Theory and Decision 71 (3):343-364 (2011)
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a preference for systematic restriction. Overall, the analysis reconciles the decision–theoretic approach of choice over time with the game–theoretic multiple-selves approach
Similar books and articles
To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
Decision Theoretic Foundations for Axioms of Rational Preference.Sven Ove Hansson - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):401 - 412.
On Seidenfeldâs Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.
A Theory of Rational Choice Under Ignorance.Klaus Nehring - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240.
A Preference for Selfish Preferences: The Problem of Motivations in Rational Choice Political Science.Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):361-378.
Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
An ´ Etude in Choice Theory: Choosing the Two Finalists.Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
The Construction of Preference.Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic (eds.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
Multiple-Stage Decision-Making: The Effect of Planning Horizon Length on Dynamic Consistency.Joseph G. Johnson & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):217-246.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads