Max Weber: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2016, 4. Auflage Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger In: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 20. Bd., Heft 1, S. 1-54, 1904; 21. Bd., Heft 1, S. 1-110, 1905. Erstdruck der vorliegenden, umgearbeiteten Fassung in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I, Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 1920, S. 17-206. Textgrundlage ist die Ausgabe: Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie. 8., photomechanisch gedruckte Auflage; Band 1, (...) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986 (1. Auflage 1920) Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Gesetzt aus der Minion Pro, 11 pt. (shrink)

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

Launched in 1982, the so-calledBerliner Wissenschaftsladen e. V.(WILAB) belonged to the scattered West-German ventures in “counter-science”. This article situates the origins of the “Laden” (~ workshop)—an “alternative” spin-off of sorts, spawned from the Technical University of Berlin—in the context of contemporary advances in regional science policy. In this connection, the ailing, de-industrializing “island city” arguably even played a certain pioneering role: elements of its multipronged “innovation offensive”, which peaked in the early-to-mid 1980s, were visible beyond city limits, including the trade (...) showBIG TECHand, notably, theBerlin Center for Innovation and New Enterprises(BIG), the FRG’s first start-up “incubator”, which opened in 1983.In other words, politically-minded scientists in tendency now had to deal with conditions that were less and less conducive to dreams of a “socially engaged” and “non-alienated” (counter-)science. Indeed, while hardly opposed to the new gospel of innovation, it’s not surprising that ventures such as WILAB, committed as they were to the production of “socially useful” science, found themselves increasingly marginalized. It’s as such a marginal venture, my argument goes, that WILAB’s prima facie hopeless attempt to initiate a different, more “humane” information technology sheds an instructive light on the emergence of “entrepreneurial” science in the FRG during the 1970s and 1980s. (shrink)

Both historical treatment and critical analysis, this work by a noted physicist takes a fascinating look at a fundamental of physics, tracing its development from ancient to modern times.

"This volume is a scholarly collection of massive biographical detail, much of which is being revealed for the first time." --Isis A selection of Fisch's most important articles on these topics is presented here in a convenient format, including revisions and updating and a complete bibliography of Fisch's published writings.

Historical surveys of the concept of space considers Judeo-Christian ideas about space, Newton's concept of absolute space, space from 18th century to the ...

According to Fisher, a hypothesis specifying a density function for X is falsified (at the level of significance ) if the realization of X is in the size- region of lowest densities. However, non-linear transformations of X can map low-density into high-density regions. Apparently, then, falsifications can always be turned into corroborations (and vice versa) by looking at suitable transformations of X (Neyman's Paradox). The present paper shows that, contrary to the view taken in the literature, this provides no argument (...) against a theory of statistical falsification. (shrink)

Newly updated study surveys concept of space from standpoint of historical development. Space in antiquity, Judeo-Christian ideas about space, Newton’s concept of absolute space, space from 18th century to present. Extensive new chapter (6) reviews changes in philosophy of space since publication of second edition (1969). Numerous original quotations and bibliographical references. "...admirably compact and swiftly paced style."—Philosophy of Science. Foreword by Albert Einstein. Bibliography.

Abweichend vom orthodoxen Marxismus reduziert Adler indessen die Dialektik auf eine bloße Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaft, welcher keine Realdialektik des geschichtlichen Seins entsprechen soll. Ebenso lehnt Adler – darin einig mit anderen Theoretikern der zweiten Internationale wie Karl Kautsky und Karl Liebknecht – die Verbindung von wissenschaftlichem Sozialismus und Materialismus ab: der wahre Marxismus sei "in Wirklichkeit sozialer Idealismus". Der historische Materialismus verkehrt sich für Adler im Grunde in subjektiven Idealismus. Sein besonderes Interesse galt denn auch folgerichtig einer erkenntniskritischen Grundlegung der (...) Soziologie, in der die Marx'schen Motive eine Verbindung mit dem Transzendentalismus Kants eingegangen sind. Den formalen Begriff von Demokratie kritisierend, differenzierte Adler zwischen der politischen Demokratie als Herrschaftsorganisation der bürgerlichen Klasse und einer sozialen Demokratie, in der mit den Klassengegensätzen zugleich die Unterdrückung abgeschafft sein und an ihre Stelle eine "solidarische Verwaltungsreform" der Gesellschaft treten solle. Die Errichtung einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft blieb für Adler gebunden an das Marx'sche 'Zerbrechen der Staatsmaschinerie'. Adler schrieb diese Abhandlung im Jahr 1904. (shrink)

Cimpian et al. observed that we accept generic statements of the form ‘Gs are f’ on relatively weak evidence, but that if we are unfamiliar with group G and we learn a generic statement about it, we still treat it inferentially in a much stronger way: all Gs are f. This paper makes use of notions like ‘representativeness’, ‘contingency’ and ‘relative difference’ from psychology to provide a uniform semantics of generics that explains why people accept generics based on weak evidence. (...) The spirit of the approach has much in common with Leslie’s cognition-based ideas about generics, but the semantics will be grounded on a strengthening of Cohen’s relative readings of generic sentences. In contrast to Leslie and Cohen, we propose a uniform semantic analysis of generics. The basic intuition is that a generic of the form ‘Gs are f’ is true because f is typical for G, which means that f is valuably associated with G. We will make use of Kahneman and Tversky’s Heuristics and Biases approach, according to which people tend to confuse questions about probability with questions about representativeness, to explain pragmatically why people treat many generic statements inferentially in a much stronger way. (shrink)

Upon Scheler’ s death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortega y Gasset called Scheler "the first man of the philosophical paradise." The Human Place in the Cosmos, the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his much (...) larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics--works he was not able to complete because of his early demise. Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of said two projected much larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy. Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ("impulsion") and "spirit," this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person. (shrink)

