Race and Culture

Using real-life examples, this book asks readers to reflect on how we—as an academic community—think and talk about race and racial identity in twenty-first century America. One of these examples, Rachel Doležal, provides a springboard for an examination of the state of our discourse around changeable racial identity and the potential for “transracialism.” An analysis of how we are theorizing transracial identity (as opposed to an argument for/against it), this study detects some omissions and problems that are becoming evident as (...) we establish transracial theory and suggests ways to further develop our thinking and avoid missteps. Intended for academics and thinkers familiar with conversations about identity and/or race, Rethinking Rachel Doležal and Transracial Theory helps shape the theorization of “transracialism” in its formative stages. -/- Part I: The Current State of (Trans)racial Discourse The first half begins with five puzzle cases, all based on specific historical figures. Each case poses the problem of someone not being readily “black” or “white” (or “mixed”). The chapter asks readers to think about their assumptions and how/why they might classify any of the puzzle cases racially. Then, with those assumptions and classification processes in mind, Part I outlines particular challenges we face—conceptually, linguistically, politically, and theoretically—as we try to adapt the messy practice of race in the U.S. to a new effort to theorize potential transracial identity. The concerns this half addresses include: how Doležal’s case might be understood alongside the identities of other racial nonconformists; what we think “black identity” consists of and how our language and concepts for race need to be clarified; whether ancestry and phenotype should continue to dominate our discourse; the relevance of political orientation and action to racial identity; and the implications of motive and intention for racial identity. Ultimately, Part I argues that we need to improve the way we are thinking and talking about transraciality in the Doležal era. -/- Part II: Pathways for Further Developing (Trans)racial Discourse Where Part I uses the case of Rachel Doležal and other real-life examples to critique the strains of our existing scholarly discourse on the topic of transraciality, Part II offers broader discussion about some of the ideas that are at play and/or need to be more adequately addressed going forward. Part II outlines some of the problems that I anticipate will trip up the discourse going forward and argues that there are particular ways we (as academics) might navigate them responsibly. My intention here is to identify and explore some of the areas we could strengthen or pay more attention to in an effort to help steer our critical exploration of transraciality in productive directions as the conversation progresses in the future. The concerns raised in Part II include: the linguistic and conceptual problems of “passing”; the very real dangers of conservatism dominating our theorization of transracial identity; the complexities of identity in terms of individual and collective identity and how the process of self-identification affects them; the sensitive and controversial issue of transgender theory (as it relates to transracial theory); and the neglected area of ideal/non-ideal philosophy. Ultimately, Part II argues that we need to avoid significant and harmful mistakes as we decide how to go about theorizing transracial identity and articulates responsible ways we can move forward. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to challenge the continued exclusion of Indian philosophies from the Western philosophical canon on the supposed basis that such philosophies are really religion, mysticism, and mythology. I argue that many schools of Indian philosophy, such as Advaita Vedānta, resist and problematize historically particular Euro-Western conceptions of both philosophy and religion, and the conceptual borders between them, where philosophy is understood as grounded in various substantive notions of reason and rationality, defined as a purely theoretical (...) enterprise. In addition, I question the predominant tendency to see philosophy as opposed to “religion”, which is often presumed to rest on faith in a Judeo-Christian conception of God: The singular and wholly other, creator of all souls, ex nihilo, the ultimate judge of humankind, where salvation is granted in proportion to the intrinsic value of faith. I suggest that Advaita challenges these prevailing conceptions. A part of my larger purpose is to dislodge the view that the Euro-Western philosophical enterprise constitutes the universal, neutral, and objective standard from which all other approaches to philosophy are to be judged as legitimate. My hope is to lay some of the groundwork required to re-think dominant historical and conceptual categories from a broader global perspective, with the aim of developing a deeper and more plural understanding of the diverse nature of both philosophical and religious inquiry. (shrink)

