Resolving Neyman's paradox

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):69-76 (2002)
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Abstract

According to Fisher, a hypothesis specifying a density function for X is falsified (at the level of significance ) if the realization of X is in the size- region of lowest densities. However, non-linear transformations of X can map low-density into high-density regions. Apparently, then, falsifications can always be turned into corroborations (and vice versa) by looking at suitable transformations of X (Neyman's Paradox). The present paper shows that, contrary to the view taken in the literature, this provides no argument against a theory of statistical falsification.

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Citations of this work

Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.

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References found in this work

Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.
Logical versus historical theories of confirmation.Alan Musgrave - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):1-23.
A falsifying rule for probability statements.Donald A. Gillies - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):231-261.

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