Life history theory predicts that greater extrinsic mortality will lead to earlier and higher fertility. To test this prediction, I examine the relationship between life expectancy at birth and several proxies for life history traits (ages at first sex and first marriage, total fertility rate, and ideal number of children), measured for both men and women. Data on sexual behaviors come from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Two separate samples are analyzed: a cross-sectional sample of (...) 62 countries and a panel sample that includes multiple cross-sectional panels from 48 countries. Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for potential confounding variables. The results provide only partial support for the predictions, with greater support among women than men. However, the prediction is not supported in sub-Saharan African countries, most likely owing to the nonequilibrium conditions observed in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to life expectancy. The applicability of the model to understanding HIV/AIDS risk behaviors is discussed. (shrink)

In his paper “Eating Animals the Nice Way” McMahan : 66–76, 2008) explores whether there are ways of routinely using non-human animals for human consumption that are morally acceptable. He dismisses a practice of benign animal husbandry, in which animals are killed prematurely and believes that a practice in which animals were engineered to drop down dead instantaneously at the same age would be equally wrong, even though it would not involve killing. Yet, McMahan considers his intuition that both practices (...) are equally wrong with regard to our duties towards the involved animals hard to justify. This paper explains in more detail why this commonsensical intuition is indeed hard to justify and explores what it would take to justify it. It takes nothing less than a yet-to-be-specified plausible theory in population ethics and an account of welfare that deals in a plausible way with non-identity cases involving species- or breed-related differences in life expectancy. (shrink)

In this paper, ambiguity aversion to uncertain survival probabilities is introduced in a static life-cycle model with a bequest motive to study the optimal demand for annuities. Provided that annuities’ return is sufficiently large, and notably when it is fair, positive annuitization is known to be the optimal strategy of ambiguity neutral individuals. Conversely, we show that the demand for annuities decreases with ambiguity aversion and that there exists a finite degree of aversion above which the demand is non-positive: (...) the optimal strategy is then to either sell annuities short or to hold zero annuities if the former option is not available. To conclude, ambiguity aversion appears to be a relevant candidate for explaining the annuity puzzle. (shrink)

Some ethical dilemmas in health care, such as over the use of age as a criterion of patient selection, appeal to the notion of life expectancy. However, some features of this concept have not been discussed. Here I look in turn at two aspects: one positive — our expectation of further life — and the other negative — the loss of potential life brought about by death. The most common method of determining this loss, by counting (...) only the period of time between death and some particular age, implies that those who die at ages not far from that one are regarded as losing very little potential life, while those who die at greater ages are regarded as losing none at all. This approach has methodological advantages but ethical disadvantages, in that it fails to correspond to our strong belief that anyone who dies is losing some period of life that he or she would otherwise have had. The normative role of life expectancy expressed in the ‘fair innings’ attitude arises from a particular historical situation: not the increase of life expectancy in modern societies, but a related narrowing in the distribution of projected life spans. Since life expectancy is really a representation of existing patterns of mortality, which in turn are determined by many influences, including the present allocation of health resources, it should not be taken as a prediction, and still less as a statement of entitlement. (shrink)

In the literature on responsibility and health care, many associate responsibility-sensitive health policies with a form of luck egalitarianism. On this view, if some health inequality is due to the choices, or responsible agency, of one of the patients involved, then it is not unjust, and we have no responsibility to compensate for it. If the inequality’s origins cannot be traced back to the patients’ choices, then it is not their responsibility, and thus it becomes society’s responsibility to compensate for (...) it. This division of responsibilities between the individual and society applies not only to the past, but also to our responsibilities concerning the future. For instance, some luck egalitarians think that inequalities in life expectancy between men and women are unjust (Segall 2010) and should be compensated. Alex Voorhoeve has recently raised a new frontier in this debate concerning ‘prospective’ lives: the lives of those who will be born in the future. Against Voorhoeve, I argue that prospective inequalities are not a concern for egalitarians. This qualifies the claim that all inequalities not traceable to personal responsibility are unjust and suggests that there is no responsibility to structure society or our social institutions to avoid such prospective inequalities. (shrink)

