Previous research has demonstrated that duration of implied motion (IM) was dilated, whereas hMT+ activity related to perceptual processes on IM stimuli could be modulated by their motion coherence. Based on these findings, the present study aimed to examine whether subjective time perception of IM stimuli would be influenced by varying coherence levels. A temporal bisection task was used to measure the subjective experience of time, in which photographic stimuli showing a human moving in four directions (left, (...) right, toward, or away from the viewer) were presented as probe stimuli. The varying coherence of these IM stimuli was manipulated by changing the percentage of pictures implying movement in one direction. Participants were required to judge whether the duration of probe stimulus was more similar to the long or short pre-presented standard duration. As predicted, the point of subjective equality was significantly modulated by the varying coherence of the IM stimuli, but not for no-IM stimuli. This finding suggests that coherence level might be a key mediating factor for perceived duration of IM images, and top-down perceptual stream from inferred motion could influence subjective experience of time perception. (shrink)

The detection and categorization of animate motions is a crucial task underlying social interaction and perceptual decision making. Neural representations of perceived animate objects are partially located in the primate cortical region STS, which is a region that receives convergent input from intermediate-level form and motion representations. Populations of STS cells exist which are selectively responsive to specific animated motion sequences, such as walkers. It is still unclear how and to what extent form and motion information contribute (...) to the generation of such representations and what kind of mechanisms are involved in the learning processes. The article develops a cortical model architecture for the unsupervised learning of animated motion sequence representations. We demonstrate how the model automatically selects significant motion patterns as well as meaningful static form prototypes characterized by a high degree of articulation. Such key poses are selectively reinforced during learning through a cross talk between the motion and form processing streams. Furthermore, we show how sequence-selective representations are learned in STS by fusing static form and motion input from the segregated bottom-up driving input streams. Cells in STS, in turn, feed their activities recurrently to their input sites along top-down signal pathways. We show how such learned feedback connections enable predictions about future input as anticipation generated by sequence-selective STS cells. Network simulations demonstrate the computational capacity of the proposed model by reproducing several experimental findings from neurosciences and by accounting for recent behavioral data. (shrink)

Biological motion is the phenomenon of recognizing a human form out of moving point-light dots, where both bottom–up and top–down processing mechanisms have been reported. This study reviews available psychological and neuroscientific evidence, and it assesses attempts either to assimilate biological motion to other structure-from-motion cases or to include biological motion into a visual “social cognition” subsystem . While neither theoretical option seems to accommodate all relevant psychological results, the study proposes that biological motion may (...) be an object recognition task, inside the framework of Pylyshyn’s sequence of data-driven and cognitive mechanisms. This implies that a bottom–up object construction out of two-dimensional stimulus information precedes a top–down, but emotionally significant categorization of a particular human movement. Recognition of biological motion may be an example of visual processing in general. (shrink)

The act of slowness is by its very nature an implied reduction of physical engagement that one might argue has as much to do with impairment as it does with temporal devaluation. Yet when placed in a twenty-first century context there are a growing number of arguments that position slowness as a mediator of resistance to fast-paced communication transactions thus impacting on the ways in which human interaction coexists between digital technology and cultural immediacy. While it may be suggestive (...) to position this new emergence as a collective of technoanthropological treaties as found, for example, in the Slow Media Manifesto , there is an under-valued relation that I will discuss throughout this paper when considering the role that slow motion plays out as a condition rather than an effect of lens based practice. Discussion will integrate the ideas of Proust, Mearleu Ponty, and Murch with review of contributions from Wes Anderson, The Wachowski Siblings, Bill Viola, and Adam Magyar. These perspectives will align with discussion of my own lens-based practice with regards to a slow motion experimental called The 51 Paintings Suite. (shrink)

In line with my model of object motion perception (Wertheim 1994) and in contradistinction to what Stoffregen (1994) states, Sauvan's data suggest that percepts of motion are not sense specific. It is here argued that percepts of object- or self-motion are neither sense specific nor do they necessarily stem from what Stoffregen calls “kinematic events.” Stoffregen's error is in believing that we can only perceive object- or self-motion relative to other objects, which implies a failure to (...) realise that percepts of absolute object- or self-motion in space (relative to the earth's surface) do exist as well, even when the earth's surface itself is not perceived. (shrink)

