ABSTRACT Banks provide a valuable but inherently unstable combination of deposit‐taking and lending functions that were successfully held together for several decades after the New Deal by tough banking rules. The weakening of the rules after the 1970s promoted the displacement of traditional relationship‐based banking with securitized, arms‐length alternatives that encouraged banks to undertake activities about which bankers lacked deep relationship‐based knowledge of the risks. Ironically, this risky behavior, encouraged by loosened regulation, was reinforced by progressively tightened securities regulation, which (...) promoted stock‐market liquidity but also deprived large banks (and other publicly traded companies) of oversight by investors with “insiders’” knowledge. Both the underregulation of banking and the overregulation of securities were underpinned by economic theories that favored blind diversification in liquid, anonymous markets, and that ignored the value of relationship‐based knowledge and case‐by‐case due diligence. (shrink)

Using the example of air pollution, I criticize a restricted utilitarian view of environmental risks. It is likely that damage to health due to environmental pollution in Western countries is relatively modest in quantitative terms (especially when considering cancer and comparing such damage to the effects of some life-style exposures). However, a strictly quantitative approach, which ranks priorities according to the burden of disease attributable to single causes, is questionable because it does not consider such aspects as inequalities in the (...) distribution of risks. Secondly, the ability of epidemiological research to identify some health effects is limited. Third, the environment has symbolic and aesthetic components that overcome a strict evaluation of damage based on the impairment of human health. It is not acceptable that priorities be set just balancing the burden of disease caused by pollution in the environment against economic constraints. As an example of a computation that inherently includes economic analysis, I refer to the proposal of an estimator of mortality in coal mining, i.e., a rate which puts deaths in the numerator and tons of coal extracted in the denominator. According to this estimator, mortality due to accidents decreased from 1.15 to 0.42 in the period 1950–1970 in the United States, for each million tons of coal extracted. However, considering the steep decline in the workforce in the same period, the traditional mortality rate (deaths over persons-time) actually increased. The proposal of a measure of mortality based on the amount of coal extracted is just one example of the attempts to influence decisions by including an economic element (productivity) in risk assessment. This paper has three purposes: One, to describe empirical research concerning the health effects of environmental pollutants; two, to discuss the scientific principles and methods used in the identification of environmental hazards; and three, to critically discuss some of the ethical principles which are applied in medicine and in the assessment and management of risk. (shrink)

Agritourism activities have gained importance as a mechanism for some farmers to broaden their sources of income. As businesses have pursued agritourism activities, they have been concerned about liability for personal injuries of participants. In some states, providers of agritourism activities have presented legislators with ideas for an agritourism statute to limit liability for injuries resulting from inherent risks. Four new agritourism statutes have been enacted, while six other states have adopted alternative liability provisions that may apply to some (...) agritourism providers. The agritourism statutes provide an affirmative defense to providers to eliminate liability for inherent-risk injuries. An analysis of the statutory provisions shows legislatures making choices on the assignment of liability for accident injuries and the ability of providers to obtain releases from negligence. Because the agritourism statutes impose prerequisites and do not stop meritless lawsuits, they do not offer much assistance to agritourism providers. An evaluation of policy issues suggests that legislatures might consider additional options to address agritourism providers’ concerns. (shrink)

BackgroundThe complexities of the workplace environment in the downstream oil and gas industry contain several safety-risk factors. In particular, instituting stringent safety standards and management procedures are considered insufficient to address workplace safety risks. Most accident cases attribute to unsafe actions and human behaviors on the job, which raises serious concerns for safety professionals from physical to psychological particularly when the world is facing a life-threatening Pandemic situation, i.e., COVID-19. It is imperative to re-examine the safety management of facilities (...) and employees’ well-being in the downstream oil and gas production sector to establish a sustainable governance system. Understanding the inherent factors better that contribute to safety behavior management could significantly improve workplace safety features.ObjectiveThis study investigates employees’ safety behavior management model for the downstream oil and gas industry to consolidate the safety, health and wellbeing of employees in times of COVID-19.MethodsNominal Group Technique was first employed to screen primary behavioral factors from 10 workplace health and safety experts from Malaysia’s downstream oil and gas industry. Consequently, 18 significant factors were identified for further inquiry. Next, the interpretive structural modeling technique was used to ascertain the complex interrelationships between these factors and proposed a Safety Behavioral Management Model for cleaner production.ResultsThis model shows that management commitment, employee knowledge and training, leadership, and regulations contribute significantly to several latent factors. Our findings support the Social Cognitive Theory, where employees, their environment, and their behaviors are related reciprocally.ConclusionIt is postulated that identifying safety factors and utilizing the proposed model guides various stakeholder groups in this industry, including practitioners and policymakers, for achieving long-term sustainability. (shrink)

This book explores the major differences between the kinds of risk encountered in different sectors of industry - production and services - and identifies the main features of accidents within different industries. Because of these differences, unique risk-mitigation measures will need to be implemented in one industry that cannot be implemented in another, leading to large managerial differences between these broad economic sectors. Based on the analysis of more than 500 disasters, accidents and incidents - around (...) 230 cases from the production sector and around 280 cases from the service sector - the authors compare the risk response actions appropriate within different sectors, and establish when and how it is possible to generalize the experience of dealing with risks in any given industry to a wider field of economic activity. This book is mainly intended for executives, strategists, senior risk managers of enterprise-wide organizations and risk management experts engaged in academic or consulting work. By setting out clearly the sector differences in risk management, the authors aim to improve the practice of general risk assessment with regard to identifying and prioritizing risks, and of risk control with regard to planning appropriate mitigation measures. (shrink)

Relations between individual traits and frequency of causing accidents have been analyzed. On the basis of results from 465 women and 277 men it has been found that the causing of accidents correlates with risk propensity and with risk taking influenced by self-destructive motivation. Persons often causing accidents are also absent minded to a greater degree, and experience depressive moods more frequently than persons rarely involved in accidents.