Life history theory aims to explain the relationship between life events, recognizing that the fertility and growth schedules of organisms are dependent on environmental conditions and an organism’s ability to extract resources from its environment. Using models from life history theory, we predict life expectancy to be positively correlated with educational investments and negatively correlated with adolescent reproduction and total fertility rates. Analyses of UN data from 193 countries support these predictions and demonstrate that, although (...) variation is evident across world regions, strong interactions exist among life expectancy, reproductive investments, and educational attainment, and these relationships occur independently of economic pressures and disease burdens. The interactions are strongest, however, in countries with a life expectancy of ≥60 years as these countries tend to have stable economies and a limited HIV/AIDS burden. These findings suggest that policies aimed at influencing education and reproductive decisions should consider environmental characteristics that drive people’s expectations about their longevity. (shrink)

In response to the growing social discontent at what is perceived as generational injustice, due to younger generations of voters facing long-term negative consequences from issues disproportionately decided by the votes of older generations of voters, there have been suggestions to introduce an upper age voting threshold. These have been all but universally dismissed as offensive and contrary to basic democratic values. In the present article, I show that the idea is in fact entirely consonant with present-day democratic practices and (...) far from without a precedent. Hence, I describe how the aforementioned generational injustice can be rectified using a simple vote weighting scheme which is easy to implement and interpret. Lastly, I discuss the societal effects that this alteration of the voting system would have on the distribution of the origins of political power. (shrink)

In this essay, I survey egalitarian and utilitarian approaches to the distribution of scarce life-saving medical resources. In my view, the major criterion for the distribution of scarce life-saving medical resources should be life expectancy: we should distribute life so as to maximize life-years. In Section II, I discuss the life-year maximization approach and situate it within utilitarian theory.

Recent research has provided converging evidence, using multiple tasks, of sensitivity to fairness in the second year of life. In contrast, findings in the first year have been mixed, leaving it unclear whether young infants possess an expectation of fairness. The present research examined the possibility that young infants might expect windfall resources to be divided equally between similar recipients, but might demonstrate this expectation only under very simple conditions. In three violation-of-expectation experiments, 9-month-olds (N = 120) expected an (...) experimenter to divide two cookies equally between two animated puppets (1:1), and they detected a violation when she divided them unfairly instead (2:0). The same positive result was obtained whether the experimenter gave the cookies one by one to the puppets (Experiments 1–2) or first separated them onto placemats and then gave each puppet a placemat (Experiment 3). However, a negative result was obtained when four (as opposed to two) cookies were allocated: Infants looked about equally whether they saw a fair (2:2) or an unfair (3:1) distribution (Experiment 3). A final experiment revealed that 4-month-olds (N = 40) also expected an experimenter to distribute two cookies equally between two animated puppets (Experiment 4). Together, these and various control results support two broad conclusions. First, sensitivity to fairness emerges very early in life, consistent with claims that an abstract expectation of fairness is part of the basic structure of human moral cognition. Second, this expectation can at first be observed only under simple conditions, and speculations are offered as to why this might be the case. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to assess the phenomenon of longevity as a particularly important component in the study of increasing life expectancy and reducing mortality. The article reveals the possibilities of increasing life expectancy and reducing mortality through research in the field of the phenomenon of longevity, self-preservation behavior and social information systems. The scientific novelty lies in substantiating the possibilities of changing demographic behavior through the prism of the study of longevity as a (...) kind of model of natural physiological aging of the population, as well as using the system of social "programming" of the population as a special social management tool. As a result of the study, unique opportunities for changing the demographic behavior of the population have been identified, which should be used in the development of practical measures for the implementation of social and demographic policy. (shrink)

Background and objectives: Summary measures of overall health inequality are independent of group membership and enable international comparisons of distribution of health. We compare inequality between and within countries over time and identify normative issues underlying such comparisons. Methods: We used a set of modeled historical life tables for 193 World Health Organization member states from the years 1990, 2000 and 2008 and calculated inequality in age at death and inequality-adjusted life expectancy. Results: Our calculations suggest that (...) overall health inequalities in age at death have been decreasing in the period 1990–2008 in most countries of the world. Only 20 countries experienced increasing distribution in age at death. Simultaneously, overall life expectancy has increased in 85 per cent of all countries. Thus, the combined measure IALE has improved globally. The same overall trend of reduced health inequality applies to all groups of countries stratified by income level. Conclusion: Overall health inequalities, in addition to average health outcomes, could be reported regularly to monitor the health status of populations and the performance of health systems. We find, on normative grounds, the combined measure IALE to be preferable to measuring trends in inequality only. Likewise, we find the Absolute GiniH to be preferable to Relative GiniH. (shrink)

