Rapid changes in the ways of survival in human societies, passing quickly from pre-industrial to industrial societies or industrial societies to knowledge societies, characterized by innovation and constant change, require a kind of a non religious spirituality not tied to beliefs. No need to go to Eastern spiritual traditions, Buddhism, Yoga or Advaita Vedanta to show and experience the possibility of a non-religious spirituality; also within the Christian tradition, we find authors that allow non-religious spirituality. We can count on an (...) important notion of Nicholas of Cusa: The "No-Other" as the absolute dimension of all reality. The Cusano considers that this term is more appropriate to describe that absolute of all reality then the term God. It is also very convenient to live a spirituality that does not divide reality into two poles: the mundane and the divine, the relative and absolute in this world and the next. (shrink)

This book addresses the need to create an "axiological epistemology". This term refers to knowledge of what is axiological, id est everything related to human values, and the know-how on how to manage the study of values. In knowledge societies, we know and live axiological projects that we do not receive from anyone, but that we must construct ourselves in a situation of continuous change. In view of the fact that the axiological crisis in which we are immersed is the (...) most serious one that humanity has suffered over its long history, the seriousness and urgency of the issue in question is evident. Adequate knowledge is required to solve this problem, which is at the root of all the problems we are experiencing. This work offers a potential solution that, in contrast to the past, cannot be definitive, but must be transformed throughout the continuous changes to ways of life as a result of technoscience. It will prove of great value to all those who must operate within human values and motivate groups, as well as to those interested in spirituality. (shrink)

Background: In recent decades, the amount of research on social and emotional learning programs in schools has increased significantly, showing a great number of positive student outcomes, including greater ability to perceive, understand and manage emotions, better attitudes about self and others, less aggressive and/or disruptive behavior, higher levels of psychological well-being and improvement in academic performance among others. The purpose of this research was the design and implementation of the OKAPI emotional education program. A multidimensional program based on cooperative (...) learning methodology. Methods: 86 students of Primary Education, from 3rd to 5th grade (45 students in the experimental unit and 41 in the control group). Results: The implementation of the OKAPI has a positive impact in academic achievement. Conclusion: This program shows the convenience of incorporating programs that can be integrated into the school life and can be applied by the teaching staff using both social emotional learning and school climate approaches. (shrink)

En sociedades de innovación y cambio no podemos repetir el pasado, hay que prospectar el futuro posible para poderlo proyectar. Para ello hay que elaborar un saber lo más preciso posible del tratamiento de lo axiológico, en general, y de la cualidad humana, que nuestros antepasados llamaron espiritualidad. Partimos de nuestra condición de vivientes que hablan, con todas las consecuencias que eso tiene para nuestro acceso a la realidad. Contamos con la lingüística para conocer la formalidad de lo axiológico. En (...) las nuevas sociedades no hay ningún determinismo, pero sí hay condicionamientos creados por nuestras formas concretas de sobrevivir. No pretendemos hacer filosofía de la historia sino epistemología axiológica. No podemos rechazar el crecimiento acelerado de las tecnociencias, pero podemos adquirir la cualidad humana suficiente, individual y colectivamente, para conducir esas tecnociencias y sus consecuencias adecuadamente. Palabras clave: Epistemología Axiológica. Sociedades de Conocimiento. Cualidad Humana. Espiritualidad. Tecnociencias.Societies based on innovation and change cannot repeat the past, the future has to be prospected to be able to project it. This requires developing a knowledge -as accurate as possible- about the axiological processing in general, and about the human quality that our ancestors called spirituality. Our starting point is the human speaker condition, through which we have access to reality, and all the consequences that arise from this fact. Linguistics allows us to know about formality of the axiological. In the new societies there is no determinism, but there are constraints created by our concrete ways to survive. We do not intend to do philosophy of history but axiological epistemology. We cannot reject the extremely fast growth of technosciences, but we can acquire enough human quality, individually and collectively, so as to conduct properly these technosciences and their consequences. Keywords: Epistemology Axiological. Knowledge Society. Quality Human. Spirituality. Technosciences. (shrink)