This article stems from my presentation at the 2020 Symposium of the Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society, whose theme was "Religion and the New Politics." The article is written for an interdisciplinary audience. Drawing on resources from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology and putting them into dialogue with an important theme in Christian theology, I argue that there is a distinctly non-discursive, embodied form of racism that should be recognized and addressed by the new politics. Because (...) this form of racism occurs not at the familiar level of discourse (word), but in the often unconscious habitualities of the lived body (flesh), it resists common antiracist strategies, and seems to be outside the purview of responsibility and of willful, rational change (the logos). I situate these underlying issues with regard to the traditional opposition between mind and body, and then offer a reinterpretation of them by way of some key phenomenological concepts: intentionality, the lived body, the critique of scientism, motivation, and empathy. I conclude that embodied racism is something which is open to an extended conception of rationality that includes the lived body, and for which we are responsible. I then suggest some antiracist political strategies that put these theoretical considerations to use through attention to embodied spaces and practices. (shrink)

With a focus on Asian traditions, this book examines varieties of thought and self-transformative practice that do not fit neatly on one side or another of the standard Western division between philosophy and religion. -/- It contains chapters by experts on Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist, Hindu and Jain philosophies, as well as ancient Greek philosophy and recent contemplative and spiritual movements. The volume also problematizes the notion of a Western philosophical canon distinguished by rationality in contrast to a religious Eastern "other". (...) These original essays creatively lay the groundwork needed to rethink dominant historical and conceptual categories from a wider perspective to arrive at a deeper, more plural and global understanding of the diverse nature of both philosophy and religion. -/- The volume will be of keen interest to scholars and students in the Philosophy of Religion, Asian and Comparative Philosophy and Religious Studies. (shrink)

This paper seeks to clear up the confusion surrounding debates over cultural appropriation. To do so, I argue for an agent-centred approach—a focus on appropriators more than appropriation. In my view, cultural misappropriation involves agents who exhibit disregard toward a relevant culture and its members. I argue further that this approach improves upon recent alternative philosophical approaches to cultural appropriation, which I divide into two camps: toleration-based and power-based.

Studies on racial and religious discriminations in Malaysia tend to be avoided. This is due to their sensitive nature, possibly becoming political ammunition, and individuals being accused of seditious intent. Much that is necessary to discuss discrimination in Malaysia remains unclear. It is not known to what extent contact between groups is undesirable especially as neighbors in Malaysia. This study examined ethnic differences and predictors of racial and religious discriminations among 1200 Malaysians (319 Chinese and 881 Malays). Discrimination was conceptualized (...) through having the attitude of not wanting people of a different race or a different religion as neighbors. Ethnic differences in discriminating against others were found to be significant. Malays showed higher means of not wanting neighbors of a different race or religion compared to Chinese. Demographic factors and beliefs reflecting conservatism were not good predictors, explaining only slight variances. However, a person who discriminates based on religion was consistently a predictor of exhibiting racial discrimination, and vice-versa, with approximately double the odds among Malays. The finding highlights a strong interplay between race and religion, suggesting that Chinese and Malays conflate the two together. (shrink)

Race theorists have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the basic historical question, “is ‘race’ modern?” I argue that this is partly because the question itself is ambiguous. There is not really one question that race scholars are answering, but at least six. First, is the concept of race modern? Second, is there a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts? Third, are “races” themselves modern? Fourth, are racialized groups modern? Fifth, are the means and (...) methods associated with racialization modern? And sixth, are the meanings attached to racialized traits modern? Because these questions have different answers, the debate about the historical origins of “race” cannot be resolved unless they are distinguished. I will explain the ways in which “race” is and is not modern by answering these questions, thereby offering a resolution to a seemingly intractable problem. (shrink)

This chapter briefly reviews the role of race (as a concept) in the history of theorizing the posthuman, engages with existing discussions of race as technology, and explores the significance of understanding race as technology for the field of posthumanism. Our aim is to engage existing literature that posits racialized individuals as posthumans and to consider how studying race might inform theories of the posthuman.