Debates about the ethical and social implications of research that aims to extend human longevity by intervening in the ageing process have paid little attention to the attitudes of members of the general public. In the absence of empirical evidence, conflicting assumptions have been made about likely public attitudes towards life-extension. In light of recent calls for greater public involvement in such discussions, this target article presents findings from focus groups and individual interviews which investigated whether members of the (...) general public identify ethical issues surrounding life-extension, and if so, what these ethical issues are? In this study, while some participants were concerned primarily with the likely personal consequences of life-extension, for others the question of whether or not to pursue interventions to extend longevity, and how they should be implemented, clearly raised important ethical issues, many of which have been prominent in debates among bioethicists. (shrink)

On average, “young” people underestimate whereas “old” people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. Such subjective survival beliefs violate the rational expectations paradigm and are also not in line with models of rational Bayesian learning. In order to explain these empirical patterns in a parsimonious manner, we assume that self-reported beliefs express likelihood insensitivity and can, therefore, be modeled as non-additive beliefs. In a next step we introduce a closed form model of Bayesian learning for non-additive beliefs which (...) combines rational learning with psychological attitudes in the interpretation of information. Our model gives a remarkable fit to average subjective survival beliefs reported in the Health and Retirement Study. (shrink)

In India, there has been a shift from using unclaimed bodies to voluntary body donation for anatomy dissections in medical colleges. This study used in-depth qualitative interviews to explore the deeper intent, values and attitudes towards body donation, the body and death, and expectations of the body donor, as well as their next of kin and representative religious scholars. All donors had enrolled in a body bequest programme in a medical school in South India. This study concludes that body donors (...) are philanthropists with deep-rooted values of altruism and service, who are often willing to forgo traditional religious and cultural death rituals. The next of kin are often uncomfortable with the donor’s decision, and this suggests that it is important that dialogue/counselling occurs at the time of the bequest, if the donor’s wishes are to be respected. Religious injunctions are often misinterpreted; this implies that religious leaders/scholars can play a significant role in addressing these misconceptions which are barriers to body donation. Body bequest programmes in India may be enhanced by positioning body donation as ‘daana’—giving without any expectation of return for a higher purpose, including ceremonies of respect in medical colleges. Furthermore, increased public engagement and awareness about body bequest programmes are also important to enhance participation. When medical students internalise what body donors expect of them, i.e. altruism, empathy with patients and becoming ‘good doctors’, it will help to ensure that the donation was not in vain and that the dead truly teach the living. (shrink)

In this synthesis, we summarize studies that yielded evidence of jealousy in young infants. To shed light on this phenomenon, we present evidence that jealousy’s foundation rests on history of dyadic interactions with caregivers which engender infants’ expectations of exclusivity, and on maturation of sociocognitive capacities that enable infants to evaluate whether an exchange between their caregiver and another child represents a violation of that expectation. We conclude with a call for greater study of the antecedents and sequelae of both (...) normative and atypical presentations of jealousy. In addition, we recommend approaches that address jealousy across a range of relationships, both within and beyond those which include attachment figures. (shrink)

Having functional expected emotions regarding one’s future life as a teacher is important for student teachers to maintain their motivation to choose a career as a teacher. However, humans show several biases when judging their emotional experiences. One famous bias is the so-called peak-end effect which describes the phenomenon that overall affective judgments do not reflect the average of the involved emotional experiences but the most intense and the most recent of the involved emotional experiences. Regarding student teachers’ expected (...) positive emotions, such a bias would be functional since their motivation to become a teacher is enhanced. However, regarding student teachers’ expected negative emotions, such a bias would be dysfunctional since their motivation to become a teacher would be decreased. The aim of the present preregistered study was to examine whether student teachers’ expected future teaching-related emotions show a peak-end effect. Student teachers viewed 14 common events that could part of a typical everyday routine of a teacher and rated their expected emotional pleasure and discomfort for each of the events. Afterward, they were asked to rate their overall expected emotional pleasure and discomfort when looking at their future professional life as a whole. Results showed that expected pleasure was much larger than expected discomfort regarding both overall, peak, and average ratings. No peak-end effect was observed for overall expected discomfort which reflected the average expected discomfort across events. By contrast, overall expected pleasure was biased toward expected peak pleasure experiences. These findings indicate that student teachers judge their expected overall affect in a functional way: realistically when dealing with negative emotions but through rose-colored glasses when dealing with positive emotions. (shrink)

