El concepto cartesiano de una _mathesis universalis _tiene como antecedente histórico inmediato algunas de las ideas defendidas en el contexto de las discusiones del aristotelismo renacentista acerca de la certeza matemática y el puesto de las matemáticas en la clasificación de las ciencias. Una de las figuras principales en este debate es la del jesuita valenciano Benet Perera (1535 – 1610). A través de la presentación de una serie de pasajes extraídos de los manuscritos inéditos de Perera, en este artículo (...) analizamos la defensa que este autor realiza de la existencia de una ciencia matemática común, en relación con algunas de sus ideas fundamentales, como la impugnación del carácter científico de las matemáticas, o la división de la metafísica en una filosofía primera dedicada al ente en cuanto ente y una teología natural que estudia las inteligencias y Dios. (shrink)

Book review of John Schuster: Descartes-agonistes: Physico-mathematics, method and corpuscular-mechanism 1618-33. (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 27.) Dordrecht: Springer, 2013, xix + 631pp. Descartes-Agonistes is the magnum opus of John Schuster, formerly of the University of New South Wales, honorary fellow at the University of Sydney. Its roots go back to the dissertation he wrote 35 years ago under Thomas Kuhn at Princeton University. As Schuster correctly remarks, some regard his dissertation as an underground classic. I count (...) myself among them: Schuster’s work has been directional in my work on the history of early modern science. Schuster himself prefers to regard his dissertation as ‘a vestige’ of a history of science of the 1970s that he has since gone beyond. In the 1980s, he elaborated and published on some central insights in a series of seminal articles, but his work on Descartes really got into its stride again around the turn of the millennium (Schuster 1980, 1990; Gaukroger et al. 2000). This book is the acme of this work, and grand it is: clocking 600 pages (excluding appendices) it extends, deepens and reinforces his analysis of Descartes into a dense and .. (shrink)

Présentation, transcription et traduction de quatre manuscrits mathématiques inédits de Leibniz traitant de la loi de continuité, des logarithmes des nombres imaginaires, des axiomes du calcul des grandeurs et du calcul dyadique.

Présentation, transcription et traduction de quatre manuscrits mathématiques inédits de Leibniz traitant de la loi de continuité, des logarithmes des nombres imaginaires, des axiomes du calcul des grandeurs et du calcul dyadique.

Objective Compare outcome of dogs that did and did not receive fresh frozen plasma (FFP) for treatment of pancreatitis. Design Retrospective case series between 1995 and 2005. Setting University referral hospital. Animals Seventy-four dogs were enrolled with a total of 77 Cases as 2 dogs had repeat episodes of pancreatitis. Diagnosis of pancreatitis was based on clinical signs, physical examination, and abdominal ultrasonographic examination. Interventions The medical database was searched for dogs with a diagnosis of pancreatitis. Information collected included (...) signalment, vital signs, CBC, use of FFP, length of stay, use of antimicrobials and supplemental nutrition, surgical intervention, preexisting illness, evidence of a coagulopathy and outcome. Outcome was compared between those patients that did and did not receive FFP. Measurements and Main Results Fifty-nine dogs survived to discharge. Two dogs with repeat pancreatitis survived to discharge after each episode. Thirteen dogs died and 2 were euthanized. FFP was administered to 20 dogs. Two dogs that were hospitalized for repeat pancreatitis did not receive FFP. Seven of 20 (35%) cases that received plasma died or were euthanized compared with 6 of 57 (12%) cases that did not receive plasma. Plasma administration was significantly related to outcome (P<0.001). Severity of illness scores were difficult to assign, however, dogs meeting criteria for systemic inflammatory response syndrome were not more likely to receive FFP. Other therapies included supplemental nutrition, antimicrobials, and surgical intervention, which did not affect outcome. Conclusions Mortality rate for those dogs receiving plasma was higher than those that did not. Severity of illness scores were difficult to assign; however, preexisting illness, evidence of systemic inflammatory response syndrome, and presence of a coagulopathy were not significantly different between the groups that did and did not receive FFP. No benefit for administration of FFP was noted. Additional investigation should be performed to confirm this result. 2009 Veterinary Emergency and Critical Care Society. (shrink)

