I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape of hardware (...) growth curves, as well as the ease of modifying minds, are found to have a major impact on how quickly a digital mind may take advantage of these factors. (shrink)

We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as (...) parts of the biological brain integrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route for mind uploading, as a person's personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain and onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary. (shrink)

A class of probability functions is studied. This class contains the probability functions of half-spin particles and spinning classical objects. A notion of realisability for these functions is defined. In terms of this notion two versions of Bell's theorem and their inverses are stated and proved.

I formulate the Zermelo-Russell paradox for naive set theory. A sketch is given of Zermelo’s solution to the paradox: the cumulative type structure. A careful analysis of the set formation process shows a missing component in this solution: the necessity of an assumed imaginary jump out of an infinite universe. Thus a set is formed by a suitable combination of concrete and imaginary operations all of which can be made or assumed by a Turing machine. Some consequences are drawn from (...) this improved analysis of the concept of set, for the theory of sets and for the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

This essay is a critical analysis of some themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It is not primarily Wittgenstein-exegesis. Much more modestly, my purpose is to express my own thoughts about some questions which Wittgenstein has treated in his writings. It is the second in a series of two articles. The first article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Private Language and Meaning", was published in Volume 42, 2007, of the present YEARBOOK. Section 1, “Philosophical Method”. Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as language therapy (...) is criticised. Instead philosophy is construed as foundational research. Wittgenstein’s statement that mathematical logic cannot contribute to progress in philosophy is repudiated. Several examples of ideas and results in mathematical logic which have led to the solution of philosophical problems are given. Section 2, “Contradictions: The Wittgenstein- Turing Debate”. In lectures on the foundations of mathematics given in 1939, Wittgenstein claimed that contradictions in mathematical theories are harmless. A debate ensued on this question between him and Alan Turing. In support of Turing's standpoint, I use the theorem on Taylor series, Church's Theorem, and Gentzen’s Cut-Elimination Theorem to show that Wittgenstein’s standpoint is untenable. For orientation, I also include here the abstract for the first article in the series, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Private Language and Meaning”. Section 1, “The Private Language Argument”. An independent argument is given for Wittgenstein’s thesis that there is no private language. I show that psychological terms in ordinary language, in contrast to an implication of Wittgenstein’s own private language argument, in their meanings do contain references to inner states, processes, and events. Section 2, “Meaning”. Wittgenstein’s definition of meaning as use in the language is criticised. Meaning is instead identified with something in the content of a conscious mind. Applications are given to some suggestions in the philosophy of language by Chomsky, Harman and Fodor, Grice, and Kripke. (shrink)

This essay is a critical analysis of some themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It is not primarily Wittgenstein-exegesis. Much more modestly, my purpose is to express my own thoughts about some questions which Wittgenstein has treated in his writings. It is the first in a series of two articles. The second article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Philosophical Method and Contradictions”, will occur in next year’s issue of the present YEARBOOK. Section 1, “The Private Language Argument”. An independent argument is given (...) for Wittgenstein’s thesis that there is no private language. I show that psychological terms in ordinary language, in contrast to an implication of Wittgenstein’s own private language argument, in their meanings do contain references to inner states, processes, or events. Section 2, “Meaning”. Wittgenstein’s definition of meaning as use in the language is criticised. Meaning is instead identified with something in the content of a conscious mind. Applications are given to some suggestions in philosophy of language by Chomsky, Grice, Harman and Fodor, and Kripke. For orientation, I also include here the abstract for the second article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Philosophical Method and Contradictions”. Section 1, “Philosophical Method”. Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as language therapy is criticised. Instead philosophy is construed as foundational research. Wittgenstein’s statement that mathematical logic cannot contribute to progress in philosophy is repudiated. Several examples of ideas and results in mathematical logic which have led to the solution of philosophical problems are given. Section 2, “Contradictions: The Wittgenstein-Turing Debate”. In lectures on the foundations of mathematics given in 1939, Wittgenstein claimed that contradictions in mathematical theories are harmless. A debate ensued on this question between him and Alan Turing. In support of Turing’s standpoint, I use the theorem on Taylor series, Church’s Theorem, and Gentzen’s Cut-Elimination Theorem to show that Wittgenstein’s standpoint is untenable. (shrink)

