In this work, Paul Bartha proposes a normative theory of analogical arguments and raises questions and proposes answers regarding the criteria for evaluating analogical arguments, the philosophical justification for analogical reasoning, and the place of scientific analogies in the context of theoretical confirmation.

Among recent objections to Pascal's Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek has shown that reformulations of Pascal's Wager that address these criticisms inevitably lead to arguments that are philosophically unsatisfying and historically unfaithful. Both the objections (...) and Hájek's philosophical worries disappear, however, if we represent our preferences using relative utilities rather than a one-place utility function. Relative utilities provide a conservative way to make sense of infinite value that preserves the familiar equation of rationality with the maximization of expected utility. They also provide a means of investigating a broader class of problems related to the Wager. (shrink)

The main result of this paper belongs to the field of the comparative study of program verification methods as well as to the field called nonstandard logics of programs. We compare the program verifying powers of various well-known temporal logics of programs, one of which is the Intermittent Assertions Method, denoted as Bur. Bur is based on one of the simplest modal logics called S5 or sometime-logic. We will see that the minor change in this background modal logic increases the (...) program verifying power of Bur. The change can be described either technically as replacing the reflexive version of S5 with an irreflexive version, or intuitively as using the modality some-other-time instead of sometime. Some insights into the nature of computational induction and its variants are also obtained. (shrink)

De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on subjective probability. It does, however, seem mandated by Dutch Book arguments similar to those that support the other axioms of the probability calculus as compulsory for subjective interpretations. These two lines of reasoning can be (...) reconciled through a slight generalization of the Dutch Book framework. Countable additivity may indeed be abandoned for de Finetti's lottery, but this poses no serious threat to its adoption in most applications of subjective probability. Introduction The de Finetti lottery Two objections to equiprobability 3.1 The ‘No random mechanism’ argument 3.2 The Dutch Book argument Equiprobability and relative betting quotients The re-labelling paradox 5.1 The paradox 5.2 Resolution: from symmetry to relative probability Beyond the de Finetti lottery. (shrink)

We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping) (). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance' (), however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of (...) novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions. (shrink)

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, (...) then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment. (shrink)

In analogical reasoning, observations about one or more source domains provide varying degrees of support for a conjecture about a target domain. Norton (2021) challenges the usefulness of formal models of analogical inference. Other philosophers (Dardashti et al. 2019) develop just such formal models in order to show how analogue experiments can confirm a hypothesis, even when the target domain is inaccessible. This paper defends the value of quasi-formal models of analogical reasoning. Such models are broadly compatible with Norton’s position, (...) but help to clarify the structure of analogical reasoning and to identify basic requirements for a good analogical inference. (shrink)

By Parallel Reasoning is the first comprehensive philosophical examination of analogical reasoning in more than forty years designed to formulate and justify standards for the critical evaluation of analogical arguments. It proposes a normative theory with special focus on the use of analogies in mathematics and science. In recent decades, research on analogy has been dominated by computational theories whose objective has been to model analogical reasoning as a psychological process. These theories have devoted little attention to normative questions. In (...) this book Bartha proposes that a good analogical argument must articulate a clear relationship that is capable of generalization. This idea leads to a set of distinct models for the critical analysis of prominent forms of analogical argument. The same core principle makes it possible to relate analogical reasoning to norms and values of scientific practice. Reasoning by analogy is justified because it strikes an optimal balance between conservative values, such as simplicity and coherence, and progressive values, such as fruitfulness and theoretical unification. Analogical arguments are also justified by appeal to symmetry--like cases are to be treated alike. In elaborating the connection between analogy and these broad epistemic principles, By Parallel Reasoning offers a novel contribution to explaining how analogies can play an important role in the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. (shrink)

The resemblance theory of representation is the view that one thing represents another by virtue of resembling it. Typically, it is taken as non-controversial that Berkeley accepts the resemblance theory of representation – even if the plausibility of the resemblance theory itself comes under scrutiny. One piece of evidence in favour of this reading of Berkeley is his commitment to the ‘likeness principle’: the view that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’ (PHK § 8). The likeness principle (...) is typically seen as a rejection of the kind of indirect theory of perception that is often attributed to Locke. However, by paying particular attention to Berkeley’s account of how mental representation via the imagination works, Dávid Bartha casts doubt on the consensus view that Berkeley does accept the resemblance theory of representation. (shrink)

