A sketch is given of a way of looking at science. Research is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes with theoretical and experimental sides. A distinction is made between context of discovery and context of presentation. In the latter "paragons of science" come into play. From this platform the "theory of research" of Christian Huygens is examined, in its contemporary situation between Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, and in connection with Galileo's outlook on method. Huygens' attitude on (...) legitimating the results of his research production is also examined. The paper employs a method of case study, which is also discussed. (shrink)

I address a question recently raised by Simon Saunders concerning the relationship between the space-time structure of Newton-Cartan theory and that of what I will call “Maxwell-Huygens space-time.” This discussion will also clarify a connection between Saunders’s work and a recent paper by Eleanor Knox.

I explain and assess here Huygens’ concept of relative motion. I show that it allows him to ground most of the Law of Inertia, and also to explain rotation. Thereby his concept obviates the need for Newton’s absolute space. Thus his account is a powerful foundation for mechanics, though not without some tension.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000) 415-432 [Access article in PDF] Christiaan Huygens's Attitude toward Animals Nathaniel Wolloch The debate on the status of animals has interested people since ancient times. In the early modern era this debate reached one of its most historically important and sedulous stages, drawing the attention of some of the most famous minds in Europe. Curiously enough, the historiography of this (...) debate has failed to take cognizance of the part played in it by the famous Dutch scientist Christiaan Huygens (1629-95), renowned for his invention of the pendulum clock, founding of the wave theory of light, and discovery of the true shape of the rings of Saturn, to name only a few of his prolific and varied activities. 1 While Huygens's contribution does not occupy a historically central part in this debate, which did not usually directly engross his attention, it is possible, based on some of his writings and activities, to piece together a picture of his general attitude toward animals. Such a study, as presented here, reveals more than anecdotal importance, since it both entails and affords an enlightening discussion of the connection between philosophy, science, and the treatment of animals, a discussion, moreover, which is relevant to the understanding not only of the early modern debate on animals, but also to the current debate of this issue. [End Page 415]One of the most prevalent features of the development of the attitude toward animals has been the recurrence of anthropocentric arguments. Such arguments were exhibited both by theriophiles (lovers of animals) and anti-theriophiles. 2 A significant instance of this is the recurring argument that harming animals is not bad in itself but rather because it might lead to the harming or corruption of human beings. While such an approach in effect states that those who are kind to animals would also be kind to human beings, it also implies that cruelty toward animals is excusable if committed to advance good causes, such as science and medicine. 3 Such anthropocentric views ultimately derive from both classical culture and philosophy, and especially the notion, rooted in biblical cosmology, according to which all of nature was given to man for his use by God, i.e., man was given the stewardship of nature. 4Theriophilic views which tend to regard animals as sentient beings in their own right became relatively common in early modern times. The most influential of these theriophiles was Michel de Montaigne, known for his love and praise [End Page 416] of animals, 5 and among the many theriophiles influenced by his views one of the most important was his disciple Pierre Charron. 6However, the most influential early modern view of animals, which became the main reference-point for the debate on animals, was anti-theriophilic. This was the Cartesian theory of the "beast-machine," which viewed animals as mere automata, devoid of an immortal soul as possessed by human beings; they were regarded as devoid of mind, and their behavior was compared to that of a clock. Descartes himself seems to have been rather agnostic regarding this issue. He did not deny animals some capacity for feeling but claimed that it was more probable they were senseless automata than beings with souls like human beings. 7 However, while many theriophiles attacked the beast-machine theory, its anti-theriophilic implications were developed and radicalized by various seventeenth-century Cartesians beyond what Descartes himself probably intended. The most prominent example of this was the leading Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche. The French intellectual Bernard Le Bovier, sieur de Fontenelle, related how he saw Malebranche, a generally kind man, kick a pregnant bitch, and when confronted with his (Fontenelle's) alarm, regarded this act as inconsequential, claiming that she did not feel a thing. 8 As cruel as the beast-machine [End Page 417] theory may seem, however, one should remember that it tried to explain away the suffering of animals. It implied that had such suffering been proven to exist, it would have required moral consideration. The views of Spinoza... (shrink)

I will present evidence that nature does not optimize in the sense of Fermat's principle of least time, contrary to what Schoemaker's unintentionally ambiguous exposition might suggest. First, Huygens' principle, an alternative nonteleological account of Snell's law, is outlined. Second, I confront Fermat's principle with a substantive conceptual problem.

