The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies

Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-19 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. Others have argued that sharing personal information about yourself that license such inferences can by itself violate the right to privacy. In this paper, we argue that the latter view should be rejected.


Added to PP

159 (#124,009)

6 months
103 (#48,168)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jakob Mainz
Aalborg University (PhD)
Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral Risk and Communicating Consent.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (2):179-207.

View all 28 references / Add more references