Writers starting with Tertullian and the author behind the Didascalia Apostolorum attest to the presence of early Christian women baptizers, as do a variety of later writers. The early Christian tradition of Holy Spirit as female and mother, her womb the font of new birth (Jn 3.3-5), helps illuminate why women may have been seen as the midwives, or ministers, of this birthing ritual. Likewise, the identification of the font as a womb adds to Jocelyn Toynbee’s 1964 proposal (...) that a scene on the Walesby Tank, a fourth-century Romano-British baptismal font, portrayed two clothed women assisting a nude female neophyte at her baptism. (shrink)

Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor provide a clearly reasoned, articulate account of the two main principles of secularism—equal respect, and freedom of conscience—and argue that in our religiously diverse, politically interconnected world, secularism, properly understood, may offer the only path to religious and philosophical freedom.

The 54 pieces chosen for this book are linked by short exclamatory passages.

Arnold J Toynbee was a historian whose 12-volume A Study of History had a huge impact on the thinking of his day. This epic, multi-volume work offered a grand synthesis of world history from the global perspective of the rise and fall of civilizations, rather than concentrating on the history of nation-states or of ethnic groups. For Time magazine Toynbee was 'an international sage' and certainly in the same bracket as 'Einstein, Schweitzer or Bertrand Russell'. Daisaku Ikeda is (...) a figure of global stature, the spiritual leader of a worldwide lay Buddhist organisation devoted to the promotion of education, culture and peace. Between 1971 and 1974 Toynbee and Ikeda discussed many of the vital issues which confronted their societies in the early 1970s, all of which remain current and significant. Indeed, topics such as the problems of pollution, dwindling natural resources, conflict and war, the role of religion, and population growth, are even more pressing than they were thirty years ago. In this volume - which still reads as freshly as it did when it was first published, and which is now reissued for a new generation of readers - the inspiring challenge issued by both men is framed as follows: will humankind choose to salvage its destiny by a revolution in thinking and morals? Or will disaster ensue if it pursues its present course towards self-destruction and the despoliation of the environment? While recognising that our survival is threatened by the imbalance between human immaturity and technological achievement, the optimistic message of this classic Dialogue is that man-made evils have a man-made cure. (shrink)

Esteemed philosopher Jocelyn Benoist argues for a renewed realism that takes seriously the context in which intention occurs. "What there is"-the traditional subject of metaphysics-can be determined only in context, Benoist contends, carving out a new path that rejects acontextual ontologies and approaches to the mind.

Professor Toynbee observes in his Study of History that as he walked down Whitehall one day in the spring of 1918, and passed the Board of Education offices which had been commandeered for a new department of the War Office, “improvised in order to make an intensive study of trench warfare,” he found himself repeating the passage from St. Matthew's Gospel.

Jocelyn Maclure | : Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is a major contribution to the normative literature on minority rights. I nonetheless suggest that liberal culturalism as a normative theory, even in Patten’s sophisticated version, is ill suited to deal with the challenges related to the status of religion in the public sphere that are so prevalent in contemporary democracies. In addition, I submit that Patten did not supply a fully convincing answer to the argument that liberal egalitarianism, well understood, (...) is capacious enough to secure fair terms of social cooperation for members of cultural minorities, making the language of “cultural rights” and “cultural recognition” superfluous. | : Le livre Equal Recognition d’Alan Patten contribue de façon majeure aux travaux de philosophie politique sur les droits des minorités culturelles. Je suggère néanmoins que la théorie normative qu’est le « culturalisme libéral », y compris dans la version sophistiquée défendue par Patten, n’est pas outillée pour penser les omniprésents défis concernant le statut de la religion dans l’espace public. De plus, j’avance que Patten n’a pas été en mesure d’offrir une réponse pleinement satisfaisante à ceux qui soutiennent que l’égalitarisme libéral bien compris est en mesure d’offrir des termes de coopération sociale justes aux membres des minorités culturelles, sans devoir être complété par des « droits culturels » ou par le langage de la « reconnaissance » des cultures. (shrink)

