We bear witness to a sweeping social movement for change—fostered and driven by a powerful group of Black nurses and nursing students determined to call out and dismantle anti‐Black racism and discrimination within the profession of nursing. The Black Nurses Task Force, launched by the Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario (RNAO) in July 2020, is building momentum for long‐standing change in the profession by critically examining the racist and discriminatory history of nursing, listening to and learning from the lived experiences (...) of the Black nursing community, and shaping concrete, actionable steps to confront anti‐Black racism and discrimination in academic settings, workplaces, and nursing organizations. The Black Nurses Task Force and the RNAO are standing up and speaking out in acknowledgment of the magnitude of anti‐Black racism and discrimination that exist in our profession, health system, justice system, and economic system. This social movement is demonstrating, in actions, how individuals and a collective act as change agents to drive meaningful and widespread change for our present and future Black nurses. We also acknowledge the Black nurses who have gone before us. (shrink)

Racism against Black people, Indigenous and other racialized people continues to exist in healthcare and academic settings. Racism produces profound harm to racialized people. Strategies to address systemic racism must be implemented to bring about sustainable changes in healthcare and academic settings. This quality improvement initiative provides strategies to address systemic racism and discrimination against Black nurses and nursing students in Ontario, Canada. It is part of a broader initiative showcasing Black nurses in action to end racism and discrimination. We (...) have found that people who have experienced racism need healing, support and protection including trauma-related services to facilitate their healing. Implementing multi-level, multi-pronged interventions in workplaces will create healthy work environments for all members of society, especially Black nurses who are both clients/patients and providers of healthcare. (shrink)

The history of ideas deals with the elemental unit-ideas which for Lovejoy are components of systems distinguished by their patterns. Special histories explain how a particular form of human history developed. General histories draw on special histories to document or explain social contexts. Since patterns influence philosophers, the history of ideas contributes little to the history of philosophy, a discontinuous strand within a period's continuous intellectual history. By accepting cultural pluralism, denying the monistic position that there always are internal connections (...) among all or some strands of intellectual and cultural history, both continuity and change in philosophy can be best understood. (shrink)

Originally published in 1971. The purpose of this book is to draw attention to important aspects of thought in the nineteenth century. While its central concerns lie within the philosophic tradition, materials drawn from the social sciences and elsewhere provide important illustrations of the intellectual movements that the author attempts to trace. This book aims at examining philosophic modes of thought as well as sifting presuppositions held in common by a diverse group of thinkers whose antecedents and whose intentions often (...) had little in common. After a preliminary tracing of the main strands of continuity within philosophy itself, the author concentrates on how, out of diverse and disparate sources, certain common beliefs and attitudes regarding history, man, and reason came to pervade a great deal of nineteenth-century thought. Geographically, this book focuses on English, French, and German thought. Mandelbaum believes that views regarding history and man and reason pose problems for philosophy, and he offers critical discussions of some of those problems at the conclusions of parts 2, 3, and 4. (shrink)

Economical questions indisputably occupy a central place in everyday life. In order to clarify these questions, people generally turn to those who are familiar with economics. In answering such legitimate questions, economists propose explanations which rest on a few principles among which the rationality principle is by far the most fundamental. This principle assumes that people are rational, but what is meant by this has to be specified. Rationality and Explanation in Economicsclaims that only a minimal kind of rationality is (...) required to ‘animate’ economic explanations. However, such a conception of rationality faces serious objections: it is closely associated with harshly criticised methodological individualism and it is not easily disentangled from sheer irrationality. The book answers these objections and shows that the economists’ way of mobilising the concepts of maximization or of consistency for defining rationality raises more serious problems. Since the latter have encouraged various attempts to downgrade or even to dispense with the very notion of rationality, the book is largely devoted to countering arguments associated with these attempts and to show why postulating that agents are rational is still the only efficient way to explain economic phenomena as such. The author also proposes original views about the role of rationality, the meaning of methodological individualism, the relevance of the selection argument and the relation between ‘rational’ explanations of economics and explanations in natural sciences. (shrink)

