The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making

Ethics and Information Technology 25 (1):1-11 (2023)
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Abstract

Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to suggest that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed, our argument is novel. Others have argued that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed because they can reduce or eliminate the psychological burdens caused by tragic moral choice-situations. By contrast, our argument explains why responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed even in the absence of tragic moral choice-situations, and even in the absence of psychological burdens.

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Author Profiles

Jakob Mainz
Aalborg University (PhD)
Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University

Citations of this work

Two Reasons for Subjecting Medical AI Systems to Lower Standards than Humans.Jakob Mainz, Jens Christian Bjerring & Lauritz Munch - 2023 - Acm Proceedings of Fairness, Accountability, and Transaparency (Facct) 2023 1 (1):44-49.

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References found in this work

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.

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