Various annoyingly incorrect statements of Stoffregen & Bardy are corrected, for example, that perception researchers commonly use the term to denote motion without any frame of reference, confuse earth-relative and gravity-relative motion, err with respect to the frame of reference implied by their subject is motion responses, believe in sense specific motion percepts, and do not investigate sensory interactions at neurophysiological levels. In addition, much of the target article seems to concern metaphysics rather than empirical (...) science. (shrink)

This article examines the Kantian ideas on motion in his work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In that essay, Kant holds that motion as a concept—from its connotation as elemental and fundamental predicament of the material reality—mobilises in matter all the characteristics of its essence as a property. Nevertheless conceiving motion as a concept does not enable us to confirm the existence of motion itself in the natural world because ‘the possibility of specific natural things can’t (...) be discovered from their mere concepts.’. Therefore, the concept of movement does not evidence the existence of the movement or its characteristics and properties. Such claim would imply that motion as a concept is not evidence of the existence of motion as such and, therefore, the properties of matter cannot be mobilised based on that concept because they are characteristics of the essence of motion. Then, how does Kant intend to denote motion? Why pretend to explain matter form the concept of motion if a pure concept is, by definition, independent of the data obtained from the sensibility?. Therefore, we will demonstrate that such weakness is the breaking point of the Kantian concept of motion in his “dynamic-metaphysical” model. (shrink)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological (...) reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality. (shrink)

Recently, approach-avoidance tendencies and visual perception biases have been increasingly studied using bistable point-light walkers (PLWs). Prior studies have found a facing-the-viewer bias when one is primed with general threat stimuli (e.g. angry faces), explained by the “error management theory”, as failing to detect a threat as approaching is riskier than the opposite. Importantly, no study has explored how disease threat – linked to the behavioural immune system – might affect this bias. This study aimed to explore whether disease-signalling cues (...) can alter how we perceive the motion direction of ambiguous PLWs. Throughout 3 experiments, participants indicated the motion direction of a bistable PLW previously primed with a control or disease-signalling stimuli – that is, face with a surgical mask (Experiment 1), sickness sound (Experiment 2), or face with a disease cue (Experiment 3). Results showed that sickness cues do not significantly modulate the perception of approach-avoidance behaviours. However, a pattern emerged in Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting that sickness stimuli led to more facing away percepts. Unlike other types of threat, this implies that disease-related threat stimuli might trigger a distinct perceptual bias, indicating a preference to avoid a possible infection source. Nonetheless, this finding warrants future investigations. (shrink)

As Aristotle classically defined it, continuity is the property of being infinitely divisible into ever-divisible parts. How has this conception been affected by the process of mathematization of motion during the 14th century? This paper focuses on Nicole Oresme, who extensively commented on Aristotle’s Physics, but also made decisive contributions to the mathematics of motion. Oresme’s attitude about continuity seems ambivalent: on the one hand, he never really departs from Aristotle’s conception, but on the other hand, he uses (...) it in a completely new way in his mathematics, particularly in his Questions on Euclidean geometry, a tantamount way to an atomization of motion. If the fluxus theory of natural motion involves that continuity is an essential property of real motion, defined as a res successiva, the ontological and mathematical structure of this continuity implies that continuum is in some way “composed” of an infinite number of indivisibles. In fact, Oresme’s analysis opened the path to a completely new kind of mathematical continuity. (shrink)