__Schooling for Critical Consciousness_ addresses how schools can help Black and Latinx youth resist the negative effects of racial injustice and challenge its root causes._ Scott Seider and Daren Graves draw on a four-year longitudinal study examining how five different mission-driven urban high schools foster critical consciousness among their students. The book presents vivid portraits of the schools as they implement various programs and practices, and traces the impact of these approaches on the students themselves. The authors make a unique (...) contribution to the existing scholarship on critical consciousness and culturally responsive teaching by comparing the roles of different schooling models in fostering various dimensions of critical consciousness and identifying specific programming and practices that contributed to this work. Through their research with more than 300 hundred students of color, Seider and Graves aim to help educators strengthen their capacity to support young people in learning to analyze, navigate, and challenge racial injustice. _Schooling for Critical Consciousness_ provides school leaders and educators with specific programming and practices they can incorporate into their own school contexts to support the critical consciousness development of the youth they serve. (shrink)

Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall (...) argue that Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

While the intersection between race and religion has been an important site for research for the sociology of religion and religious studies (in its descriptive dimensions) as well s theology (in its religiously normative dimensions), neither of these disciplines has incorporated recent work in the analytic philosophy of race. Analytic philosophy of race, for its part, has largely neglected the race/religion intersection, while analytic theologians by and large ignore the theological significance of race altogether. In this paper I am to (...) draw together these distinct disciplinary contributions—social-historical, philosophical and normative-theological—into a single integrated framework for a research program in analytic theology. I call that framework “religious racial formation theory,” and I claim that the work of specifying a determinate religious racial formation theory is not merely a (normatively driven) sociological and historical task but a necessarily philosophical one. I then detail what sorts of metaphysical determinations are required in order to yield an adequate explanation of the intersection uncovered by the socio-historical data summarized in the first section. (shrink)

The traditional blackface character Black Pete has been at the center of an intense controversy in the Netherlands, with most black citizens denouncing the tradition as racist and most white citizens endorsing it as harmless fun. I analyze the controversy as an utter failure, on the part of white citizens, of what Alison Jaggar has called multicultural literacy. This article aims to identify both the causes of this failure of multicultural literacy and the conditions required for multicultural literacy to be (...) possible. I argue that this failure of multicultural literacy is due to hermeneutical injustice and to white ignorance. I close by considering possible avenues for fostering multicultural literacy. (shrink)

I defend an empirically-oriented approach to the analysis and remediation of social injustice. My springboard for this argument is a debate—principally represented here between Tommie Shelby and Elizabeth Anderson, but with much deeper historical roots and many flowering branches—about whether racial-justice advocacy should prioritize integration (bringing different groups together) or community development (building wealth and political power within the black community). Although I incline toward something closer to Shelby’s “egalitarian pluralist” approach over Anderson’s single-minded emphasis on integration, many of Shelby’s (...) criticisms of integrationism are misguided, and his handling of the empirical literature is profoundly unbalanced. In fact, while both Shelby and Anderson defend the importance of social science to their projects, I’ll argue that each takes a decidedly unempirical approach, which ultimately obscures the full extent of our ignorance about what we can and ought to do going forward. A more authentically empirical tack would be more epistemically humble, more holistic, and less organized around what I’ll call prematurely formulated “Grand Unified Theories of Social Change.” I defend a more “diversified experimentalist” approach, which rigorously tests an array of smaller-scale interventions before trying to replicate and scale up the most promising results. (shrink)

This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of the navigation of academia as experienced by two Black scholars, situated in dissimilar disciplinary and cultural traditions and origins. What is shared is an interest in the academic space that exists within which Black scholars may freely roam, and the structure and function of the boundaries that are present. The policing of Black thought and Black emotion within those boundaries, the violence with which the boundaries are enforced, and the strategies and rationales employed (...) by Black academics in expanding, resisting, subverting, and acquiescing to said boundaries is explored by way of the authors’ testimonies. Drawing on our lived experience of academia, we suggest that the academy functions as a frontier of racist violence, where the thinking that grounds state-based racist violence is taught, legitimated and fostered. Through a dialogue which brings to the fore the tensions and contradictions of the outlooks and strategies employed by Black academics, we testify to the emancipatory potential of Black pain, Black rage and Black thought. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds in two ways. First, I argue that Fanon’s structural witnessing of racism yields important insights about the nature of violence that challenges the settler colonial concept of violence as the extra-legal use of force. Second, I argue that his analysis of violence is insufficient for combating colonial racism and violence because, using the terms of his own analysis, it leaves intact logics and mechanisms that allow racism to structurally renew itself in perpetuity: violence against women. Without a (...) critical feminism that tracks the alterities of structural violence against women, and women of color in particular, Fanonianism is just another lifeline of colonialism. I thus caution against uncritical uses of Fanon’s structural account of violence for any emancipatory social theory that fails to acknowledge the attendant alterities, asymmetries, and axes of coordinated subordination involved in racialized violence against women. (shrink)