The notion of the ‘reasonable expectations of the parties’ plays an important justificatory role in contract law, yet the notion has not been subjected to any sustained analysis in the contract law literature. This article examines the various roles that reasonable expectation plays in contract law and explores the different understandings of the notion that are revealed. It identifies three possible bases for reasonable expectations—an institutional basis, an empirical basis and a normative basis—and examines how reasonable expectations arguments in contract (...) reflect each of these differing justificatory bases. This makes appeals to reasonable expectation in contract law problematic since the differently grounded expectations of the contracting parties are usually the precise site of conflict between them. It is therefore doubtful that conflicts between contracting parties can be resolved solely by identifying and protecting their ‘reasonable expectations’. In the conclusion some speculative comments are offered as to why, given its limited explanatory power, the notion has proved attractive in attempts to explain contract law. (shrink)

The beatific vision plays a prominent role in the history of Christian ethics. Reformed ethics has an ambiguous relationship to this history, on two counts. First, it offers some qualified critiques of the role of vision in ordering ethical understanding, and second, on some accounts, Reformed ethics shares some responsibility for the loss of transcendence in the modern world, and the narrowing of the ethical field that has resulted from this loss. This essay argues that the vision of God in (...) John Calvin’s understanding of the Christian life offers resources to defend a Reformed ethics from some recent detractors. Further, it provides a constructive contrast with the role of eschatology in a prominent strand of 20th century ethics. This argument is sustained through a close reading of Calvin’s biblical commentaries on the role of theophanies and the promise of the vision of God, and of Book III, chapters 6-10 of the Institutes. (shrink)

International migration is an important issue for many high‐income countries and is accompanied by opportunities as well as challenges. South Asians are the largest minority ethnic group in the United Kingdom, and this diaspora is reflective of the growing diversity of British society. An empirical study was performed to ascertain the faith‐based values, beliefs, views and attitudes of participants in relation to their perception of issues pertaining to end‐of‐life care. Empirical observations from this study, as well as the extant (...) knowledge‐base from the literature, are used to support and contextualise our reflections against a socio‐legal backdrop. We argue for accommodation of faith‐based values of migrants at end‐of‐life within normative structures of receiving countries. We posit the ethically relevant principles of inclusiveness, integration and embedment, for an innovative bioethical framework as a vehicle for accommodating faith‐based values and needs of migrants at end‐of‐life. These tenets work conjunctively, as well as individually, in respect of individual care, enabling processes and procedures, and ultimately for formulating policy and strategy. (shrink)

Legitimate expectations should be considered in the transition to a low-carbon society. After explaining under what conditions and circumstances expectations are legitimate, this paper shows that those expectations whose frustration undermines the ability to plan, infringes basic moral rights, or is extremely costly for its bearer might justify a deviation in the baseline of justice in favour of the expectation holder. People should be notified about the likely frustration of their expectations so that they can avoid the frustration of their (...) expectations, adapt their life plans and minimise costs. Since the frustration of legitimate expectations seems unavoidable in the transformation to a low-carbon society, priority should be given to the protection of the expectations of those who cannot be materially compensated. Still, if two groups are eligible for material compensation, we should give priority to protecting the expectation of those who cannot continue with the same life plan as before if their expectations are frustrated. (shrink)

Expectations play an important role in how people plan their lives and pursue their projects. People living in highly industrialized countries share a way of life that comes with high levels of emissions. Their expectations to be able to continue their projects imply their holding expectations to similarly high future levels of personal emissions. We argue that the frustration or undermining of these expectations would cause them significant harm. Further, the article investigates under what conditions people can be thought (...) to hold legitimate expectations, in particular about permissible levels of future emissions. We distinguish differing theories of understanding these conditions, namely authority-based and justice-based theories, that each allows us to systematically distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate expectations. Furthermore, with respect to individuals’ future permissible emissions we give several reasons for holding that such theories cannot identify a particular expectation to a specific level of personal emissions as the only legitimate one. Finally, we argue that the set of legitimate expectations that people hold with respect to a just and effective solution to climate change has normative significance in at least two ways: the differing but equally legitimate expectations ought to be taken into account when justifying what could count as such a solution and when determining the just way of arriving at and implementing such a solution. (shrink)

If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point (...) at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal. (shrink)

The main theses of the papers by Dr Illich and Dr Leach are compared. Both writers, says Mr Horobin, a sociologist by training and profession, discuss the uses and abuses of medical expertise in the modern world. In his view, the problems so created must be solved for the good of those they treat; doctors must rediscover the old skills of treating the whole patient.