Diane Vaughan’s popular book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, advances a thesis that I termed the “cog in the machine manifesto”: since the Challenger disaster was the result of the determined, mechanistic movement of the parts of the organizational system; once the mechanism was set in motion, the disaster was inevitable, and could not have been prevented. In order to expose the fallacies of the cog in the machine manifesto, I consider an alternative umbrella (...) thesis and four sub-theses. The umbrella thesis proposes that the causes of the Challenger disaster were the lack of an overall 'safety first' ethos, and irresponsible choice and poor decision-making practices in the lead up to and including the final risky decision. The four sub-theses are as follows: (1) the widespread justification that one always faces inherent risk when one operates in the realm of risky technology (a thesis foreshadowed by Vaughan’s book) is an illicit and misleading justification when one considers that there is no binding necessity to employ the risky technology; (2) the real culprit is not so much "risky technology," which locates the risk in the technology, but "risky assessment," which locates the risk in the decision to employ technology while not basing that decision on known safe designs and continued use on performance data; (3) the decision to choose an Orbiter without a passenger and crew abort system is proof in and of itself of a lack of a "safety first" management priority; (4) an analysis of the fateful eve of the Challenger launch teleconference launch decision makes it impossible to construe it as a banal, routine and inevitable organizational mistake. A careful examination of the “cog in the machine manifesto” and similar frameworks that purport to explain moral disasters will reveal that the language of risky technology, organizational complexity, and inevitable accidents is deeply pernicious and should thus be avoided at all costs. (shrink)

This research examines how the meaning of risk, safety, and accidents are constructed in a military context. We compare meanings of these constructs among members working for three organizations (Health and Safety Executive, Ministry of Defence, and Royal Marine Commandos) jointly responsible for planning and executing "safe" military training and maneuvres in a particular unit of the United Kingdom's Royal Marine Commandos. The discourse among these members embodies the inter-organizational collaboration over military safety, and through an analysis of (...) this discourse we situate and frame shared and contested meanings of risk, safety, and accidents within this particular community of practice. We discuss implications of these findings for theory and practice, rallying for a more contextualized understanding of what risk, safety, and accidents mean in organizational life and thus the relative nature of the standards to which organizations are expected to adhere. (shrink)

In The Empire of Chance, historians of science Gigerenzer et al. argue that statistical thinking has been “second to no other area of scientific endeavor” in its influence on “modern life and thought”. This article describes how quantitative descriptions of risk associated with industrialization and technological change became part of the mentality of ordinary Americans. It explains why Americans began counting accidents, tells what kinds of accidents they counted and how they counted them, and shows how statistical (...) representations of risk were used to justify prescriptions for public policy and individual behavior. On this frontier of the empire of chance, safety experts and self-styled “practical statisticians” were the principal colonizers. Distant from the centers of academic statistical science, they compromised rigorous scientific standards of methodology and accurate prediction in order to make convincing arguments outside their circles of expertise. To convey their point of view to audiences who were not literate in the field of statistics, they created a public language that conveyed statistical ideas through metaphors, graphic representations, and other rhetorical devices. They also engaged non-experts in collecting and analyzing data and, by the 1920s, even used quantitative self-measurement as a device to convince members of the public to alter their own risk-taking behaviors. (shrink)

Charles Perrow used the term normal accidents to characterize a type of catastrophic failure that resulted when complex, tightly coupled production systems encountered a certain kind of anomalous event. These were events in which systems failures interacted with one another in a way that could not be anticipated, and could not be easily understood and corrected. Systems of the production of expert knowledge are increasingly becoming tightly coupled. Unlike classical science, which operated with a long time horizon, many current (...) forms of expert knowledge are directed at immediate solutions to complex problems. These are prone to breakdowns like the kind discussed by Perrow. The example of the Homestake mine experiment shows that even in modern physics complex systems can produce knowledge failures that last for decades. The concept of knowledge risk is introduced, and used to characterize the risk of failure in such systems of knowledge production. (shrink)

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways (...) in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; moral and legal responsibility; and decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars. (shrink)

One of the most significant aspects of Internet, in comparison with other sources of information, such as libraries, books, journals, television, radio etcetera, is that it makes expert knowledge much more accessible to non‐experts than the other traditional sources. This phenomenon has often been applauded for its democratizing effects. Unfortunately, there is also a disadvantage. Expert information that was originally intended for a specific group of people ‐ and not in any way processed or adapted to make it fit for (...) a broader audience ‐ can easily be misunderstood and misinterpreted by non‐experts and, when used as a basis for decisions, lead to unhappy consequences. Can these risks be diminished without limiting the informational freedoms of the information providers and without imposing paternalistic measures regarding the receivers of the information? (shrink)