Eight derivations of Bell’s inequality are given. First a simple and concrete derivation is given drawing on the full strength of the two hypotheses of locality and hidden variables. Two attempts at deriving Bell’s inequality without locality are made. They fail, but give valuable insight into the form which nonlocality must take in quantum physics. Arguments are given against this form of nonlocality. Ontological ideas which allow separation, realism, and locality in quantum mechanics are indicated. In the following five derivations, (...) a number of variants of the assumption of hidden variables are tried. Among the insights which these derivations give rise to are: Particles cannot be assumed to have spin or polarisation values for as much as one fixed direction. The classical picture of electromagnetic radiation is incompatible with QM. Heisenberg’s idea of potentiality in elementary particles is incompatible with QM. There is a weakest form of hidden variables, called realisability, which is sufficient to yield Bell’s inequality. Quantum states cannot be identified with physical states. The mathematical problem of the integration of quantum states into physical states is nontrivial. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist. -/- Design/methodology/approach This paper focuses on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant future; catastrophe (...) trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to human civilization; technological transformation trajectories, in which radical technological breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course; and astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos. -/- Findings Status quo trajectories appear unlikely to persist into the distant future, especially in light of long-term astronomical processes. Several catastrophe, technological transformation and astronomical trajectories appear possible. -/- Originality/value Some current actions may be able to affect the long-term trajectory. Whether these actions should be pursued depends on a mix of empirical and ethical factors. For some ethical frameworks, these actions may be especially important to pursue. (shrink)

The idiotypic network theory (INT) was conceived by the Danish immunologist Niels Kaj Jerne in 1973/1974. It proposes an overall view of the immune system as a network of lymphocytes and antibodies. The paper tries to offer a reconstruction of the genesis of the theory, now generally discarded and of mostly historical interest, first of all, by taking into account the context in which Jerne’s theoretical proposal was advanced. It is argued the theory challenged, in a sense, the supremacy of (...) the clonal selection theory (CST), this being regarded as the predominant paradigm in the immunological scenario. As CST found shortcomings in explaining certain phenomena, anomalies, one could view INT as a competing paradigm claiming to be able to make sense of such phenomena in its own conceptual framework. After a summary outline of the historical background and some relevant terminological elucidations, a narrative of the various phases of elaboration of the theory is proposed, up to its official public presentation. (shrink)

Kaj učimo, ko v sodobni slovenski gimnaziji učimo latinsko? S kakšnimi cilji vstopamo v razrede, kaj pričakujemo, da bodo naši dijaki znali? Navedena vprašanja so le na videz preprosta. V najbolj pragmatičnem smislu nanje odgovarja veljavni učni načrt za latinščino, ki niza cilje pouka in s tem pričakovane zmožnosti dijakov. V tem prispevku skušam slednje osvetliti z zornega kota prakse in sicer z vpogledom v slovensko državno tekmovanje v znanju latinščine, namenjeno di­jakom tretjega letnika gimnazije. Ob tem izhajam iz predpostavke, (...) da je tekmovalne naloge moč vsaj do določene mere imeti za »praktično« dopolnilo učnemu načrtu, za dovolj reprezentativne odgovore na vpra­šanje, kaj si pod začrtanimi cilji predstavljamo povsem pragmatično, in tako tudi za ilustrativen prikaz naših skupnih pričakovanj o tem, katere kompetence naj bi dijaki po skoraj treh letih gimnazijskega učenja imeli. Tekmovalne naloge, deloma pa tudi dileme, ki jih pred ocenjevalce postavlja točkovanje odgovorov, mi obenem služijo kot osnova za razmislek o tem, kje ležijo prednosti in didaktični izzivi sodobnega pouka latinščine. (shrink)

Zelo je utrujen – kaj naj zdaj počne s slavo? – dovolj je bilo. Dobro je spoznal sovražnike in prijatelje – domnevne prijatelje, kajti za občudovanjem in ljubeznijo so se skrivale njihove lastne koristi, njihove lastne sumljive sanje, pretkane in hkrati nedolžne.

