There exists a longstanding debate over the global institutional implications of Immanuel Kant's political philosophy: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government, or instead only a co...

Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to (...) respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions? (shrink)

Based on Kant’s own concept of politics, it is possible to construct his political philosophy that is related to but also different from his metaphysics of right. Politics is the practice of realizing the principles of right in experience; therefore, Kant’s political philosophy must explore the general conditions that make this practice possible. These conditions, such as political judgement, publicity and the enlightenment of the people, are indispensable to Kant’s thinking about human (...) external freedom but do not belong to the metaphysics of right. Kant’s metaphysics of right is undoubtedly a liberal theory, but we can also identify some republican elements in his political philosophy. In this way, Kant provides us with a very instructive programme to absorb republican elements within a liberal theory. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 89-110.

These comments on Professor Gallie's paper, ‘Kant's View of Reason in Politics’ are focused on a particular issue, and I shall explain at the outset what it is and why I have concentrated on it. Gallie's account of the details of Kant's political philosophy and his specific comments on them strike me as interesting and reasonable and I have, therefore, little to add. Instead I want to question Gallie's assumptions about, and dissatisfactions with, the philosophic framework on which (...) Kant's political philosophy rests. There is, firstly, his complaint that reason is insufficiently defined though he takes a somewhat more positive view later. There is, secondly, his claim that Kant's moral philosophy is inferior to his epistemology . On these points Gallie is, in my view, not convincing and not even completely clear. Without disagreeing totally with Gallie's assessments—still less claiming that Kant is invariably right—I want to argue that Kant's conclusions are formidably supported by, and can best be understood in terms of, his own arguments. To me the question about the cogency of his case is more interesting than the details of his political philosophy. How rational are, in fact, his conclusions? So, at the risk of covering some familiar ground, I want to stress some of the general features of Kant's philosophy and argue, in particular, that his political philosophy is based on and, in turn, supplements, his moral one. The latter seems to me to be as intricate, interesting and fruitful as his epistemology and exhibits a similar architectonic. .). (shrink)

Article reviews the book "Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy," edited by Howard Lloyd Williams.

Scholars have long debated the relationship between Kant’s doctrine of right and his doctrine of virtue (including his moral religion or ethico-theology), which are the two branches of his moral philosophy. This article will examine the intimate connection in his practical philosophy between perpetual peace and the highest good, between political and ethico-religious communities, and between the types of transparency peculiar to each. It will show how domestic and international right provides a framework for the development (...) of ethical communities, including a kingdom of ends and even the noumenal ethical community of an afterlife, and how the transparency and trust achieved in these communities is anticipated in rightful political society by publicity and the mutual confidence among citizens that it engenders. Finally, it will explore the implications of this synthesis of Kant’s political and religious philosophies for contemporary Kantian political theories, especially those of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. (shrink)

This article examines the controversy that has arisen concerning the interpretation of Immanuel Kant's account of European colonialism. One the one hand there are those interpreters such as Robert Bernasconi who see Kant's account as all of a piece with his earlier views on race which demonstrate a certain narrow mindedness in relation to black and coloured people and, on the other hand, there are those such as Pauline Kleingeld and Allen Wood who argue that the earlier writings on race (...) are not wholly typical of Kant's approach and suggest that Kant's later discussions of colonialism in Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals provide a better indication of Kant's progressive views on the treatment of non-European societies. The article draws attention to the very strong evidence of Kant's dislike for the pattern of European expansion to other parts of the globe and indicates that within Kant's writings there are the seeds of a wholly unconventional critical understanding of western colonialism that have yet to be developed fully. The article suggests that this critical understanding surpasses the unsystematic objections made to colonialism in post - modernist thought and also the critique proffered by the determinist Marxist account. (shrink)

In this volume, thirteen distinguished contributors from the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany cast light on important aspects of Kant's liberal thinking.

The present volume brings Arendt's notes for these lectures together with other of her texts on the topic of judging and provides important clues to the likely direction of Arendt's thinking in this area.