Resumo No segundo capítulo das Categorias, Aristóteles introduz um esquema conceptual de acordo com o qual, recorrendo a dois únicos critérios, “estar num sujeito” e “dizer-se de um sujeito”, é possível distribuir a realidade por quatro tipos de entes: as substâncias individuais, que nem estão num sujeito nem se dizem de um sujeito; as substâncias universais, que se dizem de um sujeito, mas não estão num sujeito; os acidentes individuais, que estão num sujeito, mas não se dizem de um sujeito; (...) e os acidentes universais, que estão num sujeito e se dizem de um sujeito. O problema coloca-se ao nível do terceiro tipo de entes, os acidentes individuais, em virtude, em particular, do modo como são definidos no texto, a saber, como algo que “não pode ser separadamente daquilo em que está”. Ora a importância desta cláusula, e, portanto, da sua correcta interpretação, vai muito para além de uma simples decisão em matéria textual ou mesmo doutrinária, se a restringirmos ao passo e à questão em apreço. Nela, joga-se todo o sentido que Aristóteles deseja atribuir à individualidade das inerências e, através dela, o modo como é por ele concebida a distinção ontológica entre substâncias e acidentes individuais, enquanto tipos diversos de itens individuais. Este, pois, o objecto do presente estudo: apreender o sentido e o fundamento da distinção entre substâncias e acidentes individuais em Aristóteles, a partir de uma análise do estatuto das inerências no segundo capítulo das Categorias. Palavras-chave : acidente, Aristóteles, Categorias, individual, inerências, substânciaIn the second chapter of Categories, Aristotle introduces a conceptual scheme in accordance to which, using only two criteria, “being in a subject” and “said of a subject”, it is possible to distribute reality over four types of beings: individual substances, which are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject; universal substances, which are said of a subject but are not in a subject; individual accidents, which are in a subject, but are not said of a subject; and universal accidents, which are in a subject and are said of a subject. The problem arises with the third type of entity, individual accidents, due to the way they are defined in the text, namely as something which “cannot exist separately from what it is in”. The importance of this clause, and therefore of its correct interpretation, goes far beyond the mere decision on textual or even doctrinal matters, if restricted to the passage and to the question under consideration. What is at stake here is the significance that Aristotle wishes to attribute to the individuality of inherences and, through that, the way in which the ontological distinction between individual substances and individual accidents – that is to say, between primary substances and their accidents as diverse types of individual items – is conceived by him. Here, then, is the scope of this paper: to grasp the meaning and the rationale of the distinction between individual substances and individual accidents in Aristotle, based on the analysis of the statute of inherences in the second chapter of the Categories. Keywords: accident, Aristotle, categories, individual, inherences, substance. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in (...) a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case. (shrink)

It is argued that the standard way that the criminal justice debate regarding the permissible extent of wrongful convictions is cast is fundamentally flawed. In particular, it is claimed that there is an inherent danger in focussing our attention in this debate on different ways of measuring the probabilistic likelihood of wrongful conviction and then evaluating whether these probabilities are unacceptably high. This is because such probabilistic measures are clumsy ways of capturing the level of risk involved, to (...) the extent that a defendant can be subject to an unacceptably high level of legal risk in this regard even where the relevant probabilities are very low. An alternative conception of legal risk – one that is primarily cast along modal rather than probabilistic lines – is set out which offers a much better way of framing the debate regarding what would be an acceptable level of wrongful conviction. It is further argued that with this modal conception of legal risk in play we can capture an important necessary condition that should be imposed on legal evidence, one that has application beyond the context of the criminal trial. (shrink)

Risk-weighted expected utility theory is motivated by small-world problems like the Allais paradox, but it is a grand-world theory by nature. And, at the grand-world level, its ability to handle the Allais paradox is dubious. The REU model described in Risk and Rationality turns out to be risk-seeking rather than risk-averse on one natural way of formulating the Allais gambles in the grand-world context. This result illustrates a general problem with the case for REU theory, we (...) argue. There is a tension between the small-world thinking marshaled against standard expected utility theory, and the grand-world thinking inherent to the risk-weighted alternative. (shrink)

The inherence heuristic is too broad as a theoretical notion. The authors are at risk of applying their own heuristic in supporting itself. Nonetheless the article provides useful insight into the ways in which people overestimate the coherence and completeness of their understanding of the world.

Discussions about the appropriate way of assessing and managing new or emerging technologies—like nanomaterials—expose the problematic relationship between scientific knowledge production and regulatory decision-making. On one hand, there is a strong demand for scientific expertise to support decisions, especially by analyzing risks and hazards when uncertainties are prevalent and society’s stakes are high. On the other hand, science is criticized for its authoritative claim to objectivity and for keeping the inherent uncertainty, ambiguity, and selectivity of scientific observation latent. Requests (...) for more transparency in science can lead to revealing, to risk managers and the public, the indeterminacy in knowledge production processes. This has consequences for the prevalence of scientific knowledge in decision-making, because it increases uncertainty on both sides of the breach between science and decisions: scientists lose confidence regarding the scientifically tested knowledge which they pass on, and risk managers lose confidence regarding their decisions based on this knowledge. Nonetheless, the concept of “probabilistic risk assessment” remains an important heuristic for dealing with potential future events. This paper addresses questions of the function of scientific risk assessment in organized risk management. The main argument in this paper is that knowledge alone no longer functions as a mechanism for absorbing uncertainty. Accordingly, the interaction between science and decisions must enable a temporarily stable commitment to manage new threats like products and applications coming from the field of nanoscience and nanomaterials. (shrink)

Widespread commercial use of the internet has significantly increased the volume and scope of data being collected by organisations. ‘Big data’ has emerged as a term to encapsulate both the technical and commercial aspects of this growing data collection activity. To date, much of the discussion of big data has centred upon its transformational potential for innovation and efficiency, yet there has been less reflection on its wider implications beyond commercial value creation. This paper builds upon normal accident theory to (...) analyse the broader ethical implications of big data. It argues that the strategies behind big data require organisational systems that leave them vulnerable to normal accidents, that is to say some form of accident or disaster that is both unanticipated and inevitable. Whilst NAT has previously focused on the consequences of physical accidents, this paper suggests a new form of system accident that we label data accidents. These have distinct, less tangible and more complex characteristics and raise significant questions over the role of individual privacy in a ‘data society’. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the risks of such data accidents might be managed or mitigated. (shrink)

