In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a (...) preference for systematic restriction. Overall, the analysis reconciles the decision–theoretic approach of choice over time with the game–theoretic multiple-selves approach. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the auction to allocate an indivisible good when each potential buyer has a private and independent valuation for the item and suffers a negative externality if a competitor acquires it. In that case, the outside option of each buyer is mechanism-dependent, which implies that participation is endogenous. As several works in the literature have shown, the optimal auction entails strong threats to induce full entry and maximal expected revenue. This results from the full commitment assumption, (...) which ensures that threats are credible. We show that absent credible threats, the entry process does not lead to full participation: the equilibrium entails screening of agents in the entry stage and a trade-off between reserve prices and entry fees. Besides, we discuss the conditions under which the impossibility to use threats does not prevent the seller from ensuring a minimal screening and reaching a high expected revenue. (shrink)

I analyze optimal auction design in the presence of linear type-dependent negative externalities. I characterize the properties of the optimal mechanism when externalities are “strongly decreasing” and “increasing” in the agent’s valuation and I discuss its implementation with sealed-bid auctions. Interestingly, bidding strategies are not necessarily increasing in valuations, and the optimal mechanism can be implemented by setting a price ceiling instead of a reserve price.

Psychologists and economists often ask similar questions about human behaviour. This volume brings together contributions from leaders in both disciplines.The editorial introduction discusses methodological differences between the two which have until now limited the development of mutually beneficial lines of research. Psychologists have objected to what they see as an excessive formalism in economic modelling and an unrealistic degree of sophistication in the behaviour of individuals, while economists criticize the absence of a general psychological framework into which most results can (...) be fitted and the lack of welfare implications in their theories. The editors encourage scholars to exploit the strengths of each discipline - the ability of psychologists to understand the feelings and motivation of individuals; and the experience of economists to develop normative frameworks.The editors then highlight the links between the contributions by grouping them according to central themes in the study of rationality and well-being:1. The causes and consequences of 'irrational behaviour';2. The role of anticipatory feelings and imperfect self-knowledge on decision-making; 3. The way in which memory of past events and cost of thinking affect current decisions;4. The interaction between anticipated and remembered utility and its effects on the welfare of individuals; 5. Experimental practice on how to perform controlled experiments to test hypotheses.This exciting volume provides an excellent point of entry for anyone interested in the interface between economics and psychology. (shrink)

Psychologists have a long tradition of studying human behavior, strengths and weaknesses, biases and limitations. Economists have constructed normative frameworks that capture the most important elements of human decision-making and developed powerful tools to determine individual and strategic choices in a variety of situations. Only recently have their strengths been combined and economic models enriched with key ingredients found in psychological studies.This volume covers four of the most important themes in this interdisciplinary field: feelings, inconsistencies, limitations and biases. Each chapter (...) contributes to a more comprehensive and accurate modelling and description of human behavior. Its four parts cover: the origins, formation, and evolution of beliefs; consistency, commitment, and intertemporal separability of dynamic choices; attention, preference formation, and risk evaluation in limited cognition; and affective behaviour, specifically the role of emotions in decision making. (shrink)

Psychologists have a long tradition of studying human behavior, strengths and weaknesses, biases and limitations. Economists have constructed normative frameworks that capture the most important elements of human decision-making and developed powerful tools to determine individual and strategic choices in a variety of situations. Only recently have their strengths been combined and economic models enriched with key ingredients found in psychological studies.This volume covers four of the most important themes in this interdisciplinary field: feelings, inconsistencies, limitations and biases. Each chapter (...) contributes to a more comprehensive and accurate modelling and description of human behavior. Its four parts cover: the origins, formation, and evolution of beliefs; consistency, commitment, and intertemporal separability of dynamic choices; attention, preference formation, and risk evaluation in limited cognition; and affective behaviour, specifically the role of emotions in decision making. (shrink)