The belief of Gallie, Danto, and others that history is constructing narratives is too simplistic and neglects the role of inquiry and discovery. Teleology in history - only events relevant to a known outcome find a place in a work -while similar to that in narratives is not decisive, since in any explanation the explicandum controls the explicans to some extent. History is not recounting a linear sequence of intelligible human actions but is an analysis of a complex pattern of (...) change into factors that served to make it what it was. Social backgrounds and conditions that are influences but not actually parts of the story of actions are crucial; the fundamental relationship is part to whole, not antecedent to consequent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Thus Locke's mistake is not the simplistic one of bringing in a new type of perception --perception of the agreement of an idea with something which is not an idea. He attributes the certainty which is appropriate for a general verbal truth concerning archetypal ideas to a real truth concerning ectypal ideas. There is an additional difficulty in Locke's use of the distinction between adequate (...) and inadequate ectypal ideas when he uses them in his theory of self knowledge. How can we be sure that these simple ectypal ideas are adequate? We have certainty concerning the adequacy of our archetypal ideas because we have a complete knowledge of the archetype which is itself an idea. However, we are not given a complete knowledge of the archetype of simple ectypal ideas. We are assured of the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas only by assuming the truth of the causal principle. This leads to a circular argument. We can be assured of the adequacy of the causal relation considered as a product of our own construction. If the idea of the causal relation is archetypal, then the idea of this relation is adequate. However, when the causal relation is used to assure us of the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, the causal relation is no longer restricted to the level of archetypal ideas. In order to insure the adequacy of our simple ideas, the causal relation must be a relation between our ectypal ideas and something which is not an idea, viz., the power which causes the sensation. Archetypal ideas of relations are adequate, but this is not an archetypal idea of a relation, and thus we have no way of judging its adequacy. The only way to determine the adequacy of the causal connection is to show the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, but the adequacy of these simple ectypal ideas is itself predicated on the adequacy of the idea of the causal relation. Thus, the whole argument for the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas is circular. Either the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical as claimed in Book Three, or the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical, as claimed in Book Two. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical, then these simple ideas are archetypal and adequate but they afford us no knowledge about any extra-mental thing. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical then simple ideas are ectypal, but we cannot be assured of their adequacy because their adequacy is dependent on the causal relation whose adequacy is not assured. Thus, Locke's epistemology does not support his claim for intuitive knowledge of his own existence, but the mistakes he does make are not nearly as simplistic as they are often claimed to be. DONALD W. GOTTERBARN University of Southern California THE DISTINGUISHABLE AND THE SEPARABLE; A NOTE ON HUME AND CAUSATION In this note, I shall be concemed with only one part of Hume's doctrine of causation, and my criticism of this feature of his position will leave much of the remainder untouched. This is not to say that my point is unimportant, for I shall challenge Hume's fight to claim that there cannot in any case be a direct impression of connection, force, or power. He attempted to establish this claim by argument, and I wish to show that there is a fatal flaw in that argument. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 243 In order that what follows shall not be misunderstood, two points must be noted. First, I would not claim that we have an impression of connection, force, or power in all cases in which we hold that events are related as cause and effect. There are many instances in which this is not true, and the number and even the varieties of these cases could be greatly expanded beyond the illustrations which Hume gave in the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. I shall only argue that he did not offer adequate reasons for holding that there are no eases in which we can possibly have such... (shrink)

Histories of philosophy represent a relatively new form of historical study» and some observations are made concerning the changes in style that they have tinder gone. A crucial question for the historian of philosophy is "Who is to count as a philosopher?” An answer to this question is suggested. The question of the extent to which historians falsify the doctrines of individual philosophers by viewing them in terms of their predecessors and successors is then raised. In the second section of (...) the paper» monistic views of social and cultural life are re» jected, and a pluralistic approach is developed. This approach» it is contended, allows for emphasis on both originality and continuity in philosophic thought, and shows how philosophy is related to its social and cultural milieu without losing its identity. (shrink)

Within his metahistorical thesis, White makes three assumptions about the nature of historical writing. First, he argues that "histories proper" and "philosophies of history" differ in emphasis and not in content because both share a common narrative strategy. However, White fails to acknowledge the vast differences in scope, principles of interpretation, and meaning between the two disciplines. Second, White assumes that the activity of ordering the historical text is a poetic act. This approach ignores the fact that events and the (...) relationships of those events exist prior to and independent of the historical account. Moreover, his tropological structures are too inflexible to provide a useful understanding of historical discourse. Finally, he never questions the validity of viewing an historical work as a purely linguistic structure. In fact, whereas "histories proper" seem to have much in common to compare and to evaluate, "philosophies of history" almost never agree. (shrink)

This classic study by a distinguished scholar surveys the major philosophical trends and thinkers of a vital period in Western civilization. Based on Maurice DeWulf's celebrated Princeton University lectures, it offers an accessible view of medieval history, covering scholastic, ecclesiastic, classicist, and secular thought of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. From Anselm and Abelard to Thomas Aquinas and William of Occam, it chronicles the influence of the era's great philosophers on their contemporaries as well as on subsequent generations.

Ce livre ne vise pas à donner un aperçu de ce que devrait être une religion. Il ne vise pas davantage à mettre en valeur l'argumentaire de l'athéisme. Il entend plutôt montrer qu'une personne qui se dit parfaitement agnostique et adepte d'une philosophie qui valorise la rationalité avant tout peut parfaitement être croyante, voire même pratiquante, sans qu'il y ait là la moindre contradiction. Dans une telle démarche, l'armature cognitive à laquelle de nombreux croyants ont jugé approprié d'arrimer leur foi (...) risque de se voir quelque peu déboulonnée. Et nombre d'arguments qui ont fortement contribué à miner les croyances religieuses pourraient s'en trouver passablement affaiblis. Dans les deux cas, tout découlerait de la simple reconnaissance du fait que la foi n'est en rien un savoir. Croire, expose Maurice Lagueux, en un Dieu transcendant ne veut pas dire connaître quoi que ce soit à propos d'un monde transcendant qui, par définition, échappe à nos capacités cognitives et est conçu comme le lieu de mystères insondables. Croire veut dire avoir sincèrement confiance en ce qui pourrait nous réserver l'existence de ce Dieu qui, toutefois, demeure inconnaissable. On peut se reconnaître résolument croyant sans s'estimer moins agnostique pour autant. (shrink)