This paper aims to scrutinize how the notion of risk should be understood and applied to possibly catastrophic cases. I begin with clarifying the standard usage of the notion of risk, particularly emphasizing the conceptual relation between risk and probability. Then, I investigate how to make decisions in the case of seemingly catastrophic disasters by contrasting the precautionary principle with the preventive (prevention) principle. Finally, I examine what kind of causal thinking tends to be actually adopted when (...) we make decisions on emergent cases. My arguments are mainly based on Japan's 2011 massive earthquake and nuclear power station accident. Masaki Ichinose. (shrink)

Risk decisions often appear unsatisfactory after a calamity has taken place. This holds even when they are products of systematic risk analysis. Yet, if relevant considerations available to be known pre-accident were adequately taken into account and safety measures implemented accordingly, nobody seems morally blameworthy. In this paper, I advance a two-way argument. Firstly, I show how analysis of post-accident apologizing sheds new light on vexed tensions in ethical assessment of risk impositions. This amounts to exposing conflicting (...) moral intuitions in risk decisions, discussing problematic tenets in risk analysis as well as outlining three lines of arguments that destabilize the very notion of correct risk analysis. The analysis indicates that bringing different discussions of moral blameworthiness together facilitates resolving the tensions. It also calls for further and early-on collaboration between risk theorists and ethicists in order to carry these insights to risk analysis. Secondly, I argue that analysis of risk decisions, in part, reveals a discrepancy between the definitional work done on apology and what is required by ethics. Virtually every suggestion for the gold standard for apology involves moral blameworthiness as a necessary condition. I highlight different kinds of cases in which nobody is culpable, but an apology can be morally fitting or required. It would be nonsensical to say that, in these cases, one ought to apologize, but in a disingenuous manner. (shrink)

It has been argued that the inherent risks of advance directives made by healthy people are disproportionate to the potential benefits, particularly if the directive is implementable in cases of reversible mental incapacity. This paper maintains that the evidence for such a position is lacking. Furthermore, respect for the principle of autonomy requires that individuals be permitted to make risky choices about their own lives as long as these do not impinge on others. Even though health professionals have an (...) obligation to try and ensure that patients have appropriate information about possible future treatment options, they cannot predict and describe every eventuality but nor can they disregard firm decisions knowingly made on the basis of incomplete information by competent adults. To attempt to do so would be to reinstate notions of medical paternalism which are contrary to current public expectations. (shrink)

Modern antiretroviral therapies are capable of suppressing HIV in the bloodstream to undetectable levels. Nonetheless, people living with HIV must maintain lifelong adherence to ART to avoid the re-emergence of the infection. So despite the existence and efficacy of ART, there is still substantial interest in development of a cure. But HIV cure trials can be risky, their success is as of yet unlikely, and the medical gain of being cured is limited against a baseline of ART access. The medical (...) prospect associated with participation in cure research thus look poor. Are the risks and burdens that HIV cure research places on participants so high that it is unethical, at present, to conduct it? In this paper, I answer ‘no’. I start my argument by describing a foundational way of thinking about the ethical justification for regulatory limits on research risk; I then apply this way of thinking to HIV cure trials. In offering this analysis, I confine my attention to studies enrolling competent adults and I also do not consider risks research may pose to third parties or society. Rather, my concern is to engage with the thought that some trials are so risky that performing them is an ethically unacceptable way to treat the participants themselves. I reject this thought and instead argue that there is no level of risk, no matter how high, that inherently mistreats a participant. (shrink)

This paper explores a framework for thinking about risks inherent in emerging technologies; given uncertainty about the magnitude—or even nature—of those risks, deliberation about those technologies is challenged. §1 develops a conceptual framework for risk, and §2 integrates that conception into cost-benefit analysis. Given uncertainty, we are often pushed toward precautionary approaches, and such approaches are explored in §3. These first three sections are largely literature review, and then a positive argument for how to think about the relationship (...) between risk, precaution, and uncertainty is offered in §4. (shrink)

This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriate response to mass harm. The first Part argues that the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist, which makes the lay intuitions more defensible. (...) The second Part considers how tort has dealt with this divergence between lay and expert perspectives. It also evaluates how tort's approach has differed from that of public law approaches to accident law, such as legislative compensation and risk regulation by administrative agencies. Ultimately, tort's ability to recognize the value of lay intuitions supports retaining the tort perspective as part of our societal arsenal of responses to risk and harm. This ability can also support a pro-tort perspective in two practical debates in the arena of tort law: that over preemption of tort law by administrative agency judgments, and that over access to tort recovery as part of a no-fault system. (shrink)

Risk is the probability that within a certain time some expected negative event will take place. In medicine risk can be related to a decision or to some intrinsic factors which are associated with the probability of the occurrence of a disease. Decisions can be necessary in the individual life with respect to the question of visiting a physician or performing a certain diagnostic or therapeutic procedure. The introduction of new pharmaceutical or technical products into medical use are (...) another set of decisions which can generate certain risks. Intrinsic or inherent risk factors are a set of variables or signs and symptoms which indicate the presence of a certain probability that some disease or event, e.g., arteriosclerosis or sudden infant death syndrome, may occur. Risk is always related to judgement. In a decision process cost, effectiveness and profit can be used to estimate the magnitude of the risk to be taken. In a similar way the problems in connection with an inherent risk are primarily related to the recognition of the magnitude of risk and to the possibility of prophylactic measures.In our own area of research, the sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) is an event where only risk factors can be observed. We point at two facts in this context: Highly complex patterns of symptoms like behaviour can better be classified by intuitive Gestalt perception. A medical procedure like induction of labour can itself become a risk factor. (shrink)