György Alajos Szerdahely, the first professor of aesthetics in Pest, publishes his Aesthetica in 1778, a work, written in Latin, that not only engages with the eclectic university aesthetics of late-18th-century Germany and Central Europe, but also marks the beginning of the Hungarian aesthetic tradition. Szerdahely proposes aesthetics as the doctrine of taste, a philosophical discipline that can polish our manners and social conduct through a sensual-affective Bildung offered by art experiences. Highlighting his sources in both British criticism and German (...) aesthetics, the paper traces the development of Szerdahely's concept of beauty from beauty as form (uniformity amidst variety) to beauty in motion (sensibility). Initially, Szerdahely argues for unity and variety as the two main constituents of a beautiful object, evoking disinterested contemplation, but he then turns to sensibility as the third necessary condition of beauty: an object becomes aesthetically beautiful only if it has the power to strike the senses (Lux) and stir the affections (Vivacitas), enlivening the whole embodied person. The paper argues that this third principle of sensibility proves to be more emphatic than the first two, leading to (1) the aesthetic conception of beauty as an experiential quality; but more interestingly to (2) the incorporation of the element of self-preservation and self-love into aesthetic experience. The reason for the latter development lies in Szerdahely’s anthropological argument, which traces back every affection to the instantaneous apprehension of good or evil concerning ourselves, implying desire (Adpetitus) or aversion (Auersi) in our reactions. (shrink)

Aristotle posits that time, as defined by the “number of motion in respect of before and after” (_Physics_ IV 11.219b1-2), is an inherent property of motion itself rather than a prerequisite. This implies the possibility of identifying time-independent properties of natural motions. One such critical feature, crucial to understanding the basic meaning of time, is the presence of an inherent order of before and after within motion, regardless of time. The concept of a non-temporal before and after (...) within motion is now accepted or seriously considered in scholarly discussions. However, it remains one of the most confusing and difficult issues in the interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of time. How can we conceive of motion apart from time? Moreover, how does Aristotle seemingly take this aspect for granted? In order to address these issues, I propose to combine philosophical inquiry with grammatical and mathematical reflections. I will examine the analysis of motion alongside the verbs used to describe it, with a keen focus on aspect. Hence I will draw connections between the relationship of motion and time and that of physical and mathematical objects. (shrink)

A deterministic equation of the Hamilton-Jacobi type is proposed for a single particle:S t+(1/2m)(∇S)2+U{S}=0, whereU{S} is a certain operator onS, which has the sense of the potential of the self-generated field of a free particle. Examples are given of potentials that imply instability of uniform rectilinear motion of a free particle and yieldrandom fluctuations of its trajectory. Galilei-invariant turbulence-producing potentials can be constructed using a single universal parameter—Planck's constant. Despite the fact that the classical trajectory concept is retained, the (...) mechanics of the particle then admits quantum-type effects: an uncertainty relation, de Broglie-type waves and their interference, discrete energy levels, and zero-point fluctuations. (shrink)

Not only the classical cognitive pattern but also the classical phenomenological pattern gives rise to a problem concerning the qualitative dimension. This problem is essentially related to the notion of matter, conceived as residual with respect to the notion of form: the sensorial hyle is residual with respect to the intentional form; plena are residual with respect to the extension, and physical matter is also residual with respect to the broad ensemble of connections where the physical thing is inscribed. The (...) residual component which characterizes the notion of matter is simply the other side of the absolute predominance of form. This predominance gives rise to the same problem in the context of phenomenology and in philosophy of mind: the problem of the ontological status of qualitative states. This issue is a crucial one and, in order to be solved, requires a radical change of perspective. In the context of phenomenology this change depends on the concept of enactive, embodied and situated mind. This notion implies a temporal paradigm; it alludes to a dynamic, non-static pattern; that is, it alludes not to projective notions, but to notions which are agentive and, ultimately, evolutive. (shrink)

It is shown that the following three common understandings of Newton’s laws of motion do not hold for systems of infinitely many components. First, Newton’s third law, or the law of action and reaction, is universally believed to imply that the total sum of internal forces in a system is always zero. Several examples are presented to show that this belief fails to hold for infinite systems. Second, two of these examples are of an infinitely divisible continuous body with (...) finite mass and volume such that the sum of all the internal forces in the body is not zero and the body accelerates due to this non-null net internal force. So the two examples also demonstrate the breakdown of the common understanding that according to Newton’s laws a body under no external force does not accelerate. Finally, these examples also make it clear that the expression ‘impressed force’ in Newton’s formulations of his first and second laws should be understood not as ‘external force’ but as ‘exerted force’ which is the sum of all the internal and external forces acting on a given body, if the body is infinitely divisible. (shrink)