Článek se zabývá vybranými aspekty dvou známých publikací o mnohosti světů a mimozemském životě, které vyšly na konci 17. století. Jedná se o Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes Bernarda de Fontenelle a Cosmotheoros Christiaana Huygense. V první části se článek soustředí především na to, jak oba autoři chápou postavení člověka v obydleném a neohraničeném univerzu. Fontenelle a Huygens poskytují ve svých textech přesvědčivé vyvrácení často opakované představy, že idea neohraničeného vesmíru probouzela v novověkých lidech hrůzu a obavy. Ve (...) skutečnosti pro ně neohraničený vesmír znamenal oslavu rozumu, který se dokáže vymanit z geocentrické pověry a antropocentrismu. Současně se v protoosvícenském duchu jednalo i o oslavu vesmírné všudypřítomnosti rozumu. Ve druhé části se článek zabývá tzv. kognitivními vášněmi: zejména strachem, úžasem a zvědavostí. Analýza děl Huygense a Fontenella potvrzuje některé poznatky Lorraine Dastonové a prohlubuje je. Ukazuje se, že na konci 17. století strach i obdiv byly již jednoznačně chápány jako projev nevědomosti a zaostalosti, ačkoliv dříve byly spojovány se zbožností a počátkem filosofování. Proti tomu dříve odsuzovaná zvědavost se stala legitimní, ba dokonce žádoucí vlastností opravdového badatele. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper deals with the book Cosmotheoros, in which Christiaan Huygens presented his concept of a universe made up of many inhabited planets. Recent interpreters of this work have focused especially on cosmological issues presented in the book. Cosmotheoros, however, comprises also various philosophical ideas. In this paper I want to focus on the concept contemplator coeli – stargazer. The stargazer was the embodiment of the philosophical ideal of the contemplative way of life that appeared in classical philosophy and (...) astronomy. I want to argue that Huygens followed on from the idea of the stargazer and used it in his hypothetical construction of extra-terrestrial life. At the same time, however, he altered this idea in such a way that it corresponded better to the ideals of science at the end of the seventeenth century. In Huygens’ concept, the noble contemplator coeli turned into the modern scientist who works with other scientists on the advancement of mankind’s knowledge of nature. Huygens’ stargazers are a good example of how strikingly the basic assumptions of knowledge of nature in the early modern period changed with regard to classical antiquity. (shrink)

In 1665, in a response to a question posed by Robert Boyle, Spinoza gave a definition of the coherence between bodies in the universe that seems to be inconsistent both with what he had written in a previous letter to Boyle (1661) and with what he would later write in his main work, the Ethics (1677). Specifically, Spinoza’s 1665 letter to Boyle asserts that bodies can adapt themselves to another body in a non-mechanistic way and absent the agency of an (...) external cause. This letter – Letter 32 – seems, therefore, to be in clear contradiction with the metaphysical determinism that is an important and characteristic element of his philosophy. This article suggests that the viewpoint expressed by Spinoza in Letter 32 may have been inspired by a spectacular discovery made by Christiaan Huygens a few months prior, namely, the self-synchronization of pendulum clocks. As I argue in this article, this new, hypothesized link to Huygens’ pendulum experiments may account for Spinoza’s otherwise paradoxical answer to Boyle in Letter 32. (shrink)

In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo's and Huygens's demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens re-styled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.