Risk is inherent to many, if not all, transformative decisions. The risk of regret, of turning into a person you presently consider to be morally objectionable, or of value change are all risks of choosing to transform. This aspect of transformative decision-making has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences to those wishing to defend decision theory from the challenge posed by transformative decision-making. I contend that a problem lies in a common method used to cardinalise (...) utilities – the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) method – which measures an agent's utility function over sure outcomes. I argue that the risks involved in transformative experiences are constitutively valuable, and hence their value cannot be accurately measured by the vNM method. In Section 1, I outline what transformative experiences are and the problem they pose to decision theory. In Section 2, I outline Pettigrew's (2019, Choosing for Changing Selves) decision-theoretic response, and in Section 3, I present the case for thinking that risks can carry value. In Section 4, I argue for the claim that at least some transformative experiences involve constitutive risk. I argue that this causes a problem for decision-theoretic responses within the vNM framework in Section 5. (shrink)

The present paper describes an ”ontological square’ mapping possible ways of combining the domains and converse domains of the relations of inherence and denomination. In the context of expounding and extending medieval appropriations of elements drawn from Aristotle’s Categories for theological purposes, the paper uses this square to examine different ways of defining Substance-terms and Accident-terms by reference to inherence and denomination within the constraints imposed by the doctrine of the Trinity. These different approaches are related to particular texts of (...) thinkers including Bonaventure and Gilbert of Poitiers. (shrink)

A majority opinion seems to have emerged in scholarly analysis of the assortment of technologies that have been given the label “synthetic biology.” According to this view, society should allow the technology to proceed and even provide it some financial support, while monitor­ing its progress and attempting to ensure that the development leads to good outcomes. The near‐consensus is captured by the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues in its report New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology (...) and Emerging Technologies, which arguably marked the end of a preliminary round of analysis about the ethical and policy questions raised by synthetic bi­ology. Like a number of other, earlier documents issued by various groups around the world, the re­port called attention to questions about how the technology will be used; whether it might be mis­used; what sorts of accidents might happen along the way; the economic, environmental, and social impacts of the eventual applications; whether the very idea of “synthetic biology” should be trou­bling; and how the debate over all of these ques­tions will be conducted. Also like most similar documents, however, while it called for careful monitoring and oversight of technology, it did not recommend any significant new constraints on its development and use. The commission's stance was that it would be “imprudent either to declare a moratorium on synthetic biology until all risks can be determined and mitigated, or to simply ‘let science rip,’ regardless of the likely risks.”In this report, we will take stock of the current consensus, comment on some of the major points of disagreement, and identify the next steps for the debate. In part I, we offer a brief overview of the research and applications commonly grouped together under the heading of synthetic biology, partly in order to set the stage for the rest of the discussion and partly because we want to highlight some conceptual problems that attend the very la­bel given this field. In parts II, III, and IV, we take up, respectively, three broad classes of concerns that arise in the context of synthetic biology: con­cerns about the intrinsic or inherent value of do­ing synthetic biology, concerns about the concrete harms and benefits of doing synthetic biology, and concerns about justice. Addressing these concerns requires a method for bringing the public's values to bear on policy‐making concerning emerging biotechnologies; in part V, we discuss the chal­lenges in developing such a method. (shrink)

There are few moral principles less controversial than “don’t touch people’s private parts without consent.” Though the principle doesn’t make explicit that there are exceptions, there clearly are some. Parents must wipe their infants. If an unconscious patient is admitted to the emergency room with a profusely bleeding laceration on their genitals, a doctor must give them stitches. The researchers who proposed the study in question, which would look for a connection between burn patients’ microbiomes and their clinical outcomes, presumably (...) believed they had identified an additional exception to the aforementioned principle. I argue that they did not. Rather, because of their tremendous inherent risks, we ought only to perform intimate procedures on those who can’t consent when the procedure is for their own good. -/- Intimate violations have been overlooked in both philosophy and medicine. Because of this, we have lacked an adequate conceptual framework for identifying certain kinds of harms research can inflict. When we understand these special risks, we see that the IRB was right to deny a waiver of consent. (shrink)

Risks allow a probability calculation; uncertainties do not. The incalculability of uncertainties may depend on many different factors. It may be that one does not have all the relevant information and that by collecting more information one may eventually deduce the distribution of the relevant events. However, this chapter’s claim is stronger than that: it claims that uncertain events are such that no increase of available information will allow their treatment as risks. The uncertainty of uncertain events is structural and (...) does not depend on a lack of information. We shall distinguish uncertainty arising from incomplete knowledge from uncertainty inherent in the system. The former is a kind of risk, the latter is uncertainty proper. Risk and uncertainty pertain to two different classes of events and there is no crossable boundary between them.The vast majority of future events are uncertain in the sense specified. Put otherwise, only a tiny minority of future events are amenable to probability assessments.The difference between risks and uncertainties shows that the expression “risk management” is far from adequate, since it explicitly refers only to risks and sidelines uncertainties. On the other hand, both risks and uncertainties should be addressed. By adding a reference to anticipation, the expression “anticipatory risk management” suggests a perhaps less inadequate coverage of the field. (shrink)