Resumen En sociedades preindustriales con estado, la religión como sistema de creencias que era simultáneamente sistema de programación colectiva y modo de expresar y vivir la dimensión absoluta de la realidad, el estado necesitaba de la religión y la religión del estado. La industrialización, las sociedades de innovación y cambio, y la subsiguiente democratización, han roto ese pacto y dependencia mutua. En las nuevas sociedades industriales, las religiones no podrán ofrecer sistemas de creencias con la pretensión de que se conviertan (...) en proyecto de vida colectiva, porque, interpretadas desde una epistemología mítica que da por real lo que dicen los mitos, son voluntad divina a la que hay que someterse. Por el contrario, si no se quiere quebrar la tradición, las religiones deberán hacer una oferta de espiritualidad, de calidad humana profunda, a las sociedades globalizadas en continua transformación, cuando más lo necesitan. Las nuevas sociedades no precisan de creencias que fijen, sino de calidad, de espíritu de vida. Las religiones y los estados debieran reconocer esta nueva situación por el bien de los pueblos, de la convivencia entre ellos y por el bien del planeta. Sociedades de una tecnociencia poderosa en continuo crecimiento y sin calidad, pueden ser muy peligrosas. Palabras clave : Mito; creencia; estado; religión; sociedad de conocimiento.In pre-industrial societies with a formal State, in which the religion appeared as a belief system that was both a programming system and a collective way of expressing and living the absolute dimension of reality, the state needed religion and religion needed the state. Industrialization, society in innovation and change, and the subsequent democratization broke this pact and its mutual dependency. In the new industrial societies, religions could not offer those beliefs systems that claim to be converted to a collective life project, interpreted from an mythic epistemology that take as real what the myths say, like a divine will to which we must submit. On the contrary, if you do not want to break with tradition, religions must offer a spirituality of profound human quality to the globalized societies, in continuous transformation, when they need it most. Such new societies do not need to support them, but they do need of a real density of spirit and of spirituality that gives quality to life. Religions and States must recognize this new situation for the good of peoples and the relationship between them and the good of the planet. Societies with a powerful techno science continuously growing and without quality can be very dangerous. Key words: Myth; belief; State; Religion; Knowledge Society. Resumo Nas sociedades pré-industriais com um Estado formal, em que a religião aparecia como aquele sistema de crenças que era simultaneamente um sistema de programação coletiva e um modo de expressar e viver a dimensão absoluta da realidade, o Estado necessitava da religião e a religião do Estado. A industrialização, as sociedades de inovação e mudança e a subseqüente democratização romperam esse pacto e dependência mútua. Nas novas sociedades industriais, as religiões não poderão oferecer sistemas de crenças com a pretensão de que se convertam em projeto de vida coletiva, interpretadas a partir de uma epistemologia mítica que dá por real o que dizem os mitos, como vontade divina à qual se deve submeter. Pelo contrário, se não se quer romper com a tradição, as religiões deverão ofertar uma espiritualidade, de qualidade humana profunda às sociedades globalizadas, em contínua transformação, quando mais a necessitam. As novas sociedades não precisam de crenças em que se fixar, mas de densidade de espírito e de espiritualidade que confira qualidade à vida. As religiões e os Estados devem reconhecer esta nova situação pelo bem dos povos, da convivência entre eles e pelo bem do planeta. Sociedades com uma tecnociência poderosa em contínuo crescimento e sem qualidade podem ser muito perigosas. Palavras-chave: Mito; crença; Estado; Religião; Sociedade do Conhecimento. (shrink)

VIEIRA, José Álvaro Campos. Aurora de uma espiritualidade sem religião: análise dos sem religião a partir da concepção de espiritualidade não religiosa de Marià Corbi. 2014. Dissertação , Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.

Recensión: CORBI, Marià. Para uma espiritualidade leiga . São Paulo: Paulus, 2010. 294 p. [ Hacia una espiritualidad laica, sin creencias, sin religiones, sin dioses . Barcelona: Herder, 2007, 350 p.].

Apresento neste artigo as linhas gerais do pensamento do filósofo e epistemólogo catalão Marià Corbí, bem como sua teoria acerca da função da religião nas sociedades tradicionais e da perda desta função nos quadros da moderna sociedade científica e tecnológica. Para Corbí, a era industrial fez desaparecerem as condições de vida que tornavam necessárias as culturas pré-industriais e suas mitologias e religiões. Os sistemas de programação coletiva baseados nessas religiões e mitologias perderam sua função, e por isso estão todos em (...) colapso. Em seguida abordo sua proposta de uma espiritualidade leiga, voltada para o conhecimento silencioso e o caminho interior. A espiritualidade leiga, livre da submissão a sistemas de crença, deve preservar o rico legado espiritual presente nas várias tradições religiosas como contribuição para uma sociedade mais humana e livre. Por fim, faço algumas observações e comentários sobre questões que considero sensíveis no modelo teórico de Corbí, sobretudo sua afirmação sobre o fim da religião e a falta de substitutos para ela, sua compreensão da história e a possível universalização de sua proposta de espiritualidade. Palavras-chave: Religião; Espiritualidade; Cultura; Revolução científica; Corbí.This article presents the general lines of thought of the catalan philosopher and epistemologist Marià Corbí, as well as his theory about the role of religion in traditional societies and the loss of this function within the frameworks of modern scientific and technological society. For Corbí, the industrial era made disappear the living conditions which made necessary the pre-industrial cultures and their mythologies and religions. Social programming systems based on these mythologies and religions have lost their function, so they are all collapsing. Then I discuss his proposal for a lay spirituality, which seeks the quiet knowledge and the interior path to oneself. This lay spirituality, free from submission to belief systems, should preserve the rich spiritual heritage present in the various religious traditions as a contribution to a more human and free society. Finally, I make some observations and comments on sensitive issues in Corbí´s theoretical model, especially his statement about the end of religion and the lack of substitutes for it, his understanding of history and the possible universality of his spirituality proposal. Key words: Religion; Spirituality; Culture; Scientific revolution; Corbí. (shrink)

