In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and (...) concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer’s new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer’s concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by (...) appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by (...) appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

In this important new text, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the accepted definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories as well as recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by (...) appropriate internal ones to yield knowledge. Readers of Professor Lehrer's earlier book _Knowledge_ will want to know that this text adopts the framework of that classic text. But _Theory of Knowledge_ is a completely rewritten and updated version of that book that has been simplified throughout for student use. (shrink)

The relativist position on knowledge is summarized by Protagoras’ phrase “Man is the measure of all things”. Protagoras’ detractors countered that there was no reason for his pupils to employ him since, by his own admission, his lessons lacked privilege. This the educationist’s relativist paradox. The Enlightenment tradition of Descartes, Locke and Kant solved this paradox by distinguishing given objective knowledge from constructed subjective knowledge, but this position has itself been discredited by the work of Sellars, Quine and many other (...) thinkers. Because the Enlightenment solution to the educationist’s relativist paradox is no longer satisfactory, an alternative solution to this paradox is proposed. This alternative re-examines both the basis of empiricism and the role and origins of language, and introduces the concepts of triggered hallucinations, cognitive evolutionary pressure, and cognitive empathetic resonance. Cognitive empathetic resonance provides a mechanism that can explain how our thoughts and actions are made possible by language; it is language that acts as a creative and generative force and helps us to live in the world we do. This approach inverts the empiricist claim that ideas start off grounded in an external reality and develop into more sophisticated concepts. The view of ideas presented here is that ideas are free-floating and, if they are grounded at all, are grounded as an active post-hoc process. The conclusion is that although facts do exist and are privileged, this is not because they are ‘given’ but because they are the ante required to join a space of discourse. (shrink)

Developed in collaboration with the International Baccalaureate Organization, Oxford's Course Companions provide extra support for students taking IB Diploma Programme courses. They present a whole-course approach with a wide range of resources, and encourage a deep understanding of each subject by making connections to wider issues and providing opportunites for critical thinking. This companion stimulates students to think about learning and knowledge from their own and from others' perspectives in a way that crosses disciplines and cultures. It encourages reflection, discussion, (...) critical thinking, and awareness or the ways in which knowledge is constructed, and will students to recognize the implications of knowledge for issues of global concern. Places students at the center of the course, with lively material providing opportunities for questioning, discussion, and interaction Invites students to add their own voices to those in the book, which include students, teachers, and professionals in various areas of knowledge Encourages students to frame their own perspectives with international awareness and recognition of the impact of knowledge on the world Contains guidance for current assessment, with support for the Theory of Knowledge essay and class presentation Written by experienced teachers, authors, and examiners, including recent deputy and chief examiners of Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

Written by experienced practitioners this resource for Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma offers comprehensive coverage of and support for the new subject guide. Decoding Theory of Knowledge (ToK) is an accessible new resource that explores Areas of Knowledge, Ways of Knowing, Personal and Shared Knowledge, the Knowledge Framework and Knowledge Questions. Written in succinct and clear language, this engaging book decodes ToK concepts and helps students develop their critical thinking skills. The book offers extensive support on (...) the new assessment criteria for the essay and presentation. Features include explanation of key concepts to consolidate knowledge and understanding; real-life situations to engage students; practical activities to develop students' thinking, writing and presentation skills; and top tips to provide further guidance and advice. (shrink)

The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding technical detail. Comprehensive and rich in illustrations and examples, it highlights contemporary debates over the definition, sources, and limits of human knowledge, and covers major topics including the nature of belief, theories of truth, epistemic justification, the Gettier problem, skepticism, and epistemic rationality. Its discussions identify important connections between traditional epistemological questions and cognitive science, the history of science, the sociology of (...) knowledge, and cross-cultural studies. The book culminates with a focus on questions regarding epistemological method and an examination of the roots of contemporary analytic approaches to epistemology. The authors defend a distinctive position regarding epistemological method, called broad explanationism, that incorporates some insights from naturalism in epistemology. The volume is enhanced by a glossary of important epistemological terms and suggestions for further reading. Easily accessible to beginning students in philosophy, The Theory of Knowledge serves as an ideal text for courses in the theory of knowledge and will also appeal to general readers interested in philosophy. (shrink)

Ensure learners truly understand all the essential TOK foundations and provide a practical learning scaffold to confidently progress them onto higher order thinking. Comprehensively supporting the TOK course book and mapped to the 2013 syllabus, this focused guide distils the big TOK ideas and builds student confidence right from the start.