The moral importance of liability to harm has so far been ignored in the lively debate about what self-driving vehicles should be programmed to do when an accident is inevitable. But liability matters a great deal to just distribution of risk of harm. While morality sometimes requires simply minimizing relevant harms, this is not so when one party is liable to harm in virtue of voluntarily engaging in activity that foreseeably creates a risky situation, while having reasonable alternatives. On (...) plausible assumptions, merely choosing to use a self-driving vehicle typically gives rise to a degree of liability, so that such vehicles should be programmed to shift the risk from bystanders to users, other things being equal. Insofar vehicles cannot be programmed to take all the factors affecting liability into account, there is a pro tanto moral reason not to introduce them, or restrict their use. (shrink)

This paper discusses the current initiatives on error and adverse events within healthcare, with a particular focus on the NHS, within the context of health policy. One of the key features of the paper is the proposal for an emergent taxonomy of the medical error literature, developed from the ideologies and rationales that underpin their approaches. This taxonomy provides details of three categories—empiricists, organisational rationalists and reformers of professional culture—and these act as an organising framework for the exploration of the (...) potential consequences of current policy on errors and adverse events. This discussion highlights the tension between optimising health outcomes for patients and managing the health system as effectively as possible. In particular, the inherent tension between explicit managerial formulations of risk and implicit risk management strategies associated with medical professionalism are considered. (shrink)

In the modern world, risks are complex and systemic, and their effects are interconnected with the transformations in different layers of social systems. Global issues are not necessarily reflected in local contexts, and public perceptions of risks may differ significantly from expert assessments. The aim of the article is to reveal the differences between the opinions of the Lithuanian population and experts on economic, environmental, technological, geopolitical and social risks, and to compare the differences between the opinions of local experts (...) and Lithuanian public and the assessments of experts from the Global Risk Reports. The article presents the results of a representative survey of the Lithuanian population and an online survey of municipal experts. The results of the study show that expert and population perceptions quite often coincide, especially in the case of social and economic threats. The biggest discrepancies, when the experts assessed the risks as higher than the population, were revealed in the cases of COVID-19, floods, forest fires, energy disruptions, and the mines from war legacy. Public identified higher risks than experts in the case of traffic accidents, illegal tracking of persons, illegal use of bank accounts/cards, Astravets NPP, and increase in prices. In the perception of risks of Lithuanian population and municipal experts in 2020–2021 economic and social risks dominated, and global risks with long-term effects, such as ecological or geopolitical, were not reflected in the local perceptions. (shrink)

Clarifying the causes of subway construction accidents has an important impact on reducing the probability of accidents and protecting workers’ lives and public property to a greater extent. A total of 138 investigation records of subway construction accidents from 2000 to 2020 were collected in this study. Based on a systemic analysis of 29 well-known accident causation models and the formative process of the subway construction accidents, we extracted the causative factors of subway construction accidents (...) from the collected records. Furthermore, a causation analysis index system of subway accidents was proposed based on fault tree analysis, where we considered subway construction accidents as the top event and the five dimensions, i.e., human, equipment, environment, management, and safety culture, as first-level intermediate events. Moreover, 17 causative factors were considered to be related to the severity of subway construction accidents. It is found that human factors are prone to be critical to high-risk accidents. Finally, a Bayesian network was formed to explore the causative factors of high-risk subway construction accidents. Based on the combined application of FTA and BN, this study discusses the complex influence factors and their action routes to unsafe accidents in subway construction sites, and makes efforts to correspond safety decision basis for the management of China subway construction. (shrink)

Interventions to decrease acquisition and transmission of sexually transmitted diseases among African American women using text messages versus small-group delivery modalities pose distinct research risks and benefits. Determining the relative risk–benefit ratio of studies using these different modalities has relied on the expertise of investigators and their institutional review boards. In this study, African American women participated in focus groups and surveys to elicit and compare risks and benefits inherent in these two intervention delivery modalities, focusing on issues (...) such as convenience, privacy, and stigma of participation. Some risk/benefit variables were implicated in willingness to participate the two intervention modalities. (shrink)

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and thirty-eightmeter high tsunami destroyed Tokyo Electric’s Fukushima nuclear power complex. The disaster was not a high-damage, low-probability event. It was a high-damage, high-probability event. Massive earthquakes and tsunamis assault the coast every century. Tokyo Electric built its reactors as it did because it would not pay the full cost of a meltdown anyway. Given the limited liability at the heart of corporate law, it could externalize the cost of running reactors. In (...) most industries, firms rarely risk tort damages so enormous they cannot pay them. In nuclear power, “unpayable” potential liability is routine. Privately owned companies bear the costs of an accident only up to the fire-sale value of their net assets. Beyond that, they pay nothing — and the damages from a nuclear disaster easily soar past that point. Government ownership could eliminate this moral hazard — but it would replace it with problems of its own. Unfortunately, the electoral dynamics in wealthy modern democracies combine to replicate nearly perfectly the moral hazard inherent in private ownership. Private firms will build reactors on fault lines — but so will governments. (shrink)

