To Believe or not to Believe - That is not the (Only) Question: the Hybrid View of Privacy

The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):245-261 (2023)
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In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is more plausible than the Belief-Based View. Finally, we show how the Hybrid View generates a more plausible fit between the concept of privacy, and a (morally objectionable) violation of privacy.


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Author Profiles

Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University
Jakob Mainz
Aalborg University (PhD)

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References found in this work

What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology.Rik Peels - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
Rethinking informed consent in bioethics.Neil C. Manson - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.

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