This article proposes a framework for the analysis of experienced discrimination in home mortgages. It addresses the problem of home mortgage lending discrimination in one of the richest areas of northern Italy. Employees of a local hospital were interviewed to study their perception of discriminatory behavior related to home financing. The analysis follows two steps. The first evaluates self-selection and the second focuses on the likelihood that applications are accepted by the bank. Findings show that discrimination is likely to appear (...) when the applicant’s nationality is considered. In addition to its findings, the study provides an original econometric model on a two-step procedure to test perceived discrimination and suggests a method and approach that may constitute a point of reference for those willing to study perceived discrimination. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the idea that computation is a key tool that can help us understand how the human brain works. Recent years have seen a revolution in the kinds of tasks computers can perform. Underlying these advances is the burgeoning field of machine learning, a branch of artificial intelligence, which aims at creating machines that can act without being programmed, learning from data and experience. Rather startlingly, it turns out that the same methods that allow us to make intelligent (...) machines also appear to hold the key to explaining how our brains work. In this chapter, we explore this exciting new field and some of the questions that it raises. (shrink)

Enūma eliš exhibits a masterful array of intertextual borrowings that makes it exceptional among Akkadian literary texts. In this paper I discuss “intertextu- ity” as an analytical category and its suitability and limitations for the study of ancient compositions. I consider three different levels of intertextuality and present instances from an assorted group of texts. I finally show how a variety of intertextual types that are usually found in isolation are combined in Enūma eliš to create an original piece.

The Material and Ideological Base of the Old Babylonian State: History, Economy, and Politics. By Lukáš Pecha. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018. Pp. xvii + 316. $115.

The text commonly known as the Babylonian Poem of Creation has attracted scholarly attention since it was first translated in the late nineteenth century, although critical editions have appeared only recently. In 2014 there was published a lengthy study on enūma eliš that presents a number of original approaches to the ancient composition. This new book is the subject of the following notes.

According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...) models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ( [1982] ). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. (shrink)

The note presents the discovery of a spurious Apuleian work entitled De fato from MS n° 1040 at the Bibliothèque patrimoniale Villon in Rouen. This work is, in fact, a series of excerpts from Firmicus Maternus, Mathesis Book 1.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy: Reading the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit by Andrew Alexander DavisPaul T. WilfordDAVIS, Andrew Alexander. Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy: Reading the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. London: Bloomsbury, 2023. ix + 214 pp. Cloth, $125In Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy, Andrew Davis makes a convincing argument that just as the problem of how to distinguish sophistry from philosophy is a recurrent theme of Plato's dialogues, so (...) too is the problem of sophistry or "pseudo-philosophy" central to the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, the problem of how to recognize and guard against pseudo-philosophy is the common theme linking the prefaces to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopedia, and the Philosophy of Right, each of which endeavors "to reveal something about the essence of philosophy... by highlighting the ways pseudo-philosophy fails to do justice to philosophical content." Such an undertaking is especially important to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, however, because the subject matter [End Page 543] of the work is nothing but the logos of the appearances of spirit. To arrive at knowledge of spirit requires attending to all the various ways in which spirit (or Geist) can appear, but, as Davis remarks, "like life, Geist may be thought as a source of appearances, but not as an appearance itself. It is always 'behind' what appears." As a result, the Phenomenology is an exercise in trying "to grasp what does not appear through appearances alone." Thus, just as the Phenomenology approaches the truth of spirit by considering spirit's partial, abstract, and one-sided modes of appearing, so too does the preface to the Phenomenology approach the truth of philosophy by investigating forms of pseudo-philosophy.As Hegel himself states, there are two principal tasks pursued in the preface: (1) to offer a preliminary sketch of what it would mean for "the cognition of absolute actuality to become perfectly lucid about its own nature;" and (2) to eliminate some "habitually accepted forms of thought" that prove obstacles to philosophic cognition. While most commentators take their bearings from the former, Davis's approach to the preface is unique (to my knowledge) in foregrounding the latter. Yet, as his book unfolds, it becomes clear that the latter is the route into the former. Indeed, one of the central lessons of the book is that, although the elimination of erroneous habits of thought may seem to be merely negative and therefore principally propaedeutic to the positive task of leading the reader toward "absolute knowing," the examination of error is an integral component of grasping the true. If the Phenomenology as a whole is a "highway of despair"—a comprehensive refutation of natural consciousness's pretensions to knowledge that is simultaneously a dialectical ascent to conceptually comprehending knowing (begreifende Wissen)—the preface initiates the reader into the via negativa that philosophic cognition must travel to attain self-knowledge.Davis's book is structured around seven forms of pseudo-philosophy, each of which is treated as a discrete, distinguishable problem in its own right and also as emblematic of the common failure to recognize that the form of philosophy is inseparable from the content of philosophy. As Davis argues, this failure lies at the root of the attempt (common to much of modern philosophy since Descartes) to establish a priori a universal method for thinking (what Leibniz called a mathesis universalis) that will secure certain and indubitable knowledge. But this effort proves self-undermining, always ultimately engendering the very skepticism it seeks to master. Through observing the aporiai generated by forms of pseudo-philosophy, we learn that "the method of philosophy is inseparable from the subject matter of philosophy. Method cannot be isolated and discussed on its own. Philosophy is thinking (form) about thinking (content)."Davis thus gradually discloses Hegel's positive answer to the question "what is philosophy?" through a series of determinate negations of philosophy's imitations. We learn that philosophy is the recollective, self-comprehending, self-moving thinking of thinking by attending to a set of tendencies that impede philosophy: "a tendency to explain rather than [End Page 544] present (chapter 1), a... (shrink)