The linguistic path has been explored through several works. The present paper investigates a path underlain by the fictive motion phenomenon: The plateau goes east along the river. This itinerary, here called the ‘localization path’ discloses the FM of an item along a trajectory to highlight its immobility in space. This linguistic path is here inspected through a corpus-based analysis displaying the verbs come and go. If experiencing language is first vocal, this process also implies kinetic, non-verbal modalities. The (...) languaging experience will hence be explored through the interaction between language, space and the speaker’s body through an enactive approach. A prototypical syntactic configuration mirroring the interpretative grid of FM reality will be defined. Recurrent syntactic patterns revealing the way the speaker projects his own world through simplex models will highlight the way the complexity of visual scenari is converted into linguistic sequences. (shrink)

In 1978, Yu. F. Borisov presented an axiom system using a few basic assumptions and four explicit axioms, the fourth being a formulation of the relativity principle; and he demonstrated that this axiom system had (up to choice of units) only two models: a relativistic one in which worldview transformations are Poincaré transformations and a classical one in which they are Galilean. In this paper, we reformulate Borisov’s original four axioms within an intuitively simple, but strictly formal, first-order logic framework, (...) and convert his basic background assumptions into explicit axioms. Instead of assuming that the structure of physical quantities is the field of real numbers, we assume only that they form an ordered field. This allows us to investigate how Borisov’s theorem depends on the structure of quantities. We demonstrate (as our main contribution) how to construct Euclidean, Galilean, and Poincaré models of Borisov’s axiom system over every non-Archimedean field. We also demonstrate the existence of an infinite descending chain of models and transformation groups in each of these three cases, something that is not possible over Archimedean fields. As an application, we note that there is a model of Borisov’s axioms that satisfies the relativity principle, and in which the worldview transformations are Euclidean isometries. Over the field of reals it is easy to eliminate this model using natural axioms concerning time’s arrow and the absence of instantaneous motion. In the case of non-Archimedean fields, however, the Euclidean isometries appear intrinsically as worldview transformations in models of Borisov’s axioms and neither the assumption of time’s arrow, nor the rejection of instantaneous motion, can eliminate them. (shrink)

Leibniz looked upon space as an order of co-existing, independent things which differ from each other. Starting from this approach, we may ask whether two specific differences among given things - e.g. one between A and B, the other between C and D - in their turn differ from one another. Steiner, inspired by Leibniz’s approach, showed that on this second level of abstraction they indeed do. However, if we proceed to a third level of abstraction, comparing differences observed on (...) the second stage of abstraction, we shall no longer detect any material, “palpable” difference. In short: Setting off from the co-existence of different things and analysing whether qualitative, material differences are still evident on a second and a third level of abstraction, we are led to conceive space as a system comprising three qualitatively discernible dimensions. - Concerning time, Leibniz and Steiner looked upon it as an arrangement of items succeeding one another. To understand this requires - if we follow Leibniz − to be able to perceive motion. Now, most moving items are passively driven into motion, depending on an external source which imparts the movement. In contrast to that, an actively moving thing generates within itself the impulse to modify its location in relation to other items. Within the world of sensory perceptions, “organic bodies” ( i.e. organisms) are capable of self-motion to a certain extent. Nonetheless, a true primary self-motion can only be postulated of a completely independent being. Herewith, Leibniz’s approach to the origin of motion and the therein implied up-welling of time reveals itself to be intimately related to lines of thought developed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus - albeit employing completely different terms. (shrink)

Languages differ systematically in how they map path and manner of motion onto lexical and grammatical structures (Talmy, 1985). Manner languages (e.g., English, German and Russian) typically code manner in the verb (cf. English skip, run, hop, jog), and path in a variety of other devices such as particles (out), adpositions (into the room), verb affixes, etc. Path languages (e.g., Modern Greek, Romance, Turkish, Japanese and Hebrew) typically code path in the verb (cf. Greek vjeno ‘exit’, beno ‘enter’, ftano (...) ‘reach’, aneveno ‘ascend’, diashizo ‘cross’), and manner in adverbials (trexontas ‘running’, me ta podia ‘on foot’, jrigora ‘quickly’). The distinction is not meant to imply that the relevant languages lack certain kids of verb altogether. For instance, English has path verbs, such as enter, exit, ascend and descend, and Greek has manner verbs, such as treho ‘run’, kilao.. (shrink)

