Dans le débat sur l'euthanasie, la passion l'emporte souvent sur la réflexion. Donner la mort, ou se donner la mort : voilà des actes qui sont loin d'être anodins. Le développement technologique des soins intensifs place aujourd'hui le médecin devant la possibilité, sinon l'obligation, de gérer la vie finissante. Au-delà des difficultés issues de cette situation nouvelle, le terme même d'" euthanasie " est lourd d'ambiguïtés. S'il désigne communément les procédés destinés à rendre la mort plus douce, diverses pratiques s'en (...) inspirent, qui peuvent être radicalement opposées d'un point de vue éthique. Geste de liberté individuelle, suicide, meurtre ou délivrance : la violence des arguments fait écho à celle de l'enjeu. Pour tenter d'y voir clair, une vingtaine de spécialistes d'horizons divers - médecins, psychologues, juristes, infirmières, psychiatres et représentants des religions - ont constitué pendant plusieurs années un groupe de travail collectif. Confrontant leurs convictions et leurs approches, parfois éloignées, souvent complémentaires, dans une volonté de dépassionner le débat, ils ont construit une réflexion approfondie sur la fin de vie, les soins palliatifs et l'accompagnement des mourants. Original et accessible à tous, cet ouvrage propose, face au désarroi des soignants et à la détresse des familles, une vision apaisée de la fin de vie, qui s'appuie sur la dignité de chaque personne. (shrink)

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is a viable (...) epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem. (shrink)

The history of ideas deals with the elemental unit-ideas which for Lovejoy are components of systems distinguished by their patterns. Special histories explain how a particular form of human history developed. General histories draw on special histories to document or explain social contexts. Since patterns influence philosophers, the history of ideas contributes little to the history of philosophy, a discontinuous strand within a period's continuous intellectual history. By accepting cultural pluralism, denying the monistic position that there always are internal connections (...) among all or some strands of intellectual and cultural history, both continuity and change in philosophy can be best understood. (shrink)

"Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu" de Maurice Joly. Journaliste et écrivain français (1829-1878).

The work which this author planned to call The Prose of the World, or Introduction to the Prose of the World, is unfinished. There is good reason to believe that he deliberately abandoned it and that, he had lived, he would not have completed it, at least in the form that he first outlined. Once finished, the book was to constitute the first section of a two-part work--the second would have had a more distinct metaphysical nature--whose aim was to offer (...) us, as an extension of the Phenomenology of Perception, a theory of truth. (shrink)

This book collects a renowned scholar's essays from the past five decades and reflects two main concerns: an approach to logic that stresses argumentation, reasoning, and critical thinking and that is informal, empirical, naturalistic, practical, applied, concrete, and historical; and an interest in Galileo’s life and thought—his scientific achievements, Inquisition trial, and methodological lessons in light of his iconic status as “father of modern science.” These republished essays include many hard to find articles, out of print works, and chapters which (...) are not available online. The collection provides an excellent resource of the author's lifelong dedication to the subject. Thus, the book contains critical analyses of some key Galilean arguments about the laws of falling bodies and the Copernican hypothesis of the earth’s motion. There is also a group of chapters in which Galileo’s argumentation is compared and contrasted with that of other figures such as Socrates, Karl Marx, Giordano Bruno, and his musicologist father Vincenzo Galilei. The chapters on Galileo’s trial illustrate an approach to the science-vs-religion issue which Finocchiaro labels “para-clerical” and conceptualizes in terms of a judicious consideration of arguments for and against Galileo and the Church. Other essays examine argumentation about Galileo’s life and thought by the major Galilean scholars of recent decades. The book will be of interest to scholars in philosophy, logic, philosophy of science, history of science, history of religion, philosophy of religion, argumentation, rhetoric, and communication studies. (shrink)

A study of the religious philosophy of one of the century's foremost Jewish thinkers. The author, a Buber scholar, summarizes the philosopher's views on ethics and on the history of religion, and his dialog with oriental religions. An existentialist philosopher, Buber sees "salvation" as relatedness to others and to divine revelation in day-to-day events.

Shakespeare's Villains is a close reading of Shakespeare's plays to investigate the nature of evil. Charney closely considers the way that dramatic characters are developed in terms of language, imagery, and nonverbal stage effects. With chapters on Iago, Tarquin, Aaron, Richard Duke of Gloucester, Shylock, Claudius, Polonius, Macbeth, Edmund, Goneril, Regan, Angelo, Tybalt, Don John, Iachimo, Lucio, Julius Caesar, Leontes, and Duke Frederick, this book is the first comprehensive study of the villains in Shakespeare.

Soren Kirkegaard and Maurice Blondel are positioned together in a dialogue regarding the vision of the supernatural. Maurice Ashley Agbaw-Ebai draws from this a sharper image of the preeminent place religious experience possesses in human life and thought. Kirkegaard's lament of Christian lack of fervor and Blondel's concern that religion and philosophy no longer interact are both examined and Agbaw-Ebai concludes that they both indicate the same outcome: a "dominant leveling of society" that robs religion of its particularity. (...) This devastates the individual because he is no longer challenged to seek a relationship with God and expose himself to the supernatural. The boundlessness of man must be acknowledged or else his actions will never be understood, and religious experience and philosophy must coexist with mutual reference or self-knowledge will never amount to the discovery of supernatural destiny. And this, asserts Agbaw-Ebai, is the shared urgency of both Kirkegaard and Blondel. Like these philosophers who have preceded him, Agbaw-Ebai exhorts us to never allow the sense of our relation to the supernatural as a settled matter. The philosophy of religion we have inherited does not protect us from having to confront our own subjectivity with autonomy: to be God without God and against God, or to be God with and through God. (shrink)

I believe we could learn more about freedom if we talked less about freedom. Because “freedom” is a word with singular prestige, various moral philosophers have embodied it in their teaching and claimed to set forth its true characteristics. Many words employed in philosophical controversy are ambiguous. “Freedom,” I think, is one of the most troublesome. I propose to attempt some disentanglement. To begin with, there is a sense in which the meaning of “freedom” seems to present no difficulties. This (...) sense occurs in such a remark as: “That animal was in captivity and now it is free.” I shall call this “simple freedom” and what it means is the absence of constraint. Thus applied there would probably be general agreement about the word. The difficulties arise when we come to consider freedom as pertaining to human persons. Here the distinction between simple freedom and the more philosophical definitions of the word will emerge. On the simple definition a man is free if constraint is absent, and that is all there is to it. But this will not do for most philosophers. It is pointed out that man is a special case in that he experiences conflicting desires. He wills a thing and he does not will it; or he wills something and at the same time he wills something else which is incompatible with it. Man, we are reminded, is a rational creature, but besides his rational will he is subject to the solicitations of impulses and desires which are not rational. Therefore, it is argued, the mere absence of constraint is not a sufficient condition of human freedom and hence not a sufficient definition of the word “freedom” as applied to human persons. (shrink)