Psychoanalysis has, in the very nature of its object, an interest in and difficulty with the concept of place as well as an interest in and difficulty with the logic of place, topology. The Unconscious can thus seem to give rise to a certain prospect of mathesis or formalization; and such formalization, achieved, would offer a ground for the psychoanalytic claim to scientific knowledge relatively independent of empirical questions and approaching the condition of mathematics. This might then seem to (...) have been Lacan’s wager in organizing the researches of his école around works of theoretical elaboration rather than clinical study; certainly some such notion must underlie Miller’s claim to be “axiomatic.”1In this paper I want to explore some of Lacan’s formalizations as they are unfolded in the seminar Encore. 2 I will in effect be looking at the place of place or places in psychoanalysis—in particular, I will be looking at the place of jouissance in Lacan’s psychoanalysis and at the places of what Lacan punningly calls jouis-sens. The joint problematic here might be called one of “enjoymeant,” combining the logic of pleasure with the pleasure of logic. For Lacan, questions of jouissance, however punned, are questions of unity and selfhood, so in examining the reciprocal play of pleasure and sense I will be examining how Lacanian psychoanalysis secures itself in place. This last topic touches implicitly in Encore on questions of legacy and inheritance, so in the end I will also have something to say about the limits Lacan’s formalizations would impose on our enjoyment of Freud. I should note in advance that Encore, Lacan’s seminar of 1972-73, is an extraordinarily compact and involuted text, even by his standards, and of a corresponding richness, weaving sustained meditations on such figures as Georges Bataille, Roman Jakobson, Kierkegaard, and Aquinas with “mathemystical” digressions on sexuality, discourse, Borromean knots, and the like. The reading offered here is perforce schematic. 1. By and large the evidences of the Lacanian clinic are closed to us in consequence of Lacan’s insistence on theoretical elaboration. But it should not go unremarked that much of the work of Lacan’s school seems to have focused on areas traditionally recalcitrant to psychoanalytic treatment—alcoholism, retardation, and psychosis—and that such an emphasis is responsive to traditional empirically minded critiques of the limits of psychoanalysis.2. It should perhaps be noted in this context that the project of a genuinely public presentation of Lacan’s seminars seems to have been abandoned in favor of the more circumscribed circulation of texts through the Lacanian journal Ornicar? Stephen Melville is assistant professor of English at Syracuse University. He is the author of Philosophy Beside Itself: On Deconstruction and Modernism and is currently completing a series of essays on postmodern art and criticism. (shrink)

L'œuvre de Descartes, et notamment les Regulae, a été interprétée dans son rapport avec la philosophie ancienne ou médiévale. Un vaste domaine de recherche est aujourd'hui ouvert qui lie les Regulae à leur environnement immédiat. Plus de 20 000 ouvrages portant le titre dialectica voient le jour de 1520 à 1630 qui traitent de l'invention, de l'intuition, de la déduction, de la méthode, de l'ordre, de la série et de l'application de ces concepts dialectiques aux autres savoirs, notamment mathématiques. Ces (...) logiques d'inspiration variée se heurtent entre courants dont la typologie est repérable. Les Regulae se réfèrent à l'un d'entre eux par leur plan d'ensemble, par leurs disposition de détail, par leurs concepts et par leur philosophie. Cette appartenance ramiste est commandée par la Dialectique de La Ramée de 1555. Cet article analyse le concept de dialectique dressé contre l'Organon, son fondement dans l'intuition des natures simples, son développement en mathesis universalis au travers des cent années de travaux qui précèdent l'élaboration cartésienne des Regulae. Or ces dispositions ne cesseront pas d'avoir cours dans l'œuvre cartésienne. Descartes's work, and particularly Regulae, has already been interpreted in its relations with antic et medieval philosophy. It should be also interesting to study Regulae in the renaissant field of « dialectics » — more than 20 000 books with this little, between 1520 and 1630, about invention, deduction, method, order… and applications to other sciences, such as mathematics, under the influence of the Dialectique of La Ramée (1555). Against Organon, this conception of dialectic finds its basis in the intuition of single natures and its development in mathesis universalis, through 100 years before the cartesian elaboration of Regulae, which present the same structures. (shrink)