If an object changes its spatial position over time, or moves from one place to another, we say that the object is in motion. But in Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy reality of motion has been questioned. Nāgārjuna, the renowned philosopher in Mādhyamika school, has argued that motion is an absurd concept—it is _empty_. In the second chapter of _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (_Gatāgata-parikṣā_) Nāgārjuna examined the notion of motion and showed that motion exists neither in past, nor in present, (...) and nor in future—the notion of motion is paradoxical. This paper intends to critically examine those arguments from a realist point of view, and tries to demystify the paradox analyzing its nature and origin. Nāgārjuna’s arguments on motion have two different interpretations, and the paper shows that it is possible to counter both of the interpretations from the Nyāya point of view. The paradox does not arise in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ontology. The paper also tries to find out why the paradox arises in Nāgārjuna’s theoretical framework. This paper also examines Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the commencement and cessation of motion and shows how these arguments could be answered from a realist point of view. In this context the paper also examines a modern interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments offered by Westerhoff (J Indian Philos 36(4):455–479, 2008). Nāgārjuna argues that motion and mover are mutually interdependent, hence have no intrinsic nature—they are empty and absurd. He uses this argument as an argument template to refute other notions like _pramāṇa_ and _prameya_. This paper analyzes that argument template and shows that the argument from mutual interdependence can also be countered. Time is an important presupposition for an account of motion. Nāgārjuna refutes the reality of Time which implies that there cannot be any motion. But the Naiyāyikas have refuted this position and presented arguments in favour of the reality of time. It supports the claim that motion exists—it is not an absurd concept. (shrink)

We present a theory of discontinuous motion of particles in continuous space-time. We show that the simplest nonrelativistic evolution equation of such motion is just the Schroedinger equation in quantum mechanics. This strongly implies what quantum mechanics describes is discontinuous motion of particles. Considering the fact that space-time may be essentially discrete when considering gravity, we further present a theory of discontinuous motion of particles in discrete space-time. We show that its evolution will naturally result in (...) the dynamical collapse process of the wave function, and this collapse will bring about the appearance of continuous motion of objects in the macroscopic world. (shrink)

Human vision supports prediction for moving stimuli. Here we take an individual differences approach to investigate whether there could be a common processing rate for motion-based visual prediction across diverse motion phenomena. Motion Induced Spatial Conflict refers to an incongruity arising from two edges of a combined stimulus, moving rigidly, but with different apparent speeds. This discrepancy induces an illusory jitter that has been attributed to conflict within a motion prediction mechanism. Its apparent frequency has been (...) shown to correlate with the frequency of alpha oscillations in the brain. We asked what other psychophysical measures might correlate positively with MISC frequency. We measured the correlation between MISC jitter frequency and another three measures that might be linked to motion-based spatial prediction. We demonstrate that the illusory jitter frequency in MISC correlates significantly with the accrual rate of the Motion Induced Position Shift effect - the well-established observation that a carrier movement in a static envelope of a Gabor target leads to an apparent position shift of the envelope in the direction of motion. We did not observe significant correlations with the other two measures – the Adaptation Induced Spatial Shift accrual rate and the Smooth Motion Threshold. These results suggest a shared perceptual rate between MISC and MIPS, implying a common periodic mechanism for motion-based visual prediction. (shrink)