In 1662 Christiaan Huygens carried out the famous Torricelli experiment to test the existence of atmospheric pressure by inserting the apparatus in the glass receiver of a vacuum pump, and evacuating the air inside it. He reported that when the air was exhausted, a column of water remained suspended in a 4-foot tube. This unexpected result was in stark contrast with earlier experiments of Boyle and Hooke that apparently had confirmed Torricelli’s explanation that such a water column was supported (...) by outside air pressure, and would fall when the air was removed. Huygen’s “anomalous suspension” led to the continuation of controversies in the seventeenth century about the nature of the vacuum that these experiments were expected to resolve. Surprisingly, the origin of Huygens’ unexpected result has remained a puzzle up to the present time. In this paper, I discuss the dynamics of such a column of water under the experimental conditions reported by Boyle and by Huygens, that turned out to be different, and present the results of a replication of their experiments with a modern vacuum pump. Contrary to the conventional explanations of these experiments, I demonstrate that in the Boyle–Hooke version of this experiment, the water column descends initially because it is forced down by the gas pressure due to air dissolved in the water which is released inside the Torricelli tube after the external pressure is sufficiently decreased. Huygens, however, first removed this trapped air before he carried out his experiment. In the absence of this internal gas pressure, the early rudimentary vacuum pumps were inadequate to decrease the air pressure sufficiently inside the receiver to demonstrate the descent of a Torricelli column of airless water 4-foot in height or less. (shrink)

I provide an alternative characterization of a "standard of rotation" in the context of classical spacetime structure that does not refer to any covariant derivative operator.

In 1672, inspired by the wave theory of Ignace Gaston Pardies, Christiaan Huygens made his first attempt to explain the sine law of refraction, but in 1673 he abandoned his plans owing to difficulties concerning double refraction. Huygens was able to explain double refraction on 6 August 1677 after his discoveries of the axis of symmetry of the crystal and of ‘Huygens's principle’. On 6 August 1679, he wrote: ‘I have found the confirmation of my theory of (...) light and of refraction’, and then described an ‘experimentum crucis’ to decide between his theory and a rival hypothesis. A study of caustics may have led Huygens to the discovery of ‘Huygens's principle’. (shrink)

The collapse of the Soviet Union created unprecedented dilemmas for the leaders of the new independent Russia. Shedding the communist past, Boris Yeltsin embarked on an ambitious program to reorganize Russia‟s political and economic systems. Known as „shock therapy,‟ Yeltsin advocated a rapid transition from state planning to a market economy while simultaneously introducing democracy to Russia. Expecting a short period of hardship as economic reforms opened Russia to world markets, followed by prolonged growth and prosperity, Yeltsin‟s societal upheaval left (...) Russia a prostrate state, mired in a depression that left many longing for a return to socialism. (shrink)

Summary The paper follows the lives of Mateu Orfila and François Magendie in early nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on their common interest in poisons. The first part deals with the striking similarities of their early careers: their medical training, their popular private lectures, and their first publications. The next section explores their experimental work on poisons by analyzing their views on physical and vital forces in living organisms and their ideas about the significance of animal experiments in medicine. The last part (...) describes their contrasting research on the absorption of poisons and the divergences in their approaches, methods, aims, standards of proof, and intended audiences. The analysis highlights the connections between nineteenth-century courtrooms and experimental laboratories, and shows how forensic practice not only prompted animal experimentation but also provided a substantial body of information and new research methods for dealing with major theoretical issues like the absorption of poisons. (shrink)

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of the content of perceptions, natural science. I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows (...) in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification. (shrink)

The article investigates the relationship between Leibniz’s and Huygens’ theory of possibility and the principle of conservation of energy. It assumes that their criticisms of Cartesian views concerning those questions as well as their own achievements contributed to the formation of a new metaphysical basis for modern discussions on the freedom of the will. There are especially two problems whose role is crucial in this context, namely the question of God’s knowledge of future conditionals (contingentia futura) and the mind-body (...) distinction. (shrink)

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by Habermas (...) in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

James I. The Political Works of James I. Reprinted from the Edition of 1616. With an Introduction by Charles Howard McIlwain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. cxi, 354 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.