Volume 19, Issue 7, July 2019, Page 41-43.

In an influential paper, L. A. Paul argues that one cannot rationally decide whether to have children. In particular, she argues that such a decision is intractable for standard decision theory. Paul's central argument in this paper rests on the claim that becoming a parent is ``epistemically transformative''---prior to becoming a parent, it is impossible to know what being a parent is like. Paul argues that because parenting is epistemically transformative, one cannot estimate the values of the various outcomes of (...) a decision whether to become a parent. In response, we argue that it is possible to estimate the value of epistemically transformative experiences. Therefore, there is no special difficulty involved in deciding whether to undergo epistemically transformative experiences. Insofar as major life decisions do pose a challenge to decision theory, we suggest that this is because they often involve separate, familiar problems. (shrink)

Scientists, bioethicists, and policy makers are currently engaged in a contentious debate about the scientific prospects and morality of efforts to increase human longevity. Some demographers and geneticists suggest that there is little reason to think that it will be possible to significantly extend the human lifespan. Other biodemographers and geneticists argue that there might well be increases in both life expectancy and lifespan. Bioethicists and policy makers are currently addressing many of the ethical, social, and economic issues (...) raised by life extension research. However, the emphasis on philosophical argument supporting or condemning efforts to increase human longevity means that much less attention is currently being given to the factors that might play a role in generating interest in efforts to increase human longevity. This analysis considers three factors that might play a role in heightening public interest in efforts to develop biomedical technologies capable of retarding or reversing aging processes. While discussions of life extension research can seem quite futuristic and impractical, there are some powerful existential factors that might well generate considerable public support for life extension strategies if effective biomedical interventions emerge. Rather than providing philosophical justifications supporting or condemning efforts to increase human longevity, this essay seeks to promote a better understanding of the factors generating contemporary interest in prolonging life and postponing death. (shrink)

This paper draws on Claudia Card’s discussions of moral luck to consider the complicated moral life of people—described as pessimists—who accept the heavy knowledge of the predictability of the bad moral luck of oppression. The potential threat to ethics posed by this knowledge can be overcome by the pessimist whose resistance to oppression, even in the absence of hope, expresses a sense of still having a ‘‘claim’’ on flourishing despite its unattainability under oppression.

Debates on new technologies commonly seem to be irrational. In an even higher degree this might be true for the expectations that are evoked by recent biotechnologies. A typical constellation is like this: While A expresses fears concerning a new technology, those fears are taken up to be absurd by B. And while B criticizes that A?s scenarios lack a realistic basis, A complains about not being taken serious. Thus the conflicting parties accuse each other of behaving irrational or even (...) malicious. This article deals with this mutual suspicion of irrationality and provides an explanation focusing on structural reasons for conflicts of that kind. An explanation is reached on the basis of a model that describes the genesis of expectations regarding technological potentials. These expectations are concerned with the anticipation that a technology has the power to fundamentally change our life. Based on this model a different examination of discourses on technologies is possible: The existence of structurally different levels of communication about technology is demonstrated - plus that the levels themselves can stay undiscovered by the conflicting groups due to structural reasons. And as the levels in communication remain concealed the impression of a slippery slope of rationality prevails. nema. (shrink)

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed. For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways (...) that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values. (shrink)

An absolute decline in US life expectancy in low education whites has alarmed policy makers and attracted media attention. Depending on which studies are correct, low education white women have lost between 3 and 5 years of lifespan; men, between 6 months and 3 years. Although absolute declines in life expectancy are relatively rare, some commentators see the public alarm as reflecting a racist concern for white lives over black ones. How ought we ethically to evaluate (...) this lifespan contraction in low education whites? Should we care, or is it racist to care? Does it constitute an injustice or reflect justice being done? I argue that the lifespan contraction in low education whites violates key normative criteria used to make determinations of health justice, and that these judgments do not vitiate concerns about racism. I conclude with reflections on US population health policy and building an inclusive health equity movement. (shrink)