Summary What is the “fantasmatic deixis”? It is a very creative and productive cognitive–linguistic operation that allows a “transfer” to other real or fantastic times, places, and “worlds”. The underlying psychological question concerns the possibility of moving and being moved with respect to something or someone who is absent (Bühler, 1965). This “fiction game” is made possible by deictic indicators (Tenchini, 2008), terms that allow motion in time and space, always considering the here–now–I system of subjective orientation. When we (...) refer to something that can be gathered by hearing or by sight, by terms such as here, there, I, and you, the receiver can easily use natural, prelinguistic aids (e.g., gestures, voice quality, facial expressions, and body orientation) to understand what the issuer intends to communicate to him (demonstratio ad oculos). But what happens when we move from the study of “immediate” behavior to that of “mediate” behavior, i.e., the field of memories (retrospection) or the constructive fantasy (prospecting)? The fantasmatic deixis implies enfranchisement from the physical position of the body and requires the assumption of the listener’s current tactile body image. Thus, the receiver assumes an inner attitude to correctly interpret the indications given by the speaker, seeing and hearing through the “inner” or “mental” eye and ear (Raynaud, 2006). In this way, the listener can bring something absent in his/her here, now, and I or feel moved to the point where the speaker leads him/her. My paper will focus on the features and types of fantasmatic deixis, providing some examples and showing how this operation involves language, motion, and cognitive processes. (shrink)

Most studies on verticality’s embodiment showed that up positions were related to positive emotions whereas down positions were related to negative ones. Research on motion perception found that a parabolic motion both induced animation attribution and implied negative feelings. We hypothesized that seeing a parabolic downward motion will increase both the memorization for words and the execution’s speed of a serial subtraction compared to a parabolic upward motion. Results showed that the downward motion had (...) enhancing effects both on the serial subtraction and on the number of recalled words, independently of their valence. These findings are interpreted as marking processes related to an adaptive behavior in response to a negative stimulus. (shrink)

John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese??understanding? computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that instantiating such a program is ?never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality?. I show that this phrase is incoherent, and that all that follows is that instantiating such a program is not in every case a sufficient condition for the given intentionality. But the conclusion to Searle's argument, thus revised, is neither new nor (...) significant; Searle's arguments merely raise old issues in new clothing. (shrink)

Telling tales and reading have been a part of human activity for a very long time. We review in brief the anthropological evidence, then the emergence of the 'modern novel'. This explores in narratives the psychological reflections of the characters concerned with life circumstances including loss, abandonment, despair, illness, dying, and death. We report findings that the response of crying to a novel occurs as often as to music, not reported before: both 'move us'. We note what several critics and (...) authors imply about the imagined world of 'novel space' which emphasizes the active not passive nature of reading dramatic action, the latter being embedded and embodied within us. This touches on the mind–brain problem. We provide a brief introduction to neuroscientific work with brain imaging revealing how cerebral networks to do with theory of mind and brain structures that are the basis of our movements are involved with the very act of reading words and narratives. Emotional tearing is an exclusive attribute of Homo sapiens, and crying can have positive benefits for mental health. We argue that bibliotherapy needs greater attention than has been the case at present. We also suggest that telling tales and the 'modern novel' are closely allied to the development of the consciousness of Homo sapiens. (shrink)

The counterfactual account of physical computation is simple and, for the most part, very attractive. However, it is usually thought to trivialize the notion of physical computation insofar as it implies ‘limited pancomputationalism’, this being the doctrine that every deterministic physical system computes some function. Should we bite the bullet and accept limited pancomputationalism, or reject the counterfactual account as untenable? Jack Copeland would have us do neither of the above. He attempts to thread a path between the two horns (...) of the dilemma by buttressing the counterfactual account with extra conditions intended to block certain classes of deterministic physical systems from qualifying as physical computers. His theory is called the ‘algorithm execution account’. Here we show that the algorithm execution account entails limited pancomputationalism, despite Copeland’s argument to the contrary. We suggest, partly on this basis, that the counterfactual account should be accepted as it stands, pancomputationalist warts and all. (shrink)

We show that particle-antiparticle exchange and covariant motion reversal are two physically different aspects of the same mathematical transformation, either in the prequantal relativistic equation of motion of a charged point particle, in the general scheme of second quantization, or in the spinning wave equations of Dirac and of Petiau-Duffin-Kemmer. While, classically, charge reversal and rest mass reversal are equivalent operations, in the wave mechanical case mass reversal must be supplemented by exchange of the two adjoint equations, implying (...) ψ ⇄ $\bar \psi$ .Denoting by M the rest mass reversal, P the parity reversal, T the Racah time reversal, and Z the ψ ⇄ $\bar \psi$ exchange, the connection with the usual scheme of charge conjugation, parity reversal, and Wigner motion reversal, is with, of course. (shrink)

James A. Diefenbeck, Wayward Reflections on the History ofPhilosophyThomas R. Flynn Sartre, Foucault and Historical Reason. Volume 1:Toward an Existential Theory of HistoryMark Golden and Peter Toohey Inventing Ancient Culture:Historicism, Periodization and the Ancient WorldZenonas Norkus Istorika: Istorinis IvadasEverett Zimmerman The Boundaries of Fiction: History and theEighteenth‐Century British Novel.

