Presents a pictorial history of the Great Plains region of the United States and Canada, describing how the natural landscape changed with the settling and modernization of the American prairie.

This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s book What’s the Use of Philosophy? addresses two questions. First, must philosophers be methodologically self-conscious to do good work? Second, is there value in the questions pursued in the traditional areas of analytic philosophy?

Michael J. Zimmerman explores whether and how our ignorance about ourselves and our circumstances affects what our moral obligations and moral rights are. He rejects objective and subjective views of the nature of moral obligation, and presents a new case for a 'prospective' view.

The aging of attentional and emotional functions has been extensively studied but relatively independently. Therefore, the relationships between aging and the interactions of attentional and emotional processes remain elusive. This study aimed to determine how age affected the interactions between attentional and emotional processes during adulthood. One-hundred forty adults aged 18–79 performed the emotional variant of the Attention Network Test, which probed alerting, orienting, and executive control in the presence and absence of threatening faces. During this task, contexts with varying (...) levels of task preparatory processes were created to modulate the effect of threatening faces on attention, and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to examine the neural underpinnings of the behavioural effects. The behavioural results showed that aging was associated with a significant decline in alerting efficiency, and there was a statistical trend for age-related deficits in executive control. Despite these age differences, age did not significantly moderate the interactions among attentional networks or between attention and emotion. Additionally, the fNIRS results showed that decreased frontal cortex functioning might underlie the age-related decline in executive control. Therefore, while aging has varying effects on different attentional networks, the interactions of attentional and emotional processes remain relatively unaffected by age. (shrink)

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and (...) everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only. (shrink)

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’, that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence (...) is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus ; this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4. (shrink)

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the (...) denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance. (shrink)

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the (...) causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta, before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves (...) a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter. (shrink)

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, (...) Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance. (shrink)

Aristotelian virtue ethics does not treat motives or even character as the grounding basis for the rest of ethics, but the present agent‐based approach does. However, there are objections to agent‐basing that need to be considered. Having answered those objections, the chapter discusses three major forms of agent‐based virtue ethics: a somewhat less than plausible ”morality as inner strength” ; ”morality as universal benevolence” ; and ”morality as caring”. Any agent‐based morality does well to treat overall motivation, rather than occasional (...) single motives, as the fundamental basis for ethical characterizations. (shrink)

A commonsense virtue ethics can contribute to moral education by pointing out the importance of self‐regarding virtues. That importance is often ignored or neglected in school ”values” curricula.

Even though commonsense virtue ethics is less unified than utilitarianism, various forms of pluralism are inherent in utilitarianism.

Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or personal terms. The latter is commonsensically explained by the claim that it is natural or inevitable that we should care about those closer to us more than about those less close to us, but this seemingly plausible assumption tends to undercut the justification that is typically and intuitively offered (...) for self‐other asymmetry, namely, that we naturally care more about ourselves than about others, so that there is no need to assume any duty to avoid harming oneself. A commonsense ethics of virtue avoids this and other incoherences or tensions in Kantian and commonsense moral thinking. (shrink)

Commonsense views about practical rationality are self‐other asymmetric in a way diametrically opposed to the asymmetry involved in commonsense or Kantian morality. What is likely to harm others does not count as irrational in the same fundamental way that what is likely to harm oneself does. Commonsense or Kantian morality is agent sacrificingly asymmetrical, whereas commonsense rationality is agent favouringly asymmetrical. This means that these two parts of ordinary thinking tug in opposite directions, but a virtue‐ethical approach that focuses exclusively (...) on commonsense thinking about what is admirable or counts as a virtue lacks this sort of tension, and such greater unity counts in its favor. (shrink)