MARTINS, Antonione Rodrigues. Tempo axial : um estudo sobre a epistemologia axiológica segundo Marià Corbí e as transformações no campo religioso brasileiro entre 1940 a 2010. Dissertação (Mestrado) 2013. 114p - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

"Hay quien va por la vida viéndola, dejándose sorprender por la existencia". Esta obra es una aproximación laica a los fundamentos de la experiencia mística. Ayudándose de pensadores contemporáneos como Eugenio Trías, Marià Corbí o María Zambrano, la autora fundamenta el silencio de sí como peculiar vía de conocimiento y explora las formas en las que éste pueda favorecerse. Es una invitación a adentrarse en la lucidez asombrada como núcleo de una experiencia de vida plenamente humana. Mediante la relectura (y (...) el redescubrimiento) de los maestros del camino interior -exploradores del conocimiento silencioso-, se pondrá en evidencia la práctica de un peculiar esfuerzo de desegocentración como medio de sutilización de las capacidades humanas. La exploración de La nube del no-saber, del Bhagavad Gîta, o de las obras de Maestro Eckhart, Rûmî, Al-Yîlî, Lanfranchi, Juan de la Cruz, Teresa de Jesús, Nisargadatta Maharaj o Yoka Daishi entre otros, nos acerca a unas lecciones de vida que, nacidas de la experiencia mística, dejarán al descubierto la aportación propia e insustituible de ese rico legado. (shrink)

Resenha a partir de: VIEIRA, José Álvaro Campos. Aurora de uma espiritualidade sem religião: análise dos sem religião a partir da concepção de espiritualidade não religiosa de Marià Corbi. 2014. Dissertação , Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.

This article proposes to examine some theories of non-religious spirituality in light of the growing phenomenon of those individuals who declared themselves as having "no religion" by Brazilian religious census conducted in 2010 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The intention here is to identify how the poetic question presents itself as the fundamental element of these proposals about spirituality for authors, since beauty is part of the spiritual quest, as in: Viktor Frankl and existential religiosity grounded (...) in the search for meaning in life; Marià Corbí and his non-religious or secular spirituality; Robert Solomon and his spirituality for skeptics, and André Comte-Sponville and his atheistic spirituality, or spirituality without God. From there, we then present the perception of spirituality in the poetry of the thought of Jean Paul Sartre, primarily in his work “what is Literature?”. (shrink)

María Lugones, one of the premiere figures in feminist philosophy, has at last collected some of her most famous essays, as well as some lesser-known gems, into her first book.

We argue that philosophers are competent to facilitate public discussion concerning restrictions on human migration across political borders. We also argue that presenting public audiences with a prima facie case for open borders offers a unique opportunity to elucidate important aspects of philosophical reasoning. Finally, we share resources and a lesson plan for those keen to examine the case for open borders with students, or to facilitate public discussion on these issues.

Creativity has often been declared, especially by philosophers, as the last frontier of science. The assumption is that it will defy explanation forever. I will defend two claims in order to oppose this assumption and to demystify creativity: (1) the perspective that creativity cannot be explained wrongly identifies creativity with what I shall call metaphysical freedom; (2) the Darwinian approach to creativity, a prominent naturalistic account of creativity, fails to give an explanation of creativity, because it confuses conceptual issues with (...) explanation. I will close with some remarks on the status and differences in some explanations available in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