Patients in Quebec can legally obtain medical assistance in dying (MAID) if they are able to give informed consent, have a serious and incurable illness, are at the end of their lives and are in a situation of unbearable suffering. Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2015 Carter decision, access to MAID, under certain conditions, has become a constitutional right. Quebec physicians are now likely to receive requests for MAID from their patients. The Quebec and Canadian laws recognize a physician’s (...) right to conscientious objection, but this right is contested both in the medical ethics literature and in the public sphere. This paper presents the results of a qualitative study conducted with twenty Quebec physicians who did not integrate MAID into their medical practice, either because they were opposed to or deeply ambivalent about MAID. The interviews aimed to explore the reasons – religious and secular – for opposition to or ambivalence towards MAID. The secular reasons given by participants were grouped into four main categories: 1) the ends of medicine and professional identity, 2) the philosophy of palliative medicine and resource allocation in palliative care, 3) benevolent paternalism, the “good death”, and the interests of future selves, 4) the risk of a slippery slope and the protection of vulnerable people. (shrink)

The question of whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying has recently come to the fore in debates about the legalisation of assisted dying. For example, it was central to critiques of the 2021 amendments made to Canada’s assisted dying law. The question of whether changes to a country’s assisted dying legislation lead to descents down slippery slopes has also come to the fore—as it does any time a jurisdiction (...) changes its laws. We explore these two questions through the lens of Canada’s experience both to inform Canada’s ongoing discussions and because other countries will confront the same questions if they contemplate changing their assisted dying law. Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying law has evolved through a journey from the courts to Parliament, back to the courts, and then back to Parliament. Along this journey the eligibility criteria, the procedural safeguards, and the monitoring regime have changed. In this article, we focus on the eligibility criteria. First, we explain the evolution of the law and what the eligibility criteria were at the various stops along the way. We then explore the ethical justifications for Canada’s new criteria by looking at two elements of the often-corrosive debate. First, we ask whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying of decisionally capable people with mental illnesses and people with disabilities as their sole underlying medical conditions. Second, we ask whether Canada’s journey supports slippery slope arguments against permitting assisted dying. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

In “Slowing the slide down the slippery slope of Medical Assistance in Dying: Mutual Learnings for Canada and the US,” Daryl Pullman (2023) gets a variety of empirical, logical and legal things wro...

The damaging effects of the Industrial Revolution are discussed with particular reference to man's improvidence leading to the waste of irreplaceable natural resources and to the pollution of the environment. The role of the British Royal Society is then analysed in the context of technological advances and religious thought. It is claimed that monotheistic religions have removed the constraints on man's greed and have overthrown the traditional balance between man and nature. The present environmental crisis is ascribed to the rise (...) of monotheism. The remedy may consist in reverting to pantheism and the religions of the East. (shrink)

Machine learning-based AI algorithms lack transparency. In this article, I offer an interpretation of AI’s explainability problem and highlight its ethical saliency. I try to make the case for the legal enforcement of a strong explainability requirement: human organizations which decide to automate decision-making should be legally obliged to demonstrate the capacity to explain and justify the algorithmic decisions that have an impact on the wellbeing, rights, and opportunities of those affected by the decisions. This legal duty can be derived (...) from the demands of Rawlsian public reason. In the second part of the paper, I try to show that the argument from the limitations of human cognition fails to get AI off the hook of public reason. Against a growing trend in AI ethics, my main argument is that the analogy between human minds and artificial neural networks fails because it suffers from an atomistic bias which makes it blind to the social and institutional dimension of human reasoning processes. I suggest that developing interpretive AI algorithms is not the only possible answer to the explainability problem; social and institutional answers are also available and in many cases more trustworthy than techno-scientific ones. (shrink)

In a thought-provoking paper, Schuklenk and Smalling argue that no right to conscientious objection should be granted to medical professionals. First, they hold that it is impossible to assess either the truth of conscience-based claims or the sincerity of the objectors. Second, even a fettered right to conscientious refusal inevitably has adverse effects on the rights of patients. We argue that the main problem with their position is that it is not derived from a broader reflection on the meaning and (...) implications of freedom of conscience and reasonable accommodation. We point out that they collapse two related but distinct questions, that is, the subjective conception of freedom of conscience and the sincerity test. We note that they do not successfully show that the standard norm according to which exemption claims should not impose undue hardship on others is unworkable. We suggest that the main reason why arguments such as no one is forced to be a medical professional are flawed is that public norms should not constrain citizens to choose between two of their basic rights unless it is necessary. In fine, Schuklenk and Smalling, who see conscience claims as arbitrary dislikes, sell freedom of conscience short and forego any attempts at balancing the competing rights involved. We maintain the authors neglect that most of legal reasoning is contextual and that the blanket restriction of healthcare professionals' freedom of conscience is disproportionate. (shrink)