Hannah Arendt's last philosophical work was an intended three-part project entitled _The Life of the Mind_. Unfortunately, Arendt lived to complete only the first two parts, _Thinking_ and _Willing_. Of the third, _Judging_, only the title page, with epigraphs from Cato and Goethe, was found after her death. As the titles suggest, Arendt conceived of her work as roughly parallel to the three _Critiques_ of Immanuel Kant. In fact, while she began work on _The Life of the Mind_, Arendt lectured (...) on "Kant's Political Philosophy," using the_ Critique of Judgment_ as her main text. The present volume brings Arendt's notes for these lectures together with other of her texts on the topic of judging and provides important clues to the likely direction of Arendt's thinking in this area. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Liberty or Political Freedom Equality Independence as a Key Concept in Kant's Political Philosophy Sovereignty and Independence Independence and Fraternity Resistance and Publicity Conclusion.

My intention in this essay will be to explore the role that consent-based arguments perform in Kant's political and legal philosophy. I want to uncover the extent to which Kant considered that the legitimacy of the State and of its laws depends upon the outcome of intersubjective deliberation. Commentators have divided over the following question: Is Kant best viewed as a member of the social contract tradition, according to which the legitimacy of the state and of the laws (...) it promulgates derives from the consent of those people over whom it claims authority, or should he be read as having put forward a secularized version of natural law theory, according to which the state and its laws are legitimate to the extent that they are attained by standards of sound reason and supported by an objective account of the human good? (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to clarify the meaning and extent of Kant's liberalism by contrasting some of his key ideas to those of Burke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Nozick, Rawls, and Schmitt. My claim is that Kant's political philosophy navigates the path between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, just as his theoretical philosophy tries to navigate between dogmatism and skepticism, and that current liberal claim on Kant has important limitations in Kant's letter, as well as in (...) spirit. (shrink)

While Kants political thought, which downplay or dismiss the role of teleology, I restore Zweckms politics as a theoretically and practically useful material principle, and show that a teleological perspective complements the perspective stipulated by the formal principle of Recht. By means of a systematic reconstruction of what I call ssigkeits political thought.

The importance of Kant's political thought can best be understood if we do two things: if we compare it to political theory as it existed before Kant and if we see how it fundamentally depends upon his philosophy of history. It is Kant's philosophy of history that allows him to take a major step beyond previous political thinkers. Kant brings together for the first time two projects which had traditionally remained separate. He develops a theory (...) of the ideal state and also a philosophy of history, i.e., a theory of how to actually realize the ideal state in history. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyse the potential for political emancipation that lies within Kant’s conception of Aufklärung, in critical dialogue with enlightenment critics and specialised Kantian literature. My thesis is that Kant’s concept of enlightenment is intrinsically political and so it must be studied from the point of view of his political philosophy, which was fully developed in the decade of the 1790s. From this standpoint, I propose we study the role (...) and place of Aufklärung within Kant’s central political thesis, to wit: that only the united will of the people can be a legitimate authority. (shrink)

This article considers Hannah Arendt's posthumously published Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, lectures delivered at the New School for Social Research in the fall semester of 1970. By taking Arendt's highly provocative reading of Kant as a point of departure, the essay probes Arendt's own theory of judgment. Arendt frequently draws distinctions that prove untenable. If the faculty of judgment, in Arendt's words, has to do with one's “ability to make distinctions,” and yet her own distinctions continually falter, (...) and that in a text about judgment, then it seems that she thwarts her own discourse. More specifically, she complicates her assertions by staging something that she, in Kantian terms, describes as “enlarged thought”; she explores the subject of judgment from different perspectives and allows for perspectival plurality, thereby “wooing,” as it were, our consent. In so doing, Arendt, in thoroughly Kantian fashion, establishes judgment as a performative category that defies being taught and instead remains a matter of practice. (shrink)

