This article investigates the problem of the identity of the parts of space in Newton’s natural philosophy, as well as the holistic or structuralist nature of Newton’s ontology of space. Additionally, this article relates the lessons reached in this historical and philosophical investigation to analogous debates in contemporary space-time ontology. While previous contributions, by Nerlich, Huggett, and others, have proven to be informative in evaluating Newton’s claims, it will be argued that the underlying goals of Newton’s views have largely eluded (...) prior analysis and that Newton’s approach is similar, and lends support, to several current structuralist trends in the conception of space-time ontology. (shrink)

According to Newton and Clarke, Leibniz’s relationalism cannot make sense of distance quantities. Although the core of Newton and Clarke’s “argument from quantity” is clear enough, its details remain unclear because we do not know what its key term “quantity” means. This key term is still unsettled because, unlike Leibniz, who loudly voices his view of quantity in both his correspondence with Clarke and in his philosophical essays on quantity, Newton and Clarke are frustratingly terse when it comes to defining (...) quantity. Nevertheless, I think that it would be hasty to conclude that there is no way to expand our understanding of the term “quantity” as it appears in their argument. Although Newton and Clarke do not pursue a theory of quantity, their colleagues do, and the theory of quantity developed by their peers promises to deliver a historically rich perspective on Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity. In this article, I aim to provide some historical context for Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity by examining two criteria for quantity that were popular among their peers—what I call the “divisibility” and “precise increase and diminution” conditions. (shrink)