Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of (...) belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is shaping strategy, activities, interactions, and relationships in business and specifically in marketing. The drawback of the substantial opportunities AI systems and applications provide in marketing are ethical controversies. Building on the literature on AI ethics, the authors systematically scrutinize the ethical challenges of deploying AI in marketing from a multi-stakeholder perspective. By revealing interdependencies and tensions between ethical principles, the authors shed light on the applicability of a purely principled, deontological approach to AI ethics in marketing. To (...) reconcile some of these tensions and account for the AI-for-social-good perspective, the authors make suggestions of how AI in marketing can be leveraged to promote societal and environmental well-being. (shrink)

Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...) it. Uniquely, the brain records its own history, synthesizing a Movie-in-the-Brain, called the Noumenal Cosmos. Attempting thereby to represent the actual Universe, this makes for a sovereign brain that governs itself. The brain is domicile of an Ego, with its selfhood at stake at all times. Yet, it can know itself only by its actions, in which it appears as an actor in its own movie. Phenomena enter garbled, as confused apparitions, and must be put in good form using top–down feedback control by Ego, so that each movie frame makes rational sense within the overall context of the Noumenal Cosmos. A stack of frames is processed typically in 40 Hz rhythm with 300 ms process time each, for about 12 in the stack at any time. Successive neural centers are processing the stack in the brain assembly line, based on data from increasingly global receptive fields. Ego stitches together the movie frames, but only the top frame is in consciousness for 25 ms. The top frame contains the whole scene where the Ego makes an appearance as the actor that imposes Kantian synthetic unity on the scene, merely an assembly of grammatical texts, in a system-internal coded process language, fitting the scene into the Noumenal Cosmos. But Ego observes Ego only to the extent permitted by the objectivity rule, only what it does and thinks, not its true face. From the Noumenal Cosmos, the Ego receives grammatical messages in the internal sense code. They are integrated into a whole in the reaction of the Ego to the momentary scene. The voluntary nature of Ego’s decisions is explained, based on its ability to code in advance its own actions sequentially in time, as it sees fit with a view to an orderly Noumenal Cosmos, records of code being arranged spatially in neural structures. (shrink)

The present article is devoted to the second part of chapter 10 of Aristotle’s De interpretatione (20 a 16-40), which mainly deals with the logical relations between statements whose predicate is finite (i. e., of the affirmative form “is P”) and statements whose predicate is infinite (i. e., of the negative form “is not-P”). I attempt to show that this part of the chapter contains both a section the text of which is corrupt (20 a 20-23) and a section which (...) is misplaced (20 a 37-40). In the former section the likely false reading of the manuscripts τῇ δὲ … ἡ ἀντι- κειμένη ὅτι … (“while from ‘…’ the opposite [statement follows] that …”) should be corrected into ἡ δὲ … τῇ ἀντικειμένῃ ὅτι … (“while ‘…’ [follows] from the opposite [statement] that …”), and the latter section should be placed immediately after the former, with which it is intimately connected. (shrink)

A patient’s decision-making capacity or competence is among the prerequisites for valid consent to medical treatment, and is regarded as the gatekeeping element in ensuring respect for patients’ self-determination. The issue is especially relevant in the case of vulnerable persons, such as patients who are cognitively or mentally impaired, and where medical decisions carry far-reaching consequences. As a grounding principle, DMC is a priori assumed, and challenged only when substantial doubts arise owing to observed or assumed deficiencies of the capacities (...) commonly considered relevant for competent decision making ; in this sense, the onus is on... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

In dem von Aristoteles zur Bezeichnung dessen, was wir einen Aussage- oder Behauptungssatz nennen, gewählten Ausdruck logos apophantikos hat das Wort logos eine Bedeutung, die weiter ist als die Bedeutung des deutschen Wortes ›Satz‹. Der Definition zufolge, die Aristoteles in De interpretatione 4 aufstellt, ist ein logos nämlich »eine etwas bedeutende stimmliche Äußerung, von deren Teilen einer eigenständig etwas bedeutet, und zwar als ein Ausdruck, der etwas sagt, nicht als einer, der etwas aussagt «. Unter den in dieser Weise definierten (...) Begriff des logos fallen außer Sätzen einerseits auch Wortgruppen von der Art des Ausdrucks »schönes Pferd« oder des den Begriff des Menschen definierenden Ausdrucks »zweifüßiges Land-Lebewesen« und andererseits auch ganze Texte, wie z. B. die Ilias. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of how the claim that nothing impossible follows from what is possible, which serves as the second premise of Diodorus' Master Argument, should be properly understood. In the first part I attempt to show that the interpretation of the thesis in the form of the following implication as suggested by R. Gaskin is not tenable: "If A and non-A follows from {A} plus the set Sigma, then not possible A follows from Sigma alone" In (...) the second part I discuss a reconstruction of the Master Argument which adopts A. N. Prior's interpretation of the said thesis in form of the modal-logical theorem "If it is necessary that , then " but modifies Prior's suggested reconstruction in a way which should make it more plausible. (shrink)

In this paper I shall attempt to show that the difference which Boethius has in mind when distinguishing between conditional and simple necessity in the fifth book of Philosophiae Consolatio is not, as already Thomas Aquinas presumed, the difference between a necessitas consequentiae and the corresponding necessitas consequentis, but rather the difference between the necessity of a given state of affairs which is necessary in the sense that at the moment of its existence its present existence is unchangeable, and the (...) necessity of a given state of affairs which is necessary in the sense that even prior to the moment of its existence its future existence is unavoidable. (shrink)

Presentación de la constitución de un Centro de investigación sobre el pensamiento de Giambattista Vico . Informaciones. Fe de erratas vol. 7/8.