Release of the ATP hydrolysis product ortophosphate (Pi) from the active site of myosin is central in chemo‐mechanical energy transduction and closely associated with the main force‐generating structural change, the power‐stroke. Despite intense investigations, the relative timing between Pi‐release and the power‐stroke remains poorly understood. This hampers in depth understanding of force production by myosin in health and disease and our understanding of myosin‐active drugs. Since the 1990s and up to today, models that incorporate the Pi‐release either distinctly before or (...) after the power‐stroke, in unbranched kinetic schemes, have dominated the literature. However, in recent years, alternative models have emerged to explain apparently contradictory findings. Here, we first compare and critically analyze three influential alternative models proposed previously. These are either characterized by a branched kinetic scheme or by partial uncoupling of Pi‐release and the power‐stroke. Finally, we suggest critical tests of the models aiming for a unified picture. (shrink)

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...) using the intentional binding effect as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility. (shrink)

An important debate in the current literature is whether “all truth-conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be traced to [a variable at; LM] logical form” (Stanley, ‘Context and Logical Form’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 23 (2000) 391). That is, according to Stanley, the only truth-conditional effects that extra-linguistic context has are localizable in (potentially silent) variable-denoting pronouns or pronoun-like items, which are represented in the syntax/at logical form (pure indexicals like I or today are put aside in this discussion). According to (...) Recanati (‘Unarticulated Constituents’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 25 (2002) 299), extra-linguistic context can have additional truth-conditional effects, in the form of optional pragmatic processes like ‘free enrichment’. This paper shows that Recanati’s position is not warranted, since there is an alternative line of analysis that obviates the need to assume free enrichment. In the alternative analysis, we need Stanley’s variables, but we need to give them the freedom to be or not to be generated in the syntax/present at logical form, a kind of optionality that has nothing to do with the pragmatics-related optionality of free enrichment. (shrink)

This paper investigates young children's knowledge of scalar implicatures and downward entailment. In previous experimental work, we have shown that young children access the full range of truth-conditions associated with logical words in classical logic, including the disjunction operator, as well as the indefinite article. The present study extends this research in three ways, taking disjunction as a case study. Experiment 1 draws upon the observation that scalar implicatures (SIs) are cancelled (or reversed) in downward entailing (DE) linguistic environments, e.g., (...) in the scope of negation (Chierchia, 2000). Experiment 2 was designed to determine if scalar implicatures are used by children, like adults, to influence the interpretation of disjunction in non-DE contexts, yielding an implicature of exclusivity for disjunction. Whereas adult controls always rejected assertions of the form A or B in positive (non-DE) contexts in which assertions of the form A and B were also true, many children accepted assertions with disjunction in such contexts. To provide an interpretation to the findings from Experiment 2, a new experimental technique was devised and used in Experiment 3. The new technique presents pairs of assertions to children, who are asked to judge which assertion is a ‘better’ description of the context. The findings from Experiment 3 demonstrated children's awareness that A and B is more informative than A or B in positive contexts, where both statements are true. Taken together, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 are compatible with the view that some children lack the computational resources to apply scalar implicatures when a single assertion is presented alone (see Reinhart, 1999). (shrink)

Although trust and reciprocity are ubiquitous in social exchange, their neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Here, we investigated the effect of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)—a brain region critical for valuing social information—on individuals’ decisions in a trust game and in a risk game. In the trust game, one player, the investor, is endowed with a sum of money, which she can keep or invest. The amount she decides to invest is tripled and sent to the other player, (...) the trustee, who then decides what fraction to return to the investor. In separate runs, ten patients with focal bilateral damage to the vmPFC and control participants made decision while playing in the role of either investor or trustee with different anonymous counterparts in each run. A risk game was also included in which the investor faced exactly the same decisions as in the trust game, but a random device (i.e., a computer), not another player, determined the final payoffs. Results showed that vmPFC patients’ investments were not modulated by the type of opponent player (e.g., human vs. computer) present in the environment. Thus, vmPFC patients showed comparable risk-taking preferences both in social (trust game) and nonsocial (risk game) contexts. In stark contrast, control participants were less willing to take risk and invest when they believed that they were interacting with people than a computer. Furthermore, when acted as trustee, vmPFC patients made lower back transfers toward investors, thereby showing less reciprocity behavior. Taken together, these results indicate that social valuation and emotion subserved by vmPFC have a critical role in trusting and reciprocity decisions. The present findings support the hypothesis that vmPFC damage may impair affective systems specifically designed for mediating social transaction with other individuals. (shrink)

En su infancia Mohamed Chukri se ve arrastrado por la miseria, la violencia intrafamiliar, consume prostitución y se prostituye, fuma kif, trasnocha en los bares, roba y trabaja con contrabandistas. Todo ello lo narra en la novela El pan a secas (1973). En este artículo se analiza la novela en clave de esperanza/desesperanza. La novela se divide en dos: episodios de infancia (negativos, desesperanza) y de adolescencia (positivos, esperanza recuperada). Resiliencia, libertad y esperanza están íntimamente ligadas.