This paper argues that the political adage “Be ye prudent as serpents and guileless as doves” involves three different types of relation between prudence and morality, namely: unification (Vereinigung), subordination (Unterordnung), and association (Beigesellung). I maintain that these relations are set up according to the same principle that determines the relationship between mechanical and teleological causality in the third Critique. Thus, I argue that morality and prudence are much more systematically related within the system of critical philosophy than (...) is normally assumed in the literature and that this is made possible by way of an intimate relationship between prudence and teleological judgment. (shrink)

According to recent scholarship, Kant’s "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" and the introductory section to "The Conflict of the Faculties" are masterpieces of philosophical rhetoric. The philosophical significance of these texts lies in establishing the free public use of reason as a tool to discipline political power through pure practical reason, and the rhetorical mastery consists in presenting the free public use of reason as a means to satisfy the ruler’s pragmatic practical reason. Elaborating on (...) this interpretation, I flesh out three further aspects of the writings in question. First, I examine the four types of arguments that Kant crafts in defence of the public use of reason and show how their pragmatic practical character is fully in keeping with the foundation of politics on pure practical ideas. Second, contrasting Kant’s notion of the public use of reason with the classical liberal conception of free speech, I argue that the distinctive character of Kant’s notion of the public use of reason consists in adding to the liberal demand for freedom from state censorship the requirement of the self-discipline of the participants in the public use of reason. Third, I contend that Kant’s notion of the public use of reason goes beyond a mere non-coercive discursive procedure and conclude that, to qualify as public in the distinctive Kantian sense, publicly presented positions must uphold theoretical and moral criteria informed by critical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper discusses Kant’s dealing with a fundamental of modern politics, that is, the concept of sovereignty, as well as its own capacity to reshape political order. Overcoming failures and fallacies that traditionally such a concept has maintained, Kant’s political philosophy focuses on the way to reach international peace institutionally. Starting from the discussion of contradiction in sovereignty, the paper briefly analyzes the analogy between individuals and states; finally, core elements of Kant’s cosmopolitan thought (...) will be presented. Kant’s project basically seeks to rewrite the early modern relation between politics and philosophy promoting republicanism, which is, mainly, a theory that shares state’s powers and defends representation. Extending such a political way from domestic to a world domain, Kant’s final solution for a World Republic implies a change of paradigm, by which modern sovereignty gets reassessed into a blended institutionalized coercion that emphasizes vertical power-sharing, so it realizes a cosmopolitan model of world order. (shrink)

Part of 'Works of Philosophy and Their Reception' series / -/- Contributors include: Ronald Beiner, Linda Zerilli, D.N. Rodowick, Cecilia Sjöholm, Martin Blumenthal-Barby, Helga Varden, Roger Berkowitz.

An introduction to the political philosophy of Kant, exploring how he developed his views in a context shaped by controversies following the French revolution. It provides new information on his followers and critics as they engaged in high stakes political debates on freedom's relation to the state at this key turning point in history.

