Celem niniejszego artykułu jest rozważenie znaczenia i roli kontemplacji i medytacji w filozofii. Filozofia jest tu rozumiana klasycznie — jako umiłowanie mądrości, jako rodzaj myślenia teoretycznego, podejmującego najbardziej ogólne zagadnienia, dotyczące świata. W spełnianiu tego zadania doniosłą rolę odgrywają kontemplacja i medytacja. Kontemplacja jest stanięciem w obliczu bytu czy przedmiotu i intelektualnym chłonięciem go przez podmiot poznający. Jest nieuprzedzonym oglądaniem czegoś czy przypatrywaniem się czemuś, co jest jakoś transcendentne wobec podmiotu kontemplującego. Natomiast medytacja jest namysłem nad życiem świadomościowym podmiotu. W (...) poznaniu filozoficznym dopełniają się. Kontemplacja gwarantuje obiektywność poznania, a medytacja — czuwanie nad prawidłowością aktów poznawczych. (shrink)

This is an attempt to outline the range of problems that should be taken into account when studying the ethos of scholars. The author sets forth from an uncommon starting point. He does not construct “an ideal model of the ethos of the scholar”, neither is he concerned with the “pathology of academic life”. Such approaches are dubbed “normative-functional” by the author, and without implicating that they are methodologically implausible he refrains from using them due to the simple consideration that (...) they are unable to accommodate the “tragic component of the role” involved. He sets out to show that the scholars cannot avoid finding themselves in a conflict of values and norms that cannot be ordered using criteria commonly accepted in the academic circles or derived from the concept of the role or the ethos of the scholar. Scholars are exposed to a conflict between the norms accepted by the academic community and the norms accepted by other communities to which they belong. The article discusses the influence of contemporary changes in the organization of science – its dependence on the state, its subservience to the national goals or to the exigencies of other social groups. The author is not satisfied with the treatment of these problems by R. K. Merton, and he reviews various philosophical conceptions with the hope of finding a better answer. He seeks to conceptualize the role of the scholar in terms of the theories proposed by L. Petrażycki, A. Kępiński, I. Kant, M. Weber, K. Mannheim, P. Bourdieu, and others, but has to conclude that in none of these theories is it possible to remove the tragic element from the picture of ethically relevant decision-making. The author ends by saying that the possession of “social and moral competences” that overstep the boundaries of the scholar’s responsibility defined by his role and ethos is a necessary condition of the social fulfilment of that role. (shrink)

Tato práce se zabývá možnými přístupy k etice sexuality, jejich klady i zápory. Etikou sexuality zde není míněno moralizování, stejně tak sexualitou není míněn pouze koitus, pohlavní chování je zde míněno v širším významu tedy včetně rozlehlé oblasti lidského svádění, okolků či otálení. Popsány jsou čtyři klasické přístupy k etice sexuality: tradicionalistický, romantický, marxisticko-feministický a liberální, avšak uvážen je i přístup antinatalistický, který vyplývá z asymetrického argumentu Davida Benatara uveřejněného v jeho práci Nebýt či být. Benatarův antinatalizmus totiž vytváří etiku (...) pohlavního chování, v níž pouze sex, který nevede k rozmnožení, může být morální. I když je tento pátý, antinatalistický přístup značně kontroverzní a zdaleka ne intuitivní, extrémnost jeho pozic se příliš neliší od tradicionalistického pohledu, v němž je morální pouze sex k rozmnožení vedoucí, tyto dva přístupy tak lze postavit do přímé opozice jako dvě krajní možnosti uvažování o etice pohlavního chování. Roli střední cesty v takovém řazení potom zaujme liberální přístup, který jako jediný etiku sexuality nevidí jako etiku odlišnou od jiných lidských činností. (shrink)

Paradoks implikacji materialnej pozostawał nierozwiązany od starożytności, ponieważ uważano, że naturą implikacji jest wynikanie. Artykuł ukazuje, że tą naturą jest przeciwstawność. Zostaje podane rozwiązanie paradoksu wraz z odpowiednimi zmianami nazewnictwa, dodaniem konektywów i postulatem przejęcia roli dotychczasowej implikacji przez równoważność. Ponadto zaproponowane zostają zmiany nazewnictwa bramek logicznych, odwzorowujących kompetycję w elektronice.