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century (...) since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter "paragons of science" come into play. From this platform the "theory of research" of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. Huygens' attitude on legitimating (...) the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discussed. (shrink)

Summary A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with a theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter paragons of science come into play. From this platform the theory of research of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. Huygens' attitude (...) on legitimating the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discusses. (shrink)

A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with a theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter “paragons of science” come into play. From this platform the “theory of research” of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. Huygens' attitude on (...) legitimating the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discusses. (shrink)

_An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge_ guides the reader through the key issues and debates in contemporary epistemology. Lucid, comprehensive and accessible, it is an ideal textbook for students who are new to the subject and for university undergraduates. The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of knowledge and distinguishes between different types of knowledge. Part II surveys the sources of knowledge, considering both _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ knowledge. Parts III and IV (...) provide an in-depth discussion of justification and scepticism. The final part of the book examines our alleged knowledge of the past, other minds, morality and God. O'Brien uses engaging examples throughout the book, taking many from literature and the cinema. He explains complex issues, such as those concerning the private language argument, non-conceptual content, and the new riddle of induction, in a clear and accessible way. This textbook is an invaluable guide to contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

First published in 1962, this book provides a systematic account of the development of Plato’s theory of knowledge. Beginning with a consideration of the Socratic and other influences which determined the form in which the problem of knowledge first presented itself to Plato, the author then works through the dialogues from the Meno to the Laws and examines in detail Plato’s progressive attempts to solve the problem.

This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to formalize (...) the natural pattern of belief change assumed in Sustainability in terms of a specific formal theory of belief change, after carefully examining the notions of belief, belief change, and Information, from which the cognitive function F in Chapter 3 is actually constructed, which is later implemented by a computer program and its behavior against random input is demonstrated. In Part III we proceed to examine the analysis empirically. In particular, we will investigate Sustainability from the developmental point of view. We first justify experimental approach in philosophy as a legitimate method of philosophical investigation, and then developmental approach in particular. The specific proposal of experiment here is what we call the Gettier Task, an analogue of the famous false-belief task in developmental psychology, which has been much discussed in philosophy of mind. Two versions of the Gettier Task were tested on children aged from 6 to 12, and we claim that the data obtained empirically supports our analysis of knowledge, or Sustainability. (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. -/- There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his (...) response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. -/- This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

Ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus provided some of our most cherished assumptions about physics and ethics. He postulated an infinite universe made exclusively of atoms and void. He also treated slaves and women as equals and defined our standards of pleasure and luxury. Now David Swift turns to Epicurus for help with another significant mystery: the scientific explanation of mind. Using Epicurean ideas that our minds are in our chests and, perhaps even more radically, that meaning is understood in our sense (...) organs he re-examines and reinterprets the works of philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Kant and Mill and scientists such as Pavlov, Freud, Skinner and Rogers. Seen in the light of the Epicurean concept, Renaissance philosophy and classic scientific psychology validate a surprisingly consistent and coherent scientific explanation of behaviour. The mechanisms of meaning, knowledge, learning and remembering are explained in terms of biological reflexes. The secrets of love, hate and loyalty are revealed as non-verbal knowledge only accessible as feelings. And success, failure, criminal and other behaviours are shown to be the results of learned experience not genetic predisposition. At last we have the possibility of a plausible biologically-based general psychological theory. (shrink)

Professor Reichenbach's writings have repeatedly called attention to the important rôle which probability statements play in all inquiry, and he has made amply clear that no philosophy of science can be regarded as adequate which does not square its accounts with the problems of probable inference. Recently he has brought together in convenient form many reflections on the methodology of science familiar to readers of his earlier works, and at the same time he has set himself the task of solving (...) many well-known problems of epistemology in terms of his theory of probability. His latest book is therefore of great interest, both because of the light it throws on Professor Reichenbach's own views and because it reveals the power and limitations of one approach to the problems of science. In particular, while it does not add to the details of his theory of probability worked out elsewhere, the applications Professor Reichenbach now makes of it supply fresh clues for judging its import and adequacy. The object of the present essay, therefore, is to expound a number of his views on probability and epistemology, with a view to examining his conclusions and their relevance to the problems he aims to resolve. The discussion will try to determine whether several features of his present views do not follow from assumptions which he has not sufficiently considered; whether his logical constructions do not create new puzzles; and whether a different starting-point should not be taken if the clarification of scientific concepts and procedures, to which Professor Reichenbach's devotion is as unexcelled as it is well known, is to be successfully conducted. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1951, is an examination of Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature', 'An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals', and 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'. It lucidly clarifies and makes alive the new discoveries of Hume's works in a study that makes plain the importance of this philosopher to the world today.