This is an in-depth study of J.G. Fichte’s philosophy of mathematics and theory of geometry. It investigates both the external formal and internal cognitive parallels between the axioms, intuitions and constructions of geometry and the scientific methodology of the Fichtean system of philosophy. In contrast to “ordinary” Euclidean geometry, in his Erlanger Logik of 1805 Fichte posits a model of an “ursprüngliche” or original geometry – that is to say, a synthetic and constructivistic conception grounded in ideal archetypal elements that (...) are grasped through geometrical or intelligible intuition. -/- Accordingly, this study classifies Fichte’s philosophy of mathematics as a whole as a species of mathematical Platonism or neo-Platonism, and concludes that the Wissenschaftslehre itself may be read as an attempt at a new philosophical mathesis, or “mathesis of the mind.” -/- “This work testifies to the author's exact and extensive knowledge of the Fichtean texts, as well as of the philosophical, scientific and historical contexts. Wood has opened up completely new paths for Fichte research, and examines with clarity and precision a domain that up to now has hardly been researched.” Professor Dr. Marco Ivaldo -/- “This study, written in a language distinguished by its limpidity and precision, and constantly supported by a close reading of the Fichtean texts and secondary literature, furnishes highly detailed and convincing demonstrations. In directly confronting the difficult historical relationship between the Wissenschaftslehre and mathematics, the author has broken new ground that is at once stimulating, decidedly innovative, and elegantly audacious.” Professor Dr. Emmanuel Cattin. (shrink)

Fondée sous les auspices du père de notre modernité philosophique Descartes, puis consolidée par des penseurs aussi importants que Leibniz, Bolzano ou Husserl, la mathesis universalis paraît représenter à elle seule l'ambitieux programme du « rationalisme classique ». Des philosophes tels que Husserl, Russell, Heidegger ou Cassirer ont pu s'accorder en ce point. Le développement de la « science moderne » aurait porté ce grand « rêve dogmatique » pour mener vers son terme le destin de la métaphysique occidentale. (...) Pourtant les recherches historiques récentes ont montré que l'idée de « mathématique universelle » existait bien avant Descartes, que ce dernier ne revendiquait d'ailleurs aucune rupture sur ce point et que sa réflexion se situait même assez clairement dans l'héritage des Anciens. Comment dès lors justifier que les Anciens, avec lesquels le programme des Classiques était censé rompre, aient pu déjà se préoccuper de « mathématique universelle »? Plus simplement encore, de quoi se préoccupaient donc ces philosophes sous ce concept? Le regain d'intérêt pour la mathesis universalis à la fin du XIXe siècle n'avait-il pas conduit paradoxalement à la perte de son sens comme problème? Cette étude a pour but de suivre ces questions jusqu'à leur origine et de montrer leur importance dans le dialogue entre mathématique et philosophie. Pages de début Remerciements Introduction La constitution de la « mathématique universelle » comme problème philosophique I. Aristote II. « Mathématique universelle » et théories mathématiques : Aristote, Euclide, Epinomis III. Le moment néo-platonicien Vers la science de l'ordre et de la mesure IV. La renaissance de la mathématique universelle V. La mathesis universalis cartésienne Conclusion Annexe I. La quaestio de scientia mathematica communi Annexe II. Essai bibliographique sur la mathesis universalis chez Descartes etLeibniz Bibliographie Index nominum Pages de fin. (shrink)

The paper’s central theme is the link between phenomenology and the notion of the mathesis universalis, a link articulated by Husserl in the third volume of the Ideas: “My way to phenomenology was essentially determined by the mathesis universalis.” The paper suggests three interpretations of the phenomenology—mathesis universalis nexus: the first is related to the development of Husserl’s conception of the foundations of arithmetic; the second is based on the role of the theory of manifolds in Husserl’s (...) Logical Investigations; and the third reflects the importance of the distinction between “generalization” and “formalization” for phenomenology. After examining these interpretations, the paper explores which is most helpful for understanding why Husserl distanced himself from Bolzano, arguing that the third interpretation provides the most edifying answer. (shrink)