Tato studie je recenzní statí ke knize: Christian FLECK, A Transatlantic History of the Social Sciences: Robber Barons, the Third Reich and the Invention of Empirical Social Research. London: Bloomsbury Academic 2011. Z témat, jež rozvíjí Fleckova kniha, sleduje především otázku, jak velké americké nadace formovaly a profilovaly výzkumnou agendu sociálních věd. Je zde předvedeno, jak definice vědy prosazovaná ve dvacátých letech minulého století velkými americkými nadacemi zcela zásadně proměnila samotnou ideu výzkumu a přinesla mnohé institucionální inovace. Vztah filantropie a (...) sociálněvědního výzkumu je sledován jak v obecném smyslu, z hlediska formativních idejí ovlivňujících vývoj sociální věd a reálnou vědeckou praxi, tak i ve vztahu k různým národním tradicím, roli jednotlivých nadací a jejich aktivitám směřujícím k prosazení specifické koncepce vědeckého výzkumu. Pozornost je zde věnována zejména Rockefellerově nadaci, jejíž koncept „realistického" výzkumu významně ovlivnil institucionální dějiny sociálních věd. Studie se rovněž zaměřuje na styl psaní, jenž se uplatňuje v současných textech o dějinách nadací, zejména ve srovnání s dosud převažujícím důrazem na studium intelektuálních dějin sociálních věd. (shrink)

Pogląd standardowy jest taki, że semantyka formalna stosuje się do języka naturalnego tylko w bardzo ograniczonym stopniu. Powodem tego stanu rzeczy jest nieunikniona nieokreśloność mowy potocznej polegająca m. in. na wieloznaczno- ściach, nieostrości czy tolerancji składniowej, a także obecności kontekstów intensjonalnych, co skutkuje limitacjami zasady kompozycjonalności. Ponadto konwersacja potoczna korzysta z rozmaitych reguł, np. reguł Grice’a, które wykraczają poza formalizm logiczny. W konsekwencji język naturalny nie podlega pełnej formalizacji. Z drugiej strony, jeśli L jest językiem formalnym, to metajęzyk ML, w (...) którym ten pierwszy jest opisywany, musi być częściowo nieformalny – zawiera np. terminy zwykłej matematyki, w szczególności teorii mnogości. Nawet jeśli, np. dzięki technice arytmetyzacji, ML daje się przedstawić w L, tego rodzaju reprezentacja jest tylko lokalna. W gruncie rzeczy pogląd taki można wyprowadzić z pewnych uwag Tarskiego o roli języka naturalnego. Zwykle przyjmuje się, że tzw. uniwersalność języka potocznego jest źródłem kłopotów związanych z antynomiami. Tak jest oczywiście i okoliczność ta wymaga pewnej „sanacji”, np. postaci odróżnienia stopni języka. Jednakże nawet usunięcie antynomii w taki lub inny sposób nie zmienia faktu, że to, co nieformalne ma priorytet wobec tego, co formalne. W konsekwencji także semantyka formalna ma także swoje ograniczenia w odniesieniu do języków sformalizowanych. (shrink)