V prispevku raziščem, kaj je o Homerju in arhaični epiki trdil Matija Murko. Čeprav je Murko v sodobnem homeroslovju razmeroma poznan, vsaj kot predhodnik Milmana Parryja in Alberta Lorda, pa ni še nihče temeljiteje analiziral, kaj je zapisal o homerski epiki. V prispevku obravnavam njegove najpomembnejše ugotovitve, ki neposredno ali posredno zadevajo Homerja in homeroslovje. Osre­dotočim se na raziskovanje kompozicijskih tehnik in pevcev, na literarne primerjave, na razumevanja slepih pevcev in na Murkov odnos do sočasnega homeroslovja. Kot pokažem, je Murko (...) v svojih spisih postavil precej različnih tez o homerski epiki, do katerih so se klasični filologi po vsem svetu dokopali šele več desetletij kasneje. (shrink)

Niels Kaj Jerne has proposed the “immune network theory” of interactions among anti‐idiotypic antibodies, able to interfere with humoral responses to certain antigens. After the occurrence of the primary generation of antibodies, against an antigenic epitope, idiotypes of these antibodies induce anti‐idiotypic antibodies that modulate the intensity of the first response, and so on. Adverse effects following SARS‐COV‐2 COVID‐19 vaccines are occasionally similar to the symptoms of COVID‐19 infection. Rare events linked to SARS‐CoV‐2 vaccines also resemble some rarely reported COVID‐19 (...) complications. Safety data from product information by European Medicines Agency suggest that spectra do overlap for four main vaccines. The proposition is that vaccine events and COVID‐19 complications are related to anti‐idiotypic antibodies whose spatial shape can lead to interactions with ACE2 molecules, in individuals with a prolonged Spike protein synthesis. The vaccines target cells by their affinity to the vaccine vector, or to engulf lipid nanoparticles. Anti‐idiotypic antibodies shaped similarly to the Spike protein possibly interact with ACE2 molecules and cause diverse signs and symptoms. (shrink)

Les corps algébriquement clos, réels clos et pseudo-finis n'ont, pour chaque entier n, qu'un nombre fini d'extensions de degré n; nous montrons qu'ils partagent cette propriété avec tous les corps qui, comme eux, satisfont une propriété très rudimentaire de préservation de la dimension, de nature modèle-théorique. Ce résultat est atteint en montrant qu'une certaine action du groupe GLn d'un tel corps n'a qu'un nombre fini d'orbites. /// La korpoj algebre fermataj, reale fermataj kaj pseudofinataj ne havas, pri ciu integro n, (...) pli ol finitan nombron de sternejoj kun grado n; ni montras ke ili kunpartigas tiu ci propecon kun ciu tiel korpoj kiuj kontentigas kiel ili unu tre simplan modelteorian propecon de konserveco de la amplekso. Pri atingi la resultaton, ni montras ke kelka ago de la grupo GLn de tiel korpo havas sole finitan nombron de orbitoj. (shrink)

Članek obravnava pravno teorijo, ki je prisotna v končnem delu Vebrovega spisa Etika. Prvi poizkus eksaktne logike nagonske pameti. Veber se le mimogrede ukvarja s teorijo prava, vendar njegov prispevek ni zanemarljiv. Vebrova Etika je logika nagonske pameti: Veber, gledano iz čistega predmetnoteoretičnega vidika, ne sestavlja zbirke moralnih zapovedi, ampak namerava orisati najsplošnejša formalna načela, ki določajo pravilnost nagonskega doživetja. Tega, kaj mora posameznik narediti v danem trenutku, logika nagonske pameti ne more povedati, ker je le formalna veda. »Most« med (...) formalnim in materialnim pristopom nravnemu problemu Veber najde v glasu vesti, ki svetuje posamezniku, kaj naj naredi v konkretnem delovanju. V soglasju s tem mora biti državno pravo osnovano na načelih nagonske logike, ker bi bilo drugače brez vsake veljavnosti. Pravo velja, v kolikor je utemeljeno na logiki, ki orisuje imanentna načela človeške narave; cilj prava je pospeševanje čim bolj pravilnega življenja posameznikov in družbe. Z druge strani vsebina tega prava ni enkrat za vselej določena in napisana, ampak vsakič izhaja iz hermenevtike, ki jo posamezniki in družba morajo izvršiti o sebi in o svoji naravi. Etika »zdravega razuma« in »povprečnega človeka« je po Vebru najboljši model za materialno izpopolnenje formalne nagonske logike. (shrink)