In this conceptual article, we argue that defining corporate social responsibility and corporate social irresponsibility as opposite constructs produces a lack of clarity between responsible and irresponsible acts. Furthermore, we contend that the treatment of the CSR and CSI concepts as opposites de-emphasizes the value of CSI as a stand-alone construct. Thus, we reorient the CSI discussion to include multiple aspects that current conceptualizations have not adequately accommodated. We provide an in-depth exploration of how researchers define CSI and both identify (...) and analyze three important gray zones between CSR and CSI: the role of harm and benefit, the role of the actor and intentionality, and the role of rectification. We offer these gray zones as factors contributing to the present lack of conceptual clarity of the term CSI, as a concept in its own right, leading to difficulties that researchers and managers experience in categorizing CSI acts as distinct from CSR. (shrink)

I argue that creativity is compatible with determinism and therefore with naturalistic explanation. I explore different kinds of novelty, corresponding with four distinct concepts of creativity – anthropological, historical, psychological and metaphysical. Psychological creativity incorporates originality and spontaneity. Taken together, these point to the independence of the creative mind from social learning, experience and previously acquired knowledge. This independence is nevertheless compatible with determinism. Creativity is opposed to specific causal factors, but it does not exclude causal determination as such. So (...) creativity can be naturalized. (shrink)

In _Kazimierz Twardowski: A Grammar for Philosophy_ Maria van der Schaar shows the importance of Twardowski’s method, his philosophical grammar, for both the Lvov-Warsaw School, and analytic philosophy today.

The book examines how Darwinism has been used to explain novelty and change in culture through the Darwinian approach to creativity and the theory of memes. The first claims that creativity is based on a Darwinian process of blind variation and selection, while the latter claims that culture is based on and explained by units - memes - that are similar to genes. Both theories try to describe and explain mind and culture by applying Darwinism by way of analogies. Kronfeldner (...) shows that the analogies involved in these theories lead to claims that give either wrong or at least no new descriptions or explanations of the phenomena at issue. Whereas the two approaches are usually defended or criticized on the basis that they are dangerous for our vision of ourselves, this book takes a different perspective: it questions the acuteness of these approaches. Darwinian theory is not like a dangerous wolf, hunting for our self image. Far from it, in the case of the two analogical applications addressed in this book, Darwinian theory is shown to behave more like a disoriented sheep in wolf's clothing. - A revised and much shortened version of a dissertation (2007, Darwinism, Memes and Creativity: A Critique of Analogical Reasoning from Nature to Culture). (shrink)

Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)

Human nature is a concept that transgresses the boundary between science and society and between fact and value. It is as much a political concept as it is a scientific one. This chapter will cover the politics of human nature by using evidence from history, anthropology and social psychology. The aim is to show that an important political function of the vernacular concept of human nature is social demarcation (inclusion/exclusion): it is involved in regulating who is ‘us’ and who is (...) ‘them.’ It is a folk concept that is used for dehumanization, for denying (a) membership in humankind or (b) full humanness to certain people in order to include or exclude them from various forms of politically relevant aspects of human life, such as rights, power, etc. (shrink)

Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from biology (...) in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether the often-bemoaned loss of unity of knowledge about humans, which results from the disciplinary fragmentation of science, is something to be overcome. The fragmentation of being human rests on a couple of distinctions, such as the nature-culture divide. Since antiquity the distinction between nature (roughly, what we inherit biologically) and culture (roughly, what is acquired by social interaction) has been a commonplace in science and society. Recently, the nature/culture divide has come under attack in various ways, (...) in philosophy as well as in cultural anthropology. Regarding the latter, for instance, the divide was quintessential in its beginnings as an academic dis-cipline, when Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the first professional anthropologists in the US, rallied for (what I call) the right to ignore—in his case, human nature—by adopting a separationist epistemic stance. A separationist stance will be understood as an epistemic research heuristic that defends the right to ignore a specif-ic phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation typical for a disciplinary field. I will use Kroeber’s case as an example for making a general point against a bias towards integration (synthesis bias, as I call it) that is exemplified, for instance, by defenders of evolutionary psychology. I will claim that, in principle, a separationist stance is as good as an integrationist stance since both can be equally fruitful. With this argument from fruitful sepa-ration in place, not just the separationist stance but also the nature/culture di-vide can be defended against its critics. (shrink)

This paper spells out the ways in which we need to be pluralists about “human nature”. It discusses a conceptual pluralism about the concept of “human nature”, stemming from post-essentialist ontology and the semantic complexity of the term “nature”; a descriptive pluralism about the “descriptive nature” of human beings, which is a pluralism regarding our self-understanding as human beings that stems from the long list of typical features of, and relations between, human beings; a natural kind term pluralism, which is (...) a pluralism that concerns the choices we have in deciding how to apply the kind term “human”; and an explanatory pluralism that results from the causal complexity of life. Because of the complexity of being human, which gives rise to these pluralisms, being human is, the paper claims, a kaleidoscopic affair, and one far from concerning the life sciences only. (shrink)