This paper focuses on whether static images can depict motion. It is natural to say that pictures depicting objects caught in the middle of a dynamic action—such as Henri Cartier-Bresson’s (1932) Behind the Gare St. Lazare—are pictures of movement, but, given that pictures themselves do not move, can we make sense of such an idea? Drawing on results from experimental psychology and cognitive sciences, I show that we can. Psychological studies on implicit motion and representational momentum indicate that (...) motion is really perceived in some static images: our visual system is built in order to detect motion, even where it is only implied, and to anticipate the probable outcomes of others’ actions—even when the ‘others’ are only the subject matters of pictures’. I argue that, consequently, a range of popular depiction theories—perceptualist theories of depiction—can accommodate depicted motion. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle's notion of the practical syllogism. It is argued that the notion of ‘practical’ reasoning in the sense of reasoning which implies motion in one sense or the other is alien to Aristotle's philosophy of nature. All (at least in type) the relevant passages will be discussed. The outcome is that there are three different contexts in which it would be justified to speak of practical syllogisms: (i) human deliberation, (ii) the illustration of the triggering cause (...) of animal motion, and (iii) the teleological ex post explanationof human action. (i) is genuine, but non-deductive reasoning which does not immediately result in action/motion, whereas (ii) is not genuine reasoning, but an analogy with deductive reasoning. Finally, the relation between (i) and (ii) in Aristotle's theory of animal motion will be discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch the evolution of the main theories of the relationship between time and motion from Descartes to Newton, by defending an hypothesis that traces back Newton’s realism about time to Barrow’s “metric realism”, which Newton developed as the claim that measuring a magnitude X implies that X exists independently of our measures.

Newton's arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been claimed to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton, first distinguishing two distinct arguments. Then, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich ([2005]), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, DiSalle ([1994]) claims that one argument shows Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. I agree that its premises imply a denial of a kind of (...) substantivalism, but I show that they are inconsistent with Newton's core doctrine that not all motion is the relative motions of bodies, and so conclude that they are not part of his considered views on space. The Arguments The Identity Argument 2.1 Identity of indiscernibles for individuals 2.2 Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states 2.3 Representation de re Kinematic Relationism Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

It is difficult to evaluate the role of activity - of force or of that which has causal efficacy - in Descartes’ natural philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes claims to include in his natural philosophy only that which can be described geometrically, which amounts to matter (extended substance) in motion (where this motion is described kinematically).’ Yet on the other hand, rigorous adherence to a purely geometrical description of matter in motion would make it difficult to (...) account for the interactions among the particles that constitute Descartes’ universe, since the notions of extension and kinematical motion do not in themselves imply any causal agency. There is, after all, no reason to expect that a particle whose single essence is extension, even if we suppose it to be moving, should impart motion to another particle, while conversely, there is no reason to expect a resting particle to hinder the motion of an impinging one. Descartes' hankering for an austere ontology of matter in motion is in danger of excluding causal agency (force, conceived dynmically) from matter. To the modern reader it may seem obvious that Descartes did not get himself into such a fix, since matter in motion so readily reminds us of kinetic energy or of some more primitive notion of force. Yet by no means is it obvious that Descartes attributed causal efficacy to matter in motion per se. Serious scholars have held opposite positions on this issue. Westfall, Gabbey, and others’ have argued that although on the metaphysical plane Descartes attempted to eliminate force from his mechanical universe, nonetheless ‘force is a real feature’ of his mechanical world. The thrust of this view is that Descartes conceived of force as ‘the capacity of a body in motion to act’, by means of impact, upon other bodies. An opposing interpretation, defended here, is that Descartes did in fact deny causal agency to moving matter per se, restricting agency to immaterial substances such as the human mind, angels, and God. The intention of this interpretation is not to de-emphasize the role of matter in motion in Descartes’ explanation of nature, but rather to stress the fact that Descartes did not conceive of this moving matter dynamically. -/- Reprinted in Descartes, ed. by J. Cottingham, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 281–310. (shrink)