This paper problematizes the concept of individual autonomy in the on-going project of attempting to understand and construct global principles of bioethics. We argue that autonomy as it is commonly defined and interpreted, and the emphasis that is placed on it, presupposes an individualistic concept of the self, family, and community that arises out of a Euro-Western liberal tradition and that is often in tension with various non-Western perspectives. We conclude that a more globally dialogical approach to bioethics is required.

The question of how to arrive at a consensus on human rights norm in a diverse, pluralistic, and interconnected global environment is critical. This volume is a contribution to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West. The legitimacy of the global legal, economic, and political order is increasingly premised on the discourse of international human rights. Yet the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights developed with little or no consultation from (...) non-Western nations such as India. In response, there has developed an extensive literature and cross-cultural analysis of human rights in the areas of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, yet there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to India. As problematically, there is an lacuna in the previous literature; it simply stops short at analyzing how Western understandings of human rights may be supported from within various non-Western cultural self-understandings; yet, surely, there is more to this issue. The chapters in this collection pioneer a distinct approach that takes such deliberation to a further level by examining what it is that the West itself may have to learn from various Indian articulations of human rights as well. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that John Rawls’ later work presents one of the most fruitful liberal frameworks from which to approach global cultural diversity. In his Law of Peoples (1999), the normative architecture Rawls provides is much more open to an intercultural/religious dialogue with various non-Western communities, such as the First Nations, than are other liberal approaches. Surprisingly, this has gone unnoticed in the literature on multiculturalism. At the same time, Rawls’ framework is not problem free. Here, I am (...) concerned with Rawls’ conception of overlapping consensus as political, rather than comprehensive; or the idea that dialogue and discussion concerning issues of justice must necessarily, as a matter of principle, exclude philosophical or religious reasons. I argue that this constraint will only add to the unfair exclusion of legitimate concerns. I demonstrate this in Rawls' discussion of so-called non-public spiritual perspectives of land, non-human animals, and the environment – views strikingly similar to those held by many Indigenous and Native Americans. Rawls’ framework unjustifiably and unjustly excludes such views from participation in the public and political realm. In the context of a globally diverse world, and in light of a history of Western colonialism, oppression, and domination of Indigenous peoples, I would argue that justice and fairness require that such others at least be able to articulate their concerns in the public and political domain, according to their own self-understandings and as they see fit, even if we do not agree with these. I argue that Rawls’ proviso is insufficient as a response. (shrink)

I argue that what’s so bad (qua film fiction) about the cinematic practice of actor-character race-mismatching—be it the historically infamous and intuitively repugnant practice of blackface or one of its more contemporary kin—is that the extent to which film-fictions employ such practices is typically the extent to which such film-fictions unrealistically depict facts about race. More precisely, I claim that race-mismatching film fictions—understood as a species of unrealistic fiction—are prima facie inconsistent fictions with the capacity to mislead their audiences about (...) certain morally relevant actual-world states-of-affairs and thus, prima facie aesthetically, epistemically, and morally defective. (shrink)