Is an agent‐based sentimentalist virtue ethics of caring or benevolence sufficiently action‐guiding, given the focus on the inner life rather than external factors? The answer is that such forms of ethics are not meant to be practical in this sense, because a focus on what is right or obligatory takes the agent away from a praiseworthy focus on the good of other individuals. The ideal agent is deeply connected with and directly concerned about the welfare of others, and such a (...) person does not conscientiously worry about whether he or she is acting rightly or virtuously. This conclusion allows us to understand moral growth and moral conflict – though in a way different from the way in which the Kantian tradition, with its emphasis on conscientiousness, does. (shrink)

Virtue ethics treats aretaic, as opposed to deontic, concepts as fundamental and focuses in the first instance on character traits or motives rather than actions. Virtue ethics also contrasts with utilitarianism because although both these approaches are self‐other symmetric, they embrace different forms of symmetry. Utilitarianism holds that one's concern for oneself should be no different, fundamentally, from the concern one has for each and every other individual. But such ”in sensu diviso” symmetry differs from an ”in sensu composito” symmetry (...) that would have us be equally concerned with ourselves and with others considered as a class. Commonsense virtue ethics subscribes to the latter kind of symmetry because of the way in which it gives equal or nearly equal weight to both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues. (shrink)

Looks at akrasia, monism, and pluralism. Many deem akrasia conceptually incoherent. Others, notably David Wiggins, argue that coherence is secured in so far as incommensurable values are present. Against these views, it is argued that coherent akrasia is possible, and that it requires the distinction between the cognitive and the affective, and not between comparable and commensurable values. Akrasia extends to monistic theories––a monistic theory, e.g. hedonism, is compatible with akrasia. Akratic conflict does not require plurality. An account of reasons, (...) which goes beyond value finality and value maximization, emerges. (shrink)

Philosophers commonly argue that conflicts of values are deeply problematic for ethical theories in so far as they force the theories into impracticality, incompleteness, or irrealism. To be complete, a theory must tell us in every case what must be done. To be practical, it must never tell us to do what is impossible. As conflict seems to involve just these features, some philosophers argue from the fact that avoiding conflict is impossible to the conclusion that ethical theories must either (...) be silent in some cases or that it requires us to do both of the jointly impossible acts. Others seek to explain the conflict away as merely apparent. Against these views, it is argued that mere incompossibility does not make for a conflict. All choice involves incompossibility, but not all choice involves conflict. Conflict must be understood in terms of what is conflicting. Understanding this requires seeing that many act evaluations are not action‐guiding. (shrink)

Examines arguments that maximization holds for conceptual reasons. Looks at maximizing theory and raises conceptual problems for evaluative maximization––difficulties in ranking mixes, problems with organic wholes, and mathematical versus internal evaluative judgments. As regards the evaluative decisions maximization is concerned with, it is argued that we are guided in our understanding of what is good by what is better. To the extent that the better is prior to the good, maximizations are parasitic on other evaluations. Concludes with a look at (...) the discussion of false pleasures in Plato's Philebus. (shrink)

People from one cultural background often find themselves wondering how those from a different cultural background could willingly live the way they do and/or criticize others for living in the way they do. How are we to explain this kind of mutual incomprehension? Three different possible explanations will be considered. The first is that such mutual incomprehension is sourced in a moral flaw. The flaw might be in one of the cultures, as certain cultures might be premised on a moral (...) mistake. Alternatively, the flaw might be a feature of the incomprehending individuals. If only they tried harder, they would come to appreciate the other’s point of view. The second possibility is that such mutual incomprehension is the product of principled limits on the interpretation of someone from another culture. Contrary to the first possibility, there might be no way for people from different cultures to even understand each other, let alone find fault in each other, because the culturally mediated ways in which they understand the world are inaccessible to each other. The third possibility is that the mutual incomprehension is sourced in metaphysics. Contrary to the second possibility, there might be some non-metaphorical sense in which people from different cultures inhabit different worlds. The main task of the chapter is to describe and evaluate these three possibilities with a view to ruling out the third. (shrink)