Cílem článku je prozkoumat otázku po epistemickém statusu morálních intuic. Empirické výzkumy na poli morální psychologie ukazují, že intuice hojně využíváme při morálním hodnocení. Spoléháme se na ně však i jako morální filosofové při testování našich teorií – má-li některá normativní teorie proti-intuitivní důsledky, chápeme to jako její vadu a vice versa. V článku se snažím zodpovědět otázku, zda je taková praxe odvolávání se na morální intuice jako na evidenci ospravedlnitelná – je morální intuice spolehlivým epistemickým kanálem? Nejprve se budu (...) opírat o příbuznou debatu zaměřenou na epistemické intuice, představím tzv. restrikcionistickou výzvu a vysvětlím, z jakého důvodu se zaměřuji na morální intuice. V následující sekci předložím dle mého názoru nejsilnější linii útoku na epistemickou spolehlivost morálních intuic – argument z intuitivní nestability. Dříve jsme nevycházeli z úžasu nad zprávami o masivních rozdílech mezi námi Zápaďany a obyvateli exotických krajin, kterými nás ze svých terénních výzkumů zásobovali etnografové a antropologové. Dnes to jsou především morální psychologové a experimentální filosofové, kteří nás udivují ještě více odhalováním značné variability v intuicích – tentokrát však nejen mezi civilizovanými a domorodými lidmi, nýbrž i v srdci naší vlastní kultury. V další části tak předložím jednoduchou typologii intuitivní nestability a představím v současnosti již značně rozsáhlý soubor dat, který dokumentuje právě tuto neblahou vlastnost morálních intuic. Na jejich základě pak ve finální sekci dospěji k závěru, že morální intuice nejsou schopné dostát epistemickým nárokům, které klademe na jiné informační zdroje (např. smyslové vnímání), a jako takové nemohou sehrávat svou domnělou evidenční roli. V úplném závěru předložím předběžné poznámky týkající se možnosti využívat morálních intuic spíše jako zdroje motivace a za tím účelem navrhnu obrátit filosofickou praxi testování normativních teorií naruby. (shrink)

Cílem článku je prozkoumat otázku po epistemickém statusu morálních intuic. Empirické výzkumy na poli morální psychologie ukazují, že intuice hojně využíváme při morálním hodnocení. Spoléháme se na ně však i jako morální filosofové při testování našich teorií – má-li některá normativní teorie proti-intuitivní důsledky, chápeme to jako její vadu a vice versa. V článku se snažím zodpovědět otázku, zda je taková praxe odvolávání se na morální intuice jako na evidenci ospravedlnitelná – je morální intuice spolehlivým epistemickým kanálem? Nejprve se budu (...) opírat o příbuznou debatu zaměřenou na epistemické intuice, představím tzv. restrikcionistickou výzvu a vysvětlím, z jakého důvodu se zaměřuji na morální intuice. V následující sekci předložím dle mého názoru nejsilnější linii útoku na epistemickou spolehlivost morálních intuic – argument z intuitivní nestability. Dříve jsme nevycházeli z úžasu nad zprávami o masivních rozdílech mezi námi Zápaďany a obyvateli exotických krajin, kterými nás ze svých terénních výzkumů zásobovali etnografové a antropologové. Dnes to jsou především morální psychologové a experimentální filosofové, kteří nás udivují ještě více odhalováním značné variability v intuicích – tentokrát však nejen mezi civilizovanými a domorodými lidmi, nýbrž i v srdci naší vlastní kultury. V další části tak předložím jednoduchou typologii intuitivní nestability a představím v současnosti již značně rozsáhlý soubor dat, který dokumentuje právě tuto neblahou vlastnost morálních intuic. Na jejich základě pak ve finální sekci dospěji k závěru, že morální intuice nejsou schopné dostát epistemickým nárokům, které klademe na jiné informační zdroje (např. smyslové vnímání), a jako takové nemohou sehrávat svou domnělou evidenční roli. V úplném závěru předložím předběžné poznámky týkající se možnosti využívat morálních intuic spíše jako zdroje motivace a za tím účelem navrhnu obrátit filosofickou praxi testování normativních teorií naruby. (shrink)