Je défends dans ce texte une version particulière de la position que Sharon Street a appelée le «constructivisme humien». J’esquisserai pourquoi je considère que ce constructivisme est préférable à la fois au réalisme moral et au constructivisme kantien sur le plan de la compréhension du statut ontologique des valeurs. Après avoir accepté de reconnaître le rôle des pressions de l’évolution dans l’émergence de la moralité, le constructivisme humien doit toutefois préciser le rôle de l’intersubjectivité historique dans l’évolution subséquente de la (...) morale. J’expliquerai aussi pourquoi je considère que l’intégration d’un volet cohérentiste au constructivisme permet d’atténuer les craintes concernant le caractère potentiellement non-cognitiviste des théories contextualistes. Enfin, j’esquisserai pourquoi l’idée d’un «espace des raisons morales» indépendant, à certains égards, de l’esprit humain est compatible avec le constructivisme humien.I defend a version of what Sharon Street has dubbed “Humean constructivism.” I’ll first sketch out why I think that contextual constructivism provides us with a more plausible understanding of the ontological status of values than both Kantian constructivism and moral realism. In addition to its recognition of the role of evolutionary pressures in the emergence of human morality, contextual constructivism must now clarify the role of historical intersubjectivity in the subsequent development of morality. I will then claim that adding a coherentist module to Humean constructivism provides a satisfactory answer to those who fear that contextual metaethical theories can only be non-cognitivist. Finally, I will sketch out why I think that the notion of a mind-independent “space of moral reasons” is largely compatible with Humean constructivism. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a personal and professional narrative of how Canada went from prohibition to permission for medical assistance in dying. I describe the legal developments to date and flag what might be coming in the near future. I also offer some personal observations and reflections on the role and impact of bioethics and bioethicists, on what it was like to be a participant in Canada's law reform process, and on lessons that readers in other jurisdictions might take (...) from Canada's experience. (shrink)

The the question whether the generality of thinking precludes mtentions drrected to smgular objects as such. After characterizing in what teirns thinking is. shows that this generality does not prevent us of having singular thoughts, i.e.,.intentions that are not only directed, but apprehend the singular in its own singularity.

Most of the essays collected here are essaysinmetaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (...) (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’. (shrink)

This work argues for a moral consideration of animal work relations. Paying special attention to the livestock industry, the author challenges the zootechnical denigration of animals for increased productivity awhile championing the collaborative nature of work. For Porcher, work is not merely a means to production but a means of living together unity. This unique reconsideration of work envisions animals as co-laborers with humans, rather than overwrought tools for exploitative, and often lethal, employment. Readers will learn about the disjunction between (...) those focused on productivity and profit and those who favor a more ethical work environment for animals. Porcher's text also engages environmental and political debates concerning animal-human relations. (shrink)