Despite the recent rise in articles by American philosophers willing to deal with race, the sophistication of American philosophy's conceptualizations of American racism continues to lag behind other liberal arts fields committed to similar endeavors. Whereas other fields like American studies, history, sociology, and Black studies have found the foundational works of Black scholars essential to "truly" understanding the complexities of racism, American philosophy-driven by the refusal of white philosophers to acknowledge and incorporate the foundational works of Black scholars at (...) the turn of the century, as well as the relevant insights of contemporary race theorists-remains in a very real sense underdeveloped .. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that with regard to Indigeneity, there is a profound irony at work in the purportedly emancipatory power of human rights discourse. On the one hand, it is clear that this discourse has made, and continues to make, a significant contribution in supporting Indigenous peoples to articulate their claims for cultural recognition and struggle for freedom and self-rule. On the other hand, I contend that this discourse has a detrimental effect: a Trojan horse of sorts. The (...) discourse of rights brings along with it powerful theoretical commitments, assumptions, and institutions that are at odds with and that undermine what most Native communities in Canada take to be an essential component of their cultural identities and self-understandings. I contend that at the heart of this issue are profound philosophical tensions about notions such as the self, community, and agency. That is, the core tensions rest on ideas that most Canadians take to be basic or unquestionable. I show that such assumptions are not only not basic or unquestionable, but, in fact, grounded in Western liberal ideals. I argue that dialogue in this context requires understanding that human rights, or any form of a global ethic, needs to be recast within Indigenous self-understandings and beliefs if such a dialogue is to be authentically intercultural and fruitful. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the publication of cartoons caricaturing Islam by Jyllands- Posten is problematic for a number of reasons. First, within liberal political theory itself, there are reasonable arguments that the depictions (at least two) perpetuate prejudice and verge on hate speech. Second, such depictions weaken the social conditions that make possible a thriving democracy (i.e., participation) by marginalizing the already marginalized. Moreover, the caricatures perpetuate an Orientalist discourse about the nature of Islam and the non-West, and (...) hinder global intercultural dialogue and understanding between nations. (shrink)

Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from biology (...) in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. (shrink)

The most remarkable aspect of Einstein’s 1946 address at Lincoln University is that it has vanished from Einstein’s recorded history. Its disappearance into a historical black hole symbolizes what seems to happen in the creation of a cultural icon. It is but one of many political statements by Einstein to have met such a fate, though his civil rights activism is most glaringly missing. One explanation for this historical amnesia is that those who shape our official memories felt that Einstein’s (...) “controversial” friends like Paul Robeson and activities like co‐chairing the anti‐lynching crusade might tarnish Einstein as an icon. That icon, sanctified by Time magazine when it dubbed Einstein “Person of the Century” at the end of 1999, is a myth, albeit a marvelous one. Yet it is not so much the motive for the omission but the consequence of it that should concern us. Americans and the millions of Einstein fans around the world are left unaware that he was an outspoken, passionate, committed antiracist. (shrink)

Collective memory can be used conceptually to examine African-American perceptions of wildlands and black interaction with such places. The middle-American view of wildlands frames these terrains as refuges—pure and simple, sanctified places distinct from the profanity of human modification. However, wild, primitive areas do not exist in the minds of all Americans as uncomplicated or uncontaminated places. Three labor-related institutions—forest labor, plantation agriculture, and sharecropping—and terrorism and lynching have impacted negatively on black perceptions of wildlands, producing an ambivalence toward such (...) places among African Americans. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural justice, in effect, serves to *unwittingly* perpetuate a neo-colonial agenda. Indigenous claims for recognition and sovereignty are accommodated to the degree and extent to which such communities may “liberalize” and promote distinctly Euro-Western self-understandings and conceptions of individual autonomy (tied to, e.g., substantive notions of self, private property, secularism). Individual autonomy -- defined and understood in a specific manner -- is supposedly the foundational value and the defining feature of (...) liberalism. In fact, Kymlicka attacks Rawls’ theory of political liberalism, whose tolerance-based conception would provide, I argue, a far more open theoretical normative architecture within which to dialogue with non-Western nations -- where views of self, autonomy, property, land, non-human animals, and secularism may differ radically from those of liberal Western nations. Indeed, the very reason that most Indigenous peoples seek recognition from the liberal state is so that they can live according to their traditional and spiritual self-understandings of self and land, and non-secular forms of governance, grounded in shared substantive notions of a common good. I do not see reasons to lament this. Perhaps it is Western liberal nations that should be required to “Aboriginalize”. The intrinsic value of land on most such views may have saved us from the environmental crisis in which we find ourselves -- in which land is simply a fungible commodity -- of instrumental value, its worth measured in terms of its benefit for rational self-interested agents. (shrink)