This paper offers some suggestions on, and encouragement for, how to be better at risk communication in times of agricultural crisis. During the foot and mouth epizootic, the British public, having no precedent to deal with such a rapid and widespread epizootic, no existing rules or conventions, and no social or political consensus, was forced to confront the facts of a perceived "economic disease. Foot and mouth appeared as an economic disease because the major push to eradicate it was (...) motivated exclusively by trade and economic reasons and not because of threats it posed to the lives of human beings and livestock. The British public deferred responsibility to their elected officials for a speedy end to this non-life threatening viral epizootic. The latter, however, did not have a contingency plan in place to tackle such an extensive outbreak. The appeal to an existing policy, i.e., mass eradication, as the exclusive strategy of containment was a difficult pill for the public to swallow well before the end of the 226-day ordeal. Public outcry reflected (in part) serious misgivings about the lack of effective communication of risk-informed decisions between government agents and all concerned. The government''s handling of the matter underestimated concerns and values about animal welfare, public trust, and the plight of farmers and rural communities. A general loss of trust by some segments of the public was exacerbated by perceived mismanagement and early fumbles by government agents.Public moral uneasiness during the crisis, while perhaps symbolic of growing discontent with an already fractured relationship with farmed animals and the state of animal farming today, arguably, also reflected deep disappointment in government agents to recognize inherently and conditionally normative assumptions in their argument as well as recognize their narrow conception of risk. Furthermore, broader stakeholder participation was clearly missing from the outset, especially with respect to the issue of vaccination. A greater appreciation for two-way risk communication is suggested for science-based public policy in agriculture, followed by suggestions on how to be more vigilant in the future. (shrink)

For the purpose of this analysis, risk assessment becomes the primary term and risk management the secondary term. The concept of risk management as a primary term is based upon a false ontology. Risk management implies that risk is already there, not created by the decision, but lies already inherent in the situation that the decision sets into motion. The risk that already exists in the objective situation simply needs to be “managed”. By (...) considering risk assessment as the primary term, the ethics of responsibility for risking the lives of others, the environment and future generations in the first place comes into the forefront. The issue of risk heeding is especially important as it highlights the need to pay attention to warnings of danger and to take action to redress problems before disasters occur. In this paper, the decision making that led to the choice of technology utilized and the implementation of such technology in the case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster will be used as a model to illustrate the need to take ethical factors into account when making decisions regarding the safety of technological systems and the heeding of danger warnings. While twenty-five years separates the decision to launch the Challenger and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster, the lessons of the Challenger disaster are still to be learned. (shrink)

This chapter highlights a well-known problem for defenders of transubstantiation: namely, the apparent impossibility of supposing that accidents can be separated from their substance. It begins by arguing that Aquinas’s account of accidents, in which the truth-making function of accidents relative to their substances is understood in terms of the existence of such accidents, is highly susceptible to this kind of objection. The next section considers Giles of Rome’s attempts to overcome this worry, most specifically by (...) distinguishing the existence of an accident from its truth-making function, both of which are described. Giles maintains that the existence of an accident is to be identified with the existence of its substance. According to Scotus, this means that Giles is scarcely better off than Aquinas in defending himself against the worry about separated accidents, since a separated accident needs its own existence and, Scotus avers, there is no way for an accident to gain existence when separated. Scotus agrees with Giles that the truth-making function of accidents is to be distinguished from their existence, and holds that accidents, even when united to their substances, have their own proper existence. Overall, the tale is one of the increasing hypostatization of accidents in the light of pressures from Eucharistic doctrine. (shrink)

With the increase in depth of coal mining, the hydrogeological complexity largely increases and water inrush accidents happen more frequently. For the safety of coal mining, horizontal directional drilling and grouting techniques have been implemented to detect and plug the fractures and conduits that deliver high-pressure groundwater to coal mine. Taking the grouting engineering performed at Xingdong coal mine at 980 m below sea level as an example, we collected the data of grouting quantity, the loss of drilling fluid, (...) gamma value, water temperature, average water absorption, distance between grouting loss points, water pressure on coal seam floor, and aquifuge thickness at 90 boreholes in the mine to conduct grey relational analysis, first. The analysis showed that the grouting quantity was highly correlated with all other factors. Subsequently, grey system evaluation was used to evaluate the risk of water inrush from the coal seam floor. The results of risk analysis illustrated that three water inrushes from Ordovician limestone occurred in mining face 2127, 2125, and 2222 in the study area were all located in the area with a risk score higher than 65. Through grouting, the identified cracks were effectively blocked and waterproof layers beneath the coal seam floors were constructed to reduce the threat of water inrush. By comparing the risk assessment results with three water inrush cases before grouting operation, we found that water inrush areas were consistent with the area of higher risk. (shrink)

Two seventeeth-century Scottish Catholic philosophers, Robert Balfour and William Chalmers, are introduced and their accounts of the metaphysics of the Eucharist are discussed. Their ideas are largely in terms of the Aristotelian concepts of substance, accident and inherence, with special attention paid to the idea that the essence of an accident is not its actual inherence (that is, its act of inhering) in a substance but its aptness for inherence in a substance. Balfour appears to accept this (Thomist) doctrine. But (...) Chalmers has a different story to tell. He holds that the essence of an accident is not its actual inherence or its power to inhere (which includes its aptness for inherence), but instead belongs to what he terms the ‘root and basis’ of that power. I speculate briefly about a possible Scotistic interpretation of his words. (shrink)

This article highlights two aspects of the language used in Classical Greek literary sources to discuss pitched battle. First, the sources regularly use unqualified forms of the verb kinduneuein, “to take a risk,” when they mean fighting a battle. They do so especially in contexts of deliberation about the need to fight. Second, they often describe the outcome of major engagements in terms of luck, fate, and random chance, at the explicit expense of human agency. Taken together, these aspects (...) of writing on war suggest that pitched battle was seen as an inherently risky course of action with unacceptably unpredictable results, which was therefore best avoided. Several examples show that the decision to fight was indeed evaluated in such terms. This practice casts further doubt on the traditional view that Greek armies engaged in pitched battles as a matter of principle. (shrink)

