For Kant right and ethics are two formally distinct departments of a single morality of reason and freedom. Unlike ethics, right involves an authorization to coerce, and this coercion serves as a pathological incentive. I argue that for Kant the distinctive character of right flows from the fact that juridical obligation has a different relational structure than ethical obligation. I argue that this relational structure explains the connection of right to coercion, and also explains how a categorical imperative can be (...) known a priori to issue in both a pathological and non-pathological incentive. Thus the justification of coercion and its special role as incentive are rooted in the relational character of juridical obligations, and so ultimately in categorical imperatives of reason. Since this pathological incentive has a moral basis in the structure of juridical obligations, and so ultimately in a representation of moral laws, I argue that Kant’s discussion of the juridical incentive of coercion is more continuous with his main discussion of moral incentives in the Critique of Practical Reason than it might at first appear. I illustrate the consequences of this reading by discussing the propensity to injustice, as Kant understands it, and the unique way in which the juridical incentive undermines it. (shrink)

John Rawls divides this theory into two parts that he calls ideal and nonideal theory. In this essay I argue that Rawls runs together two quite different conceptions of this dyad corresponding to the idea of strict compliance and realistic utopia respectively. These conceptions employ different criteria of classification, are motivated by different concerns, and have different practical upshots. I present a view that combines the two coherently on Rawls’ behalf while remaining true to his intentions. But I argue that (...) even this amended view is unsatisfactory. Although the realistic utopia conception is well motivated, strict compliance is problematic. The upshot is that we can embrace the division of the theory of justice into ideal and nonideal theory, while rejecting the strict compliance understanding of ideal theory. (shrink)

This study investigated the mechanisms behind episodic autobiographical memory development in school-age children. Thirty children performed a novel EAM test. We computed one index of episodicity via autonoetic consciousness and two indices of retrieval spontaneity for a recent period and a more remote one . Executive functions, and episodic and personal semantic memory were assessed. Results showed that recent autobiographical memories were mainly episodic, unlike remote ones. An age-related increase in the indices of episodicity and specific spontaneity for recent AMs (...) was mainly mediated by an age-related increase in the efficiency of the three cognitive abilities. Remote AMs varied only slightly with age , reflecting improvements in semantic abilities. Thus, EAM development in school-age children is essentially bound up with the increasing efficiency of cognitive abilities. Results are discussed in the light of models of childhood amnesia. (shrink)

I am very grateful to my critics for the time and effort that they have devoted to my work.

Social interactions in daily life necessitate the integration of social signals from different sensory modalities. In the aging literature, it is well established that the recognition of emotion in facial expressions declines with advancing age, and this also occurs with vocal expressions. By contrast, crossmodal integration processing in healthy aging individuals is less documented. Here, we investigated the age-related effects on emotion recognition when faces and voices were presented alone or simultaneously, allowing for crossmodal integration. In this study, 31 young (...) adults (M = 25.8 years) and 31 older adults (M = 67.2 years) were instructed to identify several basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust) and a neutral expression, which were displayed as visual (facial expressions), auditory (nonverbal affective vocalizations) or crossmodal (simultaneous, congruent facial and vocal affective expressions) stimuli. The results showed that older adults performed slower and worse than younger adults at recognizing negative emotions from isolated faces and voices. In the crossmodal condition, although slower, older adults were as accurate as younger except for anger. Importantly, additional analyses using the ‘race model’ demonstrate that older adults benefited to the same extent as younger adults from the combination of facial and vocal emotional stimuli. These results help explain some conflicting results in the literature and may clarify emotional abilities related to daily life that are partially spared among older adults. (shrink)

In this dissertation I argue for a broadly Chomskian account of all natural language linguistic properties, including semantic properties. But the dissertation is as much concerned with methodological issues as with this substantive question. ;In chapter one, I argue that the standard motivation for Naturalistic accounts of language and mind is misguided. Rather such accounts should be motivated by the potential explanatory gains afforded by successful Naturalistic accounts. Accordingly, we should seek accounts that increase the science's evidentiary basis and explain (...) the central explanatory roles of its kinds. My account of linguistic kinds is based on and illustrates this account of Naturalism. ;Following a brief introduction to current syntactic theory , I argue that, in the less philosophically loaded domain of syntactic properties, a broadly Chomskian account is superior, on empirical and methodological grounds, to a number of alternative accounts . I then extend the Chomskian view to cover semantic properties, treating semantic properties of natural language utterances as inherited from semantic properties of mental representations tokened in language processing . I argue for this extended account over the standard, Convention-based account of natural language semantic properties. ;Like Convention-based accounts in the Gricean tradition, the Chomskian account proceeds via a two step reduction. Natural language properties are first reduced to properties of psychological states or mental representations; then an account of the nature of these mental representations fills out the account. In my view there is quite a strong case for the Chomskian account of the first step in this reduction. I don't think there is an similarly powerful case for any particular theory of mental representation at this point. The various theoretical pressures on such theories and their ranking are not yet sufficiently clear. In chapter six I discuss Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory, arguing that a variety of cases suggest that asymmetric dependence theory puts too much emphasis on recognition. I suggest a way of amending the theory by introducing a further counterfactual component to it. (shrink)

There are no new fallacies under the sun, any more than there are any new methods of reasoning. Therefore, the Fluxive Fallacy is nothing new. Yet, pointing out the Fluxive Fallacy and giving it a name has a distinct advantage in that it directs one's attention to errors which, without the advantage of a definite name and description, might pass unobserved.