The cultural plurality and experiential diversity which characterizes much of the Caribbean has created a wealth of contexts and perspectives in Caribbean literature and discourse. The near total decimation of pre-Columbian cultures, centuries of slavery and indentured servitude, and the often uninterrupted presence of the West throughout the region, however, has greatly complicated the identification of a Pan-Caribbean view of experience and expression. This study explores three important contemporary responses to the complexities of constructing a Pan-Caribbean theory of culture and (...) discourse: the Cuban cultural anthropologist Fernando Ortiz's theory of transculturacion; his compatriot, the writer and critic Antonio Benitez Rojo's concept of positive cultural dissipation; and, the Martinican writer and critic Edouard Glissant's poetique de la Relation. As a comparative analysis will show, while the theories of Ortiz and Benitez Rojo are divided by fifty years, and those of Benitez Rojo and Glissant are separated by distinct political and cultural contexts, key similarities can be found among these approaches that suggest a kind of theoretical continuum of Pan-Caribbean cultural identity. Moreover, each of these theories addresses central themes and issues, unique unto the Caribbean, which suggests that a reading of the Caribbean's manifold expressions of culture may benefit from comparison with concepts found in the philosophy of quantum physics and chaos theory. Theoretical paradigms drawn from the concept of complementarity, created by the theoretical physicist Niels Bohr, for instance, help to explain how each of these writer's understanding of the dialogue between Western and autochthonous sources of culture contributes to their alternative reading of Caribbean discourse. Meanwhile, the theory of dissipative structures, found in the physicist Ilya Prigogine's work on non-linear thermodynamics, will clarify how these alternative readings of Caribbean culture can simultaneously maintain cultural diversity and cultural unification. Comparative analyses based on contemporary scientific theories, then, can contribute to a more-encompassing, yet non-essentialized, understanding of Pan-Caribbean cultural identity that extends beyond cultural, historical, political or geographical boundaries. (shrink)

Native women residing in the Subarctic and Arctic are currently struggling for the right to decide whether they will be hospitalized or have a midwife present for the birth of their children. The argument presented in this review paper outlines the cultural and clinical factors in favour of recognizing and legalizing traditional midwifery in the North and critically examines the statistical and safety concerns raised by those arguing against giving Northern Native women an alternative to evacuation from their home communities.

Ice Cube "What's a brother gotta do to get a message through to the Red, White, and Blue?" Ice-T Rap music has emerged as one of the most distinctive and controversial music genres of the past decade. A significant part of hip hop culture, [1] rap articulates the experiences and conditions of African-Americans living in a spectrum of marginalized situations ranging from racial stereotyping and stigmatizing to struggle for survival in violent ghetto conditions. In this cultural context, rap provides a (...) voice to the voiceless, a form of protest to the oppressed, and a mode of alternative cultural style and identity to the marginalized. Rap is thus not only music to dance and party to, but a potent form of cultural identity. It has become a powerful vehicle for cultural political expression, serving as the "CNN of black people", or upping the high-tech ante, as their "satellite communication system". It is an informational medium to tune into, one that describes the rage of African-Americans facing growing oppression, declining opportunities for advancement, changing moods on the streets, and everyday life as a matter of sheer survival. In turn, it has become a cultural virus, circulating its images, sounds, and attitude throughout the culture and body politic. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the use of the concept of privilege within the critical theoretical discourse on oppression and liberation. In order to fulfill the rhetorical aims of liberation, concepts for privilege must meet what I term the ‘boundary condition’, which demarcates the boundary between a privileged elite and the rest of society, and the ‘ignorance condition’, which establishes that the elite status and the advantages it confers are not publicly recognised or affirmed. I argue that the dominant use (...) of the concept of privilege cannot fulfill these conditions. As a result, while I do not advocate for the complete abandonment of the rhetoric of privilege, I conclude that it obscures as much as it illuminates, and that the critical theoretical discourse on liberation and oppression should be suspicious of its use. (shrink)