Risk writ large

Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384 (2017)
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Abstract

Risk-weighted expected utility theory is motivated by small-world problems like the Allais paradox, but it is a grand-world theory by nature. And, at the grand-world level, its ability to handle the Allais paradox is dubious. The REU model described in Risk and Rationality turns out to be risk-seeking rather than risk-averse on one natural way of formulating the Allais gambles in the grand-world context. This result illustrates a general problem with the case for REU theory, we argue. There is a tension between the small-world thinking marshaled against standard expected utility theory, and the grand-world thinking inherent to the risk-weighted alternative.

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Author Profiles

Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Johanna Thoma
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):751-776.
Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
No escape from Allais: reply to Buchak.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2493-2500.
Replies to Commentators.Lara Buchak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2397-2414.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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