The article addresses the question whether culture evolves in a Lamarckian manner. I highlight three central aspects of a Lamarckian concept of evolution: the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the transformational pattern of evolution, and the concept of directed changes. A clear exposition of these aspects shows that a system can be a Darwinian variational system instead of a Lamarckian transformational one, even if it is based on inheritance of acquired characteristics and/or on Lamarckian directed changes. On this basis, I apply (...) the three aspects to culture. Taking for granted that culture is a variational system, based on selection processes, I discuss in detail the senses in which cultural inheritance can be said to be Lamarckian and in which sense problem solving, a major factor in cultural change, leads to directed variation. (shrink)

This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under attack (...) in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...) entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes. (shrink)

This research aims to identify the ethical issues perceived by intensive care nurses in their everyday practice. It also aims to understand why these situations were considered an ethical issue and what interventions/strategies have been or are expected to be developed so as to minimize them. Data were collected using a semi-structured interview with 15 nurses working at polyvalent intensive care units in 4 Portuguese hospitals, who were selected by the homogenization of multiple samples. The qualitative content analysis identified end-of-life (...) decisions, privacy, interaction, team work, and health-care access as emerging ethical issues. Personal, team, and institutional aspects emerge as reasons behind the experience of these issues. Personal and team resources are used in and for solving these issues. Moral development and training are the most significant strategies. (shrink)

A celebrated study of the origins of ancient Greek philosophy, now in English for the first time How can we talk about the beginnings of philosophy today? How can we avoid the conventional opposition of mythology and the dawn of reason and instead explore the multiple styles of thought that emerged between them? In this acclaimed book, available in English for the first time, Maria Michela Sassi reconstructs the intellectual world of the early Greek "Presocratics" to provide a richer understanding (...) of the roots of what used to be called "the Greek miracle." The beginnings of the long process leading to philosophy were characterized by intellectual diversity and geographic polycentrism. In the sixth and fifth centuries BC, between the Asian shores of Ionia and the Greek city-states of southern Italy, thinkers started to reflect on the cosmic order, elaborate doctrines on the soul, write in solemn Homeric meter, or, later, abandon poetry for an assertive prose. And yet the Presocratics whether the Milesian natural thinkers, the rhapsode Xenophanes, the mathematician and "shaman" Pythagoras, the naturalist and seer Empedocles, the oracular Heraclitus, or the inspired Parmenides all shared an approach to critical thinking that, by questioning traditional viewpoints, revolutionized knowledge. A unique study that explores the full range of early Greek thinkers in the context of their worlds, the book also features a new introduction to the English edition in which the author discusses the latest scholarship on the subject. (shrink)

The term ‘human nature’ can refer to different things in the world and fulfil different epistemic roles. Human nature can refer to a classificatory nature (classificatory criteria that determine the boundaries of, and membership in, a biological or social group called ‘human’), a descriptive nature (a bundle of properties describing the respective group’s life form), or an explanatory nature (a set of factors explaining that life form). This chapter will first introduce these three kinds of ‘human nature’, together with seven (...) reasons why we disagree about human nature. In the main, this chapter focuses on the explanatory concept of human nature, which is related to one of the seven reasons for disagreement, namely, the scientific authority inherent in the term ‘nature’. I will examine why, in a number of historical contexts, it was attractive to refer to ‘nature’ as an explanatory category, and why this usage has led to the continual contestation of the term within the sciences. The claim is that even if the contents of talk about ‘nature’ varied historically, the term’s pragmatic function of demarcation stayed the same. The term ‘nature’ conveys scientific authority over a territory; ‘human nature’ is a concept used to divide causes, as well as experts, and thereby conquer others who threaten to invade one’s epistemic territory. Analysing this demarcation, which has social as well as epistemic aspects, will help us to understand why the explanatory role has been important and why it is unlikely that people will ever agree on either the meaning or the importance of ‘human nature’ as an explanatory category. (shrink)

This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under attack (...) in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment (ideally specifying what medicine and health care is all about) are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates. (shrink)

This paper is on the problem of causal selection and comments on Collingwood's classic paper "The so-called idea of causation". It discusses the relevance of Collingwood’s control principle in contemporary life sciences and defends that it is not the ability to control, but the willingness to control that often biases us towards some rather than other causes of a phenomenon. Willingness to control is certainly only one principle that influences causal selection, but it is an important one. It shows how (...) norms make causes. (shrink)