Michael E. Marmura, an outstanding Avicenna scholar, has presented a special interpretation of Avicenna’s view concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. In this paper, which consists of two parts, we will examine his interpretation of Avicenna. In the first part, we briefly present Marmura’s reading of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. According to Marmura’s interpretation of Avicenna, God only knows, individually, particular entities which are the only member of their species. Also, He knows, individually, particular events which are (...) attributed to such particular entities. Arguing that Avicenna’s theory is not able to explain God’s knowledge of ‘all’ particulars, Marmura concludes that Avicenna ‘believed’ that God does not know all particulars individually. In the second part, we will object his interpretation. The most important criticisms are as follows: he has not determined what problems Avicenna’s theory aims to solve; he has not touched two important elements of Avicenna’s theory, i.e., God’s knowledge of particulars by means of their forms, and God’s knowledge of particulars by means of His causal relation with them; and he presents an erroneous interpretation of Avicenna’s use of the eclipse example. (shrink)

Paul Feyerabend's globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. -- Amazon.com.

This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyãya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyãya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyãya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.

Ensure learners truly understand all the essential TOK foundations and provide a practical learning scaffold to confidently progress them onto higher order thinking. Comprehensively supporting the TOK course book and mapped to the 2013 syllabus, this focused guide distils the big TOK ideas and builds student confidence right from the start.

In recent years, philosophers of science have been increasingly concerned with questions about scientific change, and, in connection with those concerns, to rest their claims more and more on an examination of cases in the history of science. During the 1960s and early 1970s, those concerns tended to revolve around the question of whether scientific change, or at least major scientific change, is or is not “rational.” It seems to me, as I shall argue in what follows, that that question (...) is misguided in principle, at least as it is usually understood, and that it calls attention away from the most important and potentially most fruitful problems about the nature of scientific change. Furthermore, I believe, and will argue below, that the most fundamental reasons for investigating scientific change, and the sense in which and degree to which it is necessary to base such investigation on an examination of the history of science have not been adequately grasped even by many who are sympathetic to the approach. Finally, I do not believe that the difficulties in the way of such an approach have been properly appreciated and taken account of, and in many cases have not been considered at all. In particular, I will examine here five basic objections or types of objections against the view that the philosopher of science, in attempting to understand the nature of science, must examine the rationale of scientific development and innovation, and must base that examination on a study of cases from the history of science. (shrink)

This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyãya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyãya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyãya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.

Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive "beholding" relation between the knower and the object known and ultimately, he finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge.

Ernst Mach, philosopher, physicist, historian, and physiological-psychologist, presented a bio-psychological model of nature. Although within the community of philosophers Mach has been primarily seen as a physicist who took interest in philosophical questions about the foundations of physics, this thesis places Mach with the context of nineteenth-century evolutionary theory and psychology and sees his views on physics as being largely derivative of his bio-psychology. ;For Mach, nature was a unified whole under the inner direction of evolutionary processes. Evolution produced (...) humans, and humans, still under naturalistic influences, have produced science. Science, then, is deeply part of the natural world, both in its origination and its current practice. Mach can thus be seen as a deep evolutionary naturalist. ;This evolutionary perspective is integrated with psychology. Mach's research in psychology led him to see perception as fundamentally the comparison of contrasts. In fact, evolution, perception, and cognition all followed this model. Furthermore, since science is based upon the act of making measurements, and since measurement is at root the comparison of something to a given standard, all measurement inherently involves psychological comparison. Our knowledge of the world, then, cannot escape the psychological boundaries which constitute it. ;After tracing out Mach's views in bio-psychology, Mach's applications of this to physics are examined. In particular, his famous critique of Newtonian space and time which inspired Einstein can now be seen as partly arising out of the tradition of bio-psychology, and thus a path can be traced from the nineteenth century life sciences to the revolution in twentieth century physics. (shrink)

Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements (...) and virtues. The resulting study is the first sustained naturalized virtue epistemology, and will be of interest to readers in epistemology, cognitive science, and beyond. (shrink)