In all three areas of Kant's political philosophy that Luigi Caranti covers, he offers compelling and persuasive accounts that sharpen our understanding of Kant and show the value of close study of historical texts for today's philosophy. Recent political philosophy inspired by Kant often draws from his more general moral writings, as exemplified by Rawls's use of the categorical imperative as a procedure. Others, however, cite Kant's works more directly concerned with political philosophy. (...) Caranti assesses these readings in two areas—the foundations for human rights and the conditions for international peace—and adds an assessment of Kant on progress toward a just political order.The first two topics receive... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 51-80 [Access article in PDF] Kant's Politics of Enlightenment Ciaran Cronin THE ENDURING RESONANCE OF Kant's brief essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (henceforth "WE") can be traced in large part to the connection it makes between two ideas central to the self-understanding of European modernity. The first is the idea of autonomy implicit in its famous (...) definition of enlightenment: "Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority.Minority is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another... Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment." 1 Kant's rallying cry to independence of thought resonates with the view that individual autonomy is a central component of modern self-identity. The second is the defense of freedom in the public use of reason: "For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters." 2 With this emphatic endorsement of freedom of expression as a precondition of enlightenment, Kant appears to situate the project of enlightenment squarely in the tradition of liberal political thought. [End Page 51]Yet the interpretation of the essay as a defense of a liberal model of freedom of expression proves to be problematic on a closer reading. Even Kant's famous definition of enlightenment is not without its puzzling aspects. He employs the legal term "minority" (Unmündigkeit, often translated as "immaturity"), the condition of a child or dependent who has not reached the legal age of adulthood, to describe the condition of human beings before they have achieved enlightenment; but as some of his contemporaries remarked, the idea of a minority that is "self-incurred" makes no legal sense. That their puzzlement was not just a matter of injudicious terminology is shown by Kant's apparent indecision over whether the failure of individuals to make independent use of their reason is due to lack of courage on their part 3 or whether it is because they have been prevented from doing so by constraining social authorities. 4 Even more perplexing is Kant's idiosyncratic distinction between the private and public uses of reason: "by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted." 5 What is perplexing in this is not so much the restriction of the public use of reason to scholars addressing a public of readers as the characterization of the use of one's reason in exercising a civil or public office as "private." Moreover, liberal sensibilities cannot fail to be ruffled by the authoritarian cast of some of Kant's remarks. Most troubling is the observation that only a ruler who "hasa well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public peace" can tolerate complete freedom of public expression and that a lesser degree of civil freedom (bürgerliche Freiheit) is conducive to the fullest expansion of "a people's freedom of spirit" (or intellectual freedom, Freiheit des Geistes). 6 This would seem to lend ammunition to those who argue that Kant ultimately embraces a conservative politicalposition in contradiction to the radical implications of his own critical philosophy. 7 [End Page 52]But an examination of the historical context of the essay reveals that it is neither a clear expression of a liberal nor of a conservative position as these are conventionally understood, or so I will argue. The perplexing features of the essay become intelligible when it is seen as part of a larger project of reconciling the ideal requirements of a republican constitution with the political reality of Prussian absolutism in response to contemporary debates concerning... (shrink)

Against several recent interpretations, I argue in this paper that Immanuel Kant's support for enlightened absolutism was a permanent feature of his political thought that fit comfortably within his larger philosophy, though he saw such rule as part of a transition to democratic self-government initiated by the absolute monarch himself. I support these contentions with (1) a detailed exegesis of Kant’s essay "What is Enlightenment?" (2) an argument that Kantian republicanism requires not merely a separation of powers (...) but also a representative democratic legislature, and (3) a demonstration that each stage of a democratic transition can potentially be in an absolute monarch’s short-run self-interest. I conclude the paper by defending Kant's theory of democratization against charges of consequentialism and paternalism and by pointing out its similarity to other accounts of democratic transitions (for example, those of Samuel Huntington and Guillermo O'Donnell), suggesting a previously unnoticed opportunity for cross-fertilization between political philosophy and comparative politics. (shrink)

This book consists of two parts: Hannah Arendt’s notes for a lecture series and seminar on Kant, which she gave in 1970, and an essay by Ronald Beiner on Arendt’s theory of judgment.

This book consists of two parts: Hannah Arendt’s notes for a lecture series and seminar on Kant, which she gave in 1970, and an essay by Ronald Beiner on Arendt’s theory of judgment.

Kant's various teachings concerning (world) peace are characterized by a philosophically unique realism. Thereby, they are fundamentally distinguished from all preceding doctrines about peace. This thesis of realism refers to various aspects, respectively levels, of the doctrine, namely: 1) in general to the assumptions of the doctrine of Right3 altogether (ch. II); 2) in particular to the assumptions of the doctrine of eternal peace (chs. III-V); 3) to the recommendations with regard to the realization of eternal peace (chs. VI-XI); 4) (...) to the reasons by which Kant justifies the hope with regard to eternal peace (ch. XII, XIV-XVII); 5) to Kant's strict denial of a specifically political "morals" (ch. XIII-XVII). (shrink)