Prispevek obravnava potek in zaporedje dogodkov, preko katerih se Medeja pomladi – tako kot je pred seboj pomladila druge, to stori, kot bi se preprosto razstavila in se dala v svoj kotel ter se nato prerodila v svoj mlajši in močnejši jaz. Članek najprej predstavi različne in spreminjajoče se ženske vloge pri Senekovi Medeji, nato pa s pomočjo podrobnega branja besedila pokaže, kako Seneka uporablja podobe telesa, in se osredotoči na način, kako Medeja uporablja lastno telo, da bi dosegla svojo (...) preobrazbo: da bi začela novo življenje z vrnitvijo k svojemu prejšnjemu jazu, da bi se torej pomladila. V podporo tej tezi članek izpostavi tudi njena prejšnja pomlajevanja, kot so ohra­njena v besedilnih in ikonografskih virih, ter pokaže, kako je Seneka Medejo predstavil kot precej pozitiven lik, kot božanstvo, čarodejko in zdravilko, ki zmore upravljati z življenjem in smrtjo. (shrink)

The second of two commentaries on “Respecting Donors to Biobank Research,” from the January‐February 2013 issue.

In the trauma surrounding mass disasters, the need to identify victims accurately and as soon as possible is critical. DNA identification testing is increasingly used to identify human bodies and remains where the deceased cannot be identified by traditional means. This form of testing compares DNA taken from the body of the deceased with DNA taken from their personal items or from close biological relatives. DNA identification testing was used to identify the victims of the terrorist attack on the World (...) Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, and of the victims of the Tsunami that hit Asia on December 26, 2004. Shortly after the 9/11 attack, police investigators asked the victims' families for personal items belonging to the missing, and for DNA samples from family members themselves. The New York medical examiner's office coordinated the DNA identification testing program; however, some of the identification work was contracted out to private laboratories. (shrink)

We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (...) (a paradigm of rationality) apparently gives rise to a situation closely analogous to having intransitive preferences (a paradigm of irrationality). Indeed, the agents in these examples are vulnerable to a money pump set-up despite having preferences that exhibit no obvious defect of rationality. We explore several putative solutions to such problems, particularly those that appeal to binding and to deliberative dynamics. We consider the prospects for these solutions, concluding that if they fail, the examples show that money pump arguments are invalid. (shrink)

Currently, the return of results in the domain of biobanking constitutes an ethical and legal quagmire, whether it involves population or specific clinical research studies. In light of the fact that population biobanks are often not seen as distinct from those biobanks created for disease research, as well as the uncertainty as to what “return of results” means concretely, this lexicon attempts to demystify the terminology. The terms — results, return, clinical significance, and utility — are discussed. Through an analysis (...) of international and national normative guidance on this issue, the authors propose a concordance of meaning and a simplified lexicon. (shrink)

Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no information (...) about the coming of Doom. More complex cases suggest a move from countably additive to non-standard probability measures. (shrink)

The Principle of Indifference, which dictates that we ought to assign two outcomes equal probability in the absence of known reasons to do otherwise, is vulnerable to well-known objections. Nevertheless, the appeal of the principle, and of symmetry-based assignments of equal probability, persists. We show that, relative to a given class of symmetries satisfying certain properties, we are justified in calling certain outcomes equally probable, and more generally, in defining what we call relative probabilities. Relative probabilities are useful in providing (...) a generalized approach to conditionalization. The technique is illustrated by application to simple examples. (shrink)

Documents, in particular identity cards, mediate relationships between individuals and institutions. Their materiality matters and actively impacts how states govern populations and their movements. In this paper, I examine one such object, the Romanian identity card. Focusing on its temporality and agency, I explore how objects and technological procedures enact race. In Romania, people without an address or proof of residence—many of them members of segregated Roma communities living in deep poverty—can only receive a temporary identity card, the Carte de (...) Idenititate Provizorie (CIP). CIP holders do not enjoy full citizenship and are deprived of various rights, such as the right to travel without a passport within the European Union. They are also exposed to heightened surveillance as they must apply annually for a new CIP. Starting from the material object of the CIP, I explore how race comes into being as a relation at the intersection of various temporalities that are folded into the rules and bureaucratic practice entailed in its issue. I offer the concept of “permanent temporality” to analyze how racialization occurs in practices of governing people and their movement in Europe. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate total correctness in Nonstandard Dynamic Logic . Here we show that despite of the celebrated Kfoury-Park [5] result, termination is a rst order notion if approached properly.

The article “Ethical Responsibilities for Companies that Process Personal Data” (McCoy et al. 2023) provides a principled and pragmatic ethical framework for companies collecting, sharing, and usin...