The theory of descriptions occupies a very prominent place in Russell's system of logic and indeed in his system of philosophy. Since the publication of the now classical paper “On Denoting” in Mind for 1905 the theory had been incorporated into Principia Mathematica , the first volume of which appeared in 1910. In 1918 Russell discussed descriptions in his lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which subsequently were published in The Monist for 1919. A very lucid exposition (...) of the main tenets of the doctrine is to be found in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy dating from the same year. Epistemological aspects of the theory of descriptions are examined in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description“, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1910–11, and also in Chapter V of The Problems of Philosophy, first published in 1912. (shrink)

The study argues that linguistic/communication dysfunctions present in disorganized schizophrenia may stem, at least in part, from an impaired theory of mind. Using pragmatics and systemic linguistic theory, the study examined speech samples of two disorganized schizophrenic patients and attempted to determine if their communicative failures are because they lack theory of mind in the sense that they do not take into account the interlocutor's mind, i.e., the interlocutor's intentions, dispositions, and knowledge; or because they have a (...) hyper-theory of mind through which they over-attribute mental states to their interlocutor, i.e., assume that their interlocutor has access to their intentions, dispositions, and knowledge. The study indicates that disorganized schizophrenics are unlikely to be characterized as lacking a theory of mind; rather they seem to have a hyper-theory of mind, to which the psychopathological symptoms of hallucinations, delusions of reference and incoherent speech can be attributed. (shrink)

The study argues that linguistic/communication dysfunctions present in disorganized schizophrenia may stem, at least in part, from an impaired theory of mind. Using pragmatics and systemic linguistic theory, the study examined speech samples of two disorganized schizophrenic patients and attempted to determine if their communicative failures are because they lack theory of mind in the sense that they do not take into account the interlocutor's mind, i.e., the interlocutor's intentions, dispositions, and knowledge; or because they have a (...) hyper-theory of mind through which they over-attribute mental states to their interlocutor, i.e., assume that their interlocutor has access to their intentions, dispositions, and knowledge. The study indicates that disorganized schizophrenics are unlikely to be characterized as lacking a theory of mind; rather they seem to have a hyper-theory of mind, to which the psychopathological symptoms of hallucinations, delusions of reference and incoherent speech can be attributed. (shrink)

Previous studies have confirmed that individual waste management behavior is influenced by both rational-based and altruistic-oriented beliefs and attitudes. Scholars incorporated personal norms in Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior and confirmed its usefulness in predicting waste management behavior. However, limited attention has been paid to the interactions between the variables in the model. Scholars also commented that the cognitive dimension was largely neglected in the current socio-psychological framework of waste management behavior. This study intends to address this issue by (...) incorporating environmental concern and environmental knowledge in the model and examining the psychological paths linking these variables to waste management behavior within the expanded model of planned behavior. Based on a cross-sectional survey among 434 university students in China, the results showed that subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, personal norms, and environmental knowledge were essential predictors of waste management behavior, whereas the direct effect of attitude was not statistically significant. Environmental concern and subjective norms could influence waste management behavior through personal norms. Environmental knowledge could influence waste management behavior indirectly through environmental concern, personal norms, and perceived behavioral control. Moreover, perceived behavioral control served as a mediator between the relationship of personal norms and waste management behavior. (shrink)

In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention (...) in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance. (shrink)

Arthur Danto’s analytic theory of art relies on a form of artistic interpretation that requires access to the art theoretical concepts of the artworld, ‘an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’. Art, in what Danto refers to as post-history, has become theoretical, yet it is here contended that his explanation of the artist’s creative style lacks a theoretical dimension. This article examines Danto’s account of style in light of the role the (...) artistic metaphor plays in the interpretation of the artwork, arguing that it is unable to account for the metaphorical power he claims is embedded within the work of art. An artist’s style issues from a unique perspective, the way an artist inhabits a specific spot in history. Though each person has such a perspective, when applied aesthetically, it is the key to the articulation of a unique historical meaning in the work of art. At the same time, artists’ knowledge of their contribution remains cut off from this perspective, for they are unaware of their self-manifestation of the historical concept of style. This article makes the case that Danto’s notion of style, based on Sartre’s notion of being-for-itself, cannot fulfil the role he allots it in his theory because, at some level, artists must apprehend their style to create a work of art capable of functioning critically as a countertext. It is only through the apprehension of their style, and dialogical activity that takes place between the artist and the beholders, that the unseen body of artworld theory is formed. Without this, when oriented to the aesthetic, style provides no concept or theory for the mind to behold. This article presents an alternative approach to style that recognizes the role of theory in the creation of metaphor, which would circumvent this problem. (shrink)