Ce commentaire intégral des Conjectures de Nicolas de Cues manifeste toute la fécondité de l'oeuvre dans sa complexité. Il élucide l'art général des conjectures, en explore et approfondit les sources doctrinales (en particulier lulliennes) et scientifiques : optiques, mathématiques, biologiques et médicales... Il montre ainsi que la théorie cusaine de la connaissance constitue une hénologie des points de vue et met en évidence l'articulation du rapport entre la vérité, objet de toute recherche connaissante, et l'altérité, condition de tout être fini, (...) et notamment de l'homme. La vérité dans l'altérité se révèle alors comme condition de possibilité de tout ce qui est à partir de l'Un - ce qui constitue l'ordre de l'être - et comme condition de possibilité de toute pensée. Il s'agit, dès lors, de saisir la singularité de l'approche cusaine de la réflexion réciproque entre l'ordre de la pensée et l'ordre de l'être. Après avoir analysé le concept central de conjecture, entendu non comme une simple supposition, mais bien comme une connaissance inadéquate du vrai, la première partie déploie les principes de la nouvelle méthode, fondée sur l'analogie fondamentale entre mens humaine et mens divine. La découverte de ces principes nécessite l'exposition d'une théorie du nombre articulée à celle, d'inspiration proclusienne, des quatre unités (divine, intellectuelle, rationnelle et sensible). Cette première partie conduit à la mise en place de figures manuductrices, paradigmatiques pour notre connaissance. La seconde partie du commentaire explicite les exemples d'application de l'ars coniecturalis donnés par le Cusain en mathématiques, en philosophie naturelle et en anthropologie. Le lecteur découvrira ici comment les Conjectures engagent une philosophie de l'esprit et une philosophie critique, fondamentalement liées à une pensée de l'hétéronomie. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la perception? Par elle, que nous disent les sens du monde, de l'autre et de nous-mêmes? Rien! Les sens sont muets. Ils n'ont rien à nous dire! Telle est la réponse de Jocelyn Benoist. Il est essentiel, pourtant, que nous puissions en parler. Seulement c'est nous qui parlons, non eux. Et si, voulant faire droit à la réalité de notre expérience sensible. nous commencions par renoncer à la traiter d'abord comme un discours? Le mutisme des sens demeure (...) traversé de bruits. Jocelyn Benoist, envers et contre un certain traitement philosophique de la perception - qui la confond avec la connaissance que nous pouvons en tirer ou le sens que nous pouvons lui donner -, nous invite à écouter en elle le bruissement du sensible. Selon lui, pour rendre celui-ci pleinement audible. il faut congédier ce que la philosophie aujourd'hui appelle le "problème de la perception" et, peut-être, renoncer au concept même de "perception" tel que nous l'héritons de la philosophie moderne, au profit d'une enquête sur la texture réelle et poétique du sensible. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un phenomene? La pensee moderne emploie ce terme avec une forme d'evidence. On se dispute sur ce que sont les phenomenes, mais on ne doute pas qu'il y en ait ni qu'ils constituent un point de depart sur lequel on puisse construire. Ce livre, a travers une mise en perspective historique et conceptuelle globale, remet en question cette evidence. Non pas qu'il rejette la notion de phenomene, mais il essaie de comprendre d'abord de quel type de decision philosophique elle (...) est le produit et quel type de montage elle suppose. Sur cette base, il met en lumiere sous quelles conditions on peut effectivement parler de phenomenes et dissipe la mythologie liee a un emploi inconditionne de ce terme, frequent dans la philosophie contemporaine. Contre tout phenomenalisme, il fait valoir le lien metaphysique dans lequel le langage nous met immediatement avec les choses. (shrink)

La Décennie des Nations unies pour les femmes (1975‑1985) a coïncidé avec une brève période d’ouverture au cours de la guerre froide, lorsque les nations nouvellement décolonisées semblèrent avoir le dessus, ayant pris le contrôle de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies et de plusieurs agences de l’ONU, où elles promouvaient l’idée d’un nouvel ordre économique international. Cet article examine brièvement deux réseaux d’intellectuelles activistes basées dans le Sud qui ont émergé à la fin de cette décennie. L’Association des femmes africaines (...) pour la recherche et le développement (AFARD/ AAWORD), créée en 1977, a démontré qu’il était possible de réorienter radicalement les programmes de développement vers le bienêtre et la durabilité plutôt que vers la productivité et la croissance. L’association Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), fondée en 1984, partageait les objectifs de l’AFARD et en incluait quelques-unes des membres, mais elle reflétait un nouveau contexte de la guerre froide où le développement s’est réorienté vers des solutions néolibérales. (shrink)

A study of how public service has changed in this new era of interconnectedness.

Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and can cause workers physical, mental, and also moral suffering, (...) which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed. The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering ( animal welfare, stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry. (shrink)

To date, ethics discussions about stem cell research overwhelmingly have centered on the morality and acceptability of using human embryonic stem cells. Governments in many jurisdictions have now answered these “first-level questions” and many have now begun to address ethical issues related to the donation of cells, gametes, or embryos for research. In this commentary, we move beyond these ethical concerns to discuss new themes that scientists on the forefront of NRM development anticipate, providing a preliminary framework for further discussion (...) between scientists and ethicists. Fostering strong partnerships between neuroscientists and ethicists that operate and collaborate within this evolving framework will maximize the translation of NRM discoveries on the brain into cures that are safe and address the needs of science and society. (shrink)