The last few years have witnessed the growth of large-scale, population genomics biobanks, which serve as longitudinal, gene-environment databases for future yet unspecified research. An international consortium, the Public Population Project in Genomics, builds harmonization tools for such biobanks and has catalogued numerous studies — at least 139 with over 10,000 banked participants and 34 with over 100,000. As their potential use for translational, clinical research draws near, it is opportune to clarify the duties of such biobanks to communicate results (...) to participants. To identify the potential obligations, some demystification of the terminology surrounding the return of results as found in international and national norms on biobanking generally is essential. On the whole, our proposed lexicon is based on a study of norms as found in national and international policies but excludes debates found in the literature. (shrink)

The Pasadena game invented by Nover and Hájek raises a number of challenges for decision theory. The basic problem is how the game should be evaluated: it has no expectation and hence no well-defined value. Easwaran has shown that the Pasadena game does have a weak expectation, raising the possibility that we can eliminate the value gap by requiring agents to value gambles at their weak expectations. In this paper, I first prove a negative result: there are gambles like the (...) Pasadena game that do not even have a weak expectation. Hence, problematic value gaps remain even if decision theory is extended to take in weak expectations. There is a further challenge: the existence of a ‘value gap’ in the Pasadena game seems to make decision theory inapplicable in a number of cases where the right choice is obvious. The positive contribution of the paper is a theory of ‘relative utilities’, an extension of decision theory that lets us make comparative judgements even among gambles that have no well-defined value. (shrink)

While the socio-ethical and legal issues surrounding clinical genetics have long been the subject of international interest, the thorny questions of genetic research and biobanking are more recent. Add to this the fact that national guidelines and laws usually precede international policymaking, and the delay in international approaches is understandable. In that regard, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is unique in its prospective guidance on genetic research. Also, (...) it is in the very nature of international normative instruments to be general, except on specific issues considered to be in the interest of humanity, such as research into human reproductive cloning or access to AIDS drugs. (shrink)

While the socio-ethical and legal issues surrounding clinical genetics have long been the subject of international interest, the thorny questions of genetic research and biobanking are more recent. Add to this the fact that national guidelines and laws usually precede international policymaking, and the delay in international approaches is understandable. In that regard, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is unique in its prospective guidance on genetic research. Also, (...) it is in the very nature of international normative instruments to be general, except on specific issues considered to be in the interest of humanity, such as research into human reproductive cloning or access to AIDS drugs. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 77-80.

Human reproductive cloning has become the most palpable example of the globalization of science. Throughout the world, events and conjectures in the media, such as the birth and death in the United Kingdom of the cloned sheep Dolly and projects to clone human beings by Korean scientists, by members of the Canadian-based Raelian cult, and by the Italian physician Antinori in an undisclosed country, have galvanized the political will of individual countries to ban human reproductive cloning.Yet, international attempts to harmonize (...) policies in the area of biomedical ethics and human research, such as the 1997 Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and most recently, the United Nations’ efforts to adopt an international convention against human reproductive cloning, have been insufficient to trigger a substantial global policy design process on issues relating to these new technologies. (shrink)

Confronted with the possibility of severe environmental harms, such as catastrophic climate change, some researchers have suggested that we should abandon the principle at the heart of standard decision theory—the injunction to maximize expected utility—and embrace a different one: the Precautionary Principle. Arguably, the most sophisticated philosophical treatment of the Precautionary Principle is due to Steel. Steel interprets PP as a qualitative decision rule and appears to conclude that a quantitative decision-theoretic statement of PP is both impossible and unnecessary. In (...) this article, we propose a decision-theoretic formulation of PP in terms of lexical utilities. We show that this lexical model is largely faithful to Steel’s approach, but also that it corrects three problems with Steel’s account and clarifies the relationship between PP and standard decision theory. Using a range of examples, we illustrate how the lexical model can be used to explore a variety of issues related to precautionary reasoning. (shrink)

Berkeley’s likeness principle states that only an idea can be like an idea. In this paper, I argue that the principle should be read as a premise only in a metaphysical argument showing that matter cannot instantiate anything like the sensory properties we perceive. It goes against those interpretations that take it to serve also, if not primarily, an epistemological purpose, featuring in Berkeley’s alleged Representation Argument to the effect that we cannot reach beyond the veil of our ideas. First, (...) in section 1, I raise some concerns about the traditional narrative concerning the likeness principle’s role in Berkeley’s argumentation. In section 2, I delineate an alternative narrative, arguing that there is no ‘missing premise’ in his alleged Representation Argument we need to explain simply because he advances no argument like that in the first place. In section 3–4, I provide a close reading of the relevant passages—first from the _Principles_, then the _Dialogues_—and their contexts, supporting textually a purely metaphysical interpretation of the likeness principle arguments. In section 5, I address some possible objections, based on the phrasing of the likeness principle passages and some related texts. (shrink)