Philosophy of Science 82 (3):383-401 (2015)

Authors
Jan Sprenger
University of Turin
Abstract
One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem of Old Evidence. The problem arises for anyone who models scientific reasoning by means of Bayesian Conditionalization. This article addresses the problem as follows: First, I clarify the nature and varieties of the POE and analyze various solution proposals in the literature. Second, I present a novel solution that combines previous attempts while making weaker and more plausible assumptions. Third and last, I summarize my findings and put them into the context of the general debate about POE and Bayesian reasoning
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DOI 10.1086/681767
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References found in this work BETA

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.

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