In this article, I will examine the role of risk in the risky nature sports. Risky nature sports are identified as nature sports where participants may reckon with the possibility of severe injury or death if things go wrong. The first part of the article identifies some evolutionary, historical, and conceptual characteristics of nature sports and risk. In the second part of the article, I discuss the concept of risk and its meaning in risky nature sports. Additionally, (...) I address questions concerning the moral tone and context of risk-taking. In most academic disciplines, risk is typically understood as something negative that should always be avoided. But risk also includes positive possibilities, which may, such as in risk sports, outweigh the negative or can even be inherently positive and a value in itself. In the third part, I discuss how important risk is in nature sports. Is it a defining core or more peripheral? This leads to the question of the value. Does the risk element add to the value of the sport? I finally discuss how risk sports can be meaningful parts of the participants’ lives. (shrink)

This article maintains that it is the constitutional responsibility of the courts, here the courts of the State of Michigan, to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules. The article is written in response to the views expressed by some Justices of the Michigan Supreme Court that separation of powers concerns should impose significant limits on the power of the courts to establish and develop the common law of Michigan. Specifically, the contention is that policymaking (...) is exclusively the province of the legislature, so that the courts cannot properly formulate common law rules that may have significant social and economic effects. The article strongly disagrees with the proposition that there is any kind of constitutional constraint, either prudential or structural, on the power, and indeed, the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan courts (or the courts of any state) to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules.The judicial power given to the Michigan courts by the Michigan Constitution includes the power to do what courts have always done in the Anglo-American legal system. The judicial power gives the courts the responsibility to adjudicate controversies between private persons and in the process to develop a common law through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. In so doing, the courts may properly take into account considerations of social and economic policy just as the legislature does when it engages in the process of enacting legislation. The difference between what the courts do and what the legislature does is a difference in process, not a difference in substance. Judicial policymaking takes place within the judicial process, that is, in the adjudication of controversies between persons in which the courts promulgate common law rules. The common law develops in a line of growth through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis, and to the extent that there are limitations on the development of the common law, these are limitations that inhere in the judicial process itself. When the courts, for example, consider whether a new claim or a new defense should be recognized by the common law, they must consider whether that new claim or defense properly follows in the line of growth from existing doctrine and precedent. But if the courts conclude that it does, that is, if the claim or defense is consistent with the line of growth of existing doctrine and precedent, the courts are not constrained from recognizing the claim or defense on the ground that the substance of the claim or defense is a matter for the legislature rather than for the courts or that the resulting common law rule may have significant social and economic effects. The legislature, in contrast, enacts legislation through the legislative process. That process is a freewheeling one, often dependent on political compromise and completely unrestrained by the kind of limitations that inhere the judicial process. There is no legislative concept of line of growth, and the legislature can and often does enact legislation that brings about fundamental societal change or reverses the course of public policy. In our constitutional system, the most important questions of public policy are, of course, determined by the Legislature. Where the legislature disagrees with the policy choices reflected in a common law rule, the legislature has the power to enact legislation changing the common law rule. But there are many areas of private law where the legislature has not acted. In our constitutional system, where the matter in issue is not covered or preempted by legislation, the courts may formulate a common law rule to cover that matter, and in so doing may engage in judicial policymaking. Judicial policymaking is a part of the development of the common law, and the courts cannot avoid their responsibility to engage in judicial policymaking to the extent that it is necessary in the process of formulating the common law. As a constitutional matter, there are no separation of powers considerations that prohibit the courts from engaging in judicial policymaking. This part of the article traces judicial policymaking and the common law back to the seminal writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo.The article then discusses at length judicial policymaking and the development of the common law in Michigan. It shows that the clearest history of judicial policymaking in development of the common law is the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century that were promulgated in the wake of the Industrial Revolution to protect the newly-emerging industries. During that time the courts in Michigan and elsewhere grafted on to the general principles of negligence law liability rules such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine, all of which had the effect of denying recovery to workers and other victims of industrial accidents. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Michigan Supreme Court began excising its constitutional power to make changes in the common law, expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan. Emphasizing that "rules created by the court could be altered by the court," and that the court had a "corrective responsibility when dealing with judge-made law," the Court, in approximately a 30 year period: eliminated the imputed negligence doctrine, under which the driver's negligence was imputed to the passenger in the passenger's suit against a third party; eliminated charitable immunity as a defense to a tort action; held that a wife could maintain at tort action for loss of her husband's consortium; abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, which had been applied outside of the employment area, held that there could be recovery for pre-natal injuries and finally abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in favor of a comparative negligence approach. In these cases the Court discussed the relevant policy considerations influencing their decisions with respect to the common law rule at issue. In the last quarter century, the Court continued to take into account policy considerations in developing the common law, but not infrequently there was disagreement on the Court as to where policy considerations should lead, with some Justices arguing that policy considerations supported the imposition of tort liability, while other Justices argued that they did not.The article concludes that it has been demonstrated that in the development of the common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court has at all times engaged in judicial policymaking. From the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century designed to protect the newly-emerging industries in this state, to the Court's exercise of its power to change the common law in Michigan over a 30 year period by expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan, to its recognition of new claims, such as a child's right to recover for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a negligent injury, to its imposition of limits on tort recovery, such as the open and obvious doctrine, the Court has invoked considerations of policy in support of its decisions. In these cases, the Court's invocation of policy considerations was sometimes accompanied by substantial disagreement among members of the Court over where policy should lead, but at no time did the Court ever suggest that separation of powers considerations should somehow operate as a kind of restraint on the Court's use of policy in the development of the common law. It is the power and responsibility of the Michigan Courts under the Michigan Constitution to make policy choices in formulating the common law. (shrink)