Special Issue “Risks of artificial general intelligence”, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 26/3 (2014), ed. Vincent C. Müller. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/teta20/26/3# - Risks of general artificial intelligence, Vincent C. Müller, pages 297-301 - Autonomous technology and the greater human good - Steve Omohundro - pages 303-315 - - - The errors, insights and lessons of famous AI predictions – and what they mean for the future - Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S. Ó hÉigeartaigh - pages 317-342 - - (...) - The path to more general artificial intelligence - Ted Goertzel - pages 343-354 - - - Limitations and risks of machine ethics - Miles Brundage - pages 355-372 - - - Utility function security in artificially intelligent agents - Roman V. Yampolskiy - pages 373-389 - - - GOLEM: towards an AGI meta-architecture enabling both goal preservation and radical self-improvement - Ben Goertzel - pages 391-403 - - - Universal empathy and ethical bias for artificial general intelligence - Alexey Potapov & Sergey Rodionov - pages 405-416 - - - Bounding the impact of AGI - András Kornai - pages 417-438 - - - Ethics of brain emulations - Anders Sandberg - pages 439-457. (shrink)

Prave Nordano asertas ke planlingvo povas sukcesi nur, se ekzistas sociologia bazo por tia lingvo. Li opinias ke por tutmonda planlingvo tiu bazo mankas. Ekzistas tamen sociologia komunumo en Eŭropo, sed al tiu Eŭropo apartenas nek Britujo nek Ruslando. Oni do povas krei planlingvon sukcesan nur surbase de tiu limigita Eŭropo. Nordano skizas tian tuteŭropan lingvon klarigante la gvidajn principojn. La teoria fundamento de Nordano estas falsa, čar ankaŭ la angloj kaj amerikanoj apartenas al lo okcidenteŭropa komunumo. Krome li projektas (...) lingvon kiu estas pli latina ol eŭropa. Nordano atakas la principojn de Esperanto, sed tamen parte mem aplikas ilin. (shrink)

Papers from the conference on AI Risk (published in JETAI), supplemented by additional work. --- If the intelligence of artificial systems were to surpass that of humans, humanity would face significant risks. The time has come to consider these issues, and this consideration must include progress in artificial intelligence (AI) as much as insights from AI theory. -- Featuring contributions from leading experts and thinkers in artificial intelligence, Risks of Artificial Intelligence is the first volume of collected chapters dedicated to (...) examining the risks of AI. The book evaluates predictions of the future of AI, proposes ways to ensure that AI systems will be beneficial to humans, and then critically evaluates such proposals. 1 Vincent C. Müller, Editorial: Risks of Artificial Intelligence - 2 Steve Omohundro, Autonomous Technology and the Greater Human Good - 3 Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala and Sean O’Heigeartaigh, The Errors, Insights and Lessons of Famous AI Predictions - and What they Mean for the Future - 4 Ted Goertzel, The Path to More General Artificial Intelligence - 5 Miles Brundage, Limitations and Risks of Machine Ethics - 6 Roman Yampolskiy, Utility Function Security in Artificially Intelligent Agents - 7 Ben Goertzel, GOLEM: Toward an AGI Meta-Architecture Enabling Both Goal Preservation and Radical Self-Improvement - 8 Alexey Potapov and Sergey Rodionov, Universal Empathy and Ethical Bias for Artificial General Intelligence - 9 András Kornai, Bounding the Impact of AGI - 10 Anders Sandberg, Ethics and Impact of Brain Emulations 11 Daniel Dewey, Long-Term Strategies for Ending Existential Risk from Fast Takeoff - 12 Mark Bishop, The Singularity, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love AI -. (shrink)