Depressive mood can be involved in the moral judgments made by people with depression. Here, we focus on the negative judgments depressed patients have of themselves and the world. Possibly, the alterations in moral judgment in subjects with depression can be understood by taking into account the neural basis of depression.

The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of communicative intention on action. In Experiment 1 participants were requested to reach towards an object, grasp it, and either simply lift it or lift it with the intent to communicate a meaning to a partner . Movement kinematics were recorded using a three-dimensional motion analysis system. The results indicate that kinematics was sensitive to communicative intention. Although the to-be-grasped object remained the same, movements performed for the ‘communicative’ condition (...) were characterized by a kinematic pattern which differed from those obtained for the ‘individual’ condition. These findings were confirmed in a subsequent experiment in which the communicative condition was compared to a control condition, in which the communicative exchange was prevented. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive pragmatics and current knowledge on how social behavior shapes action kinematics. (shrink)

Les dictionnaires et documents, tirés de la littérature ou des archives, qui sont examinés dans cet ouvrage disent plus de mal que de bien de la séduction. La séduction c'est « l'élan qui porte l'un vers l'autre », mais cet élan est dévié par la tromperie. La séduction peut être située dans la polémique de longue durée contre le maquillage et la vanité des femmes. Leon Battista Alberti compare la femme, qui a la déplorable habitude de se maquiller, à l'artiste (...) qui aurait l'habitude, to... (shrink)

In this article we tackle the core question of machine emotion research – “Can machines have emotions?” – in the context of “social robots”, a new class of machines designed to function as “social partners” for humans. Our aim, however, is not to provide an answer to the question “Can robots have emotions?” Rather we argue that the “robotics of emotion” moves us to reformulate it into a different one – “Can robots affectively coordinate with humans?” Developing a series of (...) arguments relevant to theory of emotion, philosophy of AI, and the epistemology of synthetic models, we argue that the answer to this different question is positive, and that it lays grounds for an innovative ethical approach to emotional robots. This ethical project, which we introduced elsewhere as “synthetic ethics”, rejects the diffused ethical condemnation of emotional robots as “cheating” technology. Synthetic ethics focuses not on an ideological refusal, but on the concrete sustainability of the emerging mixed human-robot social ecologies. On this basis, in contrast to a purely negative ethical approach to social robotics it promotes an analytical case by case ethical inquiry into the type of human flourishing that can result from human-robot affective coordination. (shrink)

A análise feita por Hans Jonas acerca do problema da técnica moderna, se situou em uma relação de identidade e diferenciação para com a tradição em que se encontrava inserido. Husserl foi o primeiro a indicar a necessidade de se reavaliar os limites da técnica moderna, para ele o problema dessa técnica, por ser uma decorrência da matematização da natureza, seria a perda de uma capacidade de se produzir um conhecimento que não seja intermediado pela própria tecnicidade da matematização. O (...) trabalho de Ortega y Gasset na análise da técnica moderna, contribuiu para o estabelecimento de conceitos importantes, mas não suscitou uma reflexão crítica pertinente à contemporaneidade e nem apresentou grandes ressalvas quanto à utilização da técnica, pelo contrário, o filósofo espanhol foi um entusiasta dos resultados do tecnicismo. Martin Heidegger, é o filósofo anterior a Hans Jonas que com mais ênfase delineia não apenas uma análise da questão da técnica moderna, como também desenvolve uma crítica aos efeitos e as consequências que essa técnica pode produzir para a contemporaneidade. A partir dessas análises, é possível perceber que o pensamento de Hans Jonas é singular, sobretudo, porque vincula sua crítica e suas considerações à técnica moderna à análise do fenômeno da vida, preocupando-se em relacionar as ameaças e os problemas dessa técnica com a concretude e a singularidade da vida. (shrink)