W wielu państwach funkcjonują narodowe/centralne komitety bioetyki, których rolą jest monitorowanie i opiniowanie aktualnych problemów bioetycznych pojawiających się ze względu na postęp wiedzy medycznej oraz nauk biologicznych. Procedura ich powoływania oraz sposoby działania, a także wpływ na praktykę różnią się w poszczególnych krajach. UNESCO opracowała szereg wskazówek dotyczących organizacji i funkcjonowania tego typu ciał. W Polsce istnieje potrzeba sprecyzowania zasad działania narodowego/centralnego komitetu bioetyki. Celem tekstu jest przegląd prawnych możliwości powoływania i funkcjonowania komitetów bioetycznych o charakterze narodowym/centralnym wraz z przedstawieniem (...) ich roli oraz refleksją nad kształtem, miejscem, znaczeniem i funkcją tego typu ciała w warunkach polskich. (shrink)

Vision of the Historical role of Poland in Jan Hempel’s Sermons The article presents the vision of the role of Polish nation presented in two works written by Jan Hempel – Polish Sermons and Piast Sermons. The main purpose of the article is to provide the reader with Hempel’s reinterpretation of the role of Poles elaborated by the authors of the Romantic period who regarded Polish nation as the God’s chosen people. Hempel, being a lifelong critic of Christianity, thought of (...) Poland as the Antichrist of nations. With this view in mind he interpreted Polish history and the role of Polish nation in the history of world. Author of the article presents Hempel’s vision of the aforementioned role of Polish nation and seeks its sources in the writings of other thinkers. (shrink)

This paper examines the type of devotion of the early modern soldiers which was referred to as “the fearing of God”. The phenomenon started in the 1560s and continued for two centuries in the Polish and Lithuanian Duchy armies. It was based on the belief in the direct intervention of God during military action, which depended on the conduct of the soldiers. The commanders-in-chief promoted the vision of reality in which crimes were equated with sins and affected the outcome of (...) wars and battles, and even determined the safety of the soldiers themselves. The acts that were displeasing to God were to result in severe punishment during battles, while piety and good behavior guaranteed success. The analysis of this issue was conducted on the basis of normative acts issued by the commanders-in-chief, called military articles, which were supplemented by the analysis of military treaties. The paper emphasizes that this concept was promoted by all commanders regardless of denomination, including Polish Brethren, Lutherans, Reformed Evangelicals and Catholics. It was placed, as a rule, at the beginning of the military articles as an arenga, providing the basis for the validity of the criminal laws. The combination of the “fear of God” and the military law was shown to have rational justification: it guaranteed a higher discipline and morale, which could be reflected in the effectiveness of the warfare conducted. The application of this idea led to the breakdown of soldier solidarity and to the belief that the misconduct of individuals affected the fate of troops and entire armies. The most important creators of this concept include Florian Zebrzydowski, Jan Chodkiewicz and Stanisław Cikowski, and at the turn of the centuries it was developed by Jan Zamoyski and Krzysztof Radziwiłł, nicknamed Piorun. The most elaborate formula in the military articles was presented in the 17th century by Krzysztof Radziwiłł II, and a century later by Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł. A hypothesis was also formulated that an old concept, which survived as one of the elements of Old Polish culture, was adopted to evaluate the Battle of Warsaw of 1920, which has been referred to as the Miracle on the Vistula, what was supposed to symbolize the causal role of God during the war. (shrink)

Evaluating clinical ethics support services has been hailed as important research task. At the same time, there is considerable debate about how to evaluate CESS appropriately. The criticism, which has been aired, refers to normative as well as empirical aspects of evaluating CESS. In this paper, we argue that a first necessary step for progress is to better understand the intervention in CESS. Tools of complex intervention research methodology may provide relevant means in this respect. In a first step, we (...) introduce principles of “complex intervention research” and show how CESS fulfil the criteria of “complex interventions”. In a second step, we develop a generic “conceptual framework” for “ethics consultation on request” as standard for many forms of ethics consultation in clinical ethics practice. We apply this conceptual framework to the model of “bioethics mediation” to make explicit the specific structural and procedural elements of this form of ethics consultation on request. In a final step we conduct a comparative analysis of two different types of CESS, which have been subject to evaluation research: “proactive ethics consultation” and “moral case deliberation” and discuss implications for evaluating both types of CESS. To make explicit different premises of implemented CESS interventions by means of conceptual frameworks can inform the search for sound empirical evaluation of CESS. In addition, such work provides a starting point for further reflection about what it means to offer “good” CESS. (shrink)