The R-Being is, by definition, that entity which possesses all qualities which, expressed in English adjectives, begin with the letter R. It is of course unknown, at the commencement of our inquiry, whether any such entity exists, but it is nevertheless possible to determine the characteristics which such a being, whether existent or not, must possess.

The temptation in clinical research to sacrifice the interests, the health, and sometimes even the lives of research subjects to the advancement of the interests of science and society, and to the advancement of researchers' own careers, is a hardy weed which can grow anywhere. Pursuant to a commendable EU Directive a new law, the Medicines for Human Use Regulations 2004 was brought into effect in the UK. That law makes it illegal for anyone to start a clinical trial unless (...) a Research Ethics Committee has expressed a favourable opinion upon its protocol. It gives to Research Ethics Committee members the legal power, and imposes upon them the legal duty, to protect research subjects from those who have strong financial and other temptations to mistreat them. The new law specifies what standard of protection the Research Ethics Committee members shall insist upon. The Royal College of Physicians, which has been reluctant to declare its own conflicting interests, in 2007 issued some guidelines which it hopes Research Ethics Committee members will follow. Those Guidelines on the practice of ethics committees in medical research with human participants urge Research Ethics Committee members to express a favourable opinion of clinical trials which they believe, for example, do not give to research subjects the protection the new law demands. But Research Ethics Committee members have a clear legal duty not to follow any course of conduct calculated to subvert the excellent and necessary 2004 law. (shrink)

Désignant des femmes qui ont des droits et exercent des pouvoirs, le mot domina est fréquemment utilisé par Jérôme dans son traité Contre Jovinien et dans ses correspondances féminines. Les acceptions de ce terme, qui vont de l'épouse à la vierge chrétienne, en passant par la maîtresse des esclaves et la supérieure du monastère, donnent une image très claire du contexte socio-culturel qui les vit naître. Le point commun entre ces différentes occurrences est manifestement l'idéal cher à Jérôme, à savoir (...) le mode de vie inspiré des Pères du désert. Elles font voir à quel point la conversion monastique, qui faisait vivre les femmes de haut rang en compagnie de leurs esclaves, pouvait scandaliser l'aristocratie romaine.The word domina, which designates women who have rights and exercise power, is frequently used by Jerome in his treatise Against Jovinian and in his correspondence with women. The accepted uses of this term, which extend from wife to Christian virgin, including the mistress of slaves and the superior of the monastery, give a very clear image of the socio-cultural context from which they arose. The common point between these different occurrences is manifestly the ideal for Jerome, that is to say, the way of life inspired by the Fathers of the desert. We can see to what point monastic conversion, which had highly placed women live in the company of their slaves, could scandalise the Roman aristocracy. (shrink)

Albert Jonsen in The Birth of Bioethics notes that his career in bioethics began with a phone call to him from soon-to-be colleagues at the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center. Bioethics didn't begin with a bang but as an accident in the root sense—something that happened, not by necessity, but rather by chance. Indeed, the opening chapters of Jonsen's book chronicle a series of accidents that helped to create the field of bioethics. Principal among these was the (...) fact that physicians and biomedical scientists who became puzzled about the moral dimensions of their work and began to think about these puzzles sought help in doing so from moral theologians and philosophers. These physicians and scientists, for the most part, were university people. They thought broadly, not just deeply, about their work, but they just as well could have defined themselves by their academic discipline and departments and not reached beyond these familiar and comfortable intellectual confines to the “culture” of the humanities disciplines and departments. The theologians and philosophers whom these physicians and scientists sought out were also university people who also happened to have generous views of the intellectual life in their disciplines—atypical of the time, especially in philosophy. If C. P. Snow had been altogether right and if ungenerous self-understanding of their work by physicians, scientists, philosophers, and theologians had prevailed, bioethics might not have happened at all. (shrink)

This article is primarily a defense of the Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). It is secondarily a comment on a recent controversy over the validity of its use in philosophy. I argue that the controversy rests on a misinterpretation. By extending the analysis of the objections (and here I invoke Descartes' famous method of possible doubt) I show that the occurrence of a paradigm and the fact that a concept is normally used to describe that paradigm logically entails not that the (...) paradigm is instantiated, but only that it is correct to apply that concept to that paradigm. In this manner the ontological fallacy is avoided, and further, this enforces the important separation between saying something about the correct application of a concept and saying something about its meaning. (shrink)

The article argues that the growth of religious service provision directed at the Muslim diaspora in Europe has led to greater professionalization and pluralism within the Islam state in Muslim countries. Contemporary Muslim governments have claimed a monopoly over public prayer and religious education and have heavily invested in a network of infrastructure and services – the Islam state. The recent breakthrough of Islamist parties into governments in Turkey and across North Africa poses a challenge to the continued ‘civilian control’ (...) over religion. What will become of the enormous Islamic Affairs ministries that Islamist parties have inherited – the hundreds of thousands of public servants of state Islam across the region, the tens of thousands of mosques and thousands of religious schools? Liberals demand the abolition of the Islam state because it violates the separation of religion and state; Islamists detest it for its repressive qualities. Despite progressive liberalization, governments in the past decade have not sought disestablishment, and have instead increased the resources and policing of state-run religion. I draw on the experience of Muslim governments in the competitive field of state–Islam relations in European countries to explain the modest beginnings of reform of the official religion apparatus in Muslim-majority countries. (shrink)