Examining the literature of slavery and race before the Civil War, Maurice Lee demonstrates for the first time exactly how the slavery crisis became a crisis of philosophy that exposed the breakdown of national consensus and the limits of rational authority. Poe, Stowe, Douglass, Melville, and Emerson were among the antebellum authors who tried - and failed - to find rational solutions to the slavery conflict. Unable to mediate the slavery controversy as the nation moved toward war, their writings (...) form an uneasy transition between the confident rationalism of the American Enlightenment and the more skeptical thought of the pragmatists. Lee draws on antebellum moral philosophy, political theory, and metaphysics, bringing a fresh perspective to the literature of slavery - one that synthesizes cultural studies and intellectual history to argue that romantic, sentimental, and black Atlantic writers all struggled with modernity when facing the slavery crisis. (shrink)

This reassessment of the long debate about Friedman's thesis on the pointlessness of testing assumptions in economics shows that Friedman's three famous examples, on which a large part of the credit given to this thesis is based, far from substantiating it, can be used to establish radically opposite conclusions. Furthermore, it is shown that this so-called “instrumentalist” thesis, when applied by Friedman to economics, is of a quite different nature and raises much more serious problems than the standard instrumentalist thesis (...) devised by some methodologists of physics. To disentangle these ambiguities concerning realism and instrumentalism applied to physics or to economics, this paper refers to Van Fraassen's “constructive empiricism”, which is helpful in reformulating, in a more satisfactory way, the essentials of Friedman's considerations about empiricism and anti-realism. (shrink)

Cet article pointe vers les conséquences induites par l’usage d’artifices rhétoriques et l’abus du pouvoir du langage dans l’Église. Ce sont ceux-là même, les responsables d’institutions religieuses, qui censés défendre un service honnête de la Parole, qui souvent laissent se creuser un fossé entre paroles et actions. Une intention louable de servir de manière altruiste autrui est dans ce cas détourné vers des fins égoïstes : comme gagner davantage de notoriété et de moyens financiers ; assouvir un amour immodéré du (...) pouvoir. C’est moins à démasquer des « usurpasteurs » que nous invite l’auteur, mais bien à la relecture patiente des textes. Il n'y a rien de plus beau qu'une bible dont « les pages ont été cornées, marquées et dont la reliure fatiguée raconte l'assidue fréquentation de son propriétaire ». Chaque fois qu'une « bible se détruit par son utilisation, une femme, un homme se construit! ». (shrink)

Prodelision or Inverse Elision takes place when a word ending in a long vowel or diphthong is immediately followed by another word beginning with a short vowel. Though it is very occasionally found in inscriptions and in the manuscripts of certain prose authors, particularly those of Plato—almost uniquely and its cases—it is to be considered as essentially a verse phenomenon, affecting as it does the metre of the line in which it occurs. Prodelision was unknown to Homer and Hesiod, is (...) rare in lyric, and seems only to come into real use with the dramatists of the fifth century. An examination of the practice of the three tragedians and of Aristophanes is not without interest in itself and may occasionally throw some light on points of textual criticism. (shrink)

The past which the present acknowledges tends to be deceptively simple. Attention is most frequently paid to those of its aspects which appear to have anticipated the present, or to those which contrast with what the present takes to be most uniquely its own. Consequently, the past in which the present takes an interest tends to change, and it is unlikely that successive generations will assign equal significance to precisely the same aspects of what occurred in the past. This need (...) not lead to distorted views of those particular features on which attention is focused, but it can lead to a neglect of whatever aspects of the past are not of pressing present concern. Consequently, the context in which any generation views the past may easily become too narrow, and a sense of the past’s complexity will be lost. For reasons that I have elsewhere suggested, this situation is more likely to obtain in the field of cultural history than in studies of political and institutional change. When previous views as to what is most important in literature, or in philosophy, or in the arts undergo change, the whole history of these forms of endeavor will reflect that change. In what follows, I wish to call attention to some of the ways in which our own philosophic preconceptions have led to a neglect of important facets of nineteenth-century thought. (shrink)

This paper assumes that human choices are determined, and distinguishes among the views of some classical modern philosophers regarding what determines choice.Hobbes and Hume are taken as representatives of choice as determined by subjective propensities; the differences between their views is discussed. Descartes is taken as a major representative of the view that choice is determined by an apprehension of that which is objectively good, and Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz are discussed insofar as they share that view. It is then (...) shown that interpretations of Locke and Mill whieh assimilate their views to those of Hobbes and Hume are mistaken.As a third alternative, the self-determinist positions of Green and Dewey are discussed. The views of James, in which attention and effort are key concepts, are traced, and that aspect of his view whieh stresses attention is accepted, while his emphasis on effort is rejected. (shrink)