Abstract. This introductory chapter was written in 1996, for a new book of review articles on the emerging science of consciousness, specifically aimed at undergraduate and postgraduate students by experts in the relevant fields. Following on a brief history, the chapter moves on to definitions of consciousness and background philosophical issues, and then introduces a unified, non-reductionist scientific approach. It then summarises major issues for studies of consciousness in cognitive psychology, including studies of attention, memory, the extent of preconscious analysis (...) and the relation of consciousness more generally to human information processing. It then turns to the neuropsychology of consciousness, starting with some apparent neural requirements for the transition from preconscious to conscious states, various clinical dissociations of consciousness, conditions for integration (or binding) and, finally, clinical applications, including different forms of mind/body interaction and evidence for the causal efficacy of mental states. The chapter concludes that while some of the ancient problems of consciousness remain unsolved, its study has become the subject of a rapidly developing science. (shrink)

The proliferation of late of disciplines beginning in “neuro”—neuroeconomics, neuroaesthetics, neuro–literary criticism, and so on—while welcomed in some quarters, has drawn a great deal of critical commentary as well. It is perhaps natural that scholars in the humanities, especially, tend to find these “neuro”-prefixes irritating. But by no means all of them: there are those humanists who discern in this trend a healthy development that has the potential of “revitalizing” the notoriously bookish humanities. Neurohistory is a case in point, typically (...) being dismissed by historians while finding more sympathetic consideration elsewhere. While it sides with the former position, this essay attempts to develop a more complex picture. It will suggest that defiant humanists may underestimate the extent to which they are already participating in a culture profoundly tuned toward a quasi-naturalistic construction of the mind/brain as an embodied, situated, and distributed thing. The roots of this construction will be traced into the popular, academic, and technological discourses that began to surround the “user” in the 1980s, with special emphasis on the concomitant assault on “cognitivism.” What is more, the very same story—insofar as it demonstrates the complicity of the “postclassical” mind with our own man-made and “digital” age—will serve to complicate the neuro-optimists’ vision of human nature exposed by a new kind of science. (shrink)

This paper raises a challenge to Jonathan Schaffer's priority monism. I contend that monism may be true at the actual world but fail to hold as a matter of metaphysical necessity, contrary to Schaffer's view that monism, if true, is necessarily true. My argument challenges Schaffer for his reliance on contingent physical truths in an argument for a metaphysically necessary conclusion. A counterexample in which the actual laws of physics hold but the physical history of the universe is different shows (...) that priority monism is contingently true at best. I suggest some general lessons for discussion of metaphysical dependence. (shrink)

This paper develops a critique of the concept of ‘ethical identity’ as this has been used recently to distinguish between ‘cynical’ and ‘authentic’ forms of corporate responsibility. Taking as our starting point Levinas’ demanding view of responsibility as ‘following the assignation of responsibility for my neighbour’, we use a case study of a packaging company—PackCo—to argue that a concern with being seen and/or seeing oneself as responsible should not be confused with actual responsibility. Our analysis of the case points first (...) to the allure of programmes of strategic corporate responsibility and the ways in which, through identification, they can provide a tacit form of moral sanction to managers in their aggressive pursuit of profit. It then contrasts the responses of different managers to negative staff feedback to illustrate the difference between managers’ attempts to defend their identity of being ‘responsible’ managers, and responsible conduct itself. The paper concludes that a potent danger of programmes of corporate responsibility is that they allow managers to deceive not just others, but also themselves in relation to the exercise of responsibility. (shrink)

Bd. 2. Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik -- Bd. 3. Philosophische Anthropologie -- Bd. 4. Philosophie und Geschichte -- Bd. 5. Varia I -- Bd. 6. Varia II.

Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations, suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans I have argued that functional accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings. Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousness as such. Given this, (...) first-person investigations of experience need to be related nonreductively to third-person investigations of processing. For example, conscious contents may be related to neural/physical representations via a dual-aspect theory of information. Chalmers arrives at similar conclusions. But there are also theoretical differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term `awareness'. I do not agree that functionalctional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving `psychological complementarity'. I also suggest that the hard problem posed by `qualia' has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism. (shrink)

Brings together some of the most prominent and influential contemporary interpreters of Adorno's work in a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores Adorno's relation to themes and problems in postmodern thought.

Digital organizations form part of the new wave of blockchain technologies, following Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies. “Utopia ofion” offers an analysis of the utopian promise of digital organizations through a reading of one such project, Colony. We provide a critique of the ideology of Colony's white paper, supplemented by readings of pages from its website, as a member of a genre of texts that promote their products through seemingly neutral, technical descriptions. Colony's texts suggest an abstract, contextless and scaleless organizational (...) solution—powered by smart contracts on a blockchain—that, according to its proponents, might be applied to any social situation, from small firm to state-level governance. For its users, this organization combines a promise of sovereignty removed from that of the state, as well as implied financial returns. Our reading of Colony echoes the critiques of scholars arguing that cyberlibertarianism is a dominant politic of blockchain technologies. Furthermore, drawing on critiques of code as law and the elision of the social in smart contracts, we argue that Colony's vision presents a model of technical organization that substitutes for the state in the context of waning popular sovereignty. We ultimately suggest an understanding of digital organizations reminiscent of the settler colonial situation: the assumption of an empty social space to be filled, and the promise of sovereignty and riches for those occupying it. Analysis of these logics is relevant as hype increases around non-fungible tokens, Web3, and the corporate metaverse as well as data practices more widely. (shrink)

For this eighth edition he also wrote a new chapter on the quantum theory of solids.