One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem of Old Evidence. The problem arises for anyone who models scientific reasoning by means of Bayesian Conditionalization. This article addresses the problem as follows: First, I clarify the nature and varieties of the POE and analyze various solution proposals in the literature. Second, I present a novel solution that combines previous attempts while making weaker and more plausible assumptions. Third and last, I summarize my findings (...) and put them into the context of the general debate about POE and Bayesian reasoning. (shrink)

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given (...) group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions. (shrink)

Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani is one of the most important Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophical texts. Jan Westerhoff offers a new translation, reflecting the best current philological research and all available editions, and adds his own philosophical commentary on the text. His nuanced, philosophically sophisticated commentary explains Nagarjuna's arguments in a way that is both grounded in historical and textual scholarship and connected explicitly to contemporary philosophical concerns.

As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part (...) of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. So the aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations. (shrink)

The book gives an painstaking analysis of Niels Bohr's understanding of quantum mechanics based on a claim that Bohr was influenced by Harald Høffding's approach to philosophical problems.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Review text: "Es gibt Bücher, die durch ihre unprätentiöse, stille und sorgfältige Vorgehensweise auf den ersten Blick über die Sensation hinwegtäuschen, die sie bloßlegen und zur Diskussion anbieten. So ein Buch ist die "Wissenschaftphilosophie? von Jan C. Schmidt, die über die "Instabilität in Natur und Wissenschaft? handelt."Günter Altner in: Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau 9/2009.

This book provides the reader with an analysis of backward causation. The notion of backward causation faces many different paradoxes that threaten to make the notion inconsistent or incoherent. The book denies that these pose a real threat. It developed a theory of causation according to which the orientation of causation is not dependent on the direction of time. In this process it takes issues with David Lewis' contrafactual analysis of causation, and denies that the direction of time is determined (...) by irreversible processes . Likewise the book argues that the conceptual possibility of backward causation requires that the future is just as real as the past and present. Finally the book considers what the physical processes may look like if backward causation not only a a conceptual possibility but also a physical possibility. The conclusion is that no normal matter can possibly participate in backward causal processes. Instead objects moving backwards in time seem to posses negative mass and energy, a kind of objects that would be different from both ordinary objects and hypothetical tachyons. (shrink)

The mind–body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind–body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent (...) character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to universal limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. (shrink)

The article starts from the questions: what is it to be an inhabitant or citizen of a globalised world, and how are we to think of education in relation to such inhabitants? We examine more specifically the so–called ‘European area of higher education’ that is on the way to being established and that can be regarded as a concrete example of a process of globalisation. In the first part of the paper we try to show that the discursive horizon, and (...) the concrete techniques and strategies that accompany the establishment of this space of higher education, invite the inhabitants of that space to see themselves as entrepreneurial and autonomous entities. In the second part we show how this specific kind of subjectivation (this production of subjects), related as it is to this globalised space, involves what we call an immunisation that also affects our thinking and our ideas in and about education. To refer to this as a kind of immunisation implies that globalisation could in fact be considered a closing or enclosing rather than an opening up. We argue, therefore, that this immunisation needs to be refused in favour of the invention of other kinds of subjectivity, other ways of speaking and writing about the world and about education, such that we relate to ourselves in a different way. (shrink)

We introduce a cyclic proof system for the two-way alternation-free modal μ-calculus. The system manipulates one-sided Gentzen sequents and locally deals with the backwards modalities by allowing analytic applications of the cut rule. The global effect of backwards modalities on traces is handled by making the semantics relative to a specific strategy of the opponent in the evaluation game. This allows us to augment sequents by so-called trace atoms, describing traces that the proponent can construct against the opponent’s strategy. The (...) idea for trace atoms comes from Vardi’s reduction of alternating two-way automata to deterministic one-way automata. Using the multi-focus annotations introduced earlier by Marti and Venema, we turn this trace-based system into a path-based system. We prove that our system is sound for all sequents and complete for sequents not containing trace atoms. (shrink)

