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  1.  80
    Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread?Max Albert - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (4):584-593.
    Probability theory is important not least because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The frequency theory of probability on its own is irrelevant in the single case. However, Howson and Urbach argue that Bayesianism can solve the frequentist's problem: frequentist-probability information is relevant to Bayesians. The present paper shows that Howson and Urbach's solution cannot work, and indeed that no Bayesian solution can work. There is no way to make frequentist probability (...)
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  2.  79
    Methodology and Scientific Competition.Max Albert - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):165-183.
    Why is the average quality of research in open science so high? The answer seems obvious. Science is highly competitive, and publishing high quality research is the way to rise to the top. Thus, researchers face strong incentives to produce high quality work. However, this is only part of the answer. High quality in science, after all, is what researchers in the relevant field consider to be high quality. Why and how do competing researchers coordinate on common quality standards? I (...)
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  3.  39
    Bayesian Rationality and Decision Making: A Critical Review.Max Albert - 2003 - Analyse & Kritik 25 (1):101-117.
    Bayesianism is the predominant philosophy of science in North-America, the most important school of statistics world-wide, and the general version of the rational-choice approach in the social sciences. Although often rejected as a theory of actual behavior, it is still the benchmark case of perfect rationality. The paper reviews the development of Bayesianism in philosophy, statistics and decision making and questions its status as an account of perfect rationality. Bayesians, who otherwise are squarely in the empiricist camp, invoke a priori (...)
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  4.  30
    Resolving Neyman's Paradox.Max Albert - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):69-76.
    According to Fisher, a hypothesis specifying a density function for X is falsified (at the level of significance ) if the realization of X is in the size- region of lowest densities. However, non-linear transformations of X can map low-density into high-density regions. Apparently, then, falsifications can always be turned into corroborations (and vice versa) by looking at suitable transformations of X (Neyman's Paradox). The present paper shows that, contrary to the view taken in the literature, this provides no argument (...)
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  5. Indirect Reciprocity, Golden Opportunities for Defection, and Inclusive Reputation.Max Albert & Hannes Rusch - 2013 - MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner’s dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be invaded by any other strategy that conditions behavior only on own and partner reputation. The first point of this paper is to show that an evolutionary version of backward induction can lead to a breakdown of this kind of indirectly reciprocal cooperation. Backward induction, (...)
     
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  6. Der kritische Rationalismus und die Verfassung der Wissenschaft.Max Albert - 2002 - In Jan M. Böhm, Heiko Holweg & Claudia Hoock (eds.), Karl Poppers Kritischer Rationalismus Heute. Mohr Siebeck. pp. 231--241.
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  7.  19
    Critical Rationalism and Scientific Competition.Max Albert - 2010 - Analyse & Kritik 32 (2):247-266.
    This paper considers critical rationalism under an institutional perspective. It argues that a methodology must be incentive compatible in order to prevail in scientific competition. As shown by a formal game-theoretic model of scientific competition, incentive compatibility requires quality standards that are hereditary: using high-quality research as an input must increase a researcher's chances to produce high-quality output. Critical rationalism is incentive compatible because of the way it deals with the Duhem-Quine problem. An example from experimental economics illustrates the relevance (...)
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  8.  45
    Die Falsifikation Statistischer Hypothesen/The Falsification of Statistical Hypotheses.Max Albert - 1992 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 23 (1):1-32.
    It is widely held that falsification of statistical hypotheses is impossible. This view is supported by an analysis of the most important theories of statistical testing: these theories are not compatible with falsificationism. On the other hand, falsificationism yields a basically viable solution to the problems of explanation, prediction and theory testing in a deterministic context. The present paper shows how to introduce the falsificationist solution into the realm of statistics. This is done mainly by applying the concept of empirical (...)
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  9.  2
    Karl Popper und die Verfassung der Wissenschaft.Max Albert - 2019 - In Giuseppe Franco (ed.), Handbuch Karl Popper. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 321-337.
    Poppers Logik der Forschung steht für eine erhebliche Problemverschiebung in der Wissenschaftstheorie, von der Logik der Forschung zur Verfassung der Wissenschaft. Popper sieht die Methodologie als eine Institution, als ein Regelsystem für die Akzeptanz oder Verwerfung von Theorien und Beobachtungsaussagen. Dieser immer noch wenig beachtete institutionelle Aspekt von Poppers kritischem Rationalismus ist zum einen für die Interpretation der methodologischen Regeln von Bedeutung. Zum anderen wirft er ein neues Problem auf: Kann sich eine solche Methodologie als Verfassung der Wissenschaft etablieren? Eine (...)
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