Par Undo do princípio de que a crítica feita em Wahrheit und Methode à Aufklärung tern sobretudo a ver com a hostilidade do iluminismo nos seus confrontos com o preconceito religioso enquanto fundado na revelação cristã, o presente artigo pretende demonstrar de que modo Gadamer, por exemplo já num ensaio de 1941 acerca da critica kantiana da religião, alcançou a partir da sua familiaridade de longa data com os Gregos e os seus deuses uma concepção do religioso que, ao fundar--se (...) sobre a experiência "humanística" do Divino, aspira a manter uma solidariedade intima com a "Religion nach der Aufklärung" ("Religiao segundo a Auflärung"), cujo Deus, apcsar de ser o Deus dos filósofos, nem por isso é menos versado em revelaqçõs e em formas extra-potentes de realidade ". O artigo mostra ainda como no contexto de uma concepção como esta o Divino acabapor assumir sobretudo a figura da "amizade" e da "transcendencia do belo." /// It can be said that Gadamer's critique of the Aufklärung in Wahrheit und Methode has to do with the hostility of the Enlightenment towards religious prejudice derived from Christian revelation. This article aims to demonstrate that, already in an essay dating from 1941 about the Kantian critique of religion, Gadamer possessed a conception of God, largely due to his familiarity with the Greek notions of divinity, that sought nevertheless to maintain close ties with "Religion nach der Aufklärung". Whilst this God is the God of philosophers, it is a God inclined towards revelations and extra-ordinary expressions of power. In addition, the article shows that in this philosophical context the Divine acquires a figure suggesting "friendship" and a transcendent sense of the beautiful. (shrink)

"Cover " -- "Title Page " -- "Copyright " -- "Contents " -- "Preface to the English Edition" -- "Introduction" -- "1. The Substitute" -- "2. Animals, Machines, Cyborgs, and the Taxi " -- "3. Mind, Emotions, and Artificial Empathy " -- "4. The Other Otherwise " -- "5. From Moral and Lethal Machines to Synthetic Ethics " -- "Notes" -- "Works Cited" -- "Acknowledgments" -- "Credits.

This essay tackles the core question of machine emotion research—“Can machines have emotions?”—with regard to “social robots”, the new class of machines designed to function as “social partners” for humans. Our aim, however, is not to provide an answer to that question. Rather we argue that “robotics of emotion” moves us to ask a different question—“Can robots establish meaningful affective coordination with human partners?” Developing a series of arguments relevant to theory of emotion, philosophy of AI and the epistemology of (...) synthetic models, we argue that the answer is positive, and lays grounds for an innovative ethical approach to emotional robots. This ethical project, which elsewhere we introduced as “synthetic ethics”, rejects the diffused ethical condemnation of emotional robots as “cheating” technology. Synthetic ethics focuses on the sustainability of emerging mixed human–robot social ecologies. Therefore, it rejects the purely negative ethical approach to social robotics, and promotes a critical case-by-case inquiry into the type of human flourishing that can result from human–robot affective coordination. (shrink)

I argue that the debate on the division of labor between grammar and pragmatics, at least as it pertains to pragmatic free enrichment, needs to be better grounded empirically. Often, only a reduced set of facts from English is used to substantiate claims regarding pragmatic free enrichment. But considering a reduced set of facts from a single language can only afford limited (and, sometimes, wrong) results, because we can merely see whatever this one language chooses to express. Two cases studies (...) are presented: adjectival fragments, and implicit indefinite objects. A grammatical analysis is defended for them. (shrink)

Neste estudo procuramos avaliar a dimensão humana presente na Palavra de Deus. O autor sagrado está dentro de um contexto de vida cultural, e recebe os condicionamentos do seu tempo. A Bíblia deve ser lida com o espírito que foi escrita e não simplesmente vista como uma palavra literal de Deus para os homens.

Social robotics entertains a particular relationship with anthropomorphism, which it neither sees as a cognitive error, nor as a sign of immaturity. Rather it considers that this common human tendency, which is hypothesized to have evolved because it favored cooperation among early humans, can be used today to facilitate social interactions between humans and a new type of cooperative and interactive agents - social robots. This approach leads social robotics to focus research on the engineering of robots that activate anthropomorphic (...) projections in users. The objective is to give robots "social presence" and "social behaviors" that are sufficiently credible for human users to engage in comfortable and potentially long-lasting relations with these machines. This choice of ’applied anthropomorphism’ as a research methodology exposes the artifacts produced by social robotics to ethical condemnation: social robots are judged to be a "cheating" technology, as they generate in users the illusion of reciprocal social and affective relations. This article takes position in this debate, not only developing a series of arguments relevant to philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, and robotic AI, but also asking what social robotics can teach us about anthropomorphism. On this basis, we propose a theoretical perspective that characterizes anthropomorphism as a basic mechanism of interaction, and rebuts the ethical reflections that a priori condemns "anthropomorphism-based" social robots. To address the relevant ethical issues, we promote a critical experimentally based ethical approach to social robotics, "synthetic ethics," which aims at allowing humans to use social robots for two main goals: self-knowledge and moral growth. (shrink)