I argue that meaning is a result of our biological evolution, and that language evolved from primates’ ability to grasp conceptually the most important features of their environment. I hold that natural selection and adaptation ensure that primates both sense and conceptualize their world similarly, and that they therefore think similarly, whenever they receive the same sense impressions. This cognitive similarity enabled our predecessors to learn and develop a language because of the regular association of a particular sound and a (...) particular image. The evolutionary pressure on our predecessors to develop a language was the advantage that such a language had for cooperation and survival. Finally, I argue that the old, but in wider circles frowned-upon theory of meaning, the expressive theory of language, provides the best explanation of the relationship between thought, meaning, and words, because it operates with words and not sentences as the basic semantic unit. (shrink)

It is a Preface to Volume 8:2 (2019) consisting of articles presented at the International Interdisciplinary Conference anniversary of the birth of Jan Łukasiewicz, Rzeszów, Poland.

This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.

Research on expert‐novice differences has mainly focused on how experts solve familiar problems. We know far less about the skills and knowledge used by experts when they are confronted with novel problems within their area of expertise. This article discusses a study in which verbal protocols were taken from subjects of various expertise designing an experiment in an area with which they were unfamiliar. The results showed that even when domain knowledge is lacking, experts solve a novel problem within their (...) area of expertise by dividing the problem into a number of subproblems that are solved in a specified order. The lack of domain knowledge is compensated for by using abstract knowledge structures and domain‐specific heuristic strategies. However, the quality of their solutions is considerably lower than the quality attained by experts who were familiar with the type of problem to be solved. The results suggest that when experts are confronted with novel problems as compared with familiar problems, their form of reasoning remains intact, but the content of their reasoning suffers due to lack of domain knowledge. (shrink)

We have long been accustomed to thinking of democracy as a major selling point of Western institutions. That a set of political institutions should be democratic is widely regarded as the sine qua non of their legitimacy. So widespread is this belief that even those whose institutions do not look very democratic to us nevertheless insist on proclaiming them to be such. Meanwhile, an adulatory attitude toward democracy has arisen in many quarters, and many theorists have taken up anew the (...) idea that if democracy is the way to go in political institutions, then it must also be the way to go in “other” areas, notably in economic and social institutions. So there has arisen a call for “economic democracy” — which is taken to mean, especially, that the “means of production” should be managed by their constituent workers in concert rather than by some few who own, or act for the owners of, those enterprises. Robert Dahl, in his influential Preface to Economic Democracy, sums it up nicely when he proclaims a “stronger justification” for worker participation: “ If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state.”. (shrink)

This paper makes the case for a sharper terminology regarding AIs cognitive abilities. In arguing that thinking requires more than content production, I offer a definition of meaning drawing on a clear distinction between living and machine intelligence. A pivotal argument is the re-use of the Turing Test (TT) for understanding which theories of meaning and consciousness are no longer plausible—because they have been reproduced by software without thereby gaining conscious experience. In following the few theories that have not (yet) (...) failed this reversed Turing Test (RTT), the focus turns towards rethinking the human condition in times of AI along the lines of three questions: What if a machine developed consciousness? What if AI proceeded without developing a consciousness? What, if machinic and human intelligence merged? These three questions in the end lead to examining three related possible futures of humanism as now determined by the relation between Human Intelligence and AI. (shrink)

We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors :1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plausible Bayesian rationalization of consensus through iterated pooling. The link clarifies the conditions under which iterated pooling can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective, and offers an understanding of iterated pooling in terms of higher-order beliefs.

