This paper is a reply to Jan Wolenski's polemics (Filozofia Nauki 1/2000) against the author's essay „On the Epistemic Impotence of Analytical Philosophy” (Filozofia Nauki 3-4/1998). The author expresses his conviction that it is in analytical philosophy that the most interesting - and at the same time well-established - cognitive results have been reached, but many of these results have been obtained, not thanks to the declared semantic method, but thanks to the phenomenological method, which have been used at least (...) unconsciously. Therefore the gap between phenomenology and analytical philosophy is not so huge as it might seem at first glance. (shrink)

Artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia charakteru przedmiotów matematyki. Autor stara się określić ich charakter w perspektywie definicji naoczności (którą przyjmuje od Kanta). Podstawową kwestią jest tu zagadnienie: w jaki sposób przedmioty te przedstawiają się ludzkiemu umysłowi.

The quantum-relativistic breakthrough in physics has radically changed the scientific worldview. Several basic intuitions, which underlie traditional philosophy of nature, has been abandoned. As a result of this fact, scientists started to pronounce themselves as the highest authority in the philosophy of nature, leaving for the philosophers only the role of commentators. However, it is not physical theories, but their certain interpretations, or disinterpretations, which contradict common intuitions. In the case of relativistic theory, there is an alternative interpretation which allows (...) us to reconcile its content with pre-relativistic intuitions. Therefore it suggest that we should be critical also to other alleged consequences of the „new physics”. (shrink)

Dowód twierdzenia Bella sprowadza się do wyprowadzenia którejś z nierówności Bella. W ich standardowych wyprowadzeniach jednak kluczową rolę odgrywa warunek faktoryzowalności łącznego prawdopodobieństwa warunkowego, który można uzyskać jako konsekwencję dwóch innych warunków, znanych jako parameter independence i outcome independence. Pierwszy z nich jest dość oczywistym wyrazem warunku lokalności, natomiast drugi budzi wątpliwości. Ponieważ jednak jest on uszczegółowieniem warunku screening off zasady wspólnej przyczyny, jego podważenie wymagałoby zakwestionowania również tego warunku. Gdyby się to powiodło, efektywny dowód twierdzenia Bella wymagałby wyprowadzenia nierówności (...) Bella nie wykorzystującego żadnego uszczegółowienia warunku screening off. Przestawiona zostanie sugestia kierunku, w jakim powinny iść poszukiwania modelu naruszającego ten warunek. (shrink)

This is a defence of some kind of reality of relativistic effects, against the thesis that they are mere kinematic appearances or deceptions.

Putnam’s proof that time flow is incompatible with Relativity is underestimated, mostly due to Stein’s interpretation of the notion of reality in it as a two-term relation. This interpretation makes it vulnerable to easy criticism and makes various ways of escaping its conclusion possible. An alternative approach is proposed, resulting in a formalization which seems closer to Putnam’s intentions where reality is interpreted as a non-relational property. Although it makes the proof immune to all standard strategies of blocking the proof, (...) it reveals its real weak point which consists in assuming an overly strong interpretation of the principle of relativity. (shrink)

The observation that the standard solution of the paradox of the Liar is not satisfactory as a pragmatic solution of a semantic problem restores its former status as a semantic antinomy. Since the antinomy originates from Tarski's T scheme, a conservative modification of the standard semantics is looked for, which would prevent applying the scheme T to anomalous statements. Two such modifications are considered. The first is simpler and implies Kleene's weak tables for three-valued logic. The second, more complex but (...) also more intuitive, agrees with Kleene's strong tables. This undermines the seemingly natural intuition that a sentence and the sentence attributing truth to it have the same truth conditions, which is compatible only with the weak tables. (shrink)

The author proposes a formalization of Hilary Putnam's proof of the thesis that time does not pass. This enables one to eliminate difficulties connected with the original formulation.