparing and (...) supporting frontline clinicians in their efforts to determine the least-worst option, and in their responsibility for making such choices. (shrink)

Choice-based conceptions of substantive responsibility face a number of powerful counterexamples. In order to avoid some of these counterexamples, it is widely claimed that agents are substantively responsible for disadvantage arising from their choices only when the option set from which they chose satisfied a reasonability criterion. I examine three possible justifications for a reasonability criterion: an agent-responsibility-based motivation, a voluntariness-based motivation, and what I call a ‘denied-claim’-based motivation. In each case, I argue that the putative motivation cannot (...) in fact justify a reasonability condition. I end with some comments on what this result means for choice-based conceptions of substantive responsibility. (shrink)

We study whether it is possible to generalise Seidenfeld et al.’s representation result for coherent choice functions in terms of sets of probability/utility pairs when we let go of Archimedeanity. We show that the convexity property is necessary but not sufficient for a choice function to be an infimum of a class of lexicographic ones. For the special case of two-dimensional option spaces, we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions by weakening the Archimedean axiom.

The AGM theory of belief contraction is extended tomultiple contraction, i.e. to contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence. There are two major variants: Inpackage contraction all the sentences must be removed from the belief set, whereas inchoice contraction it is sufficient that at least one of them is removed. Constructions of both types of multiple contraction are offered and axiomatically characterized. Neither package nor choice contraction can in general be reduced to contractions (...) by single sentences; in the finite case choice contraction allows for reduction. (shrink)

One recent trend in the philosophy of mathematics has been to approach the central epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning mathematics from the perspective of the applications of mathematics to describing the world, especially within the context of empirical science. A second area of activity is where philosophy of mathematics intersects with foundational issues in mathematics, including debates over the choice of set-theoretic axioms, and over whether category theory, for example, may provide an alternative foundation for mathematics. My central claim (...) is that these latter issues are of direct relevance to philosophical arguments connected to the applicability of mathematics. In particular, the possibility of there being distinct alternative foundations for mathematics blocks the standard argument from the indispensable role of mathematics in science to the existence of specific mathematical objects. (shrink)

This chapter reviews empirical evidence bearing on the design of online forums for deliberative civic engagement. Dimensions of design are defined for different aspects of the deliberation: its purpose, the target population, the spatiotemporal distance separating participants, the communication medium, and the deliberative process to be followed. After a brief overview of criteria for evaluating different design options, empirical findings are organized around design choices. Research has evolved away from treating technology for online deliberation dichotomously (either present or not) toward (...) nuanced findings that differentiate between technological features, ways of using them, and cultural settings. The effectiveness of online deliberation depends on how well the communicative environment is matched to the deliberative task. Tradeoffs, e.g. between rich and lean media and between anonymous and identifiable participation, suggest different designs depending on the purpose and participants. Findings are limited by existing technologies, and may change as technologies and users co-evolve. (shrink)

A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. Autonomy is of great moral value; removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this (...) argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or (...) a preference for systematic restriction. Overall, the analysis reconciles the decision–theoretic approach of choice over time with the game–theoretic multiple-selves approach. (shrink)

We show that the axiom of choice AC is equivalent to the Vector Space Kinna-Wagner Principle, i.e., the assertion: “For every family [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL V]= {Vi : i ∈ k} of non trivial vector spaces there is a family ℱ = {Fi : i ∈ k} such that for each i ∈ k, Fiis a non empty independent subset of Vi”. We also show that the statement “every vector space over ℚ has a basis” implies that every infinite (...) well ordered set of pairs has an infinite subset with a choice set, a fact which is known not to be a consequence of the axiom of multiple choice MC. (shrink)