Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653-666 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Moore’s principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality of merely virtual intrinsic values.

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Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

Citations of this work

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