There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community (...) approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. (edited). (shrink)

We recall the notions of weak and strong Euler characteristics on a first order structure and make explicit the notion of a Grothendieck ring of a structure. We define partially ordered Euler characteristic and Grothendieck ring and give a characterization of structures that have non-trivial partially ordered Grothendieck ring. We give a generalization of counting functions to locally finite structures, and use the construction to show that the Grothendieck ring of the complex numbers contains as a subring the ring of (...) integer polynomials in continuum many variables. We prove the existence of a universal strong Euler characteristic on a structure. We investigate the dependence of the Grothendieck ring on the theory of the structure and give a few counter-examples. Finally, we relate some open problems and independence results in bounded arithmetic to properties of particular Grothendieck rings. (shrink)

There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community (...) approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. Consequently, only on the basis of this definition can the virtue approach be regarded as a qualitatively new development in research on moral education. (shrink)

Masaryk’s philosophical approach to reality is largely characterised by its orientation towards the positivism of Auguste Comte, which Masaryk sought to offset with the psychologism of J. S. Mill. The combination of these positivist approaches became the positive starting point for Masaryk’s ethics. But that was not the only influence on his ethics. Masaryk’s German translation of Hume’s book, titled Eine Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral von David Hume (1883), reveals that the main stimuli that shaped Masaryk’s ideas about (...) ethics came from David Hume. Although the need for scientific evidence became a fundamental principle of Masaryk’s thought, the need to objectively anchor ethics in rational theism necessitated in this area a departure from his positivist outlook. Masaryk’s lectures on practical philosophy attest to this fact. The reason for his departure from a positivist stance was due to the metaphysical nature of his concept of psychology. (shrink)

For the Critical Theory tradition of the Frankfurt School, rationalisation is a central concept that refers to the socio-cultural closure of capitalist modernity due to the proliferation of technical, ‘instrumental’ rationality at the expense of some form of political reason. This picture of rationalisation, however, hinges on a separation of technology and politics that is both empirically and philosophically problematic. This article aims to re-conceptualise the rationalisation thesis through a survey of research from science and technology studies and the conceptual (...) framework of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. It argues that rationalisation indeed exhibits a logic of closure, namely the ‘operational closure’ of sociotechnical systems of measurement, but that this closure in fact produces the historical logics of technical reason and, paradoxically, also generates spaces of critical-political openness. This opens up the theoretical and practical opportunity of connecting the politically just to the technically efficient. (shrink)

This paper discusses different interpretations of probability in relation to determinism. It is argued that both objective and subjective views on probability can be compatible with deterministic as well as indeterministic situations. The possibility of a conceptual independence between probability and determinism is argued to hold on a general level. The subsequent philosophical analysis of recent advances in classical statistical mechanics is of independent interest, but also adds weight to the claim that it is possible to justify an objective interpretation (...) of probabilities in a theory having as a basis the paradigmatically deterministic theory of classical mechanics. (shrink)

Conçue et écrite dans le milieu des années soixante, cette Introduction à la phénoménologie de Husserl marque les retrouvailles de Patocka avec la phénoménologie après la césure de la guerre et des années cinquante. Ayant fait l'objet d'un cours à Prague et à Mayence, ce texte ne vaut pas seulement par ses vertus pédagogiques, mais surtout par la remise en perspective globale, historique et critique, qu'il propose de la problématique du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Exposé en forme de bilan, repartant (...) des origines dans la Philosophie de l'arithmétique et les Recherches logiques, et allant jusqu'à la réduction phénoménologique, la conscience intime du temps et la question de l'intersubjectivité, il est remarquable par son sens des nuances et des difficultés, le plus souvent inaperçues dans des présentations plus doctrinales : on y retrouve tout l'"esprit de finesse" si caractéristique de Patocka. Destiné à tous les publics intéressés par la phénoménologie, cet ouvrage, rédigé par un familier de Husserl, de Heidegger et de Fink, vaudra tant par la puissance que par la subtilité de sa remise au point. Le cours est suivi d'un manuscrit de travail, daté de 1976 par les Archives Patocka, et intitulé "la Phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl après révision". C'est dire que Patocka ne s'est jamais estimé quitte de l'œuvre de Husserl, dans ses efforts pour en prolonger la portée. (shrink)