Color-motion asynchrony (CMA) refers to an apparent lag of direction of motion when a dynamic stimulus changes both color and direction at the same time. The subjective order of simultaneous events, however, is not only perceptual but also subject to illusions during voluntary actions. Self-initiated actions, for example, seem to precede their sensory outcomes following an adaptation to a delay between the action and the sensory feedback. Here, we demonstrate that the extent of the apparent asynchrony can be (...) substantially reduced when direction change is induced by a voluntary key press following a delay adaptation regime. We also show that the reduced color-motion asynchrony effect size following a motor-sensory recalibration is not a result of a change in the onset of perceived direction change relative to that of the color. This is particularly important as it implies, for the first time in the literature, that voluntary action is not only important in forming action-sensory outcome associations but may also act as a binding factor between the two perceptual features of a sensory event. (shrink)

Reprint of: Gary Hatfield, Force (God) in Descartes' physics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (2):113-140 (1979) -/- Abstract. It is difficult to evaluate the role of activity - of force or of that which has causal efficacy - in Descartes’ natural philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes claims to include in his natural philosophy only that which can be described geometrically, which amounts to matter (extended substance) in motion (where this motion is described (...) kinematically).’ Yet on the other hand, rigorous adherence to a purely geometrical description of matter in motion would make it difficult to account for the interactions among the particles that constitute Descartes’ universe, since the notions of extension and kinematical motion do not in themselves imply any causal agency. There is, after all, no reason to expect that a particle whose single essence is extension, even if we suppose it to be moving, should impart motion to another particle, while conversely, there is no reason to expect a resting particle to hinder the motion of an impinging one. Descartes' hankering for an austere ontology of matter in motion is in danger of excluding causal agency (force, conceived dynmically) from matter. To the modern reader it may seem obvious that Descartes did not get himself into such a fix, since matter in motion so readily reminds us of kinetic energy or of some more primitive notion of force. Yet by no means is it obvious that Descartes attributed causal efficacy to matter in motion per se. Serious scholars have held opposite positions on this issue. Westfall, Gabbey, and others’ have argued that although on the metaphysical plane Descartes attempted to eliminate force from his mechanical universe, nonetheless ‘force is a real feature’ of his mechanical world. The thrust of this view is that Descartes conceived of force as ‘the capacity of a body in motion to act’, by means of impact, upon other bodies. An opposing interpretation, defended here, is that Descartes did in fact deny causal agency to moving matter per se, restricting agency to immaterial substances such as the human mind, angels, and God. The intention of this interpretation is not to de-emphasize the role of matter in motion in Descartes’ explanation of nature, but rather to stress the fact that Descartes did not conceive of this moving matter dynamically. (shrink)

This article studies the debate between the Neoplatonist philosophers Simplicius and John Philoponus on the question of the eternity of the world. The first part consists in a historical introduction situating their debate within the context of the conflict between Christians and Pagan in the Byzantine Empire of the first half of the sixth century. Particular attention is paid to the attitudes of these two thinkers to Aristotle's attempted proofs of the eternity of motion and time in Physics 8.1. (...) The second part traces the origins, structure and function of a particular argument used by Philoponus to argue for the world's creation within time. Philoponus takes advantage of a tension inherent in Aristotle's theory of motion, between his standard view that all motion and change is continuous and takes place in time, and his occasional admission that at least some kinds of motion and change are instantaneous. For Philoponus, God's creation of the world is precisely such an instantaneous change: it is not a motion on the part of the Creator, but is analogous to the activation of a state, which is timeless and implies no change on the part of the agent. The various transformations of this doctrine at the hands of Peripatetic, Neoplatonic, and Islamic commentators are studied, as is Philoponus' use of it in his debate against Proclus. (shrink)