This introduction treats the field of ethics in a new way. The main topic is normative ethics and in particular the ethics of moral right and wrong, and the emphasis is on the recently highlighted division or conflict between ethical rationalism and moral sentimentalism. Rationalism treats moral judgment and motivation as a matter of rational judgment, and its main practitioners have been Immanuel Kant and, more recently, the intuitionists H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross. Philosophical weaknesses in intuitionism have (...) led recent rationalists to follow Kant's transcendental form of deontology, and this leads us to an examination of the Kant-influenced work of John Rawls and of his followers T. M. Scanlon and Stephen Darwall. After a critical examination of ethical rationalism, the book proceeds to consider the sentimentalist tradition, which goes all the way back to the Chinese philosopher Mencius and is more recently instanced in the writings of the eighteenth-century sentimentalist David Hume and in the work of feminist thinker Carol Gilligan. The sentimentalist tradition has potential strengths that have not been fully appreciated, and the book dwells on these. But it then goes on to show how Chinese thought in general offers a large philosophical context in which to make better sense of moral sentimentalism and of recent debates in normative ethics. (shrink)

Utilitarianism does best to approach justice, rationality, and various virtues in symmetric and impartialist fashion. A scalar form of utilitarianism that makes only comparative judgments of better and worse may be preferable for abstract theoretical purposes, though not in practice.

Utilitarianism is also underdetermined as a theory. It must be stated either in actualist form or in some sort of expectabilist terms. But neither choice seems preferable to the other, and this makes it difficult to settle on and defend any particular version of utilitarianism.

The value of personal relationships and of political involvement can be understood in virtue‐ethical terms, but it is not clear that a good friend who prefers his friends is morally superior to someone who is always impartial.

Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can evaluate such traits in virtue‐ethical terms without blaming or condemning those, e.g., whom we wish, in favored terms, to criticize. This approach is very reminiscent of Spinoza.

Virtue ethics allows general rules, and these can cover both perfect and imperfect duties in Kant's sense – though the concepts used are not the specifically moral notions of rightness and wrongness, but rather such notions as what is admirable/deplorable or counts as a virtue/vice.

In commonsense terms, many traits count as virtues independently of the benefit they bring their possessors or others. For example, the courage to face the fact that one has cancer may actually make things less pleasant for both the cancer victim and his/her friends and relations. In addition, many virtuous traits have both self‐regarding and other‐regarding versions: e.g. honesty, loyalty, and trustworthiness. A commonsense virtue ethics makes use of that fact to underscore the significance and plausibility of its self‐other symmetric (...) approach to ethical theory. (shrink)

Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) showed how, consistent with the predictions of error‐driven learning models, the order in which stimuli are presented in training can affect category learning. Specifically, learners exposed to artificial language input where objects preceded their labels learned the discriminating features of categories better than learners exposed to input where labels preceded objects. We sought to replicate this finding in two online experiments employing the same tests used originally: A four pictures test (match a label (...) to one of four pictures) and a four labels test (match a picture to one of four labels). In our study, only findings from the four pictures test were consistent with the original result. Additionally, the effect sizes observed were smaller, and participants over‐generalized high‐frequency category labels more than in the original study. We suggest that although Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) feature‐label order predictions were derived from error‐driven learning, they failed to consider that this mechanism also predicts that performance in any training paradigm must inevitably be influenced by participant prior experience. We consider our findings in light of these factors, and discuss implications for the generalizability and replication of training studies. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the question of whether true belief can have final value because it answers our ‘intellectual interest’ or ‘natural curiosity’. The idea is that sometimes we are interested in the truth on some issue not for any ulterior purpose, but simply because we are curious about that issue. It is argued that this approach fails to provide an adequate explanation of the final value of true belief, since there is an unbridgeable gap between our valuing the truth (...) on some issue for its own sake, and that truth's being valuable for its own sake. (shrink)

This paper argues that Moore’s principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality of merely (...) virtual intrinsic values. (shrink)

The field of the history of the idea of Europe has been very popular for some years now in History, Politics